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PERILOUS ONSET: THE DECLINE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL 
______________________________________________________________________ 
“Arms control has to have a future, or none of us does.” 





Conventional arms control and associated confidence- and security-building 
measures (CSBM) have had a profoundly positive effect upon contemporary European, 
Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security through the massive reductions and extensive 
limitations they have attained in conventional military armaments, equipment, personnel 
and activities.  These reductions and limitations have been realised through the 
successful implementation of multilateral regulating regimes, which has been predicated 
upon the conformism required to ensure their fundamental viability. 
While the concept of conventional arms control has remained essentially sound, 
the principal regimes -- the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the 
Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, and the Treaty on 
Open Skies -- have become increasingly impeded and degraded by widespread non-
fulfilment of their binding provisions.  With mitigating efforts focused largely upon 
modalities rather than practical oversight and execution, these regimes have continued 
to degrade, placing international security at ever-increasing risk.   
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 This thesis contends that, while clearly affected by inexorable geopolitical and 
geostrategic factors, the decline of conventional arms control regimes can be further 
attributed to functional breakdowns in their elemental operating constructs.  This 
contention has been validated through a contextual examination of the concept, model 
and evolution of conventional arms control and CSBM, together with empirical case 
study analysis of the three regimes, in response to the following questions: 
• Why has there been a decline in conventional arms control?  
• What are the implications?  
• What are the prospects of rehabilitation and revival?  
 The thesis concludes that efforts to restore conventional arms control must 
necessarily include those specifically aimed at rectifying regime model dysfunction.  
This begins with the re-establishment of the fundamental oversight required to surmount 
operative disaccord and apathy, thereby ensuring greater uniformity in fulfilling extant 
normative provisions.  This may, in turn, provide a more viable operating basis upon 
which to enable recovery and improvement.  
 
 






 Over the past 20 years, the steady degradation of conventional arms control and 
associated confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) has posed an 
increasingly serious threat to European, Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic peace, security and 
stability. 1  Regional conflict, territorial annexation and widespread destabilisation -- 
largely coincident with the post-Soviet Union security dynamic -- have directly 
corresponded with a significant deterioration in the standards of conduct, cooperation 
and interstate relations formally established under the treaties and accords that address 
conventional arms control and CSBM: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe,2 the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures,3 and 
the Treaty on Open Skies.4  This, in turn, has seriously undermined the established 
limits and oversight of conventional armaments and equipment, military force levels 
and activities originally attained under these regimes.  This thesis provides an in-depth 
analysis of the decline of conventional arms control and CSBM that specifically relates 
to the operative breakdown of these regimes, the implications of this failure and the 
prospects of recovery.  
                                                
1Arms control generally refers to limitations or other constraints imposed upon the quantities and types of 
specified weapons, equipment systems and personnel, as agreed by parties to a given regime.  It differs 
somewhat from disarmament, which concerns the reduction, abolishment or prohibition of weapons.  A 
key adjunct of conventional arms control, CSBM are designed to establish trust and enhance security 
through military transparency, thereby serving to raise the threshold of armed conflict.  All relate to 
proliferation security, which more broadly entails the prevention, control, safeguarding or mitigation of 
effects associated with the development, production, possession, utilization and distribution of various 
munitions and related equipment systems. 
2 Commonly known as the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. 
3 Commonly known as the Vienna Document. 
4 Commonly known as the Open Skies Treaty. 
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 The advent and progression of arms control and disarmament have had an 
undoubtedly positive impact upon international peace and stability in the modern era.  
Although their origins date back to antiquity and their evolution has closely paralleled 
that of organised warfare itself, the widespread international cooperation denoted by 
contemporary arms control regimes is largely a 20th Century development.  Indeed, 
between the end of the Second World War and 1982, no fewer than 20 strategic-level 
arms control agreements were concluded, primarily involving nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapon arsenals, along with development and testing.5   Major advancements 
in security cooperation continued with the introduction of increasingly diverse 
mechanisms and expanded jurisdictions designed to control a broadened range of 
armaments, warfare and associated technologies.  Of these, the CFE Treaty, the Vienna 
Document and the Open Skies Treaty represent truly epic achievements in dramatically 
reducing conventional armament stockpiles, limiting force levels and constraining 
certain military activities.  As noted by Nobuyasu Abe, former United Nations Under-
Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, much of this latter progress could be 
attributed to “the general improvement of international relations after the end of the 
Cold War.”6   
The remarkable headway realised in conventional arms control in particular 
provided ample reason for optimism.  As noted by international law scholar 
Mark W. Janis, the years immediately following the end of the Cold War were 
characterized by widespread support for the international legal regime, along with the 
increasing willingness of states to exercise greater restraint and work collectively 
                                                
5 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law. Fourth Edition (New York: Aspen Publishers, 
2003), 176-177. 
6 Nobuyasu Abe, “The Future of Arms Control and Disarmament is Seriously Threatened,” Disarmament 
Documentation (2003) [Journal-on-line]; available from http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0308/doc11.htm; 
Internet; accessed 5 February 2011, 1. 
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towards a more comprehensive and dynamic framework of arms control and 
disarmament.7  The resultant “blend” of arms control, disarmament, CSBM and 
associated cooperative mechanisms led to unprecedented reductions in conventional 
weapons inventories.  Under the CFE Treaty alone, nearly 70,000 specified and 
voluntary conventional weapon and equipment systems were reduced over the course of 
its implementation from 1992 to 2008.8  These mechanisms also significantly limited 
proliferation (including “black” and “grey” market arms trade and trafficking), while 
more effectively enabling states to collectively face common threats posed by “non-
deterrable” actors.9  
 Nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have generally 
overshadowed their conventional counterparts in terms of their higher precedence 
within the broader proliferation security spectrum.  Nevertheless, the significance of 
conventional arms proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, cannot be overstated, 
particularly with respect to the predominance of major conventional weapon systems as 
integral components of established offensive and defensive military strategies, including 
those serving as “strategic precursors” to WMD.  Accordingly, conventional arms 
control has proven critically important -- not only in terms of its immediate effects, but 
also its corresponding impact upon all facets of security.  
 The global impact of contemporary conventional weapons is inestimable.  
Although not classified as WMD, modern conventional armaments have been far more 
                                                
7 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 176. 
8 Arms Control Association, “The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and the Adapted 
CFE Treaty at a Glance,” Fact Sheets and Briefs (August 2012) [journal-on-line]; available from 
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe; Internet; accessed 22 August 2014, n.p. 
9 Lynne E. Davis, “Arms Control, Export Regimes and Multilateral Cooperation,” in Strategic Appraisal: The 
Changing Role of Information in Warfare, ed. Zalmay Khalilzad and John White (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999), 
361. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      11 
widely and commonly employed (i.e., by both state and non-state actors), have caused 
greater death and destruction, and have evolved, transmuted and proliferated at rates 
eclipsing those associated with any other type of weapon.  While this is largely self-
evident, their significance is further attested by the extraordinary technological 
advancements made in major conventional weapon and equipment systems, such as 
heavy artillery, tanks, aircraft and missiles, along with extended range, precision 
guided, high yield munitions and targeting systems.  Corresponding military force 
structure and doctrinal changes have paralleled these advancements, resulting in 
innovations such as network centric warfare, rapid reaction airmobile forces, brigade 
combat teams and global strategic mobility.  
 While widely acknowledged and accepted, the predominance, universality and 
pervasiveness of conventional weapons were particularly well elucidated in a 2010 
statement by Belgian Ambassador Jean Lint, on behalf of the European Union, to the 
First Committee - Conventional Weapons - of the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly.  Calling for a “strong and robust” treaty on trade in arms, Lint underscored 
the prevailing and expanding global threat posed by conventional weapons.  In addition 
to inestimable death, destruction and the constant threat to security, he also noted more 
insidious, asymmetric perils, including violations of international law, destabilisation of 
states and regions, and impediments to political, economic and social development.10  
Australian Ambassador for Disarmament, Peter Woolcott, echoed Lint’s 
characterization in 2013: 
                                                
10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statement by Ambassador Jean Lint on Behalf of the European Union at 
the First Committee – Conventional Weapons – 65th Session of the United Nations General Assembly 
(New York: Delegation of the Kingdom of Belgium to the United Nations, 2010), n.p. 
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  More than any other category of weapon, conventional arms kill, maim and 
bring unspeakable suffering to millions around the world every year.  The 
unchecked availability and misuse of these weapons and their ammunition fuel 
conflict and instability, threaten lives and livelihoods, and result in widespread 
violations of humanitarian law.  These weapons are, without doubt, the world’s 
biggest killers.11 
 The enduring threat posed by contemporary conventional armaments and 
equipment has been duly reflected in the nature of the arms control agreements, 
conventions and arrangements that have been established.  Of these, some have sought 
total disarmament through territorial demilitarisation (e.g., the 1959 Antarctic Treaty) or 
the outright elimination of entire classes of weapons (e.g., the 1997 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines 
and on their Destruction and the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions).  Others were 
conceived to establish common export policies and regulate trade on conventional 
armaments and associated technologies (e.g., 1996 Wassenaar Arrangement and the 
2013 Arms Trade Treaty).  Emergent frameworks include the 2001 UN Programme of 
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons (SALW) in All Its Aspects, which is focused upon weapons ranging from 
handguns and assault rifles, to light-crewed portable and vehicle-mounted guns, 
mortars, missiles and other ordnance.   
 Of these varied mechanisms, the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and the 
Open Skies Treaty have come to be widely regarded as the definitive conventional arms 
                                                
11 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, UNGA68 First Committee: Thematic Statement on 
Conventional Weapons. Statement by Ambassador Peter Woolcott, Australian Permanent Representative 
to the United Nations, Geneva and Ambassador for Disarmament  (New York: Australian Permanent 
Delegation to the United Nations, 2013), 1. 
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control regimes.  Indeed, the CFE Treaty has been broadly recognized as having truly 
historic significance in both concept and achievement, as noted by Richard A. 
Falkenrath: 
To a large extent, the CFE Treaty now defines what we mean by the term 
“conventional arms control” – the negotiation of strict quantitative limits on 
conventional military equipment, codified in a legally-binding treaty, and 
backed up by an array of transparency-inducing and verification measures –   
and CFE provides the standard against which all future conventional arms 
control endeavors will be judged.12 
  It is entirely appropriate that the three principal regimes are largely centred upon 
Europe, a continent beset by conflict throughout its political existence and which has 
historically possessed the world’s largest concentration of conventional forces and 
armaments.  Comprising 50 states, more than 730 million people and a third of the 
world’s wealth, Europe figures prominently because of its economic importance and 
political power (as exemplified by the 28-member European Union), which brings with 
it the attendant responsibility to shoulder its due share of the global security burden -- 
both within its own space and throughout the world.  
 While its fundamental principles have arguably remained sound, the past 20 
years have witnessed increasing impediments placed upon conventional arms control, 
both as an applied concept and as an effectual instrument of multilateral security and 
stability.  While clearly a function of a rapidly fluctuating and increasingly complex 
security environment, the present state of affairs can also be specifically linked to 
significant breakdowns within the principal regimes’ own operating models.  Once a 
                                                
12 Richard A. Falkenrath, Shaping Europe’s Military Order.  The Origins and Consequences of the CFE 
Treaty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), 242-243. 
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key component of international foreign policy consensus, conventional arms control has 
become a highly contentious element of security cooperation.  Indeed, the Russian 
Federation’s highly controversial self-imposed suspension of CFE Treaty compliance in 
December 2007, along with its 2014 de facto annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea represent defining moments in what has proven to be the steady and 
prolonged degradation and decline of conventional arms control and CSBM.  
 An overall lack of understanding and awareness of the oversight and 
management of conventional arms control and CSBM regimes has led to a commonly 
held view that noted deficiencies are the result of their having “lapsed” in terms of 
practical utility.  That is, having largely served their intended purpose, these instruments 
have simply fallen victim to their own success.  As noted by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute: 
 Arms control had already suffered a relative demotion soon after the end of the 
 cold war in the light of massive agreed and voluntary defence reductions and the 
 plethora of other security arrangements, mechanisms and institutions that 
 effectively helped enhance the sense of security on the continent….13  
  In his appraisal of European security, Wolfgang Zellner observed that neglect by 
political leaders in light of more urgent crises and concerns have contributed to “the 
stagnation of European security policy issues,” themselves strongly influenced by 
conventional arms control and CSBM regimes.  While acknowledging that more 
immediate security dilemmas, such as those in the Middle East, Africa and North Korea 
had frequently supplanted European imperatives, Zellner nevertheless asserted that, “the 
                                                
13 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The Relevance of Conventional Arms Control in 
Europe.” (3 February 2006) SIPRI 2004-2009 Archive [journal-on-line]; available from: 
http://archives.sipri.org/search?Searchable Text=relevance; Internet; accessed 7 April 2013. 
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latter’s continued neglect can have and has had dire consequences.”14  His point has 
been well demonstrated by Europe’s increasingly destabilised security framework, as 
evidenced by the on-going conflict in eastern Ukraine and corresponding responses by 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European states to Russian 
aggression.15  
  While the obsolescence of conventional arms control as an applied concept has 
been frequently cited amongst the main causes of its decline, it can be argued that the 
disparagement of the fundamental integrity and utility of the principal regimes can, in 
many respects, be similarly applied to the international system writ large, including its 
corresponding legal apparatus and security structures.  This is particularly relevant in 
terms of states’ compliance and conformity with binding multilateral frameworks as 
elemental functions and measures of consensus-based cooperation in general.  After all, 
any form of international cooperation, regardless of provisions, remains largely 
contingent upon states’ willingness to subject themselves to some “pattern of obedience 
and predictable behaviour,” in keeping with the principle of pacta sunt servanda: the 
customary norm of states to commonly adhere to agreements.16  This principle is 
universally undermined by non-compliance and non-conformity.  As Heath Pickering 
argues, conflict represents the logical outcome of sustained non-compliance; that is, 
“conflict only arises when countries fail to comply.”17 
                                                
14 Wolfgang Zellner, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Is there a Last Chance?” Arms Control  
Today (March 2012) [journal-on-line]; available from www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_03/Conventional_ 
Arms_Control _in_Europe_Is_There_ a_Last_Chance#4March 2012; Internet; accessed 18 April 2012, n.p. 
15 France 24, “NATO: Russian ‘aggression’ in Ukraine must be countered,” France 24, 24 June 2015 
[journal on-line]; available from http://www.france24.com/en/20150624-nato-russian-aggression-ukraine-
must-be-countered; Internet; accessed 10 August 2015, n.p. 
16 Mark W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law, 11. 
17 Heath Pickering,  “Why Do States Mostly Obey International Law?” E-International Relations Students 
(May 2013) [journal on-line]; available from http://www.e-ir.info/2014/02/04/ why-do-states-mostly-obey 
international-law/; Internet; accessed 19 February 2014, n.p. 
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  The cumulatively positive effects of conventional arms control and disarmament 
regimes began to rapidly diminish after 2000.  While some experts have suggested that 
the shift in the international security paradigm following the 11 September 2001 
terrorist attacks in the United States constituted a key inducement of this change, it is 
more commonly acknowledged that the overall effectiveness of international arms 
control regimes had essentially reached “critical mass” as early as 1999.  According to 
Nobuyasu Abe, growing impediments to arms control have paralleled the evolutions of 
an international security environment characterised by countless political setbacks, 
widespread non-conformity with established provisions, breaches of legally- and 
politically- binding commitments, growing unilateral action and significant increases in 
terrorist and other non-state actor activities.  All of these developments have served to 
seriously undermine the fundamental integrity of the principal regimes.18  
 
So how did we really get here?  This thesis seeks to answer this question through 
the examination of the three “core” conventional arms control and CSBM mechanisms: 
the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and the Treaty Open Skies.  Before laying out its 
methodology and approach, it is first necessary to identify where the thesis fits into the 
existing literature in the field.   
Literature Review 
  Studies on conventional arms control are, to say the least, extensive.  Indeed, a 
substantial body of work exists, ranging from the raw data contained in operational-
level reports and returns, to the highest levels of academic, technical and scientific 
                                                
18 Nobuyasu Abe, “The Future of Arms Control and Disarmament is Seriously Threatened,” 1-2. 
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analysis.  Clearly, research undertaken over the past 30 years complements an extensive 
range of work on proliferation security that includes nuclear, chemical and biological 
fields.  While many studies are historical in nature, others are highly conceptual or 
analytical in their orientation, particularly within the sphere of foreign and international 
security policy.  Technical and scientific research is frequently oriented towards more 
indicative aspects of conventional arms control.  In all, subject-related literature is 
decidedly diverse and includes the development of applied theories, practices and 
techniques; assessment of social and environmental impacts; monitoring and statistical 
accrual; and the formulation of highly specialised technologies and methods, such as 
mathematical modelling.  Indeed, the resources applied to theoretical and applied 
research on conventional arms control by government and non-government research 
centres, think tanks and independent sources are considerable.  There are also more 
plebeian studies dedicated to public education, awareness and outreach on arms control 
and non-proliferation, including exchanges of information on all aspects of associated 
policies, methodologies and technology.   
 Within this wide range of research and study, some efforts are suitably 
concerned with regime concepts, policies, structures, technical properties and other 
explicit facets.  They may also involve an assessment of regime characteristics and 
performance in fulfilling their intended purpose, or how they correspond with other 
competing requirements.  Other studies are more exclusive, including those focused 
upon regimes’ relationships with particular security issues.  These might include 
conventional arms trade and trafficking, technological advancements, or regulatory 
modifications.  A contextual foundation is frequently employed, such as state 
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sovereignty, collective security or the protection of individuals.  In other instances, an 
assay of regimes against various established international relations theories is utilised.19 
 At this juncture, it is important to emphasize that it is not the author’s intent to 
deprecate the vast body of research undertaken on conventional arms control, but rather 
to denote individual and collective paucities in the interpretation and analyses of the 
root causes of its decline.  Nevertheless, taking the argument that breakdowns in the 
essential mechanics of the principal regimes (i.e., their fundamental oversight and 
implementation) have been largely overlooked, it is useful to note the renowned 
American strategist Bernard Brodie’s somewhat stern appraisal of arms control studies.  
Brodie, a leading architect of early nuclear deterrence strategy, was fervent in his 
assertion that, “the volume of literature on arms control contrasts sharply with the 
dearth of results in actual armaments limitation or control.”20  Furthermore, he noted 
that disproportionality between the advice provided and practical outcomes were 
indicative of the “character of that advice and the magnitude of the practical difficulties 
– and especially about the failure of the former to adjust to the latter.”21  Finally, in 
bemoaning the lack of utility of the vast majority of research undertaken in arms 
control, Brodie attributed this first and foremost to the “persistent failure to clarify and 
analyze objectives,” which precluded the “pragmatic approach” required: 
…we want our objectives to be mutually consistent, to be worth achieving and to 
be in some degree achievable – and that in turn entails a properly empirical 
utilization of our experience.22   
                                                
19 Oran Young, Governance in World Affairs, (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 1999), 4-6. 
20 Bernard Brodie, “On the Objectives of Arms Control,” International Security, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Summer 
1976): 17. 
21 Bernard Brodie, “On the Objectives of Arms Control:” 17. 
22 Ibid: 17. 
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Brodie’s views can therefore be regarded as somewhat analogous to this thesis, which 
employs empirical case studies to establish the critical relationship between regime 
model functionality and the overall diminution of conventional arms control. 
  Within an extensive range of arms control studies, the work of Jozef Goldblat 
clearly stands out.  A universally acknowledged expert who dedicated his life to the 
field of arms control and disarmament, Goldblat’s extensive knowledge provides a 
fundamental frame of reference for all facets of arms control research.  His definitive 
book, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, Second Edition,23 
is unparalleled as both an exhaustive historical account of arms control and 
disarmament, but also as an extensive reference and analytical resource, covering the 
full spectrum of proliferation security, including the principal treaties, conventions, 
agreements and associated arrangements.  Although it only indirectly addresses the 
principal concerns identified in this thesis, Goldblat’s accounts, assessments and 
perspectives nevertheless encompass associated operational, political and legal 
considerations and as such, provide a valuable overarching resource in exploring the 
trends and developments of the major conventional regimes.   
 
 In Strategy and Arms Control,24 Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin 
provide a detailed analysis in which they contend that arms control represents a de facto 
component of military strategy.  Their central argument is that the cooperative 
frameworks established by arms control regimes can complement or, in some instances, 
actually fulfil strategic military objectives.  In spite of this view, they de-emphasise the 
                                                
23 Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements. Second Edition 
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importance of one of arms control’s key facets -- verification -- in favour of the view 
that the mutual interest of parties is better supported by the persuasive demonstration of 
self-initiated compliance.  While this well-known work provides a number of highly 
relevant and useful observations and deductions, its effective dismissal of verification as 
an essential component of arms control is indicative of the selectivity and exclusiveness 
of works of this nature.  
 In The Nation’s Safety and Arms Control,25 Arthur T. Hadley fully 
acknowledges the utility of arms control.  Rather than discussing particulars concerning 
its applied concept or associated challenges, however, he largely refers to it as a 
somewhat indeterminate, subsequent application to the strategic stabilization that must 
be first achieved through balanced deterrence.  Acknowledging the inherent persistence 
of impervious “second strike” strategic nuclear weapons, Hadley advocates both the 
establishment and sustainment of controlled levels of these “stable” deterrent weapons 
and forces.  He also acknowledges, with caveats, the strategic requirement for and 
utility of conventional armaments employed below the nuclear threshold.  While 
generally consistent with the major precepts of arms control, Hadley’s 1961 appraisal 
provides only passing consideration of the challenges inherent with the establishment 
and implementation of corresponding mechanisms, thereby overlooking various critical 
linkages. 
 Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation26 warrants specific mention, 
given the relevance of its central precept of cooperation theory (derived from the 
“Prisoner’s Dilemma” theory of decision analysis) to the criticality of consensus and 
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conformity in the uniform fulfilment of obligations.  Axelrod’s definitive principles can 
be directly applied to the author’s assertions regarding the association between 
breakdowns in regime operating models with the overall decline of conventional arms 
control and CSBM.  Accordingly, Axelrod’s insights are further considered in the 
context of this study.  
 Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security,27 edited by Robert D. 
Blackwill and F. Stephen Larrabee in 1989, provides a useful compendium of expert 
contributions from which to base comparative assessments and trend analyses.  This 
work includes evaluations from leading political and diplomatic figures from both sides 
of the East-West negotiating table and provides excellent insights into the mainstream 
thinking that existed during the key phases leading up to the Helsinki Final Act, which 
established the framework for the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE).  While this book also provides a relevant frame of reference for subsequent 
military and political developments ranging from doctrine to verification, this is 
accomplished within a rather broad context.  
  Complementary to Blackwill’s and Larrabee’s work, Arms Control: Moral, 
Political and Historical Lessons,28 edited by Kenneth W. Thompson, provides a unique 
series of perspectives on arms control writ large, including views calling for a shift in 
the focus of regimes from their technical and scientific orientations, to those more social 
and moral in nature.  Useful lessons of history, as reflected in long-established strategic 
foreign and security strategies and policies, are also noted.  
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Sergey Koulik’s and Richard Koukoski’s Conventional Arms Control: 
Perspectives on Verification29 comprises focused examinations of specific political and 
operational issues facing the three principal regimes during their initial years of 
implementation, along with other considerations concerning respective (East-West) 
negotiating perspectives and underlying strategies.  The book also furnishes an 
interesting and useful comparative projection of future developments and 
considerations, taking into consideration “real world” developments, such as the Gulf 
War, and their impact upon the practical application of these regimes. 
In The Future of Arms Control,30 Michael Levi and Michael O’Hanlon observe 
that arms control, once a pillar of United States foreign policy, has rapidly fallen out of 
favour with policymakers at a time when it is needed more than ever.  They argue the 
need for both adapted forms of arms control and coercion -- including the use of 
military force -- as critical tools within an integrated strategy of counter-proliferation.  
In this heady work, the authors apply established precepts within the current 
international security construct, calling for better international approaches to address 
evolving and emerging technologies.  Levi and O’Hanlon further call for more focused 
effort in realigning priorities to counter the most imminent threats in nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapon capability, while also taking into account other areas of concern, 
including conventional weapons.  Fundamental conceptual aspects of arms control -- 
such as early warning -- are endorsed, along with the demand for a broader range of 
coercive actions in response to violations.  The authors also advocate the collective 
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involvement of like-minded democratic states in building synergies within the broader 
international security framework.  
In contrast, Arms Control and Cooperative Security,31 edited by 
Jeffery A. Larson and James J. Wirtz, provides a far-reaching collection of more recent 
expert studies that touch upon virtually every aspect of proliferation security.  They 
include critical reviews of established theories, historical background, changes within 
the global security dynamic and potential future applications and adaptations.  While 
much of this collection well-exceeds the scope of this thesis, specific chapters, such as 
K.M. Kartchner’s “The Evolving International Context,” M. Moodie’s “Regional 
Perspectives on Arms Control,” and R.E. Johnson’s “Arms Control, Universality, and 
International Norms” provide useful backgrounds and perspectives.  
In New Forms of War and Arms Control in the Middle East,32 Anthony H. 
Cordesman discusses the “unpleasant truths” and “iron laws” that have come to 
constrain arms control.  He further notes the “panacea” effect that many conventional 
arms control initiatives have produced, resulting in unrealistically high expectations 
and, ultimately, failure.  One of Cordesman’s key premises is that, despite the successes 
attained in reducing and limiting conventional weapons, the world has remained heavily 
armed and nations that wish to go to war would always be able to do so.  Furthermore, 
any form of arms control or disarmament will lead to the development of weapons 
exempt from controls, necessitating constant revisions to any given control regime.  
Finally, he asserts that verification and inspection protocols have never been sufficiently 
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reliable to ensure total compliance; that agreements are typically “most binding” on the 
“least threatening” states; and that overly complex protocols will invariably fail.  
Accordingly, in order for arms control mechanisms to succeed, it must be understood 
that “arms control works best when it creates a stable balance of war-fighting capability 
that minimizes the incentive to initiate and/or escalate a conflict.”  Moreover, the “threat 
of extended deterrence and punitive action” is necessary to support enforcement, which 
itself is encumbered by the complexities of establishing and maintaining the necessary 
international coalitions.33 
The wide range of relatively succinct, but no less relevant articles, critiques, 
commentaries and editorials generated by major international policy think tanks, expert 
groups, advisory boards and various other organisations, provide ample sources of 
comparative data and analysis for specific cross-referencing and validation purposes.  
James L. Foster’s “The Future of Conventional Arms Control”34 foresaw, in 1975, the 
challenges of adapting arms control within the context of reinforced nuclear parity and 
significantly enhanced conventional military capabilities.  From this, Foster suggested 
that advances in conventional weapons technology would translate into increased 
incentive for corresponding strategies that would call for larger conventional forces and 
corresponding recapitalisation.  Despite the overall significant reductions in 
conventional forces throughout Europe and Central Asia that have since ensued, the 
logic of Foster’s posit has been proven valid in a number of instances.  Consistent with 
many other experts, Foster emphasised the imperative of suitable arms control measures 
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to address the effects of advancing conventional weapon technologies, while also 
acknowledging the inherent complexities in achieving this.    
In “Frozen Obligations: Russia’s Suspension of the CFE Treaty as a Potential 
Violation of International Law,”35 Adam Collicelli furnishes a highly detailed, focused 
and convincing “single-purpose” legal assessment of Russia’s December 2007 
suspension of its binding implementation obligations under the Treaty.  Collicelli’s work 
provides a singularly distinct appraisal that validates the positions taken by several other 
States Parties that initially challenged Russia’s actions, but subsequently deferred these 
challenges in favour of more conciliatory courses intended to persuade Moscow to return 
a state of compliance and conformity.  Collicelli concludes that Russia’s actions were 
likely illegal under international treaty law, noting that additional factors have further 
compounded the situation.  This highly insightful legal review provides detailed and 
relevant particulars on critical aspects of the current state of the CFE Treaty that directly 
relate to key elements of this thesis. 
Other more recent and specifically targeted materials include Wolfgang 
Zellner’s article, “Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Is there a Last Chance?”36  In 
describing the realities of European security (in contrast with the mainstream views of 
the OSCE and NATO) Zellner delivers a pragmatic appraisal of the CFE Treaty, noting 
that the current stalemate in relations between NATO and the Russian Federation, along 
with other closely linked factors, are central to the regime’s progressive degradation.  
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Zellner concisely examines the requirement for conventional arms control and validates 
this with several caveats relating to weapons categorizations and jurisdictional 
applications.  He then outlines five elements required for conventional arms control to 
be “restarted.”  This includes an “entirely new conceptual approach” intended to bypass 
mainstream thinking relating to the CFE Treaty’s successor -- the 1999 Adapted CFE 
Treaty -- which, lacking ratification by most signatories, never entered-into-force.  
In “Arms Control, Export Regimes and Multilateral Cooperation,”37 Lynne 
E. Davis acknowledges “the important limits to what arms control has been able to 
accomplish,” further noting that newer weapon systems had escaped controls and that 
governments were increasingly resisting imposed limitations, despite the clear 
understanding that agreement to such limitations would reduce threats and prevent 
conflict.  Davis further acknowledges the emergence of “more diffuse” security threats 
following the end of the Cold War; including the complexity and widespread abundance 
of conventional weapons.  Noting that all nations consider conventional weapons 
essential for their own defence, Davis opines that specific threats will only develop 
under certain circumstances, such as when these weapons are acquired by rogue states 
or terrorist actors.  
Other similarly focused reports and articles include:  
• Assessing Compliance with Arms Control Treaties,38 produced by the 
Geneva Centre for Security Policy in 2007, in collaboration with the 
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French Centre d’etudes de sécurité international et de maitrise des 
armements.  This publication entails both a detailed study by experts, 
which assesses the current state of compliance, along with a report of an 
international seminar that includes contributions from several notable 
experts in the field, including Jozef Goldblat and Nobuyasu Abe; and 
• Prospects for Arms Control in Europe,39 a 2011 collaborative study by 
the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (University of 
Hamburg).  This work renders valuable insights into the existing Russia-
NATO strategic disparity, provides linkages between conventional and 
nuclear arms control, and examines specific mitigating approaches aimed 
at improving confidence- and security-building collaboration in key 
areas.  These include missile defence, updating controls to encompass 
newer conventional capabilities and eliminating legacy systems that are 
no longer viable. 
 Despite the relevance and utility of these mainstream studies, there remain 
notable paucities in relating indicative observations and analysis with the elemental 
functionality of conventional arms control regimes.  Indeed, few have so much as 
touched upon the constituent components of, and interactions within, the regime models 
themselves.  This has resulted in more abstracted determinations that have fallen short 
of fully distinguishing the root causes of the breakdown and decline of conventional 
arms control.  Therefore, while acknowledging that these studies provide numerous 
correlations and broadened retrospection, this thesis seeks to close the gap between 
symptomatic and systemic factors, thereby ensuring a more inclusive appraisal.  The 
greater depth of analysis attained through this approach, together with the use of case 
studies and numerous primary reference materials, allows for a more comprehensive 
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understanding of the fundamental causes, outcomes and consequences of the 
deterioration of conventional arms control. 
Methodology 
 This thesis addresses the following principal research question: why has there 
been a decline in contemporary conventional arms control?  It also examines two 
subsidiary, although important, questions: what are the implications of this decline; and 
what are the prospects of its rehabilitation and revival?  To answer these questions, a 
case study approach is employed to systematically examine the emergence, 
development and deterioration of the three core conventional arms control and CSBM 
mechanisms: the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty.  This 
allows for a detailed and focused analysis of the underlying political, strategic, 
organisational and operative factors that led to these innovations in multilateral arms 
control, as well as their subsequent diminution.  By examining the three different, albeit 
inter-related, mechanisms using a common framework, it is possible to generate 
stronger conclusions about the fate of conventional arms control than would be the case 
by studying a single mechanism. 
Case Studies 
 Case study is a well-established research methodology that generally involves 
the examination of a given issue, entity or occurrence within its naturally occurring 
circumstances in order to obtain suitably focused conclusions and recommendations.  
Social scientist Robert K. Yin characterises it as “an empirical investigation of a 
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contemporary phenomenon within its natural context using multiple sources of 
evidence.”40  Highly adaptable, case studies can involve single or multiple items of 
examination and may employ both quantitative and qualitative data from multiple 
sources.  As such, they are commonly employed in various disciplines.41  Nonetheless, 
case study methodology is best utilised in areas of research that are conducive to in-
depth analysis within their inherent circumstances, employing varied sources of 
information.42 
 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack highlight the value of case studies in not only 
addressing the fundamental questions of “how” and “why,” but also the added insight 
gleaned through consideration of the contexts within which given subjects are 
situated.43  They identify the use of a conceptual framework; research questions; the 
logic employed in linking data to propositions; and specified criteria for interpreting 
findings as common elements in the design and implementation of a rigorous case 
study.44  They further note the judicious use of research propositions in the parameters 
of a given study, so as to remain within feasible limits.45 
 Despite the acknowledged merits of case study methodology, the basis of its 
suitability also includes some inherent limitations.  Sharan B. Merriam notes that, while 
a highly detailed description and analysis of a given phenomenon may be sought, there 
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may not exist sufficient time or resources to accomplish this.  Conversely, when 
sufficient time and resources do exist, research outcomes may prove too lengthy or 
detailed for practical use.46  Furthermore, as the “primary instrument of data collection 
and analysis,” the individual researcher is largely left to his or her own predilections and 
abilities, which could affect a study’s integrity and validity.47  Similarly, Jacques Hamel 
refers to case studies’ general lack of “representativeness” and rigor in the collection, 
assembly and analysis of empirical materials, which he attributes to bias and 
subjectivity on the part of the researcher and others involved.48    
 It can therefore be seen that case studies’ advantages also include certain innate 
weaknesses.  Given this, Christine Benedichte Meyer stresses the need for case studies 
to be as clear and definite as possible in the methodological choices made.  She further 
notes the advantage of longitudinal, comparative case studies over single case studies’ 
“generalizability.”49 Finally, she calls for researchers and recipients alike to be aware of 
the biases and other constraints that can ultimately affect a given case study.50 
 For this thesis, case study methodology entails the comparative examination of 
conventional arms control within a common context, employing multiple sources of 
evidence.  Oriented upon the central proposition that the decline of conventional arms 
control can be further attributed to breakdowns in the elemental operating models of the 
three principal regimes, a chronological overview of their governance, management and 
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implementation is undertaken from their inception to the 2014 Ukraine crisis.  This 
provides both a manageable range and standardised frame of reference within which to 
conduct a more uniform contextual analysis, even though each regime concerns a 
particular aspect of conventional arms control.  That is, the CFE Treaty establishes 
verifiable zonal limits upon specific types and quantities of major conventional 
armaments, equipment and personnel; the Vienna Document establishes verifiable 
limitations on certain military activities, along with military contacts, cooperation and 
information exchange provisions; and the Open Skies Treaty provides for the airborne 
observation and imaging of military or other national objects or activities of concern.   
 The use of case studies methodology in this thesis therefore facilitates the 
determination of the “how’s and why’s” of conventional arms control’s overall decline, 
along with estimations of its consequences, implications and prospects of recovery.   
This is accomplished through the following: 
• review of the contextual background and pre-history of conventional 
arms control and CSBM, taking into account fundamental concepts, 
associated principles and doctrine, major evolutions and developments 
leading to the establishment of the three principal contemporary regimes; 
• empirical analysis of these three regimes in terms of their effect upon 
conventional arms control and CSBM in their applicable zones, areas and 
regions of application -- this is largely undertaken from a functional 
perspective, with corresponding linkages to associated legal and political 
frameworks; 
• analysis of the relationships of these regimes with the OSCE, States 
Parties, participating States, alliances and associated entities; 
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• based upon these analyses, an overall appraisal of the current state and 
consequent impact of these regimes within their respective jurisdictions, 
along with the broader consequences and implications for international 
peace and security; and 
• to the extent possible, estimation of the prospects and possible courses of 
recovery, sustainment and improvement, where deemed practicable. 
Analytical Framework   
 The analytical framework applied to this thesis consists of the systematic 
appraisal of information and data derived from the three empirical case studies and the 
compilation of validated findings as a response to the research questions.  The uniform 
analysis of this information is attained through their measurement and evaluation 
against specified criteria.  These criteria begin with the purpose, objectives, provisions, 
technical standards and norms established under the regimes themselves.  Together they 
constitute the essential benchmark against which compliance, conformity, 
contraventions, deviations, ambiguities or other variations are measured and assessed in 
terms of their impact upon conventional arms control as an applied concept.  Regime 
governance and management, along with measures undertaken to further evolve and 
adapt, are also specifically accounted for.  Closely related factors encompass operative 
aspects, such as regime design, feasibility and effectiveness (e.g., limiting proliferation, 
security-building, verifiable and enforceable provisions), along with fundamental value, 
in terms of deterrence, early warning and related intelligence.  Broader considerations 
include: 
• political and military ideologies;  
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• states’ individual and collective interests, strategies and degrees of 
cooperation; 
• the influence of major powers and alliances; 
• the impact of political will in both enabling and impeding the common 
coherence and accord required in establishing and maintaining regime 
integrity; and 
• application in response to conflict prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict mitigation. 
 More equivocal considerations -- such as political stability, national and 
institutional capacities, complacency and apathy, along with the inherent uncertainty of 
the international security environment -- are also gauged in terms of their effect upon 
parties’ fulfilment of obligations and exercise of rights, as prescribed under the regimes’ 
normative structures.  
Sources 
 Research for the case studies necessitated an extensive examination of both 
primary and secondary sources.  Primary sources include governing treaties and 
documents themselves, applicable official implementation-related reports and returns, 
consultative records and related technical data produced by inter-governmental 
organisations (OSCE, NATO, etc.).  Applicable media-generated material has also been 
utilised.  Other primary sources encompass official documents and related information 
from national government departments and their subordinate proliferation security 
organisations and agencies.  Key organisations in this respect include: the United States 
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Bureau of Arms Control Verification and Compliance (Department of State), the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (Department of Defense) and the Weapons 
Intelligence Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Center (Central Intelligence Agency); 
the United Kingdom Arms Control and Disarmament Department (Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office), the Arms Control and Counter Proliferation Policy Department 
(Ministry of Defence) and the Joint Arms Control Implementation Group (Ministry of 
Defence); the German Bundeswehr Verification Centre (Federal Ministry of Defence); 
the French Unité Française de Vérification (Ministry of Defence); the Russian National 
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (Ministry of Defence); the Swiss Implementation and 
Verification Unit (Federal Department of Defence); and the Canadian International 
Security Bureau (Global Affairs Canada – formerly, the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade) and the Strategic Joint Staff Arms Control Verification 
Directorate (Department of National Defence).  
 One research challenge concerned access to, and the releasability of classified 
(e.g., CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET and higher) and protected (e.g., TREATY 
SENSITIVE, RESTRICTED, PROTECTED A, PROTECTED B) primary source 
documents.  While the author’s former appointments have served to some advantage in 
accessing such information, authorisation for release under the applicable official access 
mechanisms was frequently denied or otherwise heavily restricted.  Accordingly, 
particular care has been exercised in extrapolating and interpreting pertinent 
information, while remaining strictly within the terms and conditions of the Security of 
Information Act, Officials Secrets Act and other applicable laws and regulations of the 
United Kingdom, Canada, the United States and other allied nations.   
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 First-hand accounts and perspectives have been acquired through a wide-range 
of consultations and documented semi-structured interviews with key subject matter 
experts at various levels.  These include policy officials, diplomats, operational and 
technical personnel, academics and other involved individuals.  In several instances, 
however, despite the academic attribution assurances provided, requests for interviews 
were flatly rejected on the basis of the national policies of the states involved.  Despite 
these and other constraints encountered regarding both the releasability and attribution 
of information, the interview process has nevertheless served to partially mitigate an 
overall lack of material specifically pertaining to the governance-management-
implementation models and interrelationships of the three conventional arms control 
regimes examined. 
 With respect to secondary sources, the thesis draws on the considerable amount 
of academic, foreign policy and technical/scientific work on conventional arms control 
produced over the past several years, along with myriad “single-issue” studies and 
published papers on specific aspects of core concepts and apposite applications.  In 
addition to academic studies, published documentation from non-government 
organizations, agencies and centres of expertise has been scrutinised, including that 
produced by the Brookings Institution; the Center for Defense Information; the Centre 
for European Security and Disarmament; the Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies; the Federation of American Scientists; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; 
Human Rights Watch; the Institute for Science and International Security; the 
International Institute for Strategic Studies; the RAND Corporation; the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute; and the Verification Research, Training and 
Information Centre.  
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 These secondary sources have proven to be useful as means of correlation and in 
otherwise supporting the validation of criteria established under the corresponding 
analytical framework.  This approach notwithstanding, the relative lack of research 
concerning the fundamental “mechanics” of extant regime models -- including the 
explicit linkages between arms control operations/activities and their governance, 
oversight and management -- has been necessarily taken into account.  Indeed, the 
deficit in detailed analysis of conventional arms control implementation and how it is 
addressed within the governance-management-implementation process represents an 
important consideration.  Indeed, few studies have undertaken detailed examinations of 
the functional components of the three principal regimes in question; namely, policy 
formulation and development; consultation and coordination; and operations/activities 
undertaken in support of implementation and assessment.  Accordingly, this thesis 
employs a “practitioner’s perspective” that enables greater discernment of the working 
dynamics of these regimes in order to attain a more complete and balanced analysis of 
individual components and how they interact as a whole.  This includes, for example, 
the identification of gaps, obstacles or other disparities between components that some 
experts contend have seriously constrained, if not compromised, the overall 
functionality of conventional arms control and CSBM.  
Chapter Summaries 
 Following this introduction, the next chapter provides an overview of the concept, 
characteristics, evolution and interrelationships of the three regimes.  Individual case 
study chapters on the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty are 
then presented.  These are followed by an overarching analysis of the diminution of the 
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three regimes, together with estimations concerning their prospects of recovery.  The 
concluding chapter provides closing determinations and “key takeaways” concerning the 
decline and current state of conventional arms control and CSBM.  Each chapter is briefly 
summarised below. 
 Conventional Arms Control: Common Concept, Model and Evolution.   This 
chapter provides a general overview of the concept and characteristics of conventional 
arms control and CSBM, their placement within the broad security spectrum, and the 
composition and characteristics of their common operating model.  This is followed by 
an outline of the contemporary foundations and events leading to the establishment of 
the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and the Open Skies Treaty, illustrating the 
enabling preconditions, interrelationships and common consensus that were required to 
achieve them.  The specific purpose and operative concept of each regime are also 
illustrated.  The chapter highlights the essential value and relevance of conventional 
arms control and CSBM regimes as security mechanisms unto themselves, as well as 
vital components of the broader European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security 
framework.  This provides an important frame of reference for consideration of the case 
studies, analyses, characterisations and estimations that follow. 
 Case Study 1: the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.  This 
chapter provides a detailed historical examination of the CFE Treaty’s establishment, 
evolution, characteristics, achievements and ultimately, its diminishment.  This includes 
the singularly unique conditions that enabled the Treaty’s negotiation and establishment 
and how the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union would leave it fundamentally 
conflicted throughout its implementation.  As a result of this, together with a lack of 
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vigilance and resolve in preserving the essential functionality of its operating model, the 
regime became progressively dysfunctional and impaired.  Consequently, despite its 
momentous early successes in eliminating massive holdings of conventional armaments, 
equipment, and military personnel levels, the Treaty was increasingly degraded and 
ultimately compromised by the self-imposed “suspension” of compliance by the 
Russian Federation.  This was the result of disagreement over preconditions for the 
ratification of the agreed 1999 Adapted CFE Treaty.  Despite the suspension’s illegality, 
little was done by the OSCE or individual States Parties to formally challenge it.  
Rather, efforts were generally focused upon redressing Russian grievances, with the 
hope of enabling the transition to the successor Treaty.  These initiatives, left largely to 
the United States to coordinate, proved unsuccessful.  Consequently, the United States, 
along with NATO and several non-NATO States Parties resorted to the imposition of 
“counter-measures,” thereby suspending their individual Treaty obligations as they 
pertained to Russia.  Accordingly, the failure to formally hold Moscow legally 
accountable and otherwise preserve the CFE Treaty’s governance-management-
implementation model reduced an already weakened regime to its severely diminished 
present state.  While the Treaty remains in effect amongst its 29 remaining States 
Parties, it subsists as a nominal security mechanism at best.  The CFE Treaty’s 
degradation and suspension provide clear examples of the implications of having 
compromised the integrity of a regime by failing to adhere to its established provisions, 
as discharged through its operating model.  Although the Treaty can and arguably 
should continue to function as is, it will remain comparatively inconsequential as a 
European security regime without Russia.  Nevertheless, many of its provisions might 
provide some basis for a future evolved, adapted or successor regime. 
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 Case Study 2: The Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures.  This chapter provides a comprehensive examination of the Vienna 
Document’s oversight and implementation from its initial entry-into-force in 1990, to its 
current iteration and state.  It amply demonstrates that as a European and Eurasian 
CSBM, the Document’s fundamental value is apparent.  Nevertheless, despite its 
variance with other regimes, its provisions have been similarly impeded by a range of 
contraventions and infringements, further exacerbated by chronic deficiencies in the 
oversight and implementation of its operating model.  Much of this can be linked to 
institutional complacency and apathy, the flagging commitment of several participating 
States, and a general waning of underlying political consensus at virtually all levels.  
These faults have directly contributed to the erosion of cooperative security and stability 
afforded by the regime.  The chapter illustrates that, notwithstanding varied external 
influences, the diminishment of the Vienna Document regime is also specifically 
attributable to impairments in its rudimentary oversight and management.  Even with 
various technical and procedural updates to the Document, these underlying failings 
have continued to undermine and weaken not only the regime itself, but also the broader 
European and Eurasian conventional arms control and CSBM framework.  This has 
placed international peace, security and stability at increased risk, as exemplified by the 
on-going crisis in Ukraine.  While there exists broad culpability, the OSCE -- as the 
governing institution -- is held to particular account.  Given the manner in which the 
Vienna Document has been progressively destabilised over several years, its prospects 
of rehabilitation, while unclear, would require from the outset the necessary inducement 
to secure the reaffirmed commitment of all concerned.  From there, the unambiguous, 
consistent application of prescribed provisions and standards through greater 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      40 
institutional involvement, together with a more purposeful, disciplined approach by all 
concerned, would be required.  
Case Study 3: The Treaty on Open Skies.  This chapter examines the Open Skies 
regime with due attention accorded to its unique purpose and distinctive attributes as an 
observation-based CSBM regime, comparatively unencumbered by the quantitative and 
normative measurements established under the other two regimes.  Also discussed is 
Open Skies’ specific value as a reconnaissance and intelligence resource (particularly 
for States Parties possessing the necessary technical means of exploitation), along with 
the role technology has played with the introduction of digital sensors, processors and 
new aircraft.  Another important consideration is the Treaty’s broader jurisdiction, 
which includes the entire territories of Canada, the United States and the entire Russian 
Federation.  The dominant roles played by Washington and Moscow and their 
respective efforts to advantage themselves under the regime (including significant 
capability investments) are also examined.  As is the case with the other case studies, 
key developments and notable events in the oversight and operation of Open Skies are 
specifically scrutinised in terms of their overall impact to the Treaty’s rudimentary 
functionality and viability.  While this examination confirms Open Skies’ conceptual 
validity and utility, varied transgressions in its implementation, combined with a 
combination of interference and ineptness in its governance and management, have 
seriously undermined its integrity.  While the Treaty remains essentially functional and 
is certainly the least impeded of the three regimes, it is clear that continued unchecked 
transgressions will further erode its viability and with it, the broader conventional arms 
control and CSBM framework.  Accordingly, efforts to rehabilitate Open Skies must 
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include the fundamental acceptance of and adherence to its legally binding provisions as 
originally envisioned and agreed.  
Analysis.  This chapter employs the evidence gleaned from the background and 
detailed case study examinations to provide a broad evaluation of the causal factors in 
the overall decline of conventional arms control and CSBM.  Key considerations, 
including the views of subject matter experts, are factored into this appraisal.  The 
effects of unchecked detraction, waning political consensus and ineffectual governance 
in subverting regime models are specifically noted, with the Russian Federation and 
OSCE explicitly cited for their respective roles.  Furthermore, the chapter validates the 
proposition that, in addition to varied external effects, the elemental dysfunction of 
regime models constitutes a key, but somewhat overlooked core contributor to 
conventional arms control’s decline.  Accordingly, regime stabilisation is stressed as an 
initial course of mitigation, acknowledging this to be an attainable, but difficult goal.  
Finally, specific approaches to stabilise regime models are discussed, including 
measures to counteract disaccord and restore functionality.  The chapter concludes with 
a summation of findings, including the caveated prospects of regime recovery.  
Conclusions.  The final, concluding chapter returns to the central theme of the 
thesis, noting the dramatic changes in Eurasian and Euro-Atlantic security and the 
dilemma presented by the diminishment of the major conventional arms control and 
CSBM regimes.  The impact of weak governance in curbing states’ transgressions 
against regime provisions is again highlighted.  The chapter further notes that while 
timelier calibration or modification may have aided in stemming the degradation of 
regime models themselves, it is ultimately the erosion of group cohesion, conformity 
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and compliance that has undermined their operative integrity.  An appraisal of the 
present state of each of the three regimes is rendered, along with an estimation of their 
respective prospects of recovery.  While the assessed potential for restoration certainly 
varies, the re-establishment of each regime’s essential functionality nevertheless 
constitutes a general imperative.  A compilation of the major determinations rendered 
from analysis is then provided in the form of ‘key takeaways,” including adjunct 
findings and broader considerations pertaining to regime oversight and implementation.  
The chapter concludes that, while current conditions do not favour major initiatives to 
rehabilitate conventional arms control and CSBM, internal measures to stabilise the 
integral functionality of existing regimes models remain a conceivable course of action.  
This could, in turn, enable a more viable basis upon which to undertake subsequent 
courses of sustainment, modification or replacement.  
Summary of Overarching Conclusions 
 The thesis concludes that conventional arms control and CSBM regimes are 
indeed in an overall state of serious decline.  While clearly affected by the inexorable 
influences of the international security environment, this decline can be further 
attributed to breakdowns within the regimes’ respective governance-management-
implementation models.  While fundamental concepts have remained essentially valid, 
inherent disaccord, misinterpretation, complacency, non-conformity and outright 
wrongdoing have contributed to the progressive deterioration of these models.  Clearly, 
the divergent conduct of some parties and unresponsiveness of others, together with 
deficiencies in OSCE oversight, constitute key factors in the failure to preserve the 
compliance and conformity required for operative cohesion and integrity. 
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 The degradation of the CFE Treaty, Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty 
has placed Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security and stability at increased risk.  Indeed, 
the Russian Federation’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and its on-going proxy campaign 
in Eastern Ukraine have tragically exemplified the outcome of non-conformity with the 
binding provisions and cooperative security principles of these regimes.  Although 
Russia may be cited as the leading offender, it is evident that infringements and lapses 
by various other States Parties and participating States have also steadily eroded the 
integrity, efficacy and relevance of these three “pillars of security.”   
 While the extent of degradation varies, the CFE Treaty, Vienna Document and 
Open Skies Treaty are not beyond some measure of rudimentary rehabilitation that, 
while difficult, is arguably within the wherewithal of their governing authority and 
constituents to undertake.  Given overarching circumstances, this would likely be best 
carried out initially through the stabilisation of existing operating models, from which 
valid determinations could then be made regarding their subsequent alteration or 
replacement.  Accordingly, a fundamental approach to mitigate governance-
management-implementation dysfunction should be accorded due priority.  This calls 
for the OSCE and key member States to exercise fundamental leadership in shaping 
imperatives and inducing amenable behaviour, so as to ensure adherence to extant 
standards and provisions.  Indeed, the continued viability of conventional arms control 
and CSBM clearly includes the need for suitably pragmatic courses to sustain their 
elemental efficacy.  This may, in turn, provide a viable basis upon which to preserve 
fundamental concepts through suitable courses of sustainment, adaptation or succession. 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
 
CHAPTER 2  
CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL:  
COMMON CONCEPT, MODEL AND EVOLUTION 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Having introduced the central proposition and methodology of this study, along 
with a rudimentary background, this chapter provides a contextual overview of the 
contemporary concept, characteristics and operating model of conventional arms 
control.  An outline of the evolution of the three regimes, illustrating their common 
principles and interrelationships is then presented.  Together they provide a fundamental 
explication of the relevance of conventional arms control and CSBM regimes as both 
autonomous security mechanisms and as vital integrated components of the broader 
European, Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security construct.  This lays the essential 
foundation upon which to contextualise the three case studies that follow. 
Concept and Characteristics  
 Despite the range, orientation and complexity of contemporary arms control 
regimes, they nevertheless share several fundamental characteristics.  Generally 
speaking, they are designed to reduce distrust amongst parties, thereby establishing and 
reinforcing confidence and security so as to avoid the escalation of adversarial 
capability and associated intent.  This, in turn, decreases the potential for armed conflict 
or other threats, while establishing or improving the conditions for stability, constancy 
and increased cooperation.  Figure 2.1 provides a basic depiction of the orientation and 
scope of contemporary arms control and proliferation security within the full spectrum 
of defence and security operations at all levels (i.e., strategic, operational and tactical).  
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While their preclusive and preventative characteristics are illustrated by their general 
placement within the “non-proliferation” band, specific elements also extend into the 
“counter-proliferation” band of this spectrum.  They comprise: 
• security cooperation and partnerships (a function of non-proliferation);  
• arms control verification and proliferation security operations (again, a 
function of non-proliferation); and 
• interdiction, reduction and elimination operations (a function of counter-
proliferation), in the context of arms control mechanisms employed in 
the reduction and elimination (i.e., destruction, conversion) of specified 
weapon and equipment systems that would otherwise exceed the limits 




Figure 2.1:  Arms control verification and proliferation security operations  
within full spectrum defence and security operations51  
  According to Jozef Goldblat, a preeminent authority on arms control and 
disarmament, the term “arms control” originally denoted a given regulatory regime for 
limiting arms competition – a connotation distinct from the “regulation of armaments” 
or “disarmament,” as stated in the United Nations Charter.  Goldblat further stated: 
                                                
51 Department of National Defence, Strategic Joint Staff Arms Control Verification, General Orientation 
Briefing, 8 March 2010 (Ottawa:  DND Canada, 2010), 16. 
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… a wide range of measures have come to be included under the rubric of arms 
control, in particular those intended to: (a) freeze, limit, reduce or abolish certain 
categories of weapons; (b) ban the testing of certain weapons; (c) prevent certain 
military activities; (d) regulate the deployment of armed forces; (e) proscribe 
transfers of some militarily important items; (f) reduce the risk of accidental 
war; (g) constrain or prohibit the use of certain weapons or methods of war; and 
(h) build up confidence among states through greater openness in military 
matters.  Today, ‘arms control’ is often used interchangeably with ‘arms 
regulation’, ‘arms limitation’, ‘arms reduction’ or even ‘disarmament’.52 
  With particular regard to the three conventional arms control regimes examined 
in this study, the aforementioned common elements can be further distilled into some of 
the following benefits, as extrapolated from United States National Security Strategy: 
• enhancing security through the establishment and imposition of limits on 
the weapons, equipment and personnel of conventional military forces, 
thereby reducing fear and mistrust; 
• providing the means to eliminate, prohibit or otherwise control and/or 
constrain weapons and equipment exceeding established limits; 
• establishing attendant verification and compliance monitoring provisions 
through which to enable greater predictability and characterization of the 
size, structure, state and posture of forces; 
• instituting complementary confidence- and security-building 
mechanisms though which to promote increased transparency through 
inter-party contacts, cooperation and collaboration; 
                                                
52 Jozef Goldblat, “Arms Control – Basic Concepts,” Fiches Marra (February 2011) [journal on-line]; 
available from http://fichasmarra.wordpress.com/2011/02/01/arms-control-basic-concepts/; Internet; 
accessed 3 December 2012, n.p. 
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• enabling resources allocated to defence industries to be reduced and 
reallocated to other national priorities; and 
• ultimately contributing to increased geostrategic peace, security and 
stability.53 
The Model 
  A key point of emphasis in this thesis is the denotation of the fundamental 
requirement for balanced oversight and effectual execution of all constituent 
components of the major conventional arms control and CSBM regimes.  These 
components -- comprising regime governance, management and implementation -- can 
be functionally broken down into policy/planning, consultation/coordination and 
implementation/assessment.  Consistent with both doctrine and established convention, 
these interdependent components must interact within self-regulating, flexible and 
sustainable operative cycles.  The sustained integrity of each regime’s cycle assures 
vigilance and responsiveness within an integrated process of continuous feedback and 
improvement.  The corresponding governance-management-implementation model is 
depicted in Figure 2.2: 
                                                
53 United States, Executive Office of the President of the United States, A National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1995), 15. 
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Figure 2.2: Governance-Management-Implementation Model54 
 For all regimes, compliance and conformity, established and upheld through the 
verification, assessment and enforcement of specified standards and corresponding 
oversight provisions, are absolutely critical.  In the context of current conventional arms 
control regimes, the dissimilarity between the two warrants some elaboration, as while 
both are closely linked in terms of fulfilling established rules and standards, their 
specific distinctions are particularly important; i.e.:  
• compliance pertains to the fulfilment of obligatory requirements and 
specifications of a standardised nature, such as established ceilings and 
other limitations placed upon types of weapon and equipment systems, 
personnel and/or types of activity; whereas, 
 
• conformity pertains more specifically to a party’s conduct with respect to 
its manner of adherence to the established rules of governance and 
procedure concerning a given regime.   
                                                
54 Author’s conception. 
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 Given this, it is entirely possible to be compliant with the specified standards of 
a given regime, while at the same time failing to conform to the procedures and 
conventions associated with its implementation.  An example would be a party that has 
fulfilled its obligations in limiting its holdings of weapon and equipment systems at a 
designated location, but nevertheless fails to correctly report this information.  
Conversely, a party could conform procedurally by fulfilling its reception of and 
support to a verification inspection by another party, while still failing to comply with 
established limitations.  Of course, a party could also be (ideally) both compliant and 
conformant, or conversely, both non-compliant and non-conformant (worst case).  
Accordingly, while neither mutually exclusive nor necessarily congruent, compliance 
and conformity are indeed complementary and desirable.  Furthermore, there certainly 
can and indeed do exist instances of “blurring” between the two.  This is highly 
important when one considers the circumstances wherein a given party is endeavouring 
to comply, but is incapable, or others where non-compliance and/or non-conformity are 
deliberate, particularly when employed as a means of concealment or deception.  These 
are key distinctions that will be addressed further in the thesis. 
The Imperative of Verification 
 
 As the principal tool for determining compliance and conformity, verification 
has come to be commonly regarded as an absolutely essential element of contemporary 
conventional arms control and CSBM, as established as a general principle and 
employed by practitioners as operational doctrine.  Simply put, verification is the 
process through which the validity of compliance and conformity with agreed 
provisions is determined, as undertaken by systematic observation, examination and/or 
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demonstration.  The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre defines 
verification as “the process of gathering and analysing information to make a judgment 
about parties’ compliance or non-compliance with an agreement.”55  
 While similar in certain respects to the acquisition of military intelligence, 
verification is undertaken through specific provisions that authorise and regulate such 
activity.  While both intelligence and verification fulfil the requirement to render an 
independent conclusion or judgement, verification is conducted under the principles of 
conventional law, respects sovereignty and is reciprocal in nature.  Therefore, despite 
the adversarial footing of arms control agreements generally, unlike espionage, 
verification engenders cooperation and trust.56  Indeed, the term “trust, but verify” has 
become a well-known idiom that underscores the modern concept of arms control.  
Originally a Russian proverb (Доверяй, но проверяй - doveryai, no proveryai), it 
simply states that although the information provided by a given party may indeed be 
reliable, the other party should undertake additional measures to verify the veracity 
and/or accuracy of this information.57  
 In order to develop a better understanding of Soviet thinking, Russian scholar 
Suzanne Massie was employed by President Ronald Reagan’s staff to provide a 
comprehensive historical and social background of the Russian people, in preparation 
for Reagan’s summit meetings with Soviet President Gorbachev in the mid-1980s.  
Over the course of no less than 18 consultations with Reagan and other senior officials, 
Massie successfully imparted the vital importance of the “human factor,” in engaging 
                                                
55 Hassan Elbahtimy,  “The Importance of Multilateral Verification for Arms Control and Disarmament.” 
VERTIC Presentation (London: Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, 2010), 4. 
56 Hassan Elbahtimy,  “The Importance of Multilateral Verification for Arms Control and Disarmament,” 6. 
57 Ronald Reagan, Letters from the Desk of Ronald Reagan, ed. Ralph E. Weber and Ralph A. Weber 
(New York: Broadway Books), 350-351.  
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the Soviets, which included much overlooked religious and social considerations.  It 
was Massie who suggested the use of “trust, but verify” as an expression that could be 
effectively used, given the Russians’ proclivity for the use of proverbs in conveying 
points of discussion.  Reagan had adeptly internalized Massie’s advice, employing 
“trust, but verify” in his discussions with great effect.58  Indeed, the term fit exceedingly 
well with Reagan’s critical requirement for mutual inspection rights during the 1986-
1987 negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.  Having 
evolved into one of Reagan’s signature phrases, “trust, but verify” has since served to 
underscore the imperative of transparency as an overarching principle of modern 
security partnerships.  The term has been frequently employed and was, in fact, adapted 
as the official motto of the United States On-Site Inspection Agency (now a component 
of the United States Defense Threat Reduction Agency), which adorns the entrance wall 
of its headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.  
 It is generally understood that within the context of arms control, verification 
entails a subscribed process through which a determination is rendered as to whether the 
military forces or activities of a given party fall within agreed limitations and other 
obligations.  A verifiable legally- or politically-binding mechanism contains what Amy 
Woolf refers to as “an interlocking web of constraints and provisions designed to deter 
cheating, to make cheating more complicated and more expensive, or to make its 
detection more timely.”59  That is: 
In the past, the United States has deemed treaties to be effectively verifiable      
if it has confidence that it can detect militarily significant violations in time to 
                                                
58 Suzanne Massie, Trust, but Verify: Reagan, Russia, and Me (Blue Hill: Maine Authors Publishing, 2013), 
347-348. 
59 Amy Woolf,  “Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control.” CRS Report for Congress (Washington: 
United States Congressional Research Service, 2011), 3. 
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respond and offset any threat that the violation may create for the United 
States.60 
 The ability to “respond and offset” provides an important derivative of 
verification; i.e., the existence of sufficient discouragement to attempt any deviation 
from agreed limitations and other obligations.  While the consequences of a given 
deviation may fall within the provisions of specific regimes, the broader spectrum of 
conventional law and international relations should also provide sufficient negative 
reinforcement so as to ensure both compliance and conformity.  The essential precursor 
to this is, of course, verification.  Accordingly, without timely and effective verification 
and enforcement provisions -- both in design and practical application -- the 
fundamental integrity of a given regime is significantly undermined, resulting in 
increased risk to the security of the other parties.  This is noted by Robert Axelrod in 
discussing the “Value of Provocability” in The Evolution of Cooperation: 
… the only arms control agreements which can be stable are those whose 
violations can be detected soon enough.  The critical requirement is that 
violations can be detected before they can accumulate to such an extent that the 
victim’s provocability is no longer enough to prevent the challenger from having 
an incentive to defect.61 
 The 16 Principles of Verification, adopted by the United Nations Disarmament 
Commission and endorsed annually by General Assembly consensus, espouse that while 
not an end unto itself, verification  -- when properly executed and sustained -- enables 
the determination of both compliance and conformity, without which regimes cannot 
effectively function.  To wit: 
                                                
60 Amy Woolf,  “Monitoring and Verification in Arms Control.” CRS Report for Congress, 3. 
61 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 7. 
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 “1. …verification is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament 
agreements.  3. Verification should promote the implementation of arms 
limitation and disarmament measures, build confidence among States and ensure 
that agreements are being observed by all parties.  11. Adequate and effective 
verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, 
clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance.  Continued 
confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and 
maintaining confidence among the parties….”62 
 Notwithstanding the critical importance of verification, it nevertheless remains a 
central posit of this paper that all components of conventional arms control and CSBM 
regimes must function unimpeded as mutually-reinforcing and interdependent 
constituents.  In order to attain and sustain this, there must exist what Jeffery 
McCausland describes as a “harmony of interest among the signatories;” that is, the 
common determination by states that the security attained within a given regime 
outweighs the risks assumed in the fulfilment of their individual and collective 
obligations.63  This common determination may otherwise be described as group 
consensus or political will.  As aptly stated by the former Canadian Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, Joe Clark, in a 1986 address to the United Nations General 
Assembly: “Verification is not just a question of technical capacity, but of the political 
will to reach agreement on the application of technologies and techniques.”64  
 
                                                
62 United Nations, “Verification in all its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of 
Verification,” Disarmament Studies Series 32 (New York: United Nations Office for Disarmament 
Affairs, 2008), 25-27. 
63 Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Op-Ed: Developing a New Approach to Conventional Arms Control,” 
Strategic Studies Institute, 8 April 2013 (Carlisle: United States Army War College Press, 2013): 2. 
64 Department of External Affairs. “United Nations Reform – 1986.” Speech by the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, the Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 
September 24, 1986 (Ottawa: Government of Canada Publications, 1986), n.p.  
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Contemporary Foundations  
 As previously noted, while its earliest origins can be drawn from ancient history, 
the advent of contemporary arms control can be more readily traced to the early 
19th Century.  Major evolutions of the concept unfolded in a manner concomitant with 
the Industrial Revolution and the rapid advancements made in weapons technology – 
along with attendant capabilities and shifting strategies of conflict.  The Rush-Bagot 
Treaty of 1818, which served to limit naval armaments on the Great Lakes and later 
establish fully demilitarized boundaries between Canada and the United States, is 
frequently acknowledged as the first modern arms control regime.  The 1899 Hague 
Convention was the first contemporary accord to broadly encompass arms control-
related matters within the international community, instituting prohibitions upon the use 
of certain types of weapons, imposing limitations upon specific types of warfare and 
addressing associated matters of arbitration.  The 1921-1922 Washington Naval 
Conference advanced this concept by establishing limitations on the international naval 
arms race of that period.  The 1925 Geneva Protocol, which inaugurated the concept of 
proscribed first use of certain weapons in international conflicts (i.e., chemical and 
bacteriological weapons), remains in effect today. 
 These arms control milestones were accompanied by the precipitous 
development of associated precepts and doctrines, which collectively formed the 
conceptual foundation of an expanding compendium of related treaties, accords, 
documents, declarations and other mechanisms introduced throughout the latter half of 
the 20th Century.  While conceived to address immediate security imperatives, the 
number and variety of these regimes also serve as testament to the utility of arms 
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control as an increasingly pragmatic and effective concept through which to 
collaboratively manage international security issues generally.  In order to fully 
appreciate the circumstances under which subsequent regimes were envisioned and 
eventually established (in particular, the three contemporary regimes specifically 
addressed in this study), it is important to consider the wide-ranging complexities of the 
global security dynamic and the increasingly adaptive approaches employed by states, 
alliances and organisations to address individual and collective concerns. 
Cold War “Compellence” 
 Following World War II, developments in conventional arms control closely 
paralleled remarkable changes in the international security paradigm; itself closely 
intertwined with the unprecedented advancements and complexities of modern warfare.  
The core principles of arms control, while fundamentally intact, underwent substantial 
modification and refinement in order to address the increasingly urgent requirement to 
stabilise relations between the United States and the Soviet Union as the emergent 
superpowers, along with their respective security alliances.  Varied geopolitical 
accommodations and technical enhancements were necessary to address not only 
nuclear weapons as a single, overriding threat, but also the remarkable advancements 
made in conventional warfare and strategic doctrine in general.  Other factors, such as 
significant upsurges in internal and regional conflicts, along with a rapidly expanding 
global arms trade, also demanded more effective means of mitigation.  
 While rarely, if ever, conceptualised as a means unto itself, conventional arms 
control steadily developed as an increasingly comprehensive function of international 
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relations, with the state of those relations constituting what might be described as 
“enabling preconditions.”  The specific context of these relations, whether inter-state, 
bloc-to-bloc, regional or even domestic, shaped and influenced the manner in which 
arms control agreements were devised and employed as means of collectively 
safeguarding states’ respective security, sovereignty and other national interests.  
Certainly, the convolution of the post-war global security environment demanded a 
more systematic approach to tempering tensions and raising the threshold of conflict 
through the moderation of both nuclear and conventional military forces.  This included 
a structured form of “compellence;” a term fashioned by American economist and arms 
control expert Thomas C. Schelling that describes the means through which states are 
coerced to actively undertake specific actions or commit to such an undertaking.  This 
term differs from “deterrence,” which entails the use of coercion to discourage states 
from taking specific actions and is somewhat static in nature.65  As an advancement of 
traditional pacts, alignments and other forms of cooperation, contemporary arms control 
mechanisms therefore emerged as distinct supplementations of, and even alternatives to, 
traditional power-based cooperative alliances that were largely deterrent in nature.  Over 
time, they attained increased legitimacy as predominant security and stability 
frameworks, irrespective of the variances in states’ capacities, orientations or degree of 
involvement.66 
 Successive advancements and refinements transformed conventional arms 
control into an increasingly effective means of attaining conformity by not only 
instituting binding reductions and limitations of armaments, equipment and personnel, 
                                                
65 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Fredericksburg: Yale University Press, 1966), 71-72. 
66 Advisory Council on International Affairs, Conventional Arms Control: Urgent Need, Limited 
Opportunities. Number 2, April 1998 (The Hague: Government of the Netherlands, 1998), 11-14. 
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but also establishing viable means of oversight and management so as to ensure and 
maintain the integrity of the behavioural parameters established.  As might be expected, 
these included the institution of overarching principles and standards, technical 
provisions and rules of procedure, along with formalised channels of consultation and 
decision-making. 
 It is evident that global developments leading to the establishment of the 
principal contemporary regimes, despite their varying degrees of complexity, were 
uniquely aligned and predisposed to enable significant evolutions in arms control.  
Dominated by the strategic confrontation between the United States and the Soviet 
Union throughout the Cold War, the exceptional circumstances leading to the 
diminishment and ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991 produced a 
highly altered and in many respects, temporal dimension in international relations and 
security.  That is to say, prevailing conditions sufficiently transfigured the hegemonic 
enmity that existed between the United States and Soviet Union to not only enable, but 
compel increased cooperation and more peaceable conduct as “adaptive” means of 
assured security and stability, despite the persistence of traditional rivalries and 
established deterrence.  Indeed, as noted by the Dutch Advisory Council on 
International Affairs, these conditions effectively aided the introduction of 
unprecedented provisions, thereby advancing arms control as an increasingly vital 
implement of international security and stability: 
Arms control is a political concept which raised to fame in the Cold War.  Its 
aim is to achieve security and stability by encouraging states voluntarily to sign 
agreements on levels of armament, on the deployment, production, supply and 
use of arms, and also on the monitoring of enforcement procedures (i.e. 
verification).  Arms control has traditionally focused primarily on levels of 
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nuclear armament, in the United States and the former Soviet Union in 
particular, and it is this image which has helped to breed the misconception that 
arms control is simply a question of counting numbers of weapons.  Whilst a 
quantitative perspective may undoubtedly play a role in arms control, there is 
also room for a qualitative perspective, based on the aim of deploying arms in 
such a way as to minimise the risk of a military surprise attack.  In both cases, 
the principal objective is to achieve security and stability.67 
 This characterisation is noteworthy in its recognition of the quantitative aspects 
of arms control being further enhanced by qualitative ones in the attainment of 
overarching strategic security imperatives.  In the simplest of terms, both quantitative 
and qualitative provisions have demonstrated themselves to be collectively effective in 
reducing the risk of conventional military escalation that could ultimately lead to 
nuclear conflict.  Indeed, these combined provisions served to reinforce the trust and 
confidence that were emerging from the rapprochement between the United States and 
Soviet Union.  Throughout the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War 
security environment, conventional arms control mechanisms served to not only 
establish broad weapon and equipment system ceilings, but also improve upon these 
limitations with expanded categorizations, along with systematic controls on 
deployments, exercises and other military activities.  At the same time, complementary 
reporting, monitoring and verification measures (including concomitant national 
technical means) were introduced as viable capabilities to assure compliance and 
conformity, while concurrently employing broad collaborative measures to build 
confidence, security and long-term peaceful cooperation.   
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 As explained by the Secretary General of the OSCE, Lamberto Zannier, 
conventional arms control was logically embraced within the broader early warning, 
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation responsibilities 
discharged by the OSCE in its mandated oversight of its politico-military, 
economic/environmental and human security “dimensions.”  Essential functions that 
rendered conventional arms control a suitable “fit” within the OSCE security framework 
included: the establishment and maintenance of weapon/equipment system and 
personnel ceilings; limitations of specific military activities, exchange of specified 
military information; and the employment of verification as the principal means of 
ensuring compliance and conformity, thereby serving to sustain and preserve the 
integrity of the established regimes.68 
Dialogue, Negotiations and Incremental Progress 
 The inimitable circumstances leading to the establishment of the leading 
contemporary conventional arms control regimes are directly reflected in the character 
and iterative nature of the varied consultations and negotiations that began in the 1970s 
and that continue, in several respects, to this day.  While not singularly accountable for 
the manner in which this dialogue unfolded, the 1970 NATO Rome Ministerial 
nevertheless constitutes a notable juncture in both its appraisal and determinations 
concerning European security at that time and as such, provides a useful datum.  Having 
taken stock of previous consultations and analogous developments in nuclear 
proliferation security, the Rome Ministerial was remarkable in its appraisal of the 
prevalent circumstances and resultant opportunities that presented themselves as means 
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of advancing East-West détente.  The Ministerial further served to solidify NATO’s 
approach to the manner in which dialogue with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation (WTO)69 would be pursued.  This entailed the affirmation of NATO 
members’ commitment to sustaining their conventional forces in Europe, while at the 
same time remaining open to principled discussions concerning reductions.  It was also 
during this time that refinements to NATO’s general concept of military force 
reductions were formally articulated.  This included the view that “balanced” reductions 
would include both “stationed and indigenous” military forces.  Moreover, the 
Ministerial laid down a key “marker” that any conventional force reductions by NATO 
members would necessarily be based upon reciprocity with those of the WTO.70   
 The Rome Ministerial’s key outcomes were its Declaration on Mutual and 
Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), and Final Communiqué.  These outcomes were 
indeed noteworthy, as they not only served as a renewed basis for East-West dialogue 
on European Security but, given the range of other strategic security consultations, they 
also enabled a suitably-oriented “dual-track” approach.  This approach was aimed at 
addressing both the immediate imperative of military force reductions, while 
concurrently engaging broader security, human rights and economic concerns.  First, the 
Declaration formally conveyed to the Soviet Union and WTO a viable preliminary basis 
for appositely-focused discourse, with specific consideration accorded to principled 
fundamental elements that would not only permit “substantive negotiations,” but also 
legitimise some of the core principles of conventional arms control; i.e.:  
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• Mutual force reductions should be compatible with NATO’s vital 
security interests and should not operate to the military disadvantage of 
either side having regard for the differences arising from geographical 
and other considerations; 
• Reductions should be on a basis of reciprocity and phased/balanced as to 
their scope and timing; 
• Reductions should include stationed and indigenous forces and their 
weapons systems in the area concerned; and 
 
• There must be adequate verification and controls to ensure the 
observance of agreements on mutual and balanced force reductions.71 
 Second, the Final Communiqué clearly signalled NATO’s willingness to engage 
within “any suitable forum,” broader issues associated with European security, noting 
that they were “deeply rooted in the conflicting perceptions of state interests.”  Further, 
such engagement would indeed require “full and timely consultation,” “patient 
endeavour,” and constitute a “test of the willingness of all interested countries to deal 
meaningfully with real issues of security.”72   
 Taking into account the various bilateral and multilateral consultations, contacts 
and negotiations that had been taking place, NATO Ministers agreed to continue and 
intensify this effort, with a view to progressing towards more focused discussion 
concerning security and cooperation in Europe.  While acknowledging favourable 
developments, such as recent “four powers” (France, United Kingdom, United States 
and Soviet Union) discussions on the status of Berlin and Germany, United States - 
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Soviet discussions on strategic arms limitations and the entry-into-force of the 1968 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Communiqué 
nevertheless noted the lack of a Soviet response to overtures made in previous NATO 
ministerial declarations (i.e., at Reykjavik in 1968 and at Brussels in 1969).  Recalling 
the Alliance’s Report on the Procedures for Negotiation, the Final Communiqué 
specified that one of the main objectives of “intensified dialogue” would be to consider 
at what point it would be possible to convene a conference (or series thereof) 
concerning European security and cooperation.  This included the possibility of the 
establishment of a permanent body through which to so engage.73 
 The Rome Ministerial Final Communiqué therefore formally recognized both 
the exceptional circumstances and the unique opportunity that now presented itself to 
progress détente.  This included, most significantly, growing indications from the Soviet 
Union and other Eastern European States (i.e., through varied bilateral and multilateral 
contacts, discussions or negotiations)74 of a willingness to engage in not only “single 
issue” and bilateral discourse, but also in dedicated interaction aimed at reducing 
tensions and promoting cooperation generally: 
This period had… seen an acceleration of the process of change in Europe which 
sharpened the USSR’s interest in establishing a more active role in West 
European politics and seemed to improve Moscow’s chances of gaining wider 
access to Western Europe’s economic and technical resources.  Moscow 
therefore wanted a security conference more than ever, and by continuing to 
hold out against MBFR it would have hurt its chances of obtaining one.75 
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 In addition to supporting the imperative for MBFR, the Final Communiqué 
served to reinforce broader fundamental principles of regional and proliferation security 
that would be eventually adapted and refined within the subsequent Helsinki Process 
and Helsinki Final Act, as negotiated within a dedicated Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).  These included:   
4.  …[that] peace must rest upon universal respect of the sovereign equality,  
political independence and territorial integrity of each European State, regardless 
of its political or social system, and for the right of its peoples to shape their own 
destinies, free of the threat of external intervention, coercion or constraint;  
16. a.  …the principles which should govern relations between states, including 
the renunciation of force; and  
16. b.  …the development of international relations with a view to contributing 
 to the freer movement of people, ideas and information and to developing co-
 operation in the cultural, economic, technical and scientific fields as well as in 
 the field of human environment.76 
 The “dual-track” approach to East-West security dialogue resulting from the 
Rome Ministerial unfolded from 1973 and continued into the early 1990s.  
Notwithstanding preceding events, including a 1972 United States – Soviet agreement 
to hold parallel military and political talks, the resultant consultations were: 
• MBFR talks and subsequent negotiations, ultimately leading to the 
establishment of the CFE Treaty; and                   
• The Helsinki process, resulting in the establishment of the Vienna 
Document. 
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 While the MBFR dialogue and Helsinki process are discussed and referred to in 
subsequent chapters, it is important to provide a broad overview of their respective 
progression, interaction and association with other events.  This is necessary in order to 
reinforce the unique circumstances and conditions during this period, which ultimately 
enabled the establishment of the major conventional arms control regimes. 
MBFR: Towards a CFE Treaty 
 Michael D. Miggins, former Head of the Arms Control and Coordination 
Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO, referred to the MBFR 
(1973-1989) as possibly “the most successful arms control negotiation ever 
conducted.”77   The arduous MBFR consultations and negotiations comprised an 
extensive series of proposals, counter-proposals and counter-counter-proposals 
discussed over the course of 16 years.  Stressing the significance of aforementioned 
“enabling conditions,” and as acknowledged in several sources, it is indeed worthy to 
note the effect of both integral and external, “real world” developments upon the MBFR 
process.  These are quite varied, but include such events as NATO’s planned 
deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, the United States 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces 
Agreement in 1987, on-going Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations 
and, more specifically, iterative proposals by the Soviet Union to include nuclear and 
conventional land and air forces, as well as zonal (i.e., Atlantic to the Urals or “ATTU”) 
area parameters within the MBFR consultative framework.  These proposals -- to be 
                                                
77 Michael D. Miggins, Conventional Arms Control and Its Contribution to European Security and 
Stability,” Briefing to NATO Senior Officer Course 10 February 2005 (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation, 2005), 8. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      65 
followed by additional propositions and compelling actions -- were duly addressed in 
NATO’s Halifax Statement on Conventional Arms Control (1986), the Brussels 
Declaration on Conventional Arms Control (1986) and in subsequent 
communications.78 
 In response to the Halifax Statement, the Soviet/Warsaw Pact proposals of 1986 
(frequently referred to as the “Budapest Appeal”) were highly significant, in that they 
represented an entirely new approach in which Moscow was now assuming much of the 
initiative, including its willingness to expand MBFR dialogue beyond NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact, to include other European states.  Even more unforeseen were Soviet 
announcements of both unilateral national troop reductions and military force 
withdrawals from Eastern Europe.79  It was during this period that a range of critical 
factors (including domestic pressures relating to overwhelming military spending and 
other imperatives associated with the security and economic objectives of détente) had 
compelled the Soviets to energetically advance these proposals.  Together with NATO’s 
largely constructive responses, East-West dialogue had reached a defining moment.  
Fen Osler Hampson notes: 
The general feeling at the time was that the initiative was more than just 
propaganda, reflecting the Soviet need for “significant savings in defense 
expenditures” and the recognition that these savings could “be best made in 
conventional forces.”  Related to this argument was the view “that the restruc- 
turing of the Soviet economic system [required] another phase of détente….80 
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 During this momentous period of rapprochement, which culminated in the 
historic summit meeting between United States President Ronald Reagan and Soviet 
Secretary General Gorbachev in Reykjavik in 1986, it had become increasingly evident 
that while inexorably linked, nuclear and conventional arms each required their own 
suitably focused consultations so as to ensure commensurable reductions in both.  
Indeed, within NATO, there existed a specific concern that, unless corresponding cuts 
in conventional weapons could be achieved, nuclear force reductions would place 
Western Europe at particular risk to the numerically superior WTO.  This imperative 
was clearly asserted in the 1986 Brussels Declaration: 
 3.  While maintaining effective deterrence involving both nuclear and 
 conventional forces, we seek to establish a stable relationship of conventional 
 forces in Europe.  Reductions in nuclear weapons which are the subject of 
 discussions between the US and the USSR in Geneva would increase the 
 importance of eliminating conventional disparities.81 
 As noted by Dieter Mahncke, the Brussels Declaration provided “remarkably 
clear language” in conveying a principled response to Soviet proposals, including a 
necessary refutation of the equal numerical reductions proposed by Moscow, given the 
significant European conventional force imbalances that already existed in favour of the 
WTO.82  In addition to the “elimination of disparities,” the Declaration further 
communicated the requirement to discuss other prevailing factors, including specific 
armaments, military force levels, mobility, deployments and readiness, along with 
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“considerations of geography.”83  Moreover, the Declaration effectively advanced the 
principles espoused in the Rome Ministerial Final Communiqué as stated objectives, 
including: 
 …‘the establishment of a stable and secure level of forces, geared to the 
elimination of disparities,’ a step-by-step negotiating process focusing on ‘the 
elimination of the capability for surprise attack or for the initiation of large scale 
offensive action,’ the redressing of regional imbalances, as well as more 
openness, calculability and an effective verification regime.84  
 Accordingly, the Brussels Declaration signified the transition from the on-going 
MBFR talks to more suitably oriented dialogue focusing upon specified imperatives, 
including the call for “a new mandate for negotiating on conventional arms control 
covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.”85  
 In February 1987, the Conventional Stability Talks (also referred to as the 
Conventional Mandate Talks) between NATO and the WTO commenced as a derivative 
of the MBFR process.  Over the course of nearly two years, both sides worked out the 
details of a mandate, resulting in the January 1989 transition to the Negotiations on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which were conducted within the framework of 
the CSCE.  With this transition, the MBFR process ended, with no concluding 
agreement having been reached.86 
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 With its mandate now established, formal CFE negotiations commenced on 
9 March 1989 in Vienna.  Despite the great complexity of these consultations, progress 
was rapidly made, with NATO’s broad acceptance of a number of Soviet weapon 
system reduction proposals, further complemented by the Soviets’ acceptance of NATO 
proposals in stationed personnel reductions.  Negotiations were subsequently impacted 
by the rapidly unfolding events in the Soviet Union and its satellites, leading to the 
eventual dismantling of the entire Soviet political apparatus.  Nevertheless, these 
developments had provided even greater imperative for Moscow to secure acceptable 
force reduction levels not only with NATO, but also with its WTO partners within the 
negotiated Soviet total.  It is evident that this had become a matter of urgent security 
and political survival for Moscow, given the impending “collapse” of Communist rule 
in Eastern Europe and the effective “disintegration” of Soviet control within its 
periphery.87   
 Ultimately, negotiations were successful, with the CFE Treaty signed on 
19 November 1990.  This was followed shortly thereafter by negotiations to set military 
personnel limits within the CFE Treaty’s Area of Application.  The resultant 
Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed 
Forces in Europe, or CFE-1A, established a political commitment to maintain verifiable 
military personnel levels within established limits and to provide notification of changes 
in these levels.  Following ratification, both the CFE Treaty and CFE 1A entered-into-
force on 17 July 1992.88 
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 Subsequent evolutions of the CFE Treaty, including its series of quinquennial 
and extraordinary review conferences, the 1990 Adapted CFE Treaty Agreement, along 
with key events associated with the Agreement, will be discussed in detail later in the 
thesis. 
Helsinki and the Path to the Vienna Document 
 The Helsinki process, undertaken in parallel with the MBFR consultations, was 
in several respects the long-term outcome of an initial proposal by the Soviet Union in 
the 1950s for the establishment of a European-specific consultative mechanism for 
security and cooperation.  This early proposal had not been particularly well received by 
the West, given the assessed Soviet objective to solidify European boundaries 
established following World War II as means of consolidating power, countering 
American influence and further enabling the expansion of communism.  It also sought 
to legitimise East Germany and other Soviet regimes as the political status quo, 
dissuade Western European states (in particular, West Germany) from seeking NATO 
membership and otherwise expand Soviet pan-European influence.89  As such, little 
Western support existed for such a contrivance until the WTO submitted a revised 
proposal under its 1969 Budapest Declaration.90  As noted by Daniel James Thomas, by 
that time, changes in prevailing geostrategic conditions (which included the attainment 
of East-West nuclear parity, the entrenchment of Soviet hegemony following the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, and Eastern economic stagnation) had provided Moscow 
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and in particular, the Soviet republics, greater incentive to seek closer pan-European 
relations.  Moscow had long sought Western recognition of the “legitimacy” of the 
Soviet bloc and earlier efforts aimed at undermining Western Europe’s alignment with 
the United States’ position on this matter had failed.  Accordingly, a cooperative 
consultative apparatus came to be regarded as the means through which Moscow could 
progress its legitimisation and better influence European affairs generally.  The 
governments of Soviet bloc countries were motivated by the opportunity to reduce their 
dependency upon Moscow by gaining access to Western markets and investment, which 
were largely out of reach without some means of rapprochement.91   
 These broad circumstances therefore presented the Soviet bloc with suitable 
enticements for expanded dialogue.  They also afforded Moscow with favourable 
conditions under which détente could be employed to advance its strategic agenda, as 
envisioned by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev:  
Leonid Brezhnev himself believed that détente suited the ideological purposes of 
the Soviet Union…. Once the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the consolidation 
of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe was complete, Moscow was ready to 
offer new terms for the security conference it had so long desired.92   
 Although neutral, Finland had nevertheless maintained close relations with 
Moscow and as such, was able to serve as an impartial interlocutor in this endeavour.  
By May 1969, following preliminary discussions, sufficient momentum had been 
attained for the government of Finland to invite European countries, along with the 
                                                
91 Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism.  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 34-35. 
92 Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of 
Communism, 34-35. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      71 
United States and Canada, to Helsinki for dedicated consultations on security and 
cooperation.93  By November 1972, the resultant Helsinki Consultations were 
underway, with representatives from 35 states undertaking the far-reaching negotiations 
necessary to “hammer out” the arrangements for a formalised conference framework.94  
The opportunity presented by these events also brought with them a range of issues for 
the United States, in that the broad nature of the proposed consultations would have less 
focus, predictability and perhaps more importantly, less direct influence than existed in 
established bilateral dialogue.95  There were also specific concerns that security and 
cooperation discussions of this nature might distract or even impede on-going strategic 
security negotiations with Moscow.96  Within NATO, there was also a divergence of 
views and varying degrees of support for such discourse with the Soviets.97  Similar 
variances also existed amongst neutral and non-aligned European states, over which the 
United States held less sway.98   
 As then-United States National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger noted: “a 
conference would probably find the East European countries closely aligned with a rigid 
Soviet position, while the Western participants would be competing with each other to 
find ways to ‘break the deadlock.’”99 Particularly worrisome for the United States was 
that any formal acknowledgement of the Eastern European status quo (i.e., Soviet 
territorial entrenchment, including the absorption of the Baltic States) would constitute 
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an insupportable concession to Moscow.  Nevertheless, bending somewhat to its allies 
and other European partners, the United States ultimately conceded to participating in 
what would become the CSCE.  With the support and reassurances of Western 
European states,100 Washington rationalised the consultations as presenting limited risk, 
while outwardly maintaining that its existing position(s) could be maintained in what 
could otherwise serve as a worthwhile, albeit adjacent approach to progressing the 
European security agenda. 101 102 
 These developments notwithstanding, as late as 1974, Kissinger (now United 
States Secretary of State) largely deprecated the Helsinki process as a “meaningless 
process” and a “grandstand play to the left” that the Americans “went along with” at the 
behest of European states that were seeking a more pluralistic, broad-based form of 
dialogue.103  Indeed, many European Community states viewed the Helsinki Process as 
a rare opportunity to engage in a dedicated discourse through which to lower barriers, 
while also serving to assert Western beliefs across a broader range of issues.104  
Accordingly, the talks were promoted by Washington’s allies and partners as 
worthwhile in not only improving relations on a practical level, but (given that the 
Soviets had first proposed such dialogue) also demonstrating the superiority of Western 
ideology in negotiating practical measures, to include such aspects as fundamental 
human rights.105   
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 By 1975, with the process nearly completed, President Gerald Ford responded to 
domestic criticism by emphasising that American acquiescence to Helsinki had not 
obliged the United States to anything more than to which it was already committed.  He 
further stressed that while the Helsinki process included “some military understandings 
such as advance notice of manoeuvres,” they were not to be confused with on-going 
Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) or MBFR negotiations.  In allaying the 
concerns of Americans of Eastern-European descent, he stated: “the Helsinki summit is 
linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and pursuing 
peace, but it is a much more general and modest undertaking.”106   
 Irrespective of Ford’s and Kissinger’s characterisations, the Helsinki process 
rapidly developed into a comprehensive and energised consultative mechanism, through 
which a broad range of compromises and concessions by both sides were merged into a 
resultant framework.107  These included Soviet acquiescence to the full participation of 
both the United States and Canada in the consultations in exchange for securing other 
European states’ participation, along with increased “military-specific” dialogue.  While 
Moscow had been more interested in economic cooperation, Washington and NATO 
had grudgingly sought a military consultative element in order to ensure a measure of 
equilibrium, while still recognizing the requirement to maintain due focus within the 
more explicit MBFR consultations.108  However, the roles played by Yugoslavia (of the 
Neutral and Non-aligned Group), and France in advancing the concept of “confidence-
building measures” had proven highly significant: 
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Of special relevance for national security concerns was the creation of a very 
modest collection of confidence-building measures.  …Helsinki CBMs 
established an important procedural precedent and fostered a modest but 
enduring (primarily European) interest in developing a much more elaborate 
collection of second generation CBMs called confidence- and security-building 
measures or CSBMs.109  
 Accordingly, the military dynamic addressed within the Helsinki process, while 
initially met with less than unbridled enthusiasm by the major participants, would prove 
itself an element of compromise that would later have a far more significant outcome as 
one of the principle areas of multilateral dialogue; namely, security; economics, science, 
technology and the environment; and humanitarian and cultural concerns.110 
 
 In August 1975, the Conference on Security and Co-operation Final Act 
(Helsinki Final Act) was signed in Helsinki by the leaders of 33 European states (that is, 
all European states less Albania, which had refused to participate because of the Soviet 
Union - United States orientation of the process),111 the United States and Canada.  The 
complexity and degree of effort associated with this agreement cannot be overstated.  
Indeed, the details of the Final Act itself best serve to underscore the rare opportunity 
presented by the circumstances of that time in enabling agreement to such a 
comprehensive framework of security and cooperative measures.   
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 As noted by the Historian of the United States Department of State, despite 
continued opposition to what was viewed as the West’s concession on established 
territorial boundaries (that is, the Soviet annexation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), 
other political and social provisions, including those pertaining to human rights and 
freedoms, served to offset Soviet territorial and political entrenchment.  Indeed, the 
monitoring and reporting processes established under the Final Act ensured specific 
oversight and accountability concerning violations of this nature.112  In addition, 
following interventions made by Canada, Ireland, Spain and other states, the language 
of the Final Act’s Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating 
States, was modified to state: “frontiers can be changed, in accordance with 
international law, by peaceful means and by agreement.”113  This was in addition to the 
provision concerning a state’s “rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, 
including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity 
and to freedom and political independence.”114  The United States also took the 
opportunity to specifically reaffirm its extant non-recognition of the annexation of the 
Baltic States within the Soviet Union.115   
 The Helsinki Final Act is a politically-binding agreement, containing a range of 
measures oriented upon three general areas of cooperation -- commonly referred to as 
“baskets” -- designed to enhance security and cooperation throughout the area 
associated with the territories of its participating States.  The first “basket” addresses 
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political and military issues and is premised upon the Declaration on Principles 
Guiding Relations between Participating States, also known as the “Decalogue,” which 
declares the commitment of each participating State to “respect and put into practice” 
the following ten principles in guiding mutual relations: 
• Sovereign equality and respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; 
• Refraining from the threat or use of force; 
• Inviolability of frontiers; 
• Territorial integrity of states; 
• Peaceful settlement of disputes; 
• Non-intervention in internal affairs; 
• Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the 
freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; 
• Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 
• Cooperation amongst states; and 
• Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law;116 
These principles are reinforced through the implementation of CSBM, as specified 
under the “Document on confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security 
and disarmament.”117 
 The second “basket” addresses trade and other economic issues, along with 
scientific, technological, environmental and labour cooperation.  The third “basket” 
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addresses human rights, including freedom of mobility, family reunification, emigration 
cultural/education exchanges and freedom of the press.  The remainder of the Final Act 
provides particulars concerning further consultations and implementation procedures.118 
 Building upon the “baskets” established under the Final Act, a series of key 
CSCE consultations ensued, including those held in Belgrade in (1977 - 1978), Madrid 
(1980 - 1983), Ottawa (1985), Stockholm (1986), and Vienna (1986 - 1989).   It is 
important to note that the specific nature and direction of these consultations were 
closely interconnected with and further impelled by external factors, most significant of 
which concerned the momentous chain of events ultimately leading to the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union.  Indeed, a general breakdown of détente in the late 1970s --
interspersed with competing United States-Soviet regional interests, the Soviet invasion 
of Afghanistan and setbacks leading to the non-ratification of the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty II -- had slowed progress in on-going security consultations.119  It was 
only with the ascendency of Mikhail Gorbachev as General Secretary of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union in 1985 and as President in 1991 that the conventional arms 
control and regional security agendas picked up again.  Indeed, the overall process was 
reinvigorated not only due to Gorbachev’s “new political thinking,” but more 
specifically, his attempts to decentralise and democratize the Soviet Union, ultimately 
resulting in its collapse in 1991 and along with it, Moscow’s post-war domination of 
Eastern Europe.120 
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 The culmination of the CSCE consultations was the Concluding Document of 
the Vienna Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (1989), 
modestly described by Arie Bloed as a “major step forward in the Helsinki process.”121 
Embodying the key components of the Helsinki Final Act and incorporating CSBMs as 
separately agreed in Stockholm in 1986, the Concluding Document constitutes the basis 
of the 1990 Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and its 
successive 1992, 1994, 1999 and 2011 iterations.  Further, the Concluding Document 
incorporated the mandate and all “organisational and procedural modalities” for the 
CSCE, thereby institutionalising it.  Lastly, the Final Act established the mandate for 
the Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.122  
 Thus, the Helsinki Process and CSCE consultations not only established the 
Vienna Document, they also enabled the CSCE’s transformation to that of a permanent 
establishment in 1995: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE).  Further expounded and formalized through the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe (1990), the CSCE Helsinki Document (1992) and the Budapest Summit (1994), 
the new OSCE was accorded its formal (but not legal) status, along with a headquarters 
in Vienna, a Secretariat, Conflict Prevention Centre, Parliamentary Assembly, Senior 
Council and other constituent parts.  Additional components would be added with the 
establishment of corresponding treaties, accords and tasks, as overseen by the new 
organisation. 
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Figure 2.3: OSCE Permanent Council Meeting, Hofburg Palace, Vienna123 
 At this juncture, it is worth noting the politically-binding status of the Vienna 
Document regime.  That is to say, while not legally obliged, as is the case with States 
Parties of the CFE and Open Skies Treaties, the participating States of the Vienna 
Document are nevertheless committed to conform with its provisions with respect to 
their individual and collective compliance, modification, or withdrawal.  Therefore, 
while not subject to international law per se, the non-compliance, non-conformity or 
other contravention of a participating State nevertheless remains subject to an 
appropriate political response.124  This is reflected in the status of the OSCE itself, 
whereby membership constitutes a political commitment, which is considered to enable 
greater flexibility in the oversight and execution of security cooperation throughout the 
“OSCE area” (i.e., the territories of its participating States).  As will be discussed, the 
OSCE’s lack of legal status has, in many respects, limited its international authority, 
along with the protection of its field operations -- particularly in conflict and other high-
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risk areas.  It also necessitates the negotiation of separate collaborative arrangements 
with individual participating States, precluding a “uniform operating environment.”125 
The Innovation of Open Skies 
 While interrelated with parallel developments in contemporary conventional 
arms control, the Open Skies Treaty can specifically trace its beginnings to the July 
1955 Geneva Summit.  There, the leaders of the principal post-war powers (namely, 
Prime Minister Edgar of France; Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin of the Soviet Union; 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden of the United Kingdom; and President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower of the United States) had gathered to discuss matters pertaining to global 
security as a response to the rising tensions that had developed over the decade 
following the end of World War II.  Discussions were broad in nature; including 
security, disarmament, trade, German reunification, and various other approaches to 
improving the overall relationship between East and West.126  
 The Summit was a significant step in initiating direct security consultations and 
breaking down some of the impediments to relations amongst the powers, including 
those resulting from the lack of regular consultative contact.  As noted by Saki Dockrill 
and Gunter Bischof, it also provided a means through which to introduce new thinking 
in progressing both peaceful coexistence and collaboration, including the concept of 
free trade.  Indeed, the Soviet leadership had advocated a new system of collective 
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security that included the dismantling of NATO and the perpetual neutrality of 
Germany and other European states, as had been demonstrated by its agreement to re-
establish Austria as an independent state in 1955.127  Nevertheless, West Germany’s 
entry into NATO and Moscow’s response in creating the Warsaw Pact had aptly 
demonstrated that considerable challenges existed in building trust and confidence.  The 
positive ambiance of the Summit and the general receptiveness of all parties to 
discussion (often referred to as the “spirit of Geneva”), therefore served to reduce 
tensions and promote goodwill, despite not having secured any specific agreement on 
arms control or other major international issues.128 
 A key issue in attaining agreement on security pertained to the concept of 
“mutual inspection” as a precept of arms control and in particular, reductions and 
controls of respective nuclear stockpiles.  Given the varied issues associated with 
inspections as means of confirmation/validation, President Eisenhower proposed an 
"open skies" concept, which would permit states to conduct aerial observation flights as 
means of facilitating the active monitoring necessary to verify and validate exchanged 
information concerning respective military establishments.  Indeed, in his address at the 
Summit, Eisenhower strongly emphasized the utility of the concept in not only 
establishing a reliable means of confirming mutually-agreed armament holdings 
(including nuclear stockpiles), but also mitigating more immediate risks related to 
military force posture/disposition and the real or perceived potential of surprise 
attack.129   
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 Taken aback somewhat by this proposal, along with additional offers to disclose 
even more information concerning the United States’ strategic order of battle 
(contingent upon reciprocal disclosure), Soviet representatives (which included 
Communist Party First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and Foreign Minister Vayacheslav 
Molotov) rejected the intrusive nature of such a concept, which was perceived as a 
significant enhancement to American strategic targeting and intelligence-gathering 
capability.  This is understandable, given the clear strategic nuclear advantage held by 
the United States at that time, along with the fact that the concept was indeed a form of 
overt and controlled reciprocal intelligence acquisition in an era preceding space-based 
sensors.  John Prados observed that the United States also had much to gain politically 
in its offer, given its superiority in both nuclear forces and integral strategic 
reconnaissance, as exemplified by the introduction of the U-2 “spy” aircraft at that time.  
Irrespectively, Eisenhower had introduced what he had described as "an idea that might 
open a tiny gate in the disarmament fence," by according the Soviet Union the 
opportunity to partake, as an equal partner, in a collaborative scheme of reciprocal 
military information exchange, backed up by airborne monitoring and inspection.130	
	 Although the Open Skies proposal was effectively dismissed by the Soviets, the 
"Spirit of Geneva" nevertheless served to ease East-West tensions through direct contact 
and dialogue on security and cooperation, while introducing some innovative new 
conceptions of arms control, disarmament and security-building.  The Summit also 
underscored the unique post-war conditions -- including the permanent threat of nuclear 
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conflict – that had emerged as an imperative to seeking courses through which to better 
safeguard peace and security, irrespective of the East-West ideological chasm.131  
 Three-and-a-half decades later, with the Cold War drawing down and in 
correlation with the advent of the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and other security 
accords, the Open Skies concept was reintroduced by United States President 
George H.W. Bush.  Bush pitched Open Skies as a means of specifically enhancing 
security and confidence between NATO and the WTO within what had become a 
markedly altered strategic security paradigm.132  While both the Soviet Union and 
United States had developed, over the years, significant satellite-based national 
reconnaissance capabilities -- some of which were being employed for the verification 
of specific nuclear arms control agreements (i.e., SALT I and START II) -- such 
resources were tightly controlled and largely unavailable to the international 
community.  John Hawes observed that major changes in the international dynamic had 
significantly transformed the national security imperatives of states:  
There is no longer a simple bipolar confrontation. There is no single formula for 
structuring security questions…. Many states, both large and small, that had 
become accustomed to Cold War security alignments, are now reassessing their 
international position.  The security role of international organizations, including 
the United Nations and regional bodies, is becoming increasingly important.  In 
this context it is essential that as much relevant information as possible be 
directly available to all states so that they can make more accurate assessments 
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of their security situation, their force requirements, and the possibilities for 
international action and arms control.133 
 It was in this context that Bush had assessed the emergent strategic environment 
as one that would now favour the establishment of an evolved aerial observation 
regime.  While undertaken in part as a specific American response to a number of 
domestic and foreign policy reforms introduced by Moscow, Bush believed that such a 
regime would more fully secure Moscow’s commitment to increased security 
transparency and reform.134  As the result of preliminary bilateral consultations held 
with Canadian officials, the “Open Skies” concept was subsequently expanded beyond 
the purview of the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective alliances as a 
broad-based multilateral accord.  This modification was made with a view to 
empowering smaller nations with the means of independently acquiring information on 
the military forces and activities of other states of potential concern to them.135 
 With this modification, the Bush proposal received strong Canadian 
endorsement and advocacy.  This helped garner the support of other Allies and even 
some WTO members, based upon the premise that such a regime would have an 
“equalizing” effect within an increasingly open and flexible international security 
structure.  In a remarkably short period, sufficient momentum had been generated to 
convene an international conference on Open Skies, hosted by the Canadian government 
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in Ottawa, in February 1990.  Subsequent negotiations were conducted over the 
following two years in Budapest, Vienna, and Helsinki.136   
 Despite Bush’s executive sponsorship and Soviet President Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s overall receptiveness, both leaders encountered considerable difficulties 
within their respective administrations.  The United States defence and intelligence 
establishments had sought to advantage themselves by securing specific procedural 
provisions, along with the employment of superior American sensor and other 
technologies for their exclusive use.  Corresponding Soviet establishments sought 
various technical and procedural caveats so as to prevent any American technical 
advantage and otherwise limit the concept’s aim of full transparency in order to protect 
their security interests.137  Internal divisions on both sides ensued, with various 
positions taken by respective agencies.  Dan Lindley characterized the internal struggle 
on the American side as follows: 
 As these agencies moved to make the proposal concrete and firm up the U.S. 
bargaining position, they split among and within each other between those who 
wanted intrusive inspections and were willing to give up some secrecy in return, 
and those who placed a higher priority on secrecy.138 
 Negotiations in Ottawa and Budapest were subsequently impeded by these 
varied exigencies and caveats, along with the general bureaucratic obstinacy of both 
Washington’s and Moscow’s defence and intelligence establishments.  Ultimately, it 
was the personal insistence of Bush and Gorbachev that ensured the fundamental 
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principles of a balanced and transparent accord were effectively preserved.  Their 
resolve was further bolstered by the enthusiastic support of several other states that, 
lacking organic strategic reconnaissance capabilities, recognised the principle, practical 
application and overall value of the concept.  Resistance nevertheless continued in the 
United States and Soviet Union until both leaders had to compel their respective 
bureaucracies to fall into line.  This proved to be a more daunting undertaking for 
Gorbachev who, in August 1991, had to overcome an attempted government and 
military coup.  It was only then, following the resultant removal of several hardliners, 
that the Soviets returned to the negotiations later that year, which led to an agreement 
finally being reached.139  In the end, both sides had compromised significantly, with 
Washington abandoning its attempt to secure superior sensors for their exclusive use 
and Moscow accepting unrestricted observation overflights, with no territorial 
constraints.   
 Although the Treaty was signed in Helsinki on 24 March 1992, a decade of 
provisional application would ensue before it would finally enter-into-force on 
1 January 2002.  This followed an extended period of ratification in Ukraine, Russia and 
Belarus that had been punctuated by internal political upheaval, institutional resistance 
and cost-related issues concerning the new regime.140  
 The first major European security accord established after the Cold War, the 
Open Skies Treaty has been widely regarded as the most extensive international 
mechanism ever established in promoting transparency and confidence regarding the 
disposition and posture of military forces and other strategic capabilities of its 
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respective States Parties.141  The highly unique circumstances under which the regime’s 
concept was introduced, negotiated and eventually codified, serve to underscore the 
exceptional conditions that existed in generating the political will necessary to create 
such an accord.  In this instance, high-level political intervention was required -- at 
considerable risk -- to overcome persistent institutional intransigence in order to 
establish this unprecedented security regime.142 
Interrelationships 
 As indicated here, the conception and formulation of the three regimes have not 
only been closely interconnected with major developments in international relations, but 
represent distinct evolutions in their own right.  Irrespective of their specific origins, 
orientation and jurisdiction, they have reshaped contemporary concepts of security. 
With the CFE Treaty establishing a controlled balance of conventional forces; the 
Vienna Document instituting extensive CSBM; and the Open Skies Treaty providing a 
framework of transparency through aerial observation, they constitute the vital 
symbiotic constituents of the OSCE’s overarching security and cooperation framework.   
 While not exhaustive, Figure 2.3 provides a general frame of reference for the 
chronological sequence and interrelationships of events associated with the evolution of 
the CFE Treaty, Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty, together with the CSCE and 
OSCE, as noted here and in subsequent chapters.   
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Figure 2.4: Contemporary evolution of conventional arms control143 
 The interdependence of these regimes was effectually denoted in remarks by 
Damian Leader, Chief United States Arms Control Delegate in a 2012 address to the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly:    
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…the U.S. believes in the indivisibility of security throughout the Euroatlantic 
area and the interdependence of all three OSCE Dimensions.  Human rights, 
economic development, and military transparency, along with the OSCE 
instruments that promote them, are all part of a seamless cloth of comprehensive 
European security.  Arms control is a key part of that effort.  …all three regimes 
contribute to security and stability in their unique ways, but when they are 
working in harmony, the result is greater stability for all.144   
 Generally speaking, the respective provisions of these regimes incorporate 
extensive individual and collective compliance and conformity stipulations in order to 
attain their designed purpose.  While greater detail will be provided in subsequent 
chapters, they are summarized as follows:  
• The CFE Treaty places two major limitations on conventional 
armaments, equipment and personnel (under CFE-1A) within its 
designated Area of Application; namely, 1) overarching ceilings 
established between the respective “Eastern and Western Groups of 
States Parties,” and 2) geographic limitations within specified concentric 
geographic zones to preclude the conventional force concentrations 
required for large-scale offensive operations.  These “Treaty Limited 
Equipment” ceilings include specific categorizations of tanks, armoured 
combat vehicles, artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft.  
Detailed military data exchanges, monitoring and inspections enable 
valid measurements and assessments, thereby ensuring the reliability of 
reported force dispositions; 
 
• The Vienna Document establishes CSBM concerning specific military 
activities conducted within its designated “zone of application.”  This is 
attained through a combination of an annual “global exchange” of 
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military information, force disposition notifications, area inspections, on-
site evaluations and observation visits, along with various forms of 
military-to-military contacts; and 
 
• The Open Skies Treaty provides broad military transparency through the 
use of unrestricted observation flights conducted over the entire 
territories of all States Parties, employing approved observation aircraft, 
procedures and certified sensors; namely, electro-optical panoramic and 
framing cameras, video, infra-red line scanning systems and sideways-
looking synthetic aperture radars. 
 Despite the significantly evolved and elaborate nature of these international 
security structures, it is important to recall that their basis remains fundamentally 
adversarial in nature.  That is, arms control agreements are negotiated to best mitigate 
threats to national security or other detrimental consequences.145  Nevertheless, while 
discord constitutes an intrinsic element of regimes and international relations generally, 
cooperation can still exist.  In this regard, Stephen Krasner’s characterisation of regimes 
as “institutions possessing implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations,”146 is germane.  More specifically: 
… dilemmas of common aversions and dilemmas of common interest are 
distributions of references that do create incentives to establish and maintain 
international regimes.  Both involve strategic interaction.  Dilemmas of common 
aversions refer to situations in which actors must coordinate their policies by 
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agreeing on some set of rules or conventions to avoid mutually undesirable 
outcomes.147 
 Given the precarious strategic security situation that existed only a few decades 
ago, it remains highly important to recognise not only the tremendous achievement 
represented by the three major conventional arms control accords, but also the 
exceptional circumstances that led to their creation.   It is equally important to bear in 
mind the need to preserve their fundamental integrity, as observed by Jeffery D. 
McCausland: 
At its very core, any arms control agreement depends upon a harmony of interest 
among the signatories.  This harmony is based on careful analysis by each nation 
that the security benefits gained by entering the regime outweigh the risks 
associated with reducing military forces and accepting a transparency regime 
that includes data exchanges and verification inspections.  Consequently, it is 
critical to underscore once again that arms control is a “method or way” to 
achieve the “objective” of improved security.148 
 McCausland further explains that arms control remains a function of states’ 
foreign and security policies, which directly impact upon how an accord is established 
and what is required to sustain it.  That said, he also notes that within the contemporary 
European landscape, cooperative security, the indivisibility of security and military 
transparency should take precedence in order to ensure that any new agreements do not 
encumber the maintenance or improvement of existing agreements.  This is an 
important consideration, given the view held by many proliferation security experts that 
the CFE Treaty has become obsolete and that the Vienna Document and Open Skies 
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Treaty are not far behind.  Others maintain that recalibration, adaptation or other forms 
of modification to existing regimes constitute more measured, pragmatic and logical 
approaches than their outright replacement. 
Conclusion 
 Both the essential value and relevance of conventional arms control and CSBM 
have been introduced here as prefatory frame of reference, as well as to emphasise the 
imperative of political will and common resolve in their successful oversight and 
implementation.  In order to provide suitable context, general conceptual 
characterisations have been included with the acknowledgement that the three regimes, 
as currently established and implemented, are fraught with “real world” imperfections, 
issues and challenges.  Nevertheless, when considered in essential terms, their 
fundamental value continues to be recognized and supported.  In a 2012 address to the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Rose Gottemoeller, the United States 
Acting Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, asserted 
that the CFE Treaty, Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty continue to “provide a 
foundation for security in our strategic relationships.”149  Moreover, while 
acknowledging the myriad challenges (and associated scepticism) facing these regimes 
with respect to their continued viability, suitability and relevance, Gottemoeller further 
emphasised that:  
“… conventional arms control, done right, can significantly improve security on 
the continent by helping to address today’s concerns.  It can provide confidence 
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regarding the military activities and intentions of neighbors, especially in 
sensitive areas.  We also need to spend our stretched defense budgets wisely.  
Arms control can help us do that, for the more predictable our relationships, the 
better we can plan our defense spending.  The conventional arms control regime 
that has been in place in Europe since the end of the Cold War contributes to the 
security of the continent.  In order to maintain security and stability, this regime 
requires constant tending.150  
 At this juncture, it important to recall that, irrespective of its evolution or 
sophistication, conventional arms control does not constitute a means unto itself, but 
rather a political process leading to a consensus-based, formalised method through 
which the specific security objectives of states are secured.  Accordingly, McCausland’s 
aforesaid “harmony of interest” can be expected only when inherent disaccord, variance 
and risk are sufficiently outweighed -- not just in the establishment, but also in the 
sustained oversight and implementation of any such agreement.151   
 This chapter has provided an elementary overview and perspective concerning 
the contemporary concept of conventional arms control, its “fit” within the broader 
security spectrum, and the principal characteristics of its operating model.  The 
accompanying prehistory has illustrated the closely interrelated circumstances and 
conditions enabling their formulation and evolution.  Together, they comprise an 
important frame of reference in consideration of the following case studies and analysis, 
with a view to ensuring a common understanding in consideration of the degraded state 
of the three major conventional arms control regimes and their prospects of recovery. 
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CASE STUDY 1:    
THE TREATY ON CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
 This chapter will provide a detailed case-study examination and appraisal of the 
establishment, characteristics, performance, evolution and ultimate diminution of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, commonly known as the 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (or CFE Treaty).  Each area of examination will 
be undertaken with respect to the Treaty’s fundamental purpose, application and overall 
effectiveness as a major instrument of conventional arms control and international 
security.  Associated estimations will include political, technical and operational factors 
as they specifically pertain to the Treaty’s implementation, record of performance, and 
current state.  The assigned research questions will be addressed through an account of 
those factors that have specifically contributed to the decline of the regime, the 
implications of this decline and the prospects of recovery.  These factors include those 
specifically pertaining to Treaty governance, management and implementation, which 
will serve to demonstrate the critical importance of their interactions and 
interdependence. 
 Specific considerations in this case study will include: 
• the prevailing conditions enabling the negotiation and establishment of 
the Treaty;  
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• an overview of the Treaty’s particulars, characteristics and performance 
in attaining and maintaining its specified objectives; 
• major developments in the evolution of the Treaty; 
• circumstances and contributing factors affecting the governance, 
management and implementation of the Treaty and their resultant 
impact; 
• specific efforts to adapt and sustain the Treaty; and 
• the current state of the Treaty in terms of its viability, implications and 
outlook. 
Accordingly, the chapter will explain how the exceptional circumstances 
associated with the establishment of the CFE Treaty enabled its remarkable early 
achievements.  It will also demonstrate how inattention and inaction in addressing 
transgressions and other stresses contributed significantly to the weakening of the 
Treaty’s integrity, eventually resulting in its current nominal state.  This will illustrate 
the vital importance of preserving the viability of the interdependent components of the 
governance, management and implementation model.    
Backdrop 
 As noted in the preceding chapter, extraordinary geostrategic circumstances 
enabled the conceptual formulation, negotiation and eventual establishment of the CFE 
Treaty.  Indeed, the introduction of the “nuclear equation” at the end of World War II 
resulted in an unprecedented alteration of the international system and with it, the 
security strategies and foreign policies of states within emergent alliances.  This was 
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initially denoted by United States - Soviet enmity and the establishment of nuclear 
deterrence as a principal determinant of strategic military doctrine.  Subsequent strategic 
parity and various manifestations of antagonism between the United States and Soviet 
Union led to myriad nuclear and conventional weapons security-related evolutions 
throughout the Cold War.   
While emergent détente between the United States and Soviet Union dominated 
the global security environment in the 1970s, it was apparent that bilateral consultative 
mechanisms were proving insufficient in addressing the concerns of other strategic 
security partners.  This insufficiency was reflected in a joint statement of principles that 
concluded the May 1972 Moscow Summit.  One of the major milestones of strategic 
détente between Washington and Moscow, the Summit included the signing of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and the United 
States-Soviet Union Incidents at Sea Agreement.  It also addressed aspects of Euro-
Atlantic security, but did so without the participation of other stakeholders.  As noted by 
Linda P. Brady, with the release of the Summit’s joint statement of principles, “West 
Europeans expressed concern about the possible compromise of their interests in a 
bilateral forum.”152 
 
As détente progressed, it became increasingly apparent that the “introduction of 
a European dimension to what had been until then an essentially bilateral arms control 
process” was required.153   Given the Soviet Union’s growing impulse to engage in the 
political and economic aspects of détente (as evidenced by repeated proposals for a 
                                                
152 Linda P. Brady, “Negotiating European Security: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR),” 
International Security Review, Vol. I, No. II (1981): 190. 
153 Linda P. Brady, “Negotiating European Security: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR):” 
190. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      97 
conference on security and cooperation in Europe), a momentous opportunity emerged 
to negotiate the establishment of a broader multilateral framework within which specific 
military-related concerns could be addressed in return for participation in the broader 
security and cooperation consultations sought by Moscow.  Soviet reticence to engage 
in a multilateral military dialogue notwithstanding, subsequent compromise resulted in 
the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations, later renamed the Mutual 
Reductions of Forces and Armaments in Central Europe, which first took place in 
Vienna, Austria in October 1973.  These negotiations represented a unique convergence 
of circumstances that would eventually enable unprecedented advancements in 
conventional arms control and disarmament.  Indeed, the exceptional conditions that led 
to these initial negotiations would continue to influence the consultations and outcomes 
that would follow.154  
MBFR Negotiations, Real World Developments and Resultant Outcomes 
Given the variance of Soviet and Western objectives, it is important to recall that 
the CFE Treaty was the progeny of both the relatively focused MBFR dialogue (i.e., 
that between the United States/NATO and Soviet Union/WTO) and the broader, 
politically-oriented dialogue specifically sought by the Soviet Union through the CSCE.  
While the initial CSCE consultative process successfully concluded with the 1975 
signing of the Helsinki Final Act by 33 European states, the United States and Canada, 
MBFR talks -- beset by various difficulties – struggled along until 1989, when they 
were formally terminated.  Although these bloc-to-bloc negotiations concluded without 
an agreement, they were successful insofar as introducing and refining CSBM proposals 
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that were subsequently negotiated in the CSCE process.  Furthermore, MBFR served 
very much as the foundation upon which dedicated consultations on conventional forces 
in Europe would be subsequently undertaken.155 
In examining both the genesis and evolution of the consultative processes 
undertaken within MBFR and CSCE, it is essential to bear in mind the prevailing 
geostrategic circumstances and their impact upon respective national security interests 
of that time.  Indeed, these circumstances were appositely reflected in the positions 
adopted and actions carried out throughout that extended period.  As noted by 
Wally Walters, the security interests of the United States were initially oriented towards 
the attainment of a more stable, manageable and affordable balance of power.  This 
included, to the extent possible, the continued containment of the Soviet Union through 
the deterrence afforded by American strategic (including nuclear) capabilities and the 
employment of NATO to further support and sustain them.  This approach was largely 
predicated by the general expectation of the survival of the Soviet Union, however 
evolved, and the continuation of the fundamental ideological rivalry between the two 
superpowers.156  
While the Soviet Union’s approach had necessarily taken into account 
unavoidable realities concerning the disposition of military forces in Europe, its 
reluctant acceptance of MBFR was largely driven by the fact that it constituted a 
condition for Western European states’ participation in the political and economic-
oriented CSCE.  The Soviets had specifically sought CSCE under a broader strategy of 
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détente, as means of further consolidating their strategic security interests in Europe.  
Moscow initially opposed MBFR on the grounds that security was a political matter 
more suitably assigned to CSCE, which should logically precede force reductions and 
arms control dialogue.  When agreement was finally reached on having both CSCE and 
MBFR in 1972, both sides had settled on having no formal linkages between the two.157  
While these delineations were worked out, Moscow’s strategy was suitably adapted, 
while continuing to seek the consolidation of Soviet/WTO capabilities and military 
force levels in Central and Eastern Europe, ensure a stable and manageable reduction of 
United States military forces and otherwise advance Soviet influence in the security 
affairs of Western Europe.158  Outside of these goals, there existed no major incentive 
for the Soviet Union in having the size and composition of either alliance’s 
conventional forces dramatically altered, as noted in this United States Central 
Intelligence Agency appraisal: 
Neither in the MBFR, nor in their broader détente policies for that matter, are 
the Soviets working for a fundamental reconciliation between East and West, 
nor are they interested in underwriting West Europe’s stability and security…. 
The Soviets would see much greater disadvantages than potential gains in an 
agreement which substantially altered present force levels or combat capabilities 
on either the NATO or Warsaw Pact sides….  The Soviets will hold hard to the 
position that the existing relationship of forces should remain essentially 
unchanged…. The Soviet leaders say, and seem to believe, that the “correlation 
of international forces” has shifted in the USSR’s favor.159 
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 This appraisal is important in considering the context of MBFR negotiations and 
subsequent consultations, oversight and implementation.  That is, arms control should 
not be considered an exclusive means of increasing security and stability, but rather part 
of a broader matrix of concessions derived from competing national policies and 
strategies.  Indeed, multilateral arms control moves the concept further towards a “larger 
logic of governmentality” with more involved forms of regulation and control than 
traditional inter-state regulatory agreements.160  This renders the essential concept of 
conventional arms control no less valid, as regardless of the rationale for entering into 
any such agreement, the resultant formalisation of consensus establishes a 
corresponding framework that imposes binding obligations and rights, in accordance 
with its specific terms and conditions.  The point here is that, regardless of competing 
policies and strategies, the preservation of the fundamental integrity of the established 
framework remains essential to its viability – an elemental aspect of this thesis and its 
analysis. 
 
During the MBFR talks, the United States and NATO had initially proposed to 
withdraw 29,000 troops from Europe in return for a corresponding Soviet withdrawal of 
1,700 tanks and 68,000 troops.  That would be followed by a reduction by both sides to 
a total of 900,000 troops apiece.  The Soviet Union and WTO proposed removing 
20,000 soldiers on each side and freezing troop strengths at this reduced level.161  From 
this point of departure, subsequent MBFR negotiations would entail a broad range of 
proposals and counter-proposals, including variations in geographic boundaries and 
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corresponding force reduction formulae.  Generally speaking, proposals from the United 
States and NATO entailed specific, targeted reductions, followed by the establishment 
of common personnel ceilings for both alliances.  The Soviet Union and WTO 
alternatively proposed phased percentage-based reductions of both personnel and 
equipment, with these reductions undertaken nationally, rather than by each alliance as a 
whole.  Elaborate variations of these two essential proposals continued throughout the 
negotiating process.162  
As talks continued into the late-1970s, dialogue had reached the point where 
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems were introduced into the force reduction 
dynamic, adding a critical new component to the overall consultative process and a new 
phase of proposals and counter-proposals.  During this latter period, the MBFR process 
was significantly affected by two specific developments: 
• a major variance in the WTO’s reported values and NATO estimates 
concerning the WTO air and ground personnel figures, necessary to 
establish a baseline for the exchange of military data, bringing MBFR to 
a standstill; and 
• NATO’s 1979 decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles 
within the European theatre.163 
While these two events effectively stalled the MBFR process, a series of 
subsequent “real world” developments served to effectively compel the Soviet Union to 
                                                
162 Rudulf Th. Jurrjens, and Jan Sizoo, Efficacy and Efficiency in Multilateral Policy Formation. The 
Experience of Three Arms Control Negotiations: Geneva, Stockholm, Vienna, 325-327. 
163 John Van Oudenaren, Détente in Europe.  The Soviet Union and the West since 1953, 218-220. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      102 
adopt a more pragmatic approach to proliferation security-related dialogue.  Foremost of 
these were:  
• the introduction of NATO’s “Flexible Response” concept; i.e., revised 
doctrine concerning the employment of nuclear weapons to counter the 
overwhelming superiority of the WTO’s conventional forces;  
• the Reagan administration’s remarkable build-up of American intermediate 
and long-range nuclear forces; and  
• the introduction of the United States’ Strategic Defense Initiative.164  
 Generally speaking, these developments convinced Soviet General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev that effective Soviet countermeasures to the United States’ 
technological and financial investments in strategic defence were becoming increasingly 
untenable.  By 1985, as the United States deployed new intermediate nuclear missiles in 
Europe, the Soviet Union agreed to the resumption of a range of negotiations on 
strategic, intermediate and defensive weapons, leading to the milestone Intermediate 
Nuclear Forces Agreement and Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty.165  While remarkable 
in its own right, this phase of United States-Soviet engagement also put into motion the 
conditions that would ultimately enable significant progress in complementary efforts to 
reduce conventional forces: 
Reagan presided over a massive nuclear buildup and launched an expensive 
effort to build a defense against strategic missiles, which exacerbated tensions 
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with Moscow…. Yet, Reagan’s unconventional leadership style and 
determination also allowed him to reach out to the Soviet leadership and relate 
to Gorbachev’s new and bold thinking. Together the two leaders set their nations 
on a path toward arms control arrangements that reflected their personal 
abhorrence for nuclear war and addressed domestic and international concern 
about where Cold War nuclear rivalry might eventually lead without such 
restraint.166 
In 1986, in response to revised NATO proposals designed to overcome the 
stalemate on WTO military data, Gorbachev proposed substantial reductions in ground 
and tactical air forces in Europe, formal establishment of the Soviets’ previously 
defined “area of application;” (i.e., the “Atlantic to the Urals” (ATTU) region, 
comprising most of Europe, including Russia, extending east to the Ural Mountain 
Range) and instituting a robust verification regime.  Following further consultations and 
refinement, agreement was reached on a “dual-track” approach that would: 
• build upon the confidence- and security-building provisions of the 1986 
Stockholm Document, formalizing on-site inspections; and 
• establish conventional stability in Europe through negotiations on 
reductions and ceilings on conventional forces, weapons, and equipment 
systems within the ATTU region.167   
Concurrent with these developments were the remarkable social, economic and 
political events that took place in Eastern Europe from 1988 to 1989, ultimately leading 
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and with it, the WTO.   Indeed, by this stage 
many of Gorbachev’s decisions might be better characterized as unavoidable, rather 
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than elective.  These included the unilateral withdrawal of 50,000 troops from Eastern 
Europe and outright demobilization of 500,000 more military personnel, which were 
quickly followed by the unilateral reductions of both troops and armaments of other 
WTO states.168 
Although the sudden termination of the MBFR dialogue in 1989 might be 
simply regarded as the result of an overall lack of progress, it might be better 
characterised as recognition of these broad-based talks having been overtaken by “real 
world” events.   Moreover, there now existed a new imperative to shift to more focused 
negotiations in areas offering a better chance of success, as denoted in the final MBFR 
Communiqué of 2 February 1989: 
The extent of common ground has proven insufficient to enable the participants 
to agree on a treaty.  Nevertheless the positions of the two sides have converged 
on a number of issues.  The participants have gained valuable experience and a 
clearer picture on what will be necessary to achieve mutually agreeable and 
verifiable reductions and limitations of forces and armaments in Europe.169 
The MBFR-mandated Conventional Forces in Europe negotiations that 
commenced on 7 March 1989 in Vienna therefore set to codifying the best compromise 
on force reductions that could be attained under these exceptional circumstances.  In this 
respect, growing convergence on specific issues was very much a function of the 
significant political upheaval faced by a weakened Soviet Union and its WTO security 
partners.  As stated by Sergai Karaganov, a former advisor to President Boris Yeltsin 
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and deputy director of the Institute of Europe: “There is wide[spread] feeling that the 
United States pushed too hard when Russia was weak and that the [CFE] treaty is 
unfair.”170  Certainly, the arguable inequity of Soviet concessions made “under duress” 
is a point that has been subsequently and repeatedly made by Russian officials:  
“Moscow considers the original CFE treaty… to be discriminatory and out-dated since 
it does not reflect the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
or recent NATO expansion.”171  This raises an important underlying consideration of 
the diminution of conventional arms control.  That is, legally- or politically-binding 
force notwithstanding, regime integrity is nevertheless susceptible to latent disaccord, 
irrespective of the consensus attained in its codification. 
Enter the CFE Treaty 
Following 20 months of intensive negotiations, the CFE Treaty was signed at the 
CSCE Summit in Paris on 19 November 1990 and entered-into-force on 
17 July 1992.172  Legally-binding, the CFE Treaty formally set limitations on the 
number of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), heavy artillery, combat 
aircraft, and attack helicopters deployed within its designated Area of Application 
(AOA), thereby establishing a regulated balance of conventional forces between NATO 
and WTO countries currently comprising the Treaty’s 22 (now 30) States Parties.173   
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By limiting and reducing overall numbers of conventional weapons held by 
respective NATO and WTO “blocs,” the Treaty was specifically designed to eliminate 
military armaments, equipment and personnel disparities, thereby reducing either side 
from attaining a conventional capability-based incentive to initiate a large-scale attack.  
Further, under Article VIII and the Protocol on Notification and Exchange of 
Information, the Treaty established an “annual exchange of military information” 
concerning the organization of land and air forces within the AOA, along with 
respective holdings of Treaty-limited armaments and equipment, as means of increasing 
transparency and confidence amongst States Parties.  These holdings also include the 
number, type, and location (i.e., “declared sites” and “objects of verification,” which are 
individual brigade- or separate battalion-sized units and formations) of designated 
limited armaments and equipment, along with corresponding personnel strengths.  A 
change of 10 percent or more in organizational structure or armament, equipment or 
personnel levels requires formal notification, which can be provided in the annual 
exchange or during the course of the year, as long as its is submitted at least 42 days in 
advance of such a change.174 
As depicted in Figure 3.1, the Treaty’s AOA includes all States Parties’ territories 
within the previously defined ATTU region.  Within the AOA, overall conventional 
armaments and equipment proportionately limited between the respective military blocs 
are further restricted within specifically defined concentric zones, centred upon the 
former inter-German border.  The purpose of this was to prevent the concentration of 
conventional arms in Central Europe, where there existed a higher likelihood of 
conflict.  Established limits within these zones (along with attendant designated “flank” 
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zones, in which additional limitations are imposed to preclude flanking manoeuvres by 
either alliance) were specifically designed to prohibit larger deployments of armour and 
artillery.175  
 
                   
                     Figure 3.1: CFE Treaty Area of Application and Sub-Zones176 
The conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty are separated 
into five categories and are commonly referred to as Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE).  
TLE includes tanks, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), artillery, attack helicopters, and 
combat aircraft.  Established overall ceilings within the AOA are as follows: 
• 40,000 battle tanks;  
• 60,000 armoured combat vehicles; 
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• 40,000 artillery pieces; 
• 4,000 combat helicopters; and 
• 13,600 combat aircraft.177 
Within its extensive array of provisions, the Treaty also imposes specified 
ceilings upon these specified classes of conventional weapons and equipment systems 
held at the operational unit level, as well as those contained within designated 
permanent storage sites.178  Moreover, under the so-called sufficiency provisions of the 
Treaty, the proportion of these systems held by any one European State Party are further 
limited to approximately one third of the overall total.179 
An absolutely vital component of the Treaty is its comprehensive verification 
apparatus, designed to ensure that States Parties are provided, on an equitable basis, the 
necessary means through which to systematically determine compliance and conformity 
with its extensive provisions.  States Parties are assigned a specified number of 
verification inspection quotas and may also participate, by invitation, in inspections 
conducted by other States Parties.  Two on-site inspection procedures are principally 
employed: declared site and challenge site inspections.  Declared site inspections can be 
undertaken at any “object of verification” (unit/formation) that permanently or routinely 
holds Treaty-limited armaments and equipment.  States Parties have the right to conduct 
declared site inspections without any right of refusal.  States Parties may also undertake 
challenge inspections in areas other than declared sites; however, this is subject to right 
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of refusal by the inspected State Party.180  Accordingly, the employment of systematic 
short-notice, intrusive on-site inspections, together with the utilization of “national and 
multinational technical means”181 to further validate the Treaty’s comprehensive data 
exchange, have provided the critical monitoring and scrutiny required to reinforce and 
sustain the Treaty’s fundamental integrity.182 To date, more than 4,000 inspections have 
been conducted under the provisions of the Treaty’s Protocol on Inspection (POI).183   
 
Figure 3.2: CFE Treaty Declared Site Inspection, Reduction Period.184 
Governance and management of the Treaty was established with the creation of 
the Joint Consultative Group (JCG):  a body of the CSCE and later OSCE, composed of 
representatives of all States Parties and overseen by a rotating chair.  Specifically, the 
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JCG was, and remains, responsible for resolving ambiguities and interpretive variances, 
adjudicating disagreements in implementation, addressing technical issues and 
considering approaches to improving, enhancing and otherwise sustaining the Treaty.185 
Containing 23 Articles and eight Protocols, along with associated Declarations 
and Statements, the CFE Treaty is an extremely complicated document, requiring 
considerable technical expertise, administrative acumen and associated supportive 
resources to oversee and implement.  In order to provide some further insight into the 
characteristics of the Treaty, a synopsis of its Articles and Protocols is provided at 
Appendix A. 
Given its unprecedented scope, magnitude and persistent undercurrents of 
antipathy, it is not particularly surprising that a number of difficulties arose during the 
Treaty’s early, pre-ratification implementation phase.  This included concern over 
actions initiated by Moscow to relocate (rather than reduce) TLE outside of the AOA 
(i.e., Treaty jurisdiction), as well as transfer some of its conventional forces to the 
Soviet Navy, which was not subject to the Treaty.186  Following a number of urgent 
consultations and negotiations largely held between the United States and Soviet Union 
(i.e., outside of the JCG), an agreement on Article III interpretation (the Article III 
Agreement) was reached in June 1992.  In a combination of legally- and politically-
binding statements, Moscow conceded to:  
• reduction, through destruction, of 14,500 pieces of TLE located outside 
the AOA;  
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• that TLE within the AOA requiring reduction would be destroyed and 
not merely moved outside of it;  
• that TLE located east of the Urals (outside of the AOA)would not be 
rendered “rapidly deployable;” and  
• that coastal defense forces would be included in the annual exchange of 
information.187   
 The Article III Agreement was followed shortly thereafter by the October 1991 
Baltic Understanding, providing for Soviet TLE located within the non-party states of 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to be nevertheless subject to CFE Treaty inspections and 
information exchanges.188  
 Although the imperatives of the time enabled these early issues to be quickly 
addressed and effectively resolved, they nevertheless demonstrate both the Treaty’s 
complex technical character and the intrinsic fragility of its consensus.  That is, despite 
the significantly weakened state of the Soviet Union, the concessions made were not 
without resistance and resentment by many in Moscow.189 
 This initial phase of Treaty implementation was further encumbered by the 
continued rapid deterioration of the Soviet Union as a single federated state, 
culminating in its formal dissolution in late-December, 1991.190  This created additional 
problems, in that Soviet armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty were rendered 
largely indeterminate in terms of their ownership.  Again, with the involvement of the 
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United States, the situation was effectively resolved with the May 1992 Tashkent 
Agreement, in which the eight former Soviet Republics within the AOA (i.e., Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine) were 
formally recognized as States Parties, amongst which Treaty-subject armaments and 
equipment were correspondingly apportioned.191  
In July 1992, the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE-1A) was signed.  An adjunct of the Treaty, 
the Concluding Act is a politically-binding agreement that stipulates declared national 
military personnel ceilings.  For the purposes of the Act, States Parties determined their 
own limits and were obliged to meet them by November 1995.   Under the Act, an 
aggregate ceiling of 5.7 million personnel within the AOA was established, with 
individual States Parties’ military personnel levels duly reported in the annual 
information exchange.192 
Successes and Achievements 
Regardless of the early (and ultimately pervasive) difficulties noted here, the 
overall success of the CFE Treaty in achieving its overarching objectives is undeniable.  
By 2008, reductions carried out during the initial 40-month reduction period193 and 
undertaken voluntarily thereafter accounted for 69,955 pieces of conventional 
armaments and equipment, including 17,955 pieces destroyed below specified 
                                                
191 Jane M.O. Sharp, Striving for Military Stability in Europe, Negotiation, implementation and 
adaptation of the CFE Treaty, 111. 
192 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel 
Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Helsinki: Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 1992), Section II, 1. 
193 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
13-15. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      113 
thresholds.  Other accomplishments include more than 6,000 notifications and 
verification inspections.194  The Treaty also significantly increased confidence by 
establishing amongst States Parties a “culture” of transparency and predictability 
through its notification and verification provisions.  Customarily destabilising activities, 
such as the deployment of new types of weapon and equipment systems, were now 
subject to specific notification and scrutiny.  The inspection regime established by the 
Treaty has served as both an example and technical model for other international 
agreements.195 
 In addition to the sheer magnitude of the reductions achieved under the Treaty, 
States Parties’ subsequent collective holdings have remained well below established 
limits; i.e.: 
• fewer than 25,000 battle tanks of 40,000 authorized;  
• fewer than 45,000 armoured combat vehicles of 60,000 authorized;  
• fewer than 29,000 artillery pieces of 40,000 authorized; 
• fewer than 2,000 attack helicopters of 4,000 authorized; 
• fewer than 8,000 combat aircraft of 13,600 authorized; and 
• fewer than 3,000,000 of 5,700,000 troops authorized.196  
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Over a remarkably short period, the CFE Treaty and CFE 1A decisively enabled 
the unprecedented reduction of major conventional weapon and equipment systems, 
along with standing military forces, under a single regime.  Its utility in allaying specific 
concerns and avoiding further escalations during periods of conflict was demonstrated 
in the application of provisions vis-à-vis Russian military operations in Chechnya and 
NATO operations in the Balkans.197  The Treaty also served as a template for the 1996 
Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control Article IV, a key supplement to the 1995 
Dayton Peace Accords that ended the 1992-1995 Bosnian War in the former 
Yugoslavia.  The success of this adapted Agreement was reflected in the common 
interest expressed by its three parties in acceding to the CFE Treaty at some point in the 
future.198 
An Imperfect Accord 
Notwithstanding its irrefutable achievements, since its entry-into-force, the 
Treaty has proven increasingly difficult to oversee and execute.  This is understandable, 
given its technical intricacy, innate disaccord and resultant instability as a security 
regime that, at the very least, calls for robust oversight and adroit implementation to 
maintain functionality.  Indeed, some have opined that the reductions attained under the 
Treaty during its reduction phase were largely inevitable and have since rendered it 
impracticable as a sustained regime.  Gulner Aybet observed that the Treaty’s practical 
utility had actually been overshadowed by the prevailing conditions of the closing 
phases of the Cold War, supporting the view that “arms control agreements are only 
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reached when they are no longer necessary.”  Nevertheless, Aybet conceded that the 
CFE Treaty had not been an “entirely useless exercise.”  That is, in keeping with its 
formal objectives, it had served a measure of its intended purpose by securing a balance 
of conventional forces and eliminating the capability of any one party to launch a 
surprise attack or initiate large-scale offensive action.199   
 Aybet and others have nevertheless contended that the Treaty has largely 
“missed the mark” in terms of its intended design, given the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and WTO prior to its entry-into-force.  These circumstances have significantly 
encumbered the execution of what was designed as a bloc-to-bloc regime, necessitating 
concerted efforts to accommodate not only the accession of the eight successor states of 
the former Soviet Union, but also major subsequent alterations in its East-West security 
orientation.  That is, the changing security alignments within the “Eastern and Western 
Groups of States Parties” have significantly shifted the Treaty’s “centre of gravity.”  
Consequently, an increasingly imbalanced Treaty has encountered successive obstacles 
to its continued implementation, necessitating various extemporisations to remain 
nominally viable.200  
Buoyed by the success of its reduction phase, the CFE Treaty was largely living 
up to its often-used depiction as “the cornerstone of European security.” By the late-
1990s, however, it was clearly evident that cracks were appearing.  While verification of 
types and quantities of major military armaments and equipment held by the 30 States 
Parties had been largely sustained through regular military data exchanges and intrusive 
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on-site inspections, growing issues had developed over myriad technical details 
pertaining to the Treaty’s Protocol on Existing Types (POET) and Protocol on 
Inspection (POI).  This included growing interpretive variances pertaining to the 
specific categorisations of types of weapon and equipment systems, necessitating 
specific conventions to be adopted by NATO States Parties to ensure a consistent 
approach to noted inspection ambiguities and other observations.201  Regardless, 
increasing discrepancies resulting from subjective national interpretations, technical 
ambiguities and a clear lack of standardisation continued to erode the essential 
functionality of the Treaty’s POET and POI.202 
These fundamental deficiencies were further exacerbated by other 
developments, including: 
• increasing challenges and assertions made by a recovering and 
increasingly emboldened Russian Federation to its legally-binding Treaty 
obligations, including those of procedural conformity;  
• growing reticence on the part of several States Parties to counteract these 
challenges and assertions; 
• actions undertaken by Russia and other States Parties to “sidestep” the 
Treaty by re-categorising and/or reassigning specific weapon and 
equipment systems to other non-applicable departments and agencies, 
such as Border Guards and Interior Ministry; 
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• general reluctance on the part of the OSCE to address specific instances 
of non-compliance and non-conformity, even when openly raised during 
formal consultative proceedings of the JCG; and 
• a lack of uniformity and consistency of NATO States Parties in applying 
the Alliance’s established interpretations of Treaty protocols and 
provisions.203 
 A particular irritant to Moscow was, and remains, the practice of NATO States 
Parties to refrain from inspecting one another, in keeping with separate conventions 
established within the Alliance.  This practice served to maximise NATO States Parties’ 
inspections of “Eastern Group” States Parties under the Treaty’s passive inspection 
quota.204  WTO States Parties subsequently joining the Alliance therefore served to 
intensify verification inequities between the increased number of NATO States Parties, 
neutrals, and those remaining within the successor Russian Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) and/or Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).205  
Mitigating Measures  
 By the end of the Treaty’s reduction period in November 1995,  most of the now 
30 States Parties had remained largely in compliance and conformity with its 
provisions.  Applicable conventional armaments and equipment in excess of group 
limits were destroyed, converted, re-categorised or otherwise reduced in accordance 
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with provisions laid out by the Treaty.   Russia, however, continued to exceed its limits 
in the flank zones located to the north and south of the principal central and extended 
zones of the defined AOA, despite having met its aggregate reductions.206   
 At the inaugural CFE Treaty Review Conference of May 1996, Russia and 
Ukraine advised other States Parties of problems they were encountering with Treaty-
limited armaments and equipment ceilings impeding their ability to move conventional 
forces into internal areas of instability or crisis located within the “flanks,” such as 
Russia’s southern autonomous republics.  Furthermore, Moscow was experiencing 
difficulty in relocating forces previously stationed in Central and Eastern Europe, 
resulting in associated ceilings being exceeded.  The legally-binding Flank Agreement 
to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (1997) was brokered to address this 
problem.  By reducing the physical size of the flank zones, the Agreement rendered the 
extant ceilings on battle tanks and armoured combat vehicles better suited to meeting 
internal security and reallocation requirements.  In return, Russia and Ukraine agreed to 
more frequent information exchanges and increased notification requirements for these 
sensitive areas.  Moscow, which also agreed to freeze its treaty-limited armament and 
equipment deployments within the original flank zones, was further obliged to meet the 
newly prescribed limits by 31 May 1999.207  These adjustments notwithstanding, the 
“flank issue” would remain one of a number of specific sore points for Russian 
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authorities, who would continue to argue the fundamental unfairness of these and other 
imposed restrictions.208 
 At the 1996 OSCE Lisbon Summit, States Parties agreed to commence a new 
round of talks aimed at altering the Treaty in order to address inherent disparities and 
evolving circumstances, including the dissolution of the WTO and NATO enlargement.  
Dedicated negotiations on “adaptation” commenced in 1997 and continued over the 
next two years.209  During this period, the Treaty’s integrity continued to be tested.  A 
United States government report stated that Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan were not in full compliance with the Treaty, with contraventions ranging 
from excessive holdings of Treaty-limited armaments and equipment to denying full 
access during verification inspections.  The report concluded that these contraventions 
were not "militarily significant," and that Russia and Ukraine, with the largest holdings 
of the Eastern Group of States Parties, remained within their overall limits.210  
Nevertheless, Russian equipment holdings in the southern flank zone continued to 
exceed re-established limits211 -- a situation compounded by Moscow’s second military 
campaign in the Chechen Republic.212  As the talks progressed, other key issues would 
ultimately bear impact upon the adaptation process.  From NATO’s perspective, the 
first issue concerned Russian military forces stationed in Georgia, the numbers of which 
exceeded those authorised by the Georgian government.  The other was the continued 
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Russian military presence in Moldova that lacked the explicit agreement of the 
Moldovan government.213  From Moscow’s perspective, the fundamental unfairness of 
the CFE Treaty had been significantly exacerbated by NATO enlargement, NATO’s 
military campaign in Kosovo, and United States ballistic missile defence initiatives, 
particularly those involving the installation of system components in Europe.214 
These issues reinforced the imperative in working out suitable compromises, 
which eventually led to the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the CFE 
Treaty, which was signed at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in 1999.215  In a series of 
politically-binding obligations specified in 14 Annexes to the Act, as well as the 
Istanbul Summit Declaration (commonly referred to as the “Istanbul Commitments”), 
Russia committed to withdrawing its military forces from Moldova; reducing its 
stationed forces in Georgia and determining their future status in accordance with the 
government of Georgia’s wishes; fulfilling its flank zone commitments; and exercising 
restraint in military deployments to Russian oblasts adjacent to the Baltic States.  
Central European states committed to modify their Adapted CFE Treaty territorial 
ceilings.216  To wit: 
The act included a politically binding agreement with Russia stating that they 
will exercise restraint in future deployments to the Kaliningrad and Pskov 
oblasts, bordering the Baltic States, as well as a commitment on the part of 
numerous central European states to adjust their Adapted CFE territorial 
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ceilings, and, finally, between Georgia and Russia, and Moldova and Russia, on 
the withdrawal of Russian TLE from their respective territories.217 
 Most importantly, the 30 States Parties also signed the Agreement on Adaptation 
of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.218  This “Adapted CFE Treaty” 
was a significant undertaking to alter the CFE regime in order to accommodate the rapid 
changes of its attendant security environment, as well as stem growing dissonance.  
Foremost were the modifications made in response to Moscow’s repeated 
remonstrations over the disparity of the Treaty’s bloc-to-bloc orientation, given the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and WTO.  Accordingly, the regime’s parameters were 
modified to better reflect the post-Soviet security dynamic.  This entailed altering the 
previous orientation and zoned geographic delineations, to a system of national and 
territorial ceilings that also entailed further reductions in conventional armaments and 
equipment.  Treaty adaptation would also serve to “level the playing field” between 
NATO, and Eastern States Parties in terms of holding ratios, largely through NATO 
voluntarily reducing a larger overall percentage of its existing Treaty-limited armaments 
and equipment.  All signatories accepted this new structure of limitations, which also 
included national and territorial ceilings accounting for host nation consent for the 
presence of foreign-stationed forces.  The Adapted CFE Treaty also included increased 
quotas for mandatory declared site inspections, added provisions to permit ceilings to be 
temporarily exceeded and specific provisions for accession.219  Other modifications 
                                                
217 United States, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,  
“Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty: Executive Summary.” Treaty Compliance. ACQ 
Web [journal-on-line]; available from http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/cfe/execsum.htm; Internet; 
accessed 3 December 2012, 1. 
218 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe.  Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Istanbul: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
1999). 
219 Jeffrey D. McCausland, “Conventional Weapons, Arms Control and Strategic Security in Europe,” 278. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      122 
included revised weapon and equipment system categorizations and a more transparent 
system of notification.220 
Adversity and Disdain 
Following the Istanbul Summit, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine moved quickly to 
enable the transition to the Adapted Treaty.  Belarus and Ukraine ratified the Agreement 
on Adaptation in 2000, while Russia -- now under the President Vladimir Putin’s 
tenacious authority -- immediately undertook to fulfil its original pledge to reduce 
14,500 pieces of conventional armaments and equipment located east of the AOA.  
Undertaken together with Kazakhstan, this longstanding commitment was completed by 
mid-2003.  Kazakhstan’s ratification of the Adapted Treaty was completed in 2003.  
Russian ratification was completed at end of 2004, following the accession of seven 
new NATO states that year.221   
 As might be expected, the 2001 CFE Treaty Review Conference, held at OSCE 
Headquarters in Vienna, was duly focused upon preparations for the entry-into-force of 
the Adapted CFE Treaty.  Nevertheless, various on-going issues associated with the 
implementation of the existing Treaty were noted.  These included complications 
arising from unaccounted and uncontrolled TLE within the AOA, along with Russia’s 
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continued non-compliance with flank provisions. 222  Others issues were more 
fundamental, but nevertheless critical to the viability of the Treaty  
• specified limitations and related Treaty obligations; 
• interpretation of Treaty counting rules; 
• notifications and exchange of information; and 
• verification, including specific issues that had arisen during 
inspections.223 
 Acknowledging the reaffirmation made by States Parties, the Review 
Conference’s concluding document clearly stated that ratification of the Agreement on 
Adaptation by NATO and other States Parties would be possible “only in the context of 
full and verifiable compliance with agreed levels of conventional armaments and 
equipment and consistent with the commitments contained in the CFE Final Act,” 
together with “the commitments referred to in the Istanbul Summit Declaration.”224   
 Later in 2001, Russia undertook initial withdrawals of armaments and 
equipment from Georgia; however, disagreements developed between Moscow and 
Tbilisi regarding what stationed forces would remain.  Similarly, Russian forces in 
Moldova were in the process of withdrawing, but by the end of 2002, Moscow ceased 
the movement of personnel, stockpiled ammunition and equipment. Although additional 
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steps were taken to bring itself into compliance with the Adapted Agreement in the 
flank zones, Russia nevertheless remained in breach of extant ceilings.225 
 NATO States Parties’ refusal to ratify the Agreement on Adaptation as long as 
Russia failed to meet its stated commitments regarding its stationed forces in Moldova 
and Georgia, had effectively lead to a stalemate.  This situation was worsened by the 
three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and Slovenia -- all non-States Parties 
to the CFE Treaty -- joining NATO prior to their planned accession to the Adapted 
Treaty.  Given the existing CFE Treaty’s lack of an accession clause, Moscow wanted 
these states to adhere to CFE-like restrictions; otherwise, this would further 
disadvantage Russia, particularly along its western periphery.226  Accordingly, NATO’s 
2004 intake of these four non-States Parties, along with Bulgaria, Romania and 
Slovakia (members of the Eastern Group of States Parties) understandably led to 
Russian outcries over “strategic equity.”227  In anticipation of this, NATO had provided 
earlier reassurances in the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and 
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation: 
NATO reiterates that in the current and foreseeable security environment, the 
Alliance will carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the 
necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather 
than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. 
Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with 
the above tasks.228 
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Moscow nevertheless denounced NATO’s expanding membership, particularly 
that of non-CFE States Parties, as something that would only serve to further handicap 
Russia in terms of comparative conventional armaments and equipment: 
… neither NATO nor the Baltic states have adequately addressed the Kremlin's 
concerns over the future of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
or CFE, which the Baltic states have not signed.  Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov recently dubbed the situation a "legal black hole."  The lack of dialogue 
has only roused the suspicions of Russian generals, who recently conducted a 
series of large-scale war games in Kaliningrad…. Clearly, top military brass are 
convinced that NATO will expand eastward, but remain extremely skeptical that 
expansion will entail anything other than increased regional tension.229 
While continuing to publically oppose what it regarded as growing threats to its 
national interests, Moscow nevertheless undertook specific actions to mitigate these 
circumstances.  This included an agreement reached with Georgia in 2005 on the 
withdrawal of its stationed forces in Georgia, which was to be completed by 2008.230  In 
addition, a Russian proposal was made at the 2006 CFE Treaty Review Conference to 
provisionally implement the Adapted CFE Treaty, but NATO States Parties rejected 
this.231  Additionally, in a 2007 response to United States ballistic missile defence 
emplacements planned for Europe, President Putin offered the shared use of Russia’s 
Gabala ballistic missile early warning radar in Azerbaijan as an alternative to the United 
States building a new system in the Czech Republic.  Putin also proposed increased 
partnership with European states in collaborative missile defence, along with 
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alternatives to the emplacement of intercept missiles in Central Europe.  These 
proposals were also declined.232 
Putin’s growing impatience with the lack of progress on the Adapted CFE 
Treaty, the OSCE and his general dissatisfaction with security developments in general, 
were conveyed in an address made at the Munich Conference on Security Policy on 12 
February 2007: 
People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to 
promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries.  And this 
task is also being accomplished by the OSCE's bureaucratic apparatus which is 
absolutely not connected with the state founders in any way.  …The Adapted 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1999.  It took 
into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the elimination of the Warsaw 
bloc. …NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, 
including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of 
armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from 
Georgia and Moldova.  Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an 
accelerated schedule.  We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian 
colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova 
that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with 
ammunition left over from Soviet times.  …It turns out that NATO has put its 
frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty 
obligations and do not react to these actions at all.  I think it is obvious that 
NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the 
Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe.  On the contrary, it represents 
a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.233 
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The weeks and months following the Munich address were notably tense.  In his 
annual address to the Russian Federal Assembly on 26 April 2007, Putin announced his 
intention to impose a moratorium on Russian implementation of the CFE Treaty until all 
NATO members ratified the Agreement on Adaptation and started observing its 
provisions, as Russia had already been doing on a unilateral basis.234  Putin’s address 
included the now well-established argument that an expanding NATO, including 
members that were not States Parties to the Treaty, had created an imbalance in 
conventional armaments and therefore, a specific threat to Russia.  Associated 
comments by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov included assertions that 
Moscow’s political commitments made at Istanbul had been largely fulfilled in terms of 
their relevance to the Treaty and that continued linkages made by NATO were 
essentially spurious.235  
At the June 2007 Extraordinary CFE Conference in Vienna, called by Moscow 
under the Treaty’s provisions, the head of the Russian delegation, Ambassador Anatoly 
Antonov, called for immediate steps to resolve these escalating issues.  Antonov 
reiterated Moscow’s warning that Russia would move to unilaterally suspend the 
Treaty’s validity unless NATO members undertook the necessary actions to enable the 
Adapted Treaty’s entry-into-force by July 1, 2008, or at least comply with its 
provisional implementation.  Antonov also indicated that, given developments since 
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1999, the Adapted CFE Treaty would require renegotiation and amendment as soon as it 
entered-into-force; that is, “an adaptation of the Adapted CFE Treaty.”236 
During the conference, specific Russian proposals included the abolition of the 
flank arrangements for Russia; the entering-into-force of the adapted CFE Treaty by 
1 July 2008; and the reduction of NATO Treaty ceilings "to compensate for the military 
potential acquired by the alliance as a result of its two waves of enlargement.”  Russian 
officials also demanded that the CFE regime be immediately extended to NATO 
members Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, along with agreement on a formal definition of 
"substantial combat forces.”237  These imperatives included inferences that NATO’s 
expanded membership had resulted in its own ceilings being exceeded, which was 
becoming further compounded by plans to establish new American bases in Bulgaria 
and Romania.  According to Antonov, the Russian proposals were a reflection of 
geopolitical changes that had occurred since the dissolution of the WTO and should be 
regarded as "a kind of roadmap that is necessary to revive the practicability of the CFE 
Treaty."238   
The conference ended without any change in NATO States Parties’ position on 
Russia’s fulfilment of its Istanbul Commitments.  Indeed, on the last day of the 
conference, following an extended oratory of Russian grievances, a member of the 
United States delegation, Larry Schultz, tersely responded: “fulfil your obligations!”239   
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As a result of this impasse, the Russian Federation’s self-imposed “suspension” 
of its extant CFE Treaty obligations took effect on 12 December 2007.  Highly 
contentious, the suspension was and remains an act for which no valid legal provision 
exists, given that the only option available to a State Party other than full 
implementation is its withdrawal, in accordance with the provisions contained in Article 
XIX: 
1. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to 
withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the 
subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardised its supreme interests.  A State 
Party intending to withdraw shall give notice of its decision to do so to the 
Depository and to all other States Parties.  Such notice shall be given at least 150 
days prior to the intended withdrawal from this Treaty.  It shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events the State Party regards as having 
jeopardised its supreme interests.  3. Each State Party shall, in particular, in 
exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if 
another State Party increases its holdings in battle tanks, armoured combat 
vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft or attack helicopters, as defined in Article II, 
which are outside the scope of the limitations of this Treaty, in such proportions 
as to pose an obvious threat to the balance of forces within the area of 
application.240 
Russian officials have maintained that a suspension of this nature may indeed be 
enacted, in that any State Party may take actions less than full implementation in 
conformity with international law, as well as Russian federal law.241  Accordingly, 
Russia has since refused to accept or conduct inspections, or participate in the exchange 
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of military data with other States Parties, as specified and legally required under the 
current Treaty.  Moscow’s representation at the JCG was, nevertheless maintained until 
11 March 2015, when it terminated its participation in the Treaty entirely.242  
Conciliation, Counteraction and Failure 
From 2007 to 2011, various efforts were undertaken by the United States and 
NATO States Parties to maintain an open dialogue with Russia and seek a mutually 
acceptable compromise.  These included a series of German-sponsored informal 
discussions; several United States-Russia bilateral consultations, and NATO-initiated 
CFE “at 36” negotiations, in which the 30 CFE Treaty States Parties, plus the six new 
NATO member states not party to the Treaty (Albania, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Slovenia) attempted to secure “a new framework for negotiations on 
strengthening and modernizing conventional arms control in Europe.”243  Also during 
this period, a “parallel action plan” formulated by the United States, envisioned NATO 
signatories to the Adapted Treaty “stepping up” their national ratification processes in 
return for Russia concurrently resuming its military withdrawals from Georgia and 
Moldova.  NATO States Parties also conveyed their willingness to address outstanding 
Russian concerns once the Adapted Treaty was in place.244  Although Moscow was 
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reported to have demonstrated “new flexibility on key issues,” none of these 
consultations were successful.245   
Major sticking points in these negotiations included the established requirement 
for a host nation’s consent to stationed military forces, along with the term 
“internationally recognized borders.”  These related to the continued presence of 
Russian military forces within the territories of Georgia and Moldova, along with 
Moscow’s recognition of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions as independent 
states following Russia’s 2008 conflict with Georgia.  By mid-2011, Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Aleksandr Grushko declared these negotiations to have arrived at an 
“impasse,” blaming Western States Parties.246  Indeed, Moscow’s position became only 
further entrenched, sticking to variations of the demands it had previously conveyed.  
These included those articulated by Ambassador Antonov, his senior arms control 
delegate Mikhail Ulyanov and Lieutenant-General Evgeny Buzhinsky (Head of the 
International Treaty Directorate, Ministry of Defence), at Bad Saarow, Germany, in the 
fall of 2007; namely: 
• immediate ratification and entry-into-force of the Adapted CFE Treaty;  
• Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia signing the ratified Adapted 
Treaty; 
• new group limits imposed upon NATO armaments and equipment to 
compensate Russia for NATO enlargement and US military 
deployments; 
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• adjustments to Treaty-limited force ceilings in Romania and Bulgaria, 
commensurate with new American facilities in those countries; 
• ceilings on Russian forces in designated Flank Zones “lifted” as further 
compensation to Russia; and 
• re-negotiation and modernization of the Adapted CFE Treaty undertaken 
as soon as it enters-into-force.247   
 
The Russian Foreign Ministry subsequently intimated that the consequences of 
the suspension included the discarding of Treaty-imposed limits to the numbers and 
location of Russia’s conventional forces throughout the AOA.  While outright 
remilitarization has not since occurred (which some would suggest to be more a 
function of limited Russian capacity), the situation has nevertheless grown increasingly 
serious, given that the suspension has afforded Moscow considerable autonomy in 
modifying and employing its conventional military forces.  This is a particular concern 
within not only the flank zones, but also with respect to conflict and other sensitive 
areas, including: the build-up of forces along Russia’s southern borders in the Caucasus 
and its western borders with NATO states; its reinforced standing military presence in 
Georgia and Moldova; and major deployments in support of the conflict with Georgia in 
2008 and Ukraine in 2014.  It is therefore evident that the suspension has facilitated 
Russia’s self-legitimised efforts to attain and secure unconstrained freedom of action 
throughout its territorial periphery and former Soviet republics (that is, its defined Near 
Abroad) consistent with its National Security Strategy.248  
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NATO’s response to the Russian suspension has remained measured, if not 
muted; i.e., acknowledging Russian concerns, while emphasising the need to preserve 
the regime.  This has contrasted somewhat with the Alliance’s initial strong 
disagreement with Russia’s interpretation of the legal basis of the suspension, publicly 
reaffirming the right of States Parties “to take any steps provided for by the Treaty and 
international law.”  Accordingly, Allied States Parties have continued to meet their 
Treaty obligations “without prejudice to any future action,” despite the pressure 
generated by some to formally cite the Russian Federation for legal non-compliance.249  
Otherwise, NATO has maintained its emphasis on the negative effect the suspension has 
had upon the Treaty, regularly urging the Russian Federation to rescind its decision.  In 
a 28 March 2008 statement, former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
warned that the suspension risked “eroding the integrity of the CFE regime,” but added 
that the Alliance would retain its current position as long as both NATO and Russia 
continued to support a revised version of the CFE Treaty.250  For the following four 
years, NATO and other State Parties continued to “challenge” the Russian suspension 
by repeatedly transmitting, via the OSCE Communications Network, formal inspection 
and evaluation requests to Moscow – all of which were flatly refused.251  
Despite NATO and other States Parties’ objections and to a lesser extent, those 
of the OSCE itself, Russian authorities have held firm on the suspension decision.  In a 
statement following the NATO-Russia Council meeting of 4 April 2008, Putin (now 
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Russian Prime Minister) argued that no legal link existed between Adapted CFE Treaty 
ratification and the Istanbul Commitments, further describing the crisis surrounding the 
CFE Treaty as “one of the serious obstacles to improving NATO-Russian relations.”252  
As a further demonstration of its resolve, other than a few generalised synopses initially 
provided, Russia has exempted itself from the Annual Exchange of Military 
Information, which provides the essential data compiled by Canada and the United 
States as the Data Responsible Nations for the Russian Federation and used by States 
Parties to determine inspection quotas and verify compliance throughout the year.  
Accordingly, given the absence of valid data for the largest holder of conventional 
armaments and equipment within the AOA, the CFE Treaty database has significantly 
degraded since the suspension, clearly impeding and undermining the regime.253   
 
It is also worth noting that, as a means of offsetting the effects of the suspension 
on its own verification programme, the Russian Federation correspondingly increased 
its inspection and evaluation operations conducted under the Vienna Document.  For 
example, within the first four months of the 2008 implementation year (coincident with 
the calendar year), the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (Russia’s verification 
organisation) had already completed no less than 27 uncoordinated Specified Area 
inspections and unit evaluations, effectively flooding the Vienna Document 1999’s 
annual passive (received) quota of two inspections and one evaluation for each of the 
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participating States located within the Document’s zone of application, significantly 
restricting inspection/evaluation opportunities for NATO participating States.254 
On 5 June 2008, in an evident effort to supplant the Treaty and advance Russia’s 
security interests, President Dmitry Medvedev proposed an entirely new, legally-
binding “pan-European security pact.”  As envisioned by Medvedev, European states 
would be exclusively called upon to form an all-European organization, akin to the 
OSCE, that would “conclusively clarify the role of the use of force in the Euro-Atlantic 
community.”  Furthermore, while existing organizations (presumably NATO and 
CSTO) would also be eligible for membership as distinct signatories to the pact, they 
would not be permitted to participate in associated negotiations. In presenting his 
proposal, Medvedev notably added that NATO enlargement would damage relations 
“for a long time to come,” advising the Alliance to take a “time-out.”255  
 The Medvedev proposal and its subsequent variations are, for all intents and 
purposes, updates of the Soviet-era initiative intended to advantage Russia within the 
European geopolitical decision-making process.  In its current context, this means 
marginalising the United States and NATO, “reforming” the OSCE (where Russia aims 
to consolidate its influence as the principle European actor), and establishing a series of 
bilateral security arrangements with select European governments.  As proposed, such 
an accord would, in effect, result in NATO subjecting itself to external vetoes and 
various other binding constraints.  Moreover, it would imply formal international 
                                                
254 Department of National Defence, Issue Synopsis for the Chief of the Defence Staff – Update on 
Russian Suspension of CFE Treaty Compliance, 1-2. 
255 Kremlin Archive. Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders 
(5 June 2008) [journal-on-line]; available from: http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_ 
type82912type82914 type84779_202153.shtml; Internet; accessed 28 November 2012, n.p. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      136 
recognition of the CSTO on a par with NATO -- a goal that Moscow has long sought, 
but not attained.256 
Given the specificity of the CFE Treaty’s withdrawal provisions, along with 
NATO and individual States Parties’ early challenges to Russia’s suspension, it is 
bewildering that, over time, no formal responsive action has been initiated to hold 
Moscow more fully to account, such as a request for a ruling or even an opinion, by an 
independent arbiter, such as the International Court of Justice.  Similarly, no action -- 
executive, secretarial or otherwise -- has been undertaken by the consensus-based JCG, 
other than to duly note these actions, express regret, encourage a return to full 
compliance and otherwise provide a forum for continued consultation.  Clearly, this 
passive approach has undermined the Treaty’s fundamental integrity.  Using violations 
of arms control agreements to illustrate cooperation theory, Robert Axelrod states that 
the longer a “defection” (i.e., violation) is allowed to go unchallenged, the more likely it 
is that the offender will determine that such action is worthwhile.  This underscores the 
need to detect and address violations quickly; i.e., “…it is better to be provocable 
sooner, rather than later.  By responding right away, it gives the quickest possible 
feedback that defection will not pay.”257  
Without question, the wait and see approach taken by the OSCE, NATO and 
neutral States Parties in response to the suspension has worked to Russia’s advantage.  
It also justifies any assumption made by Moscow of insufficient provocability existing 
to formally challenge the suspension.  That is, the Kremlin correctly assessed that it 
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would be able to walk away from the Treaty without formally withdrawing -- despite 
Article XIX’s explicit provisions -- thereby sidestepping its obligations and avoiding the 
blame that it would have otherwise received for quitting outright.  While clearly 
benefitting Russia, the resultant damage to the integrity of the regime and its underlying 
principles is self-evident.   
While debate concerning the legitimacy of the suspension has been extensive, it 
is apparent that Article XIX’s particulars should have provided more than sufficient 
justification to challenge, with effect, Russia’s de facto abrogation of its legally-binding 
obligations.  As noted by Adam Collicelli: 
Both international legal scholars and international relations theorists have long 
focused on what is involved in entering into treaties, but have generally ignored 
careful studies of treaty exit.  Russia’s unilateral and potentially unlawful 
suspension of the CFE Treaty is a reminder of how crucial this portion of treaty 
law can be.  The CFE Treaty does not explicitly authorize suspension.  The 
Vienna Convention [on the Law of Treaties] does not convincingly provide for 
any other justification for the suspension and Putin did not attempt to invoke 
one.  Thus, Russia’s suspension likely violated the CFE Treaty.258 
The JCG’s impassiveness, along with that of individual States Parties, while 
presumably intended to give Russia every opportunity to end its suspension through 
conciliation, only served to reinforce Moscow’s intransigence and further undermine the 
Treaty.  Indeed, the ramifications of failing to formally challenge Russia’s suspension 
was perhaps most poignantly illustrated at the Fourth CFE Treaty Review Conference, 
held in November 2011 in Vienna.  During this overall downcast affair, the United 
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States, along with several other NATO and neutral States Parties, each formally 
announced the imposition of countermeasures with respect to the Russian Federation.  
These measures entailed Russia’s exclusion from exchanged military data, along with 
the Protocol on Inspection, pending Moscow’s resumption of its legally-binding 
obligations.259  Given the presumption of collaboration within the Eastern Group of 
States Parties, the United States also asserted that the sharing of exchanged military 
information with the Russian Federation should be considered a violation of the Treaty, 
given that such data should only be provided to active, vice suspended parties.260 
The countermeasures announcements were acknowledged by the lead Russian 
representative, Ambassador Mikhail Ulyanov, who further noted that they merely 
served to formally recognize and validate the legitimacy of Russia’s suspension under 
international law.261  It would appear that Ulyanov’s response had merit, given that both 
the suspension and subsequent countermeasures are based upon more general precepts 
of international conventional law, rather than the very specific provisions of the Treaty 
itself.  Indeed, both actions call into question the fundamental basis of legally-binding 
international agreements, given that both purposely deviate from explicit corresponding 
provisions.  In this regard, the countermeasures undertaken by the United States and 
several other States Parties in response to Russia’s de facto material breach may appear 
justifiable under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.  However, both 
Russia’s cessation of compliance and the subsequent countermeasures have been based 
upon the presumption of an implicit right of suspension, whereas under the Treaty there 
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exists only explicit provisions for withdrawal.262  Therefore, rather than responding in 
kind to the Russian suspension, a more appropriate response would have been a formal 
legal challenge and corresponding Treaty governance actions to hold Russia to account, 
based upon the following: 
• Russia’s suspension is not provided for under the provisions of the CFE 
Treaty and therefore constitutes a violation;  
• given the CFE Treaty’s specific withdrawal provisions, Russia’s 
suspension is not justified under any corresponding provision of the 
Vienna Convention; and 
• additional justification used by Moscow, such as that cited under 
Russia’s 1995 Federal Law on International Treaties is invalid with 
respect to the Treaty and the Convention in this respect.263  
Accordingly, the lack of a formal legal challenge in favour of appeasement, 
followed by the countermeasures imposed by several States Parties, has further 
obscured the suspension issue and compounded the Treaty’s overall impairment.  
Nevertheless, it continues to be implemented amongst the other 29 States Parties.  
Moreover, even with Moscow’s alleged encouragement to some other States Parties to 
follow its lead, none -- including Belarus -- have signalled any intention to similarly 
suspend themselves or withdraw outright.264  Regardless, lacking the single largest 
holder of conventional armaments and equipment within the AOA, the Treaty has lost 
much of its practical utility and relevance.  This has led it to be increasingly regarded as 
a “Cold War anachronism,” indicative of the diminishment of European conventional 
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arms control in general.265 Accordingly, Moscow’s decision to finally end its 
participation in the JCG on 11 March 2015, while somewhat anticlimactic, was a 
suitable reminder of the consequences of the Treaty’s breakdown:  
In hindsight, it is clear that Russia achieved a military advantage by refusing to 
comply with the CFE, enabling it to deploy troops to Crimea and the Russian-
Ukrainian border.  That is, it could accomplish precisely what the CFE was 
supposed to guard against: the secret concentration of forces as a prelude to 
aggression.  Moscow's decision to dispense with every pretense of abiding by 
the CFE provides further evidence that a new Cold War is rapidly 
approaching…. The CFE is not simply an outdated set of binding procedures as 
the Kremlin contends, but the embodiment of a principle.  Today, Russia has 
rejected that principle.  That leaves only one way to achieve security in Europe 
— military deterrence.266 
Conclusions and Implications 
 The decline of the CFE Treaty illustrates the perils of non-adherence to a highly 
complex, legally-binding accord and the costs of failing to adequately challenge clear 
transgressions.  Regardless of the reasons for failure -- weak institutional oversight, 
political indecision, intimidation, and even evasion by the OSCE/JCG and other States 
Parties -- they all relate to the fundamental impairment of the regime’s operating model 
and the ramifications of such impairment.  As noted by Adam Collicelli,  “…the very 
benefits attained from engaging in international agreements will be in true jeopardy if 
parties can invariably deviate from those agreements and halt their responsibilities for 
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political gain.267  For now, Russia’s defection appears to have achieved its desired 
effect, but to the obvious detriment of the regime and by extension, European security 
and stability in general.  
The CFE Treaty has long passed a critical juncture.  While it may continue to 
operate for some time at a contracted level amongst its remaining States Parties, it is 
clear that the regime will continue to fall well short of its intended purpose.  Even if 
formal legal adjudication were to now rule that the Russian Federation’s suspension was 
indeed unlawful, such a determination more than eight years after the fact would have 
little real impact, other than to officially characterise Moscow’s actions.  Increasingly 
emboldened, Russia’s leadership can be expected to remain impudent in any related 
security dialogue, given that it has already demonstrated that it can do largely what it 
wants, with economic sanctions and traditional forms of military deterrence now 
appearing to constitute the only real disincentives.  As such, barring some other form of 
compulsion, a CFE-like successor regime would likely have little, if any, interest for 
Moscow.  Given this outcome, it is clear that by failing to maintain adequate 
accountabilities and tolerating major deviations from its provisions, the security 
assurances afforded by the CFE Treaty regime have largely collapsed, giving way to a 
new phase of European security underscored by antipathy, uncertainty and instability.  
 This case-study examination of the CFE Treaty has highlighted a number of 
considerations relevant to both the regime specifically and contemporary conventional 
arms control in general.  First, the circumstances that led to the establishment of the 
Treaty must be regarded as singularly unique and as such, impossible to replicate.  That 
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is, the Treaty constitutes a one-off systematisation of collaborative behaviours derived 
from exceptional circumstances.  Second, the successes realised during the initial 
reduction period were largely driven by external imperatives, with the Treaty providing 
commensurable regulatory and administrative “orderliness” to the exceedingly complex 
task of reducing conventional forces.  Third, despite the uniformity that it established, 
the CFE Treaty has been fundamentally conflicted from the outset, with regular 
demonstrations of its pervasive variability and instability.  Accordingly, lacking the 
necessary adherence to its governance-management-implementation model, the regime 
was arguably destined to fail from its inception, particularly given the Soviet Union’s 
and WTO’s unforeseen collapse and the successive challenges that followed. 
 It is noteworthy that, over time, major Treaty disputes had been increasingly 
consigned to the United States, Russia and other States Parties to tackle, with the JCG 
serving more as a venue than an implementing body.  Indeed, throughout Moscow’s 
self-imposed suspension of the Treaty, the OSCE’s relative detachment has been 
apparent.  Moreover, the on-going distractions created by the suspension have led to 
other implementation-related issues becoming increasingly overshadowed, further 
degrading the regime.  Irrespective of blame, the failure to hold Russia sufficiently to 
account has ruinously undermined the regime’s integrity.  Although the Treaty can and 
arguably should continue to function as is, Russia’s absence will continue to render it 
comparatively inconsequential.  And while many of its provisions might indeed provide 
some basis for an alternative form of adaptation, the outcome would likely be somewhat 
removed from that envisioned in 1999.  Nevertheless, the CFE Treaty experience will 
hopefully provide valuable lessons concerning the governance, management and 
implementation of an evolved or successor regime, should one be established. 




 CASE STUDY 2: THE VIENNA DOCUMENT  
ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
In keeping with the established methodology of the thesis, this chapter entails a 
case study examination of the Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building 
Measures (commonly known as the Vienna Document), to include its purpose, 
structure, means of application and related developments contributing to its overall 
degradation.  Specific events associated with the regime’s oversight and implementation 
-- from its entry-into-force to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea -- will be reviewed in 
order to ascertain their basis and corresponding effect.  Foremost of these are the 
Russian Federation’s military resurgence and the growing incongruity of Moscow’s 
geostrategic agenda with the Vienna Document’s principles, aims and objectives.  These 
and other events will be appraised in terms of their bearing upon this regime’s declining 
influence as an instrument of European and Eurasian security and stability. 
This examination will illustrate that, despite its variances with other regimes, the 
Vienna Document has been similarly impeded by numerous ambiguities and 
contraventions, compounded by systematic deficiencies in governance, management 
and implementation.  This will corroborate that, notwithstanding the effects of various 
external influences, the diminishment of the Vienna Document regime can also be 
fundamentally attributed to faults in its rudimentary operation.  Moreover, the sources 
of these faults have been largely overlooked in the regime’s practical oversight, as well 
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as in associated academic research and analysis that have more typically focused upon 
symptoms rather than root causes.  Left unresolved, these underlying failings will 
continue to vitiate not only the Vienna Document, but further undermine the broader 
conventional arms control and CSBM framework.  
Backdrop 
As previously discussed, the Vienna Document is a politically-binding accord 
designed to build mutual trust and confidence through increased openness and 
transparency.  Separate and distinct from, but complementary to, the CFE and Open 
Skies Treaties, the Vienna Document was specifically conceived to reduce ambiguity 
and misunderstanding between states, while also serving to restore and reinforce 
security and stability during times of increased tension or conflict.  A principal 
instrument of its governing institution, the OSCE, the Vienna Document has proven 
itself as a vital adjunct mechanism of conventional arms control.  Its systematised 
CSBM are described by Jeffery A. Larson as those which: 
 
…are intended to foster transparency and trust through purposely designed 
cooperative measures.  They help clarify states’ military intentions, reduce 
uncertainties about potentially threatening military activities and constrain 
opportunities for surprise attack or coercion.268 
  
Its latest iteration, the Vienna Document 2011 (adopted on 30 November 2011), 
constitutes a technical and procedural “update” of the preceding Vienna Documents of 
1990, 1992, 1994, and 1999.  Each has been iteratively modified, expanded and 
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enhanced with respect to its applicability to specific military activities, verification 
provisions and cooperation amongst its (now 57) participating States.  With the 
exception of Chapter II (Defence Planning), the Document’s jurisdictional “zone of 
application” covers the entire territories and surrounding sea areas of European and 
Central Asian participating States (excluding Mongolia269) and the Russian Federation 
from its western border to the Ural Mountains.  As has been the case since the outset, 
only States Parties’ military forces and activities physically located and conducted 
within the zone of application are subject to verification.  Through the Document, 
intrusive “right of access” area inspections and unit evaluations are conducted on short-
notice, in order to verify participating States’ compliance with respect to “notifiable 
military activities,” along with the accuracy of exchanged military information.  
Associated protocols include the observation of certain military activities, 
demonstrations of new weapon and equipment systems, as well as visits to air bases and 
other military installations.270 
 
Although in many respects less structured, more dynamic and demonstratively 
more readily adaptive than the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document has nevertheless 
remained similarly constrained by various impediments, ranging from simple 
interpretive ambiguities to the deliberate misconduct of individual participating States, 
compounded by systematic deficiencies in the governance, management and 
implementation of the regime.  While not formally defined, traditional “bloc-to-bloc” 
conventions have nevertheless been incorporated into the routine execution of Vienna 
Document provisions.  For example, participating States that are members of NATO 
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will not normally conduct inspections or evaluations of one another, in keeping with 
established internal procedures.  Accordingly, given the nature of NATO expansion and 
the residual effects of the WTO’s dissolution, the Vienna Document, even in its most 
recent iteration, has been similarly affected by verification quota imbalances and 
associated inequities, along with various other fundamental deficiencies in its practical 
implementation.271  
 
The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) -- a senior OSCE consultative body 
that addresses the military aspects of security in the OSCE area -- oversees the Vienna 
Document and in particular, the application of its CSBM provisions.  In addition to the 
FSC’s regular meetings, an Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (AIAM) is 
held in March of each year to review the current state of implementation, discuss 
associated issues and render decisions concerning the status of the Vienna Document.272 
This meeting is normally preceded by an Annual Heads of Verification Centres 
Meeting, which provides implementation-specific input, including reports and 
recommendations concerning technical and operations-oriented matters, including those 
pertaining to verification, compliance and conformity.273 
 The Vienna Document is a significant security accord for several reasons, 
including its central role and standing within its governing institution, the OSCE.  
Specifically derived from the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the Document constitutes the 
Organisation’s cornerstone regime, to which all members are politically bound as 
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participating States.  The Helsinki Final Act’s Decalogue, comprising 10 formalised 
principles, provides the “normative structure” under which the former Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) transitioned to becoming the OSCE in 
1995 and presently operates.  The same cooperative values and associated objectives 
contained in the Helsinki Final Act also established the first detailed CSBM, which 
entailed the requirement for prior notification of military activities involving more than 
25,000 troops.274  At the same time, these principles constituted the doctrinal “core” and 
central role of the Vienna Document as the OSCE’s “regional cooperative security 
regime.”275   
  
 Appropriately, the orientation, purpose and development of the Vienna 
Document have closely paralleled those of the OSCE itself.  As the Organisation 
progressed from a series of consultations and multilateral agreements, the general 
CSBM provisions contained with the Helsinki Final Act also continued to develop.  
That is, while the CSCE’s efforts to further improve inter-state relations and broaden 
the Helsinki Final Act led to the 1990 Charter of Paris (setting the foundations of the 
Organisation), the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) -- a CSCE 
subcommittee -- dedicated itself to the development and codification of expanded 
CSBM.  The efforts of the CDE resulted in the 1986 Stockholm Document, establishing 
specific provisions for the observation of military activities: a key development in the 
contemporary evolution of arms control.  Subsequent CSCE meetings, designed to 
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reinforce and build upon these CSBM, ultimately led to their formal systemisation 
under the Vienna Document 1990.276  
Vienna Documents 1990 and 1992 
 
 The initial iteration of a regime that would undergo a process of repeated 
expansion and refinement, the original Vienna Document 1990 featured a number of 
specifically executable provisions that were derived from the 1986 Stockholm 
Document.  In addition to the notification of specified military activities, it also 
established the requirement for a verifiable annual information exchange concerning 
military force levels, weapon and equipment systems, deployments and national 
military budgets.277  The Vienna Document 1990 also specified a dedicated 
communications network, along with an annual assessment meeting (the previously 
noted AIAM), to provide a means of recurrent consultative appraisal within the 
Document’s implementation calendar.278 
 Concurrent with the Vienna Document 1990 was the creation of the Conflict 
Prevention Centre (CPC).  The CPC assists the OSCE and all participating States with 
regime implementation, along with other organisational functions associated with early 
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation.  The 
Centre specifically facilitates political dialogue and supports OSCE field operations, 
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provides expert advice and analysis, monitors developments throughout the territories of 
participating States (comprising what is commonly referred to as the “OSCE area”) and 
aids in the negotiation, mediation and facilitation of efforts to prevent and resolve crises 
and conflicts.  The CPC enables OSCE decision-making bodies and participating States 
to make informed decisions and develops options in response to specific challenges to 
regional security.279 
 As previously noted, the geopolitical vacuity resulting from the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union (and subsequently, Yugoslavia) had created the conditions necessary 
to quickly elevate the CSCE/OSCE as Europe’s foremost inter-governmental security 
institution, along with the Vienna Document as its principal instrument.  These 
prevailing conditions had also enabled several additional enhancements and refinements 
to be quickly agreed to and formalised under the Vienna Document 1990 and 
subsequently, the Vienna Document 1992.280  Clearly, the harmonization of the 
political, technical and operational facets of these early iterations highlights the 
overarching imperative required to overcome the complexity and diversity of national 
and regional interests: 
The participants at the 1992 CSCE Helsinki Summit adopted a Programme for 
Immediate Action covering inter alia CSBMs. …with the aim of ‘establishing 
among themselves new security relations based on co-operative and common 
approaches to security’…. The participating states strove both to improve and 
supplement the CSBMs and to elaborate new ones.  The Vienna Document 
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1992…sought to address some of the new needs and challenges of the enlarged 
CSCE.281 
 The progress achieved by the rapid production of two successive regimes also 
demonstrated a common understanding of, and belief in, the Helsinki Final Act’s 
principles as embodied by the Vienna Document -- along with the imperative to build 
upon this.  The Vienna Document 1992, signed on 29 February 1992, added to the 1990 
regime an expanded and strengthened package of CSBM.  For military activities, this 
included reductions in established personnel thresholds (13,000 to 9,000) and main 
battle tanks (300 to 250) requiring prior notification.282  A two-year prior notification 
period was also imposed for military activities of 40,000 troops/900 main battle tanks, 
with only one such activity permitted within a two-year timeframe by any one 
participating State.283  Finally, within a single year, each participating State was further 
limited to conducting no more than six activities involving more than 13,000 troops and 
300 main battle tanks -- a particularly important provision in further lowering the 
thresholds of less than “army level” activity as an additional hedge against 
destabilization in the early post-Soviet era.284  The Vienna Document’s zone of 
application was also significantly expanded beyond the extant “ATTU” (Atlantic to the 
Urals), to include the entire territories of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.285  
 
 The unity of purpose that had been attained and embodied within the Vienna 
Document was denoted at the CSCE’s 1994 Budapest Summit that, in addition to 
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initiating the transition of the Conference’s status to that of a permanent organization, 
also moved to specifically strengthen its institutions.  The language of the 1994 
Budapest Document typified this transition, surpassing characteristic political rhetoric 
and conveying a decidedly confident and assertive tone:  
 4. …the participating States will base their mutual security relations upon a co-
 operative approach.… The participating States will co-operate in ensuring that 
 all such security arrangements are in harmony with CSCE principles and 
 commitments under this Code.  5. They are determined to act in solidarity if 
 CSCE norms and commitments are violated  and to facilitate concerted 
 responses to security challenges that they may face as a result.  They will consult 
 promptly, in conformity with their CSCE responsibilities, with a participating 
 State seeking assistance in realizing its individual or collective self-defence. 
 They will consider jointly the nature of the threat and actions that may be 
 required in defence of their common values.286 
 The Vienna Document regime continued to be significantly reinforced and 
enhanced in remarkably short order.  This early momentum was indicative of the 
prevailing geostrategic conditions of the concluding phases of the Cold War that 
favoured the CSCE/OSCE generally and the Document specifically as the only regime 
to politically bind all member States under a “common and indivisible” vision of 
security.  This was already evidenced by its high degree of implementation and proven 
comparative flexibility.    
 The 1994 iteration of the regime was wholly developed by the previously noted 
FSC.  Established at the 1992 Helsinki Summit Meeting of the CSCE287 and presently 
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one of the OSCE’s two “main regular decision-making bodies,” the FSC was created as 
a dedicated assembly within which to undertake regular consultations on the “politico-
military dimension” of security.  This included not only security dialogue of a general 
nature, but more intensified discussion on specific politico-military security matters, 
including “new stabilising measures” and targeted negotiations on CSBMs.288  In 
addition, the FSC’s Support Section was assigned technical oversight the OSCE 
Communications Network.  This network, featuring a purpose-designed Integrated 
Notification Application (INA), was designed to provide participating States with a 
“reliable, timely and secure channel for transmitting military information to supplement 
diplomatic channels.”289  The network would prove critically important in enabling the 
means through which to fulfil the growing notification and information exchange 
requirements of not only the Vienna Document, but also the other regimes administered 
by the OSCE.  
Vienna Document 1994 
 The Vienna Document 1994, signed on 28 November 1994, immediately 
superseded the Vienna Document 1992, incorporating expanded and reinforced CSBM 
provisions.290  Extant military contacts and cooperation provisions were broadened to 
include visits to naval bases, along with contacts between military units.  Additional 
provisions were created for military sports and cultural exchanges, collaborative 
training and even the joint publication of security- and defence-related research 
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studies.291  Concomitant with the Vienna Document 1994 was the institution of the 
Global Exchange of Military Information (GEMI).  A transparency measure, the GEMI 
broadly expanded the obligatory data provided by participating States on their armed 
forces, to include command structures, strength and location of forces, major weapon 
and equipment holdings and associated technical data.292  In addition, reporting on 
defence planning policy, doctrine, planning, and budget (including five-year 
projections) were also incorporated as an annual reporting requirement.293 
 With the Vienna Document 1994, both the regime and its governing institution 
had attained an appreciable level of sophistication and rigour.  With its varied revisions 
and enhancements, the Document now represented a more complete and balanced 
confidence- and security-building accord.  That said, the implementation of the 
expanded requirements of the Vienna Document regime brought with it increased 
demands in overseeing all facets of its control, regulation and application.  These 
demands were increased by unavoidable variances in the orientation and wherewithal of 
many of the regime’s constituents (which included several former Soviet Republics) in 
managing their binding obligations.  This was not lost by the CSCE, as noted in a 
corresponding Chairman’s Statement, incorporated as Annex IV of the Vienna 
Document 1994:   
It is understood that the participating States will take into consideration practical 
problems which may arise at an initial stage in implementing CSBMs on the 
territories of newly independent States admitted to the CSCE.  Those States will 
promptly inform all the participating States about such practical problems.  This 
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statement will not constitute a precedent and will be subject to review in the 
light of the discussion at the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.294 
The AIAM was created to provide a dedicated means of recurrent consultative 
appraisal within the annual FSC calendar.  With the establishment of the Vienna 
Document 1994, it had developed into an important annual gathering of national 
delegations to the FSC, supported by policy and operational experts from capitals.  This 
enabled the focused review and assessment of the implementation of established 
CSBM, with a view to validating, correcting and adjusting provisions as part of a 
process of continuous improvement.  Accordingly, the AIAM was and remains a rather 
unique annual venue, bringing all components of regime governance, management and 
implementation together in a single forum.  With support from the CPC, discussion can 
be oriented towards any aspect of the regime, including the analysis and validation of 
agreed measures, technical and procedural clarification, and formalized 
interpretation.295   
With the introduction of the Vienna Document 1994, it had already become 
evident that, with the ambitious expansion and reinforcement of the regime, various 
issues were emerging with its amenable implementation and oversight.  Despite the 
prevailing overall harmony, inherent variances in many participating States’ 
fundamental perceptions, interests and associated intentions were becoming 
increasingly problematic.  Doctor Zdzislaw Lachowski, a leading arms control 
researcher of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, characterized these 
as the “emergence of various problems of circumvention, violation of and non-
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compliance,” created by “different military, political and security factors and 
situations.”296  As previously indicated, these problems were particularly evident 
amongst former integral Soviet states in East-Central Europe, Southern Caucasus and 
Central Asia -- including those actively or recently engaged in conflict, such as 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia and Uzbekistan -- that were adjusting to the 
significant shift towards the openness and transparency represented by the regime.  
These problems ranged from simple interpretive difficulties to specific attempts to 
evade detection and scrutiny of deliberate contraventions.  Within this range, there 
existed various degrees of non-conformity and non-compliance, including those 
attributable to inadvertent error, the inability to comply or conform, purposeful acts, or 
combinations thereof.  While specific details from inspection and evaluation reports are 
“Treaty Sensitive” or “OSCE Restricted,” they include failures in responding to 
inspection requests within the prescribed timelines or refusing such requests for 
unsubstantiated reasons.  Others involve the non-provision of prescribed support 
(including logistical assistance) to an inspection or evaluation or the outright denial of 
inspection access within a previously agreed Specified Area.  As specifically noted in 
some national reporting, infractions of this nature could be ascribed to a lack of 
wherewithal, insufficient resources, deliberate attempts to impede verification or a 
combination thereof.297  
While these problems were becoming increasingly apparent, they remained 
largely overshadowed by the broad political support for the uniqueness and innovative 
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character of the regime.  Given that oversight and implementation were being conducted 
under generally conducive conditions, the overall success of the Vienna Document 
appeared self-evident and as such, somewhat assured.  While buoyed by the overall 
common commitment and cooperation needed to sustain the Vienna Document as a 
viable security construct, continued violations and other infractions would nevertheless 
increasingly undermine what Lachowski referred to as the “fair weather conditions” 
under which the earlier iterations of the regime were implemented.298   
 These early instances of non-compliance and non-conformity were indeed noted 
within the FSC, within which there remained general agreement on the necessity to 
uphold the provisions of this still-novel accord.  Certainly, given the politically-binding 
nature of the regime, along with the consensus-based functionality of its governing 
body, there existed the clear imperative amongst participating States to ensure that 
existing and adopted provisions and measures would remain clear, effective and 
sustained through individual and collective accountability.  Accordingly, the scrutiny of 
issues brought before the AIAM and FSC had been, by design, purposely and 
necessarily inclusive, with a view to engaging them in a collective, collegial fashion: 
The role of the AIAM should be to increase the efficiency of existing measures, 
to improve their application and to provide inspiration for the provision of new 
measures in the FSC.  …Proposals have been made to deal with various cases of 
non-compliance (e.g., preparing maps, charts, etc by the CPC in order to 
facilitate the analysis of data by participating states; submitting a survey to states 
asking them to submit missing information one month before the AIAM; 
offering implementation assistance from other states; and raising the issues of 
compliance at the FSC before the AIAM).299 
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 Nevertheless, the very nature of Vienna Document implementation (that is, 
inspections, evaluations and other operations/activities conducted on a state-to-state 
basis, rather than undertaken by the organisation as a whole) has rendered its 
operational methodology particularly arduous.  In this regard, it has been especially 
important for all participating States to be sufficiently resourced and prepared to 
articulate their national views and hold themselves to account within the context of the 
Vienna Document’s principles and provisions, as a matter of credibility and integrity.300 
 Indeed, credibility and integrity had proven particularly important to the validity 
of interventions made on various implementation issues during early proceedings of the 
FSC and AIAM.  That is to say, there were important and distinguishable delineations 
between observations raised by comparatively impartial participating States, such as 
those with no stationed forces in a given region, as opposed to those raised between 
belligerents.  These proceedings, which frequently involved the “naming and shaming” 
of offending participating States for any manner of transgression, were also highly 
dependent upon the FSC Chairperson (provided by each participating State on a 
sequential, rotational basis) in maintaining decorum, as well as providing suitable 
interpretive objectivity and clarity.301  Given that the decisions rendered by 
CSCE/OSCE decision-making bodies were and continue to be adopted by consensus, 
the Chair’s manner of supervision and interpretation have proven vital.  The FSC is “an 
autonomous decision-making body,” whose mandate set in “relevant decisions” of the 
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CSCE/OSCE’s higher authorities.302  Therefore, the manner in which the Chairperson 
oversees proceedings has proven instrumental to not only ensuring the “good order and 
smooth running of meetings,”303 but to effectively enable the FSC to “implement, 
within its area of competence, tasks defined and decisions taken,” through adoption of 
consensus-based determinations.304  Given that this process is highly dependent upon 
the Chairperson’s individual approach to fair and equitable treatment of a given matter, 
his or her level of expertise, personal credibility and standard of conduct must be 
beyond reproach.  For example, a Chairperson allowing misrepresentations or 
procedural deviations to occur without some form of correction or clarification would 
have failed to act in the interest of all participating States, bringing into question his or 
her impartiality as an honest broker.  The same can be said in the manner the 
Chairperson sets the agenda for each meeting and raises issues associated with 
implementation of commitments.  To further reinforce impartiality and neutrality in this 
regard, the FSC Chairperson is assisted by both the incoming and outgoing 
Chairpersons, forming the FSC “Troika,” with the Chair itself rotating three times each 
year.305 
The overall rectitude of the CSCE/OSCE in the oversight and implementation of 
the Vienna Document has, therefore, remained dependent upon the essential 
requirement to adroitly and effectively administer what Mary M. McKenzie and 
Peter H. Loedel refer to as the “security interdependence” of participating States.  
Effective administration in this regard entails the ability to sustain and reinforce a 
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universal commitment to the established normative standards of compliance and 
conformity required to attain the security safeguards sought.  Accordingly, the integrity 
of the CSCE/OSCE and their constituents has remained entirely dependent upon a 
collective understanding of this interdependence and the requirement to uphold the 
regime’s prescribed provisions to a common standard of “interstate behaviour.”306  With 
this in mind, instances of non-compliance and/or non-conformity (i.e., violations or 
other infringements of specified provisions), be they deliberate, inadvertent, erroneous 
or otherwise, nevertheless constitute various forms of defection per Robert Axelrod, 
referred to earlier in this study.  That is, unchecked repeated defections will establish a 
pattern of effrontery that will become increasingly difficult to correct, thereby 
progressively undermining and ultimately debilitating the integrity of the regime.307   
Per Zdzislaw Lachowski, the “emergence of various problems of circumvention, 
violation of and non-compliance”308 of the Vienna Document in the 1990s, while not 
exclusive, was nevertheless largely attributable to the participating States that had 
devolved from the former Soviet Union:  
Implementation of the Vienna Document encounters obstacles on the part of 
some participants which have an eroding effect on the confidence- and security-
building regime.  For the most part, this concerns some of the post-Soviet states 
with a rather poor experience in complex CSBM procedures and scant resources 
to meet all the requirements of compliance.309 
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 As previously mentioned, a number of newly independent Eastern European and 
Central Asian republics that had been integral components of the former “federated” 
Soviet Union (and therefore accounted for by Moscow internationally), were somewhat 
lacking in the wherewithal and resources required to fulfil their binding international 
obligations as participating States.  While not exhaustive, these included Moldova, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.310  While noted “obstacles” 
often pertained to specific observations raised in the national inspection and evaluation 
reports submitted by other participating States, they also included common compliance 
deficiencies, including annual military information exchange requirements.  Infractions 
were broad in nature, including the failure to respond, accept and/or support inspections 
as planned and requested, denying freedom of movement and access where not provided 
for under established provisions, and otherwise impeding the verification process 
generally.  While some exchanged information failed to meet specific reporting 
requirements, others missed their submission deadlines entirely.311  In addition to a 
presumption of participating States’ “self-correction” in response to noted observations, 
the FSC further sought to ensure that breaches were addressed through focused 
discussion and positive reinforcement within its established consultative processes, 
including the AIAM, as noted in the CSCE Annual Report for 1994: 
The Fourth Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting (12 - 14 April 1994) 
once again called the attention of participating States to the problems of 
compliance with all obligations stemming from the Vienna Document 1992, in 
particular with regard to information exchange.  Those problems were 
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essentially attributed to technical difficulties and inadequate knowledge of the 
relevant provisions.312  
 Other mitigating measures undertaken by the CSCE included the reinforcement 
of provisions adopted and incorporated into the Vienna Document 1994.  For example, 
expanded military information exchange requirements employed increasingly emphatic 
and assertive language to convey the imperative of compliance and conformity, along 
with the utilization of consultative mechanisms to fulfil requirements: 
Participating States which, for whatever reason, have not exchanged annual 
information according to this document will during the meeting explain the 
reasons why and provide an expected date for their full compliance with this 
commitment…. In order to strengthen compliance with agreed confidence- and 
security-building measures and in addition to other relevant provisions of this 
document, the participating States will, as necessary, consider in appropriate 
CSCE bodies how to ensure full implementation of those measures.313 
Another approach to address compliance and conformity difficulties included 
the use of dedicated consultative and training seminars, often delivered within target 
countries and regions, often through the sponsorship of other participating States.  
Given the variances in training undertaken by individual participating States and noting 
specific problem areas, instruction of this nature was specifically aimed at “tailoring” 
Vienna Document modalities within a regional context, with due regard to local 
deficiencies and other concerns.  One example was the “Seminar on CSBMs and Arms 
Control: Application and Compliance,” conducted in 1995 by the CPC in Almaty, 
Kazakhstan.  In light of aforementioned difficulties in implementation and compliance, 
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the seminar was focused upon imparting to officials of Central Asian participating 
States a better political and technical understanding of the Vienna Document 1994 and 
its exigencies within the broader OSCE framework.314 
Despite a steep “learning curve” for several participating States, an overall 
collaborative environment provided the CSCE with the needed synergy to improve the 
competencies required to meet the standards of regime conformity.  This was 
increasingly facilitated by certain “lead” countries, such as Germany, the United 
Kingdom and the United States providing dedicated funding, facilities and/or 
instructional staff, often on their own initiative.  This enabled the CSCE to not only 
enhance interactive collaboration, understanding and partnership, but also further 
reinforce the integrity of the institution and its CSBM agenda.315   
A key example of the importance of regime conformity and unity attained 
during this early period was the action taken by the CSCE in May 1992 to suspend the 
membership of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro), 
resulting from its “clear, gross and uncorrected violations of CSBM commitments” in 
the Balkans.  Yugoslavia’s traditional ally, Russia, initially objected but eventually 
conceded to the action, given Belgrade’s blatant aggression and the strong “push” made 
by the United States and other CSCE members.316  Employing new “consensus minus 
one” provisions that had been instituted by the CSCE in January of that year,317 the 
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Former Republic of Yugoslavia was effectively barred from the OSCE without its 
consent, until it was readmitted in November 2000.    
This action by the CSCE aptly demonstrates that, despite the inherent limitations 
of consensus-based governance and management, an individual participating State 
could, indeed, be held to account and suitably sanctioned when there existed sufficient 
overarching imperative:   
Its use [i.e., “consensus minus one”] was testimony to the desire of most 
participating states at least to appear to be doing something about the most high-
profile violations of CSCE principles taking place within their own ranks.318 
Although the CSCE was able to uphold and even enforce the common standards 
of regime conformity to some extent, persistent variances in participating States’ 
capacities and cooperation would remain significant challenges to preserving the 
necessary accord.  As such, the need to maintain robust institutional oversight and 
management would become increasingly urgent as security developments within the 
zone of application continued to transform and evolve.     
The Test of Conflict 
The next major test of the Vienna Document’s integrity occurred during the 
internal conflict between the Russian Federation and the separatist Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria, commonly referred to as the First Chechen War (December 1994 - August 
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1996).  When the Moscow initiated major troop and heavy aircraft movements and 
concentrations in support of its operations in the Chechen Republic (a federal subject of 
Russia) in late-1994, it did so in contravention of extant Vienna Document 
provisions.319  Moscow had elected to withhold the notification of these movements, 
rationalising them as “non-applicable,” under the Vienna Document, given the domestic 
nature of the Chechen security crisis and that no other state was affected by Russian 
military operations.  This rationalisation was noteworthy, as over time, other subjective 
interpretations of fundamental CSCE/OSCE principles and provisions would continue 
to manifest themselves -- both in discussion and practice – and increasingly challenge 
the integrity of both the regime and its governing institution.320   
Moscow’s actions in the Chechen conflict were strongly rejected by other 
participating States and the CSCE/OSCE as a whole, both as a matter of technical 
compliance and principle.  Other provisions, including those contained in the 1994 
Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security concerning human rights, the 
laws of armed conflict, and the proportionate use of force in performing internal 
security missions, were also cited as having been abrogated by Russia.321 Over the 
course of various consultations, most notably the AIAM held in April 1995, Moscow 
ultimately acquiesced to the overwhelming rejection of its rationale for its non-
compliant actions and begrudgingly accepted the applicability of CSBM in internal 
security situations.  This was a particular triumph for the CSCE in preserving the 
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fundamental and inherent concept of security indivisibility within the Vienna 
Document’s zone of application.322   
The manner in which CSCE/OSCE consultative mechanisms were engaged in 
response to the Chechen crisis clearly proved their utility in enabling a cooperative and 
deferential approach to the resolution of a serious security situation.  In the OSCE’s 
Annual Report 1995, the AIAM was specifically noted as having developed into “a 
flexible tool, a useful vehicle for the development of new techniques and measures,” 
including “questions such as the validity, practical implementation and improvement of 
existing measures, as well as their further development.”323  Further, the dynamism and 
flexibility of the newly-transitioned OSCE in responding to the Chechen crisis was 
aptly demonstrated in the manner it adapted its political consultative and conflict 
management practices, including the establishment of an “OSCE Chechnya Assistance 
Group” and other OSCE efforts -- in close cooperation with Moscow -- that ultimately 
aided the cessation of hostilities in July 1995.  As stated in the OSCE’s 1995 Annual 
Report, “The carefully elaborated mandate of the OSCE Chechnya Assistance Group is 
a good example of the OSCE’s - and OSCE States’ - ability to adjust OSCE instruments 
to the specific circumstances of a given situation.”324 
These events notwithstanding, it is important to note that while the OSCE’s 
conciliatory and collaborative approach in addressing the security situation in Chechnya 
was ultimately successful in attaining specific objectives, Moscow’s actions were never 
censured in any way.  This was indicative of not only the Organisation’s characteristic 
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forbearance, but also its growing trepidation over Russian behaviour generally.  This 
would continue to underscore the increasing tenuousness of the Vienna Document and 
Moscow’s propensity to transgress when deemed suitable to do so.  As noted by 
Alan S. Krass in 1997, despite the favourable outcome, “… none of this can change the 
fact that Russia displayed an utter disregard for its commitments under the Vienna 
regime in its Chechnya operation.  The full implications of this incident for the regime 
remain to be played out.”325  Accordingly, without the OSCE maintaining sufficient 
rigour in its overall governance and management, no amount of flexibility in responding 
to continued challenges of this nature would prevent the erosion of the regime’s efficacy 
as a CSBM mechanism. 
With the onset of the Second Chechen War in the fall of 1999, the Russian 
Federation demonstrated what could be described as an “evolved interpretation” of its 
obligations to, and compliance with, Vienna Document provisions.  This second,        
10-year conflict was again regarded by Moscow as an exclusively domestic security 
operation and as such, largely inapplicable to Vienna Document jurisdiction.  
Nevertheless, some information concerning Russian troop movements and force 
concentrations in the North Caucasus region was provided, along with limited updates.  
The universal application of CSBM provisions within the zone of application, however, 
remained a matter of interpretive disagreement.  Moscow acknowledged that it had 
exceeded some of the regime’s established military activity thresholds, but maintained 
that it had nevertheless demonstrated “exceptional goodwill and transparency” in 
providing the information it did, given the nature of its internal counter-terrorism 
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operations.326  Mindful that the Vienna Document made no distinction between 
domestic and international employment of military forces for notification and reporting 
purposes, many participating States, particularly NATO members, continued to press 
for Moscow’s full disclosure in strict accordance with the Document’s established 
provisions, along with its agreement to allow a specified area inspection to be 
conducted within Chechnya.  As a result of repeated representations, Russia provided 
additional information on its forces engaged in operations and invited a German 
inspection.  This was followed by a second invited inspection visit in June, involving 
representatives from 22 participating States.  Although a number of constraints were 
imposed on the visit by Moscow, it did enable inspectors to directly observe Russian 
forces and obtain information on military forces and equipment involved in these 
operations.327  Nevertheless, in spite of varied individual and collective objections to 
Moscow’s repeated non-compliance with the Vienna Document and the Code of 
Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security -- including the protection of civilians 
and proportionate use of force -- there were, ultimately, no formal consequences.  This 
is likely due to the OSCE and several participating States ultimately accepting 
Moscow’s partial acquiescence as “good enough.”   
Despite the lessons of the First Chechen War, the universal application of 
CSBM provisions within the zone of application was left largely unresolved as a matter 
of interpretive disagreement.  While the OSCE unquestionably played a key role in 
negotiating a peace settlement in First Chechen War in 1996 and even supervised local 
elections the following year, its continued collaborative approach and tolerance of 
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Moscow’s transgressions would reap increasingly limited dividends.  For example, the 
OSCE hailed the re-establishment of its field mission in Chechnya in 2002 as a “major 
breakthrough” in applying some form of practical influence, only to see Moscow simply 
refuse to extend its mandate the same year, with the operation terminating shortly 
thereafter.328  As observed by Rick Fawn, the OSCE’s discerning conciliatory approach 
towards an increasingly emboldened Moscow had lent itself to “at least allowing, if not 
excusing, Russian behaviour in Chechnya,” and that such an approach had created 
“egregious and hypocritical contradictions.”329   
 Although the very nature of the OSCE’s governing principles renders its ability 
to “allow” any transgression a matter of interpretation, the Chechen example 
nevertheless highlights an underlying incongruity between the OSCE’s “flexible and 
adaptive” approach to security and the requirement to maintain the normative standards 
of its regimes.  Indeed, the forbearance accorded to Russian transgressions highlights a 
particular vulnerability.  Wolfgang Zellner, head of the Centre for OSCE Research at 
the University of Hamburg, acknowledges the OSCE’s relative “weakness,” further 
noting the added difficulty of dealing with Russia in comparison with other 
participating States: "If Russia is suspended like Yugoslavia was (1992-2000), then the 
OSCE would have no raison d'être, and then it may as well just be dissolved."330  
Indeed, the de facto Russian “exception” represents a serious implication for not only 
the Vienna Document, but also the fundamental principles of conventional arms control 
in general. 
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Another important evolution in the Vienna Document’s implementation 
occurred during Yugoslavia’s internal conflict in Kosovo (February 1998 - June 1999), 
which was fought by forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (i.e., Montenegro 
and Serbia) and Kosovo-Albanian rebels.  The rebels received support from Albanian 
forces and, from 24 March to 10 June 1999, air support from NATO under Operation 
ALLIED FORCE.331 
The conflict on the ground was largely characterised by its strong ethnic 
demarcations, numerous atrocities and the massive displacement of refugees.  Equally 
noteworthy were the limitations of the United Nations in effectively responding to the 
crisis due to various constraints, but most notably the fundamental disagreements that 
existed between the Russian Federation and the United States.332  The United Nations 
(UN) Security Council had condemned Yugoslavia’s excessive use of force and 
imposed a largely ineffective arms embargo.  Further, under Security Council 
Resolution 1199, the UN demanded the cessation of hostilities; termination of actions 
by security forces affecting civilians; permitting access to international monitors; 
facilitating the return of refugees; allowing humanitarian aid and making “rapid 
progress” towards finding a political solution.333   
In their own right, these demands had had little impact on Belgrade.  It wasn’t 
until the threat of NATO intervention was diplomatically relayed by the United States 
Special Envoy, Richard Holbrook and the Balkans Contact Group (comprised of France, 
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Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States)334 that Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milošević ultimately agreed to Resolution 1199.335  Milošević 
further accepted Security Council Resolution 1203, establishing an OSCE monitoring 
mission and NATO aerial surveillance mission.336  Renewed and intensified fighting 
between Kosovar rebels and Yugoslav federal forces and Milošević’s subsequent failure 
to honour the agreement resulted in NATO’s decision to proceed with its air campaign 
as a humanitarian imperative.  Moscow’s disagreement with this action was largely 
based upon its traditional alignments with Serbia (a fellow Slavic state), similar 
difficulties in dealing with its own Muslim minorities, and its desire to retain its 
influence in Eastern Europe.337  Accordingly, as a result of Russia’s formal opposition 
within the UN Security Council, joined by China and Brazil, Operation ALLIED 
FORCE  -- NATO’s first offensive air campaign against a sovereign state  -- was 
undertaken without an UN Security Council mandate.338 
Given these circumstances -- particularly the tenuous relationship between 
Russia and the United States -- the Vienna Document would prove especially useful in 
acquiring information, dispelling concerns, and otherwise holding NATO participating 
States to account regarding their execution of Operation ALLIED FORCE.  During the 
first month of operations, in the absence of any notification of military activity, Belarus 
initially requested clarification of the operations being undertaken by seven 
participating States belonging to NATO, pursuant to Chapter II (Risk Reduction) of the 
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Vienna Document 1994.  This was followed by the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) advising all participating States in April of a concentration of 
forces in its territory, pursuant to Chapter IV (Prior Notification of Military Activities).  
In May, in conjunction with several CFE Treaty Declared Site inspections undertaken in 
Italy and Hungary, the Russian Federation conducted specified area inspections in the 
FYROM and Albania, along with submitting its own Chapter II request concerning the 
concentration of forces.339   
Shortly thereafter in Vienna, the Russian Federation delegation to the FSC 
formally protested the denial of access and other constraints placed upon its inspection 
teams in their efforts to access NATO units in the FYROM and Albania earlier that 
month.  This included delays and redirection to an undesignated point of entry, denial of 
aerial observation, denial of access to NATO military forces and equipment and non-
provision of briefings, as duly specified in the Vienna Document 1994.  The Russians 
further complained that its inspection teams had been denied access to areas and 
facilities where NATO formations and units were stationed, in contravention of Vienna 
Document provisions.340  Moscow also specifically cited the United States for non-
compliance with extant notification and observation requirements, given that there were 
more than 13,000 military personnel deployed to the FYROM.341 
In their responses, Albania, the FYROM, the United States and other involved 
NATO participating States justified the denial of access to Russian inspectors on the 
                                                
339 Michael D. Miggins, Conventional Arms Control and Its Contribution to European Security and Stability. 
Briefing to NATO Senior Officer Course 10 February 2005 (Brussels: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 
2005), 21-24. 
340 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 31-35. 
341 Ibid, 20-27. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      172 
basis of safety, security and force protection reasons, given the hostile operational 
environment generally, and for specific “areas or sensitive points,” as provided under 
paragraph 78 of the Vienna Document 1994.342  Additionally, the United States claimed 
that the purpose of its military presence in the FYROM was to provide humanitarian 
assistance and, unlike the Russian troop concentrations in Chechnya (constituting forces 
“engaged in war”), this did not fall under the same specific notification and observation 
criteria.343  Albania and the FYROM cited technical reasons for the non-provision of 
aircraft for aerial inspection.  This was stated, despite the fact that under paragraph 97 
of the Vienna Document 1994, Russia, as the inspecting State could specify “whether 
aerial inspection will be conducted using an airplane, a helicopter or both,” with the 
selection of the actual aircraft subject to “mutual agreement between the inspecting and 
receiving States.”344 The change in points of entry was explained as due to constraints 
arising from humanitarian airlift operations.345  Under the Document’s “Observation of 
Certain Military Activities” provisions,346 the FYROM eventually coordinated a visit to 
observe NATO forces and operations; however, this only occurred after Operation 
ALLIED FORCE had concluded.347  
  The application of the Vienna Document 1994 with respect to NATO’s Kosovo 
campaign demonstrates both the value and operational impact of its notification, 
observation, risk reduction, verification and constraining provisions.  At the same time, 
it highlights the effects of non-compliance and non-conformity with these provisions, 
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regardless of their nature (e.g., lack of understanding, misinterpretation or deliberate 
intent).  In this instance, contraventions were rationalised in terms of either perceived 
inapplicability of Vienna Document provisions or presumed mitigating circumstances 
under which United States and the other involved Allied participating States operated.  
The United States, in particular, had defended its actions in denying Russian access as a 
matter of operational security concerning the deployment of high technology military 
equipment, given Moscow’s close relationship with Belgrade and the likelihood of 
intelligence sharing.  This was less of an issue for other NATO participating States, 
such as the British and Germans, who were more forthcoming in terms of access and 
information.348   
For the United States and other NATO participating States, Operation ALLIED 
FORCE provided a simple but important lesson concerning both the Vienna Document 
and the CFE Treaty; namely, that compliance and conformity with politically- and 
legally-binding commitments and obligations must be fulfilled.349  To be fair, the 
unprecedented nature of NATO’s first operation of this nature rendered the 
interpretation of specific provisions a particular challenge.  Nevertheless, given the 
strong Russian criticism of Operation ALLIED FORCE, including the lack of an 
international legal mandate (i.e., UN Security Council authority), NATO had been 
placed squarely on the defensive, maintaining that after more than a year of concerted 
diplomatic effort, the humanitarian crisis (including genocide) and overall threat to 
international peace and security had warranted the actions that were taken.350  
Notwithstanding the moral justification of the mission, the lack of conformity with 
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established, binding regimes only served to further exacerbate the situation for the 
Alliance, both internally (given noted variances in interpretation and actions taken by 
the participants) and externally (international criticism).  This would remain an 
important consideration, as demonstrated by the scrutiny of NATO participating States 
that have continued to operate under the Military Technical Agreement between the 
International Security Force ("KFOR") and the Governments of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (9 June 1999) and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (10 June 1999).351 
 As a result of its poor response to Vienna Document and CFE Treaty scrutiny, 
NATO was compelled to acknowledge associated deficiencies and consequently set 
about to address this through its integral lessons learned process.  First and foremost, 
the perceived conflict between regime compliance and operational security/force 
protection needed to be reconciled.  This was largely addressed by ensuring a full 
understanding of extant provisions, achieved through the provision of training and 
promulgation of related information throughout NATO’s command structure, thereby 
ensuring that arms control expertise would be made readily available at all levels.  It 
was also decided that, as a matter of standard procedure, Alliance planning would 
“factor in” the Vienna Document and other arms control provisions into both the 
political decision making and operational planning processes, to ensure appropriate and 
timely fulfilment of obligations – particularly those relating to the build-up of NATO 
forces during periods of tension and crisis.  As a means of further inculcating these 
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requirements throughout the NATO chain of command, regime-related obligations and 
responsibilities were incorporated into command post and field training exercises.352  
 As explained by Michael Miggins, former Head of the NATO Verification 
Coordinating Committee (VCC) -- the principal body in managing and coordinating 
Allies’ conventional arms control implementation, data management and verification 
activity353 -- the lessons learned from the Kosovo crisis were eventually translated into 
formal NATO military guidance.  In December 2002, Military Committee (MC) 453 - 
Arms Control and Alliance Military Activity was published to “provide guidance for 
developing procedures and defining responsibilities for complying with arms control 
commitments which may impact on NATO’s collective military activity.”354 MC 453 
was subsequently included as a standard annex to NATO operational plans and 
orders.355 
 The manner in which NATO eventually “de-conflicted” compliance and 
conformity with Vienna Document provisions and its operational security/force 
protection imperatives represents a noteworthy acknowledgement by the Alliance of not 
only the imperative of fulfilling participating States’ obligations, but also the utility of 
doing so.  That is, notwithstanding the associated impact upon the planning and 
execution of operations, compliance and conformity with binding obligations were 
ultimately determined to be compatible with the attainment of overarching strategic 
objectives, as reflected in the Alliance’s 2010 Strategic Concept:  
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NATO seeks its security at the lowest possible level of forces.  Arms control, 
disarmament and non-proliferation contribute to peace, security and stability, 
and should ensure undiminished security for all Alliance members.  We will 
continue to play our part in reinforcing arms control and in promoting 
disarmament of both conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, as 
well as non-proliferation efforts…. We are committed to conventional arms 
control, which provides predictability, transparency and a means to keep 
armaments at the lowest possible level for stability.  We will work to strengthen 
the conventional arms control regime in Europe on the basis of reciprocity, 
transparency and host-nation consent.356 
 NATO’s Kosovo experience also highlighted the fact that operational security 
and force protection considerations had already been factored into the Vienna 
Document’s (and CFE Treaty’s) provisions.  These “managed access” stipulations 
effectively limit or prohibit verification access to specific locations, facilities, units 
and/or equipment that would otherwise affect physical, personnel and operations 
security/protection.  Section VIII (Compliance and Verification) Paragraph 79 states: 
In the specified area the inspection team accompanied by the representatives of 
the receiving State will be permitted access, entry and unobstructed survey, 
except for areas or sensitive points to which access is normally denied or 
restricted, military and other defence installations, as well as naval vessels, 
military vehicles and aircraft.  The number and extent of the restricted areas 
should be as limited as possible.  Areas where notifiable military activities can 
take place will not be declared restricted areas, except for certain permanent or 
temporary military installations which, in territorial terms, should be as small as 
possible, and consequently those areas will not be used to prevent inspection of 
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notifiable military activities.  Restricted areas will not be employed in a way 
inconsistent with the agreed provisions on inspection.357 
Both the Chechen and Kosovo examples therefore illustrate the adverse impact 
of attempts to withhold, limit, control, constrain or otherwise deny information, 
notification or access as provided for under the regime.  Subsequent corresponding 
changes in NATO policy and doctrine, while clearly favourable in terms of the 
Alliance’s acknowledgement of the imperative of compliance and conformity, would 
nevertheless need to be consistently and uniformly applied in practical terms to avoid 
future difficulties.  Conversely, despite what might be described as begrudging 
acknowledgement, the Russian Federation’s future compliance and conformity could be 
expected to remain characteristically selective and conditional in both its interpretation 
and corresponding conduct.  In any event, effective governance and management would 
remain particularly important in ensuring uniform adherence to the regime’s 
fundamental provisions.  This would remain a persistent dilemma for not only the 
Vienna Document, but in all aspects of conventional arms control and CSBM 
implementation.  Nevertheless, whether inadvertent or deliberate, various transgressions 
would continue to impede the implementation of the Vienna Document in the years to 
come, with overall misapprehension and lack of awareness only serving to further 
exacerbate this.  Indeed, in 1998, Colonel A.M. Brown, Director J3 Arms Control 
Verification, National Defence Headquarters (Canada), in noting a fundamental lack of 
understanding in both the concept and technical requirements of the regime within the 
upper echelons of military chains of command, departments and ministries, stated that 
“ACV [arms control verification] operations are poorly understood, if at all, by senior 
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management….”358  The ramifications of this lack of understanding were reflected in a 
2005 United States Department of State report on adherence and compliance, which 
stated: 
Even if violations are detected early and are quickly understood as such, an arms 
control, nonproliferation or disarmament regime can still be in peril if its 
members are unable or unwilling to address them as compliance challenges.  
Detection is only part of what is needed: violations must have consequences.  
National governments play a critical role both in deterring and detecting 
violations, and in taking resolute action – individually and collectively – to 
enforce compliance and hold violators accountable for their actions. Verification 
only works when these elements act together to deter, detect, and remedy 
noncompliance.359 
 
 These fundamental deficiencies notwithstanding, the Vienna Document 1994 
remained sufficiently robust to not only sustain its support within the OSCE, but to also 
enable the progression to a successor regime.  Indeed, despite a range of noted 
underlying “problems,” FSC and AIAM consultations from 1995 to 1999 continued to 
endorse the overall value and effectiveness of existing CSBM and seek, where 
appropriate, their continued improvement and development.360  This included initial 
adjustments that included a common five-year period for air base visits, clarification of 
the role of the Conflict Prevention Centre in the operation and oversight of the OSCE 
Network and an adjustment of the timeframe for the submission of defence planning 
information.361  This was followed by additional “tweaks,” that included the 
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standardisation of reporting formats, an elaboration of force majeure provisions and the 
decision that multinational teams would conduct evaluation visits.362  Otherwise, the 
OSCE realised a significant overall increase in Vienna Document 1994 implementation 
activity.  From 1996 to 1999, the following CSBM operations, activities and events 
were undertaken: 
• Specified Area Inspections: 150; 
• Unit Evaluations: 265; 
• Airbase visits: 18; 
• Observation of Certain Military Activities and Visits to Military 
Facilities and Formations: 37; and 
• Demonstrations of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment 
Systems: 17.363 
 This notable level of activity by participating States to the Vienna Document 
1994 provides ample evidence of continued strong support to the regime, as well as its 
growing utility as a mechanism of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis 
management and post-conflict mitigation.  On-going refinements also served to 
reinforce the regime’s complementarity with the various other resources employed by 
the OSCE in its increasingly comprehensive approach to politico-military, economic, 
environmental and human security.  In addition to the OSCE’s primary function as a 
security-oriented consultative institution, these resources included a growing number of 
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monitoring missions, field operations and programmes employed specifically in 
response to crisis and conflict situations.  As these situations were not limited to inter-
state security relations, this provided the opportunity to further demonstrate the Vienna 
Document’s versatility and efficacy, as noted by Ambassador Herbert Salber, Director 
of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre: 
…many of the OSCE’s best practices in conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution are well-tested: these include a series of confidence-building and 
security measures that can be used in situations of inter-state conflicts but also in 
the case of conflicts within states to foster confidence and cooperation among 
different political, ethnic and religious communities.364 
 Accordingly, despite the implementation difficulties experienced during the 
Chechen and Kosovo crises, the practical utility of the Vienna Document 1994 
continued to be demonstrated and valued accordingly, as not only an anticipatory and 
preventative security regime, but also as a reactive mitigation measure.  This included 
its broadened practical application in response to unresolved or “frozen” domestic 
conflicts in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, including their separately 
established security arrangements.  Specifically, these unresolved conflicts comprised: 
• the conflict between Moldova and its eastern Transdniestrian region 
(1990 – 1992).  Since 1992, a Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement, 
including a trilateral military “Joint Control Commission” composed of 
Russian, Moldovan and Transdniestrian personnel (subsequently 
including a small number of Ukrainian observers) has remained in effect, 
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with Transdniestria effectively functioning as an autonomous entity 
under the de facto protection and influence of Russia; 
• the first South Ossetia conflict (1991 – 1992) between the Georgian 
government forces and secessionists of that country’s South Ossetia 
Autonomous Oblast.  A ceasefire, again brokered by Moscow, 
established a “joint peacekeeping force,” but left South Ossetia without a 
final determination of its political status, remaining closely aligned with 
Russia; 
• the conflict in Georgia’s Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (1992 – 
1993), between Georgian government forces and Abkhazian separatist 
forces.  A precarious 1994 ceasefire, once again brokered by Moscow, 
combined with a peacekeeping force and observers, left the status of the 
region undeterminable, but well within the Russian sphere of influence; 
and  
• the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia (1988 
– 1994), that resulted from the parliament of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-
Karabakh Autonomous Oblast voting to join Armenia in early 1988.  Yet 
another Russian-brokered ceasefire was put in place in 1994, along with 
peace talks, coordinated and mediated by the OSCE “Minsk Group” 
(comprising France, the United States and the Russian Federation), 
which remain on-going.365 
 While all of these conflicts are singularly distinct in terms of their respective 
geographic, political and demographic circumstances, they nevertheless share common 
factors, which include their Soviet origins and the persistence of Moscow’s regional 
influence through its direct or furtive support to secessionist entities and governments.  
This approach has been consistent with specific facets of Russia’s 1993 Foreign Policy 
                                                
365 S. Neil MacFarlane, “Frozen Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union – The Case of Georgia/South 
Ossetia,” OSCE Yearbook, 2008 (Vienna: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2008), 
23-25. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      182 
Doctrine and Military Doctrine (and successive policies), which have accounted for the 
use of military power in support of ethnic Russians in the Near Abroad.  This includes 
the discernment of the suppression of "rights, liberties and legitimate interests" of not 
only Russian Federation citizens living in foreign states but, by inference, those 
identifying themselves ethnically and culturally as Russian, particularly in areas in 
which local demographic majorities are so composed.366  This has resulted in what 
diplomat and scholar Filon Morar refers to as “a confluence point between different 
regional and international actors’ interests.”367  That is, Russian policy concerning the 
divergences between post-Soviet states and entities aligned with Moscow (i.e., 
separatist groups or governments, as is the case with Armenia) has been and remains 
fundamentally incompatible with the OSCE’s governing principles and as such, 
discordant with the implementation of the Vienna Document and other regimes.  
Indeed, this incompatibility has been most recently exemplified in the developments 
leading to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and the on-going conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine.  That is, Moscow's attendant policies and actions have escalated to the point of 
significantly impacting “the normative bedrock of European security institutions,” 
including “sovereign equality, the indivisibility of security, refraining from the threat or 
use of force and, last but not least, the territorial integrity of all states.”368   
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Vienna Document 1999 
 As noted, over the course of the Vienna Document 1994’s five-year period of 
implementation, focused FSC and AIAM consultations enabled further refinement and 
expansion of its provisions.  This ultimately resulted in the fourth iteration -- the Vienna 
Document 1999 -- being formally adopted at the FSC’s 269th plenary meeting in 
Istanbul in November 1999.  In addition to expanding its constraining provisions to a 
broader range of military activities, the updated regime also increased site visits, 
inspections and observations, while further enabling broadened military cooperation.  It 
also incorporated new chapters on defence planning and regional security within the 
zone of application, enabling participating States to complement CSBMs with 
additional measures, specifically oriented upon unique, sub-zonal requirements.369 
 
 While the attainment of the unanimity procedurally required to produce the 
updated regime was a notable achievement, the FSC’s efforts also highlighted the 
limitations of consensus-based amendment. A range of proposals to further refine and 
improve the provisions of the regime, such as adjustments to established force level 
thresholds and the inclusion of new types of weapon and equipment systems in the 
annual military information exchange, failed to attain common support.  While not the 
only participating State to disagree with these proposals, the Russian Federation figured 
prominently.  While specific reasons varied, the fundamental underlying reason 
remained the desire to best secure individual national interests in light of evolving 
security developments.  In 1999, this had included NATO’s on-going process of 
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enlargement, along with the Kosovo and North Caucasus conflicts.370  As stated by 
Josiah Rosenblatt, United States Deputy Head of Mission to the FSC: 
We recognize many of us suffered disappointments during the review process…. 
Many delegations -- including my own -- put forward new ideas and proposals 
for consideration.  For example, we and others had high hopes for the inclusion 
of provisions related to military infrastructure transparency and new aircraft 
types.  After thorough consideration, however, few of these proposals have 
survived the review process and are included in Vienna Document 1999.371 
 
 Therefore, while the Vienna Document 1999 underwent sufficient modification 
to be issued as a separate and distinct version, it also demonstrated the limitations of 
more substantive alterations being incorporated.  Nevertheless, the update represented a 
continued endorsement of the validity of its extant provisions, demonstrating that the 
regime had reached a point of maturity where calibration, vice revision, appeared more 
suitable: 
 
These changes strengthen the Vienna Document and make it even more 
applicable to today's politico-military realities.  Second, however, and equally as 
important, the process itself has demonstrated that we already have a mature and 
sturdy collection of CSBMs.  This review has helped us understand that there is 
a finite number of militarily significant CSBMs that are capable of achieving 
consensus on an OSCE-wide scale.372 
 
 
 Implemented over a period of 12 years, the Vienna Document 1999 represents, 
in many respects, the epitome of the CSBM concept.  In stark contrast with the CFE 
                                                
370 Wolfgang Richter, “A new start for the Vienna Document,” 17. 
371 United States Department of State, Statement on Vienna Document Delivered by Deputy Chief of 
Mission Josiah Rosenblatt to the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Istanbul (Istanbul: U.S. Mission 
to the OSCE, 1999), n.p. 
372 United States Department of State, Statement on Vienna Document Delivered by Deputy Chief of 
Mission Josiah Rosenblatt to the OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Istanbul, n.p. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      185 
Treaty (a highly structured and categorized arms control regime designed to 
quantifiably limit, reduce or eliminate specific weapon and equipment systems), the 
provisions of the Vienna Document 1999 were a comparative model of simplicity – 
comprising just 12 chapters and five annexes in a 57-page publication.  Its collaborative, 
transparent approach to reducing uncertainty and clarifying intent regarding military 
activities had evolved into a well-developed and proven security mechanism.  
Specifically, it established a well-balanced combination of information exchanges and 
notifications; specified area inspections; unit/formation evaluation visits; observation 
visits; and various forms of military-to-military contacts.  As the regime’s longest-
serving iteration, the Vienna Document 1999 represents a definitive benchmark.  
Accordingly, a synopsis is provided at Appendix B.   
Refined and enhanced, the range of Vienna Document 1999 CSBMs and other 
provisions had rendered it a highly functional and effective component of European and 
Eurasian security.  Going well beyond purely quantitative regulatory controls on 
weapons, equipment and personnel, the 1999 version constituted a wholly distinctive 
context, scope and character in reducing the risk of armed conflict across the spectrum 
of regional, sub-regional, area and domestic security.  As both a proactive measure 
against real or perceived hostile intent, as well as a mitigating measure in response to 
military escalation and conflict, it “fit” particularly well with the CFE Treaty and the 
nascent Open Skies Treaty, which now comprised the oft-referred “three pillars” of the 
OSCE’s contemporary conventional arms control framework.373   
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Figure 4.1: Vienna Document 1999 Specified Area Inspection Aerial Survey, Munitions Depot, 
Central Asia.374 
For the most part, the initial implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 
unfolded as expected.  The 2001 AIAM noted that “the first full year of implementation 
of the Vienna Document 1999 proceeded smoothly without, the need for major 
changes.”  It was further acknowledged that the Document had reached a level of 
maturity where “fine tuning” vice “renegotiation” would be more appropriate as 
circumstances dictated.375  In fact, implementation was taking place very much 
according to its overall design, including various compliance- and conformity-related 
observations raised in national reporting.  In the first full year of implementation, the 
following CSBM operations and activities were undertaken: 
• Specified Area Inspections: 70 (of which 6 were bilateral); 
• Unit Evaluations: 56 (of which 18 were bilateral); 
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• Airbase visits: 6; 
• Observation of Certain Military Activities and Visits to Military 
Facilities and Formations: 10; and 
• Demonstrations of New Types of Major Weapon and Equipment 
Systems: 5.376 
By this time, the OSCE itself had matured considerably as an institution.  Fully 
engaged in an extensive range of security endeavours, the Organisation now sported 
field missions, offices and monitoring groups throughout Europe and Central Asia, for 
which it was endowed with a unified budget of over €209,000,000.377  An expanding 
number of high commissioners and representatives were now assigned varied 
responsibilities within the politico-military, economic/environmental, and human 
security dimensions.  With direct oversight accorded to the FSC and relatively minor 
issues aside, the Vienna Document appeared to be moving in the right direction as the 
OSCE’s cornerstone regime, albeit within an increasingly complex organisational 
matrix that now extended well beyond the customary arms control and regional security 
framework.  Indeed, perhaps as a function of its success, the operation of the regime had 
become increasingly routine and, as noted by Angus Brown, “a never ending 
responsibility:” 
 
While most military operations begin and end at set times, ACV operations are 
ongoing.  From time to time there may be successes  or highlights but most of the 
work is ongoing and somewhat tedious.... The visibility of ACV operations has 
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been obscured on a routine basis….  It is hard to drum up enthusiasm for “more 
of the same.”378 
 
 Implementation was also becoming increasingly challenged by the imperative to 
keep pace with the rapid changes that were occurring within the zone of application: 
New threats and challenges have emerged; unresolved territorial conflicts, 
recurrent violence and military action have created new distrust; and further 
enlargement of NATO and the EU have changed the political landscape in 
Europe.  While the general trend of force reductions in Europe has persisted, 
there has been a sharp increase of major weapon holdings in the Caucasus area.  
At force levels which would have been assessed “minor” in Cold War times, a 
war was fought.  One might legitimately ask why the Vienna Document and 
other CSBMs have not played their expected role in early warning and conflict 
prevention during recent conflicts.379  
This imperative included the adjustments needed to better account for lower 
force levels as “notifiable,” or the inclusion of installations and sites containing high 
concentrations of conventional armaments and equipment, such as training centres and 
depots, not covered under the regime.380  Other issues were more insipid in nature, such 
as interpretive clarifications, technical updates to verification equipment, the 
composition of inspection/evaluation teams, and the utilisation of interpreters.  Over 
time, these relatively ordinary “care and maintenance” matters would bear greater 
significance.   
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Other challenges -- directly and indirectly related – were also developing that 
would increasingly impact the oversight and application of the Vienna Document 1999.   
These included factors affecting the commitment and investment of participating States 
in maintaining the essential viability of the regime.  That is, in addition to annual 
financial contributions to the OSCE, national verification capabilities and programmes 
were clearly essential.  However, for several participating States the resources required 
to sustain these capabilities and programmes had come to be perceived as increasingly 
counterintuitive to the economic benefit derived from the end of Cold War.  Indeed, this 
“peace dividend” had been readily translated into corresponding cutbacks in most 
military establishments and defence budgets.  These ranged from the modest to the 
more dramatic, such as Canada’s 1993 complete withdrawal of its 40-year commitment 
of stationed forces in Europe, which at the time comprised a mechanized brigade group 
and an air division.381  The United States defence budget fell about three percentage 
points of GDP (i.e., seven to four percent) from 1990 to 2000,382 with most participating 
States following suit.  A by-product of the “peace dividend” was the corresponding loss 
of imperative and general complacency in proactive security investment, including arms 
control:    
The end of the Cold War has led to reductions in the defense budgets of the 
 United  States, of most of its allies in NATO, and of the successor states of the 
 Soviet Union and most of its allies in the former Warsaw Pact.  The end of the 
 East-West arms race by no means, however, implies that the arms race as a 
 phenomenon has come to an end.383 
                                                
381 Roy Rempel, Counterweights. The Failure of Canada’s German and European Policy, 1955-1995 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press) 178-179. 
382 Diana Walker, Trends in U.S. Military Spending, Council on Foreign Relations Report (Washington: 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2014), 6. 
383 Michael D. Intriligator, “The Concept of a Peace Dividend,” in Economics of Peace and Security 
Journal, ed. James K. Galbraith, Jurgen Brauer and Lucy L. Webster (Oxford: Encyclopaedia of Life 
Support Systems, 2009), 72. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      190 
Ultimately a national responsibility, reduced priority and the lack of resources 
accorded to conventional arms control by several participating States manifested 
themselves in various ways over time, including the reduced size and structure of 
verification units, technical training and the sustainment of “core” expertise by policy 
officials, diplomats and verification personnel.384  For a number of participating States, 
a “minimalist” approach was developing; that is, falling back on doing only what was 
absolutely necessary to remain compliant.385  This included curtailing “active” 
operations and restricting activity to the receipt of and support to “passive” inspections 
and evaluations conducted within respective national territories.386  Even the NATO 
VCC was largely unable to mitigate this amongst Allied participating States, as it was 
similarly constrained with “few collective resources” and was “not well configured to 
support multilateral arms control.”387  Like the OSCE, the VCC was therefore largely 
dependent upon the verification capabilities and assets of its members.  Angus Brown 
characterised this overall trend thusly:    
In times of budgetary constraints, ACV operations are hard to justify as 
productive for senior management.  They see these as sideshows, to be done at 
the least possible cost….  This probably reflects two things: declining 
importance of ACV operations in the eyes of some senior management… and 
secondly, the fact that many of the organizations concerned… were now 
approaching a “steady state” of activity and regarding ACV operations as more 
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routine staff work rather than the anomalous and wonderfully new thing they 
had been previously.388 
 
Another concern pertained to broader developments in conventional arms 
control outside of the Vienna Document regime, but having due effect, nonetheless.  
These included growing stresses between the Russian Federation and other States 
Parties to the CFE Treaty following the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999.   Indeed, the 
developing “stalemate” concerning the ratification of the Treaty’s “adapted” successor 
remaining contingent upon the fulfilment of Russian military force withdrawals from 
Moldova and Georgia constituted a principal manifestation of Moscow’s disaccord with 
not only the CFE Treaty, but the conventional arms control and CSBM status quo in 
general.389  This, in turn, highlighted the growing incongruity of Moscow’s aspirations 
with the principles embodied by these regimes.  As Wolfgang Zellner points out, CFE 
Treaty-related pressures:  
 
… would influence European arms control in general, as well as all institutions 
and instruments dealing with cooperative security.  It is doubtful whether the 
Vienna Document 1999 on confidence- and security-building measures could 
survive if the CFE Treaty failed.  More broadly, institutions such as the OSCE 
and the NATO-Russia Council could be affected.  Finally, the breakdown of 
cooperative security policy in Europe would have a negative impact on U.S.-
Russian strategic relations.  It is difficult to imagine that they could continue to 
improve if tensions in Europe were to rise.390 
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 In keeping with its flexible and dynamic approach to security, the OSCE was 
becoming increasingly engaged in broader security initiatives as a response to various 
developments and requirements within its jurisdiction.  With more than 4,000 personnel 
and 19 field missions in 17 countries, the Organisation’s focus now extended well 
beyond the immediacy of Vienna Document 1999 implementation.  This included its 
assistance to other multilateral agreements, including the new Agreement on Sub-
Regional Arms Control Article IV (part of the General Framework Agreement for Peace 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina); broadened engagement in the economic and environmental 
dimensions of security; and expanded politico-military and human security endeavours, 
including terrorism, small arms and light weapons, corruption and policing.391  
Although such broadened engagement clearly demonstrated the Organisation’s 
increasingly “flexible and adaptive approach,” it was also indicative of growing 
difficulties in maintaining sufficient span of control and due focus on core functions.  
The OSCE Secretary General, Ján Kubiš acknowledged the “administrative problems 
identified in recent years, which were largely a consequence of the rapid growth in our 
field activities.”392   
In 2004, the OSCE reported that the AIAM held that year had undertaken a 
complete review of Vienna Document implementation measures, resulting in upwards 
of 40 proposals “aimed at further improving the transparency and relevance of the 
military information exchanged,” with a number of those proposals implemented.393  
This effort was, however, somewhat overshadowed by the ever-increasing range of 
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other OSCE activities, which now included election monitoring and support activities in 
Ukraine and Afghanistan, conferences on anti-Semitism and racism, efforts to address 
human trafficking, Mongolia’s acceptance as a Partner for Cooperation, and various 
other organisational reforms and related efforts to “transform and strengthen the 
Organisation.”394 
2005 marked the 30th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 15th 
anniversary of the Charter of Paris.  In the OSCE’s 2005 Annual Report, it was noted 
that efforts had been stepped up to even further broaden its activities in security matters 
that now included organized crime, migration and discrimination.  Within this expanded 
activity, the FSC nevertheless continued to assess Vienna Document 1999 
implementation and had issued a Statement by the Chairman of the FSC on Prior 
Notification of Major Military Activities, concerning a voluntary measure to further 
enhance openness and transparency.  The report also noted that the Forum was working 
more closely with the OSCE’s Permanent Council (PC) to facilitate FSC reporting on 
Vienna Document 1999 implementation for the AIAM.395   
It is evident that within the growing complexities of the OSCE’s activities, its 
core CSBM operations and activities, while still important, were becoming just one of 
many areas of involvement.  In addition to their negotiation and oversight of adopted 
CSBM implementation measures, both the FSC and AIAM were being increasingly 
drawn into supporting other areas of the OSCE’s broadened security portfolio.  This 
was largely determined by the PC, itself influenced by the individual and collective 
interests of its national constituents, along with the institution’s inherent predilection to 
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“take on more,” as means of advancing its vision of comprehensive security.  As noted 
by Maxim Suchkov, “OSCE operations and performance are largely dependent upon the 




Figure 4.2: OSCE structures and institutions, 2005397` 
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Responsible for the OSCE’s “military dimension” the FSC’s undertakings in 
broader security issues, while fully within its mandate, nevertheless left it frequently 
distracted, if not diverted, from its primary responsibilities.  For example, in 2005, both 
the FSC and AIAM conducted work on “OSCE Documents on small arms and 
conventional ammunition.”398  In addition, the FSC examined approaches in the 
elimination of toxic “melange” rocket fuel, undertook discussions on a possible OSCE 
role in the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, contributed to the 
upcoming Annual Security Review Conference’s terrorism thematic, and planned a 
high-level Seminar on Military Doctrine.399  While this broadened activity continued to 
illustrate the Organisation’s “flexible and adaptive approach,” it also denoted the 
increased potential to lose sight of core priorities.  That is, Vienna Document 1999 
issues would likely have been better addressed by a less preoccupied FSC according 
more focused attention to their resolution.  
As additional “tweaking” of Vienna Document 1999 CSBM continued, it was 
becoming evident that many fundamental requirements were being overlooked.  
Whether the result of distraction or preoccupation with regime modalities, the actual 
management of implementation (i.e., inspections, evaluations and other executables) 
was becoming increasingly perfunctory.  This is noteworthy, as these “cornerstone” 
functions were inherently dependent upon close oversight and there had been increasing 
occurrences of varied forms of non-compliance, non-conformity and other 
insufficiencies in fulfilling provisions.400  Although a regular topic of national reporting 
and informal discussion, formal FSC deliberation was comparably limited, aside from 
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the occasional interventions made on specific occurrences.401  By 2006, OSCE FSC and 
AIAM emphasis still remained somewhat fixated on proposals for expanded 
implementation of OSCE documents, along with CSBM training and assistance for 
Central Asian participating States and continued development of the OSCE 
Communications Network.402  Meanwhile, occurrences of non-compliance and non-
conformity had become commonplace and were increasing.  They included various 
instances of military information containing discrepancies or not being provided at all, 
failures in hosting air base/military installation visits and demonstrations, and a growing 
number of notification, data and inspection/evaluation infractions.403  These ranged 
from minor oversights and misinterpretations, to unconcealed disregard of provisions 
and deliberate efforts to suppress access, observation and verification of defined 
military activity and exchanged data.404  
For a number of years, the NATO VCC conducted annual “VCC Seminars” 
involving the Alliance’s Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council405 members, comprising 
both the participating States of the Vienna Document and States Parties to the CFE 
Treaty.  The Seminar provided an informal means through which to openly discuss 
implementation issues, plan for joint multinational activities, define common training 
requirements, examine collaborative opportunities and address issues of concern.  At the 
March 2006 Seminar, Major-General Nicolai Petrovich Artyukhin, the Head of the 
Russian National Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre asserted that his country’s “national 
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procedures” would always supersede its “treaty obligations.”406 Artyukhin’s comment 
underscored one of the fundamental challenges to viable sustainment of the European 
and Eurasian arms control framework: that of interpretive and selective adherence to 
binding provisions.  Notwithstanding that this assertion was completely at odds with 
conventional and international law, it also served to signal Moscow’s now well-
established disaffection with the CFE Treaty as an affront to its security interests as a 
resurgent power and the lack of progress in the ratification of its successor – the 
Adapted CFE Treaty.  Although it received little in the way of direct challenge from any 
other representative to the Seminar, Artyukhin’s pronouncement was nevertheless 
addressed in subsequent presentations and remarks from other representatives 
concerning the non-fulfilment of Vienna Document 1999 obligations.407  
 By this point, it had become increasingly apparent to the OSCE itself that the 
diversity and breadth of its security mechanisms, projects and missions were becoming 
increasingly difficult to manage.  As acknowledged by Secretary General Marc Perrin 
de Brichambaut: “The OSCE is a uniquely complex Organization – complex in its 
decentralized structure and its ambitious and ever-growing mandates, complex also in 
the myriad activities it undertakes across 56 countries.”408  Furthermore, there was 
growing realisation of the need for closer scrutiny of Vienna Document implementation.  
In 2007, the first “Heads of Verification Centres” meeting was held in Vienna, 
concurrently with the AIAM.  While the meeting provided the opportunity for 
practitioners to contribute their “practical thoughts and lessons learned on the 
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implementation of CSBMs,” for many, it fell short in having been held concurrently 
with the AIAM, precluding the ability to attend both events.  In addition, several 
verification specialists appeared notably restricted in their ability to freely express their 
views, likely due to instructions received from their higher echelons, national 
delegations and/or capitals.409  Despite this, the meeting did provide the opportunity for 
some delegations to convey their views and concerns in a relatively frank and open 
manner.  Compliance failures by Russia and certain other participating States, 
particularly those of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, were identified as a major 
concern in this intervention: 
Notwithstanding diplomatic conventions, there needs to be a clear understanding 
of the implications of non-compliance.  There must be consequences, else risk 
continued “shirking of responsibility” by a select but growing number of parties 
that appear to do so with little regard to the ramifications of their respective 
actions.  …ultimately it is the OSCE as a collective authority which should 
exercise and manage both positive and negative reinforcement in holding parties 
accountable.410 
 
At the 2007 NATO VCC Seminar, held in October of that year, representations 
made concerning the state of the Vienna Document 1999 were now much more direct in 
identifying on-going deficiencies, root causes and specific examples.  Interventions 
included the imperative of adherence to established provisions in order to ensure 
certainty in the determination of compliance or non-compliance.   It was also strongly 
emphasized that “interference” (with subtle reference to Artyukhin’s “national 
procedures” remark) was fundamentally contradictory to the principle of adherence to 
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“agreed methods, procedures and techniques of verification,”411 particularly those 
undertaken under the specific provisions of established regimes.412   
 
It was also noted during the VCC Seminar that, in addition to records, monthly 
reports and quarterly/annual surveys on CSBM information exchanged, the OSCE CPC 
had produced a summary of recent trends in the implementation of the Vienna 
Document 1999.   Some representatives took issue with the summary for having stated 
that inspections and evaluations that year had been undertaken “in full compliance with 
Vienna Document provisions,” while at the same time vaguely noting “problems or 
inconsistencies.”  These “problems or inconsistencies” included complications in 
sending/receiving inspection requests/responses; differences in the effective period of 
reports; disagreement concerning areas to be inspected or mismatching inspection areas 
with those requested; issues with sensitive points; and undue restrictions being placed 
on the use of equipment during inspections.  Moreover, in many instances, aerial 
inspections of specified areas had been frequently refused or cancelled, either due to 
weather, technical issues or security reasons.  Although most briefings provided to 
inspectors and evaluators were described as “open and comprehensive,” others provided 
misleading or incomplete information.  Responses to policy-related questions were 
sometimes limited or not provided at all.  There were also problems noted concerning 
organisational issues.413   
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Further review had confirmed that these “problems and inconsistencies” were 
generally compliance and/or conformity related, largely involving the “usual suspects.”  
It was also noted that in several instances, official reports by inspecting or evaluating 
States contained “glaring” omissions or carefully edited comments concerning these 
transgressions.  This particular shortcoming was characterised by some representatives 
as the intentional variance between “diplomatic interpretation” and the “operational 
realities of Vienna Document 1999 implementation.”414  In other words, findings were 
frequently moderated or otherwise edited in order to avoid controversy or ill-will 
between inspecting and inspected states; that is: “the discernable difference between 
what we call ‘ground truth,’ and that which is officially published and/or otherwise 
conveyed at higher official levels.”415  
Further representations made at the Seminar cited numerous specific examples 
of non-compliance and non-conformity with Vienna Document 1999 provisions, 
ranging from minor oversights and errors to outright violations.  These were mostly 
attributed to the Russian Federation and Soviet successor states, including those from 
the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions.  Examples included: 
• 2004 – 2007:  repeated declarations of “national procedures” superseding 
Vienna Document 1999 inspection and evaluation provisions  (Chapter 
IX, Paragraph 72); 
• 2004 – 2007:  increased cases of denial of “access, entry and 
unobstructed survey” within given Specified Areas without explanation 
(Chapter IX, Paragraph 81); 
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• February 2006:  refusal of inspection request on grounds of “holiday 
preparations” and “reorganization of Verification Centre,” even though 
inspection period was outside national/religious holiday period (Chapter 
IX, Paragraph 79) 
• March 2006:  refusal of inspection through the declaration of force 
majeure attributable to a contrived weather forecast (Chapter IX, 
Paragraph 78); 
• February 2007:  denial of aerial inspection, even with an offer made by 
inspecting participating State to provide its own helicopter for this 
purpose (Chapter IX, Paragraphs 83, 93-102, 104); 
• 2004-2007:  failure/refusal to directly respond or otherwise acknowledge 
VD 99 Format 33 Inspection Notifications and other messages (Chapter 
IX, Paragraphs 79, 86); and  
• 2004-2007:  non-compliance due to de-facto abrogation of binding 
obligations through non-engagement (Chapter IX, Paragraph 72). 416 
Subsequent Heads of Verification meetings in Vienna included changes to better 
integrate their discussions with the proceedings of the AIAM.   As explained by 
Mathew Geersten, Head of the CPC’ FSC Support Section, operationally focused “food 
for thought” presentations and thematic working groups were intended to enable more 
fulsome dialogue amongst practitioners, while deconflicted timings would ensure better 
coordination with the AIAM.  Topics included the clarification of provisions, resolving 
technical ambiguities, collaborative training and examining opportunities for improved 
efficiency.  These changes were regarded as a suitable approach through which to attain 
common understanding, ameliorate working level implementation issues, facilitate the 
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exchange of ideas and better enable the development of recommendations.  
Nevertheless, the efficacy of Heads of Verification consultations has nevertheless 
remained sub-par, given the continued disinclination of several verification units -- 
particularly those from former Soviet states -- to lead workshops, provide input or 
openly participate in discussions due to national policy constraints, lack of expertise or 
other limitations.417  
 
 Despite its reticence in addressing issues of non-compliance and non-conformity 
“head-on,” the OSCE was ultimately compelled to pay more attention to 
implementation of the Vienna Document.  Given the Russian Federation’s suspension 
of its CFE Treaty compliance in December of 2007, along with the August 2008 
conflict between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia, there were particular concerns 
over the effects these events would have on the viability of the regime.  Certainly, with 
the loss of transparency brought about by Moscow’s self-imposed suspension, the 
imperative to preserve the feasibility and integrity of the Vienna Document had become 
even greater. 
 As stated in the 2008 FSC Chairperson’s Progress Report to the Sixteenth 
Meeting of the Ministerial Council, intensified dialogue and the employment of Chapter 
III (Risk Reduction) measures -- in response to the 20 April 2008 shoot down of a 
Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle over Abkhazia, Georgia by a Russian fighter aircraft 
-- did serve to temper increased tensions to some extent.  Nevertheless, these 
consultative measures prevented neither the contravention of specific Vienna Document 
and CFE Treaty provisions, nor the outbreak of conflict in August of that year.  
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Subsequent FSC discussions necessarily focused instead on post-conflict mitigation 
efforts.418  The first post-conflict verification inspection conducted in Georgia, deferred 
from September to November of that year, was a Canadian challenge inspection 
conducted under Section 8 of the CFE Treaty -- similar in some respects to a Vienna 
Document specified area inspection, but somewhat more limited in time (24 hours) and 
area (65 square kilometres).419  The inspection was conducted just south of the South 
Ossetia’s internal boundary with Georgia.  Despite various infringements of provisions 
and other constraints imposed by both belligerents, the inspection did manage to 
provide some useful findings.  This included confirmation of a unilaterally imposed 
Russian “security zone,” which extended south of this internal boundary, well into 
Georgian territory, in contravention of a French-brokered agreement to withdraw from 
uncontested Georgian territory three months earlier.420 
 
Figure 4.3: Georgia-South Ossetia Boundary with Russian Security Zone421 
                                                
418 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, FSC Chairperson’s Progress Report to the 
Sixteenth Meeting of the Ministerial Council. Efforts in the Field of Arms Control Agreements and 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in Accordance with its Mandate. December 2008, Helsinki 
(Vienna: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2008), 5-6. 
419 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 
Article VIII, 86, 90. 
420 Department of National Defence, Strategic Joint Staff Arms Control Verification, Verification Mission 
Report – Operation VERIFY #1/08 – Georgia (NATO CONFIDENTIAL – releasable excerpt) (Ottawa:  
DND Canada, 2008), n.p. 
421 Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Russian Security Zone, provided by the OSCE Mission 
to Georgia, November 2008. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      204 
Notwithstanding these and numerous other transgressions, the 2008 FSC 
Chairperson’s Progress Report remained entirely upbeat, with CSBM implementation 
characterised as “relatively stable and high,” adding that “overall, there have not been 
any major changes in the implementation of these CSBMs during the past years.”422  
While it was further noted that all but one participating State423 had fulfilled their 
annual military information exchange requirements (an improvement over the previous 
two years), only 36 of the now 56 participating States had submitted information on 
defence planning.424  In all, 2008 was described as “an active year” for CSBM 
implementation with a total of 108 specified area inspections and 55 (corrected from 75) 
formation/unit evaluation visits conducted.425  This notable increase in verification 
activity (up from 88 specified area inspections and 41 formation/unit evaluations in 
2007)426 was specifically attributable to the increased utilisation of the Vienna 
Document regime -- especially by the Russian Federation -- following Moscow’s 
December 2007 suspension of CFE Treaty compliance.  Particularly confounding was a 
2009 AIAM Consolidated Summary Report stating, despite information to the contrary, 
that approximately 95% of the inspections and 96% of the evaluations conducted in 
2008 “took place in full compliance with the provisions and often in the spirit of the 
VD 99.”427   
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 These statistics, while clearly at odds with the level and severity of compliance 
issues commonly acknowledged amongst several practitioners within NATO VCC 
Seminars, Heads of Verification Meetings and elsewhere, were indicative of the 
diplomatic politesse and other forms of filtering commonly incorporated into official 
verification reports submitted by a number of participating States.  It is apparent that 
such filtering was aimed at maintaining positive reinforcement, promoting amity and 
otherwise avoiding open discord, in keeping with the OSCE’s culture of impassiveness.  
Indeed, despite the ground truth obtained through several inspections and evaluations, 
reports broadcasted to all participating States through the OSCE Communications 
Network have frequently overlooked or downplayed specific contraventions or 
infringements of Chapter IX (Compliance and Verification) provisions.428  These 
included unwarranted constraints placed upon verification personnel, including the 
denial of access, refusal to provide aircraft for aerial survey, withholding information 
and placing unwarranted limitations upon freedom of movement.  The tendency to 
overlook such findings can be at least partially attributed to the “diplomatically 
weighted” revisions made to “hard” technical determinations of inspections and 
evaluations in order to fulfil the positive outcomes desired by the OSCE.  This 
fundamental problem had become further exacerbated by an overall decline in expertise, 
particularly amongst national policy and diplomatic personnel, leading to increasingly 
cursory oversight and “situated” interpretations of inspection and evaluation results.  In 
some instances, verification non-compliance findings were strongly challenged and 
even overruled within some national chains of command due to apprehension over the 
potential negative reactions of inspected/evaluated participating States.  This 
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apprehension was exacerbated by the misperception that non-compliance and non-
conformity were exceptionally rare occurrences.429 
 Despite its reluctant acknowledgement of the seriousness of Vienna Document 
1999 contraventions, a voluntary approach to compliance was advocated by the FSC,430 
which otherwise remained focused upon continued enhancements and adjustments to 
the regime.  Certainly, numerous presentations, food-for-thought papers and proposals 
were considered in various FSC working groups, plenary meetings and special meetings 
from 2007 to 2009, including: 
• a proposal for a draft decision on defined specifications for the physical 
surface dimensions of the specified area;  
• a recommendation for a draft decision on a single deadline for 
submission of information on defence planning; 
• revisions to the prior notification of major military activities; 
• a food-for-thought paper on improvements to the implementation of 
confidence- and security-building measures in accordance with the 
Vienna Document 1999; 
• consideration of an OSCE role in promoting cyber security, and a 
presentation on maritime security; 
•  a proposal for naval confidence- and security-building measures; 
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• proposed guidelines for briefings by military representatives during 
evaluations and inspections; and 
• a proposal for possible FSC action to improve the application of Vienna 
Document 1999 compliance and verification measures by extending the 
use of digital cameras. 431 432 
 Given the wide range of proposals for improvement, the FSC established, in 
2010, a standing procedure for regular and continuous updating of the Vienna 
Document, called “Vienna Document Plus.”  With various proposals consolidated 
within a single “Vienna Document Plus folder,” decisions adopted would take effect 
immediately, unless decided otherwise.  The FSC decision also included the practical 
requirement for the Vienna Document to be formally reissued every five years 
(beginning no later than 2011) with all adopted decisions duly incorporated.433  As 
provisions for FSC decisions to amending the Vienna Document already existed, the 
approach was regarded by some practitioners as unnecessary and unduly focused on the 
mechanism itself, instead of the more immediate imperative of effective 
implementation.  The novelty of Vienna Document Plus also sparked a wide range of 
proposals, many of which were regarded by some of more experienced practitioners as 
either duplicative of existing provisions (indicating a lack of understanding of the 
existing regime) or imbalanced with respect to their specific benefit (such as reducing 
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the responsibilities of certain participating States in receiving and supporting 
inspections and evaluations).434 
 By 7 November 2011, the FSC had adopted the following Vienna Document 
Plus decisions (with several other several proposals concerning Chapters I, III, V and IX 
remaining under discussion):  
• consideration of national holidays in the planning of verification 
activities; 
• eligibility of air bases for hosting visits; 
• timing of demonstrations of new types of major weapon and equipment 
systems; 
• formalised procedure for incorporating relevant decisions into the 
Vienna Document with requirement for special meeting to take place 
every five years or more frequently to reissue the Vienna Document; 
• updated list of Partners for Cooperation in Chapter XII; 
• updated list of OSCE Participating States noted in the introduction; 
• specification of coordinate accuracy for formations, combat units, air 
formations and air combat units; 
• recommended briefing information for inclusion under Chapter IX; and 
• revised title and introduction to the Vienna Document 1999.435  
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 The Vienna Document 1999’s utility and versatility as a “developed” CSBM 
were well substantiated over the course of its 11 years of implementation.  This longest-
serving iteration further demonstrated that the measure of its effectiveness as a 
confidence and security mechanism were not merely a function of design, but also the 
specific manner in which it was governed, managed and implemented within an 
increasingly precarious security environment.  This is an important consideration in the 
regime’s overall appraisal, particularly in light of the perceptions of its efficacy and the 
actions undertaken to address explicit deficiencies.  This will be explored further in the 
examination of the Vienna Document 1999’s succeeding iteration, the Vienna 
Document 2011. 
Vienna Document 2011 
At the OSCE Heads of Verification Centres Meeting, held in Vienna on 
14 December 2011, the new Vienna Document 2011 (published 30 November 2011) 
was introduced, together with a briefing on its various amendments and enhancements.  
While generally accepted, it was nevertheless remarked upon by some delegations that 
from a technical and operational perspective, longstanding implementation issues 
remained largely unaddressed, and that the updated Document contained largely 
superficial alterations.436  More substantive change proposals, such as reductions in 
thresholds for prior notification of certain military activities, or increases in inspection 
and evaluation quotas had ultimately proven unattainable.  Not surprisingly, the Russian 
Federation was regarded as the principal source of opposition to such changes, given its 
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general condescension of reinforced transparency measures (particularly in light of its 
own military build-ups), along with its view that additional inspections and evaluations 
would serve to “sidestep” its suspension of CFE Treaty compliance.437   
In addition to lacking substance, some of the changes incorporated into the 
Vienna Document 2011 were regarded as either impractical or non-executable, such as 
the specification of highly precise geographic coordinates (to the nearest 10 seconds of 
latitude and longitude).  This standard of accuracy was imposed without the prescribed 
technical means of measuring or verifying them (a number participating States 
specifically prohibit the use of precision positioning equipment, such as the Global 
Positioning System, by inspection and evaluation teams).  Other changes included 
“elective” vice “directive” provisions, such as briefing information that “may” be 
included by units and formations during inspections and evaluations.438  While there 
was general support in the regularisation of Vienna Document amendments, a number 
of outstanding “Vienna Document Plus” recommendations themselves were regarded as 
trivial, imprudent or imbalanced.  Accordingly, the reaction of some verification 
practitioners was decidedly unenthusiastic.439  
While many amendments incorporated into the Vienna Document 2011 have 
been either superficial or aesthetic in nature, OSCE/FSC responses to more exigent 
implementation imperatives have remained largely muted.  As noted by Wolfgang 
Zellner, in referring to the current state of the regime, “the progress achieved is limited 
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to purely technical and procedural matters.  This poor outcome is aggravated by 
difficulties with implementation.”440  This is not to suggest that no effort has been made 
to address specific implementation concerns.  Indeed, within the FSC, AIAM and 
elsewhere, a number of participating States (including Armenia, Canada, the Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Georgia, and the United States) have strongly protested specific 
contraventions.441  Nevertheless, rather than hold offenders to account, correct or 
otherwise influence a return to compliance and conformity, the more characteristic 
OSCE response has largely remained one of polite acknowledgement, while largely 
leaving the matter to the aggrieved parties to work out.  While frequently rationalised by 
both OSCE officials and national delegations as a fundamental limitation of a 
consensus-based organisation, it can be also argued that such passivity has been 
employed as a means of avoiding discord in the interests of institutional harmony and 
self-preservation.   
Accordingly, while the OSCE and FSC continued to preoccupy themselves with 
institutional and systematic concerns (such as Mongolia’s 2012 accession as a 
participating State442 and the adoption of the United Nations Instrument For 
Standardized International Reporting of Military Expenditures443), more immediate 
security-related implementation matters remained largely unanswered.  They include: 
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• Uzbekistan’s longstanding de facto abrogation of the Vienna Document, 
having not provided data since 2003,444 consistent with its post-Soviet 
authoritarian government and poor human rights record.  The country 
further withdrew its OSCE participation following the May 2005 
shooting of protesters by government troops in the city of Andijan.  It 
has rejected inspection and evaluation requests outright since 2007 and 
has remained largely absent within the FSC, AIAM and other Vienna 
Document-related proceedings within the OSCE;445  
• Russia’s repeated manipulation of information reported under the Vienna 
Document, along with other forms of deception and preclusion of the 
verification of major combined joint military exercises, including 
“KAVKAZ 2012” (held in the North Caucasus) and “ZAPAD 2013,” 
(held in Western Russia, Belarus, Kaliningrad, and Baltic Sea). This 
included the separation of exercise components in order to remain below 
specified observation thresholds, along with the exhaustion of available 
inspection quotas through “self-inspection” (i.e., Russia inspecting 
Belarus).  Further, the Russian ZAPAD 2013 declaration of slightly more 
than 22,000 troops was far short of what was later to be determined to be 
over 70,000 troops.”446 
 
• Russian imposition of significant additional restrictions on the physical 
dimensions of defined “specified areas,” despite no such specifications 
existing in Vienna Document 2011 provisions,447 along with extensive 
over-declarations of areas and sensitive points to deny or otherwise 
impede inspection access;448 and 
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• the extensive and widespread abuse of force majeure provisions as a 
means of a denying, delaying or otherwise impeding inspection and 
evaluation access, as exemplified by Russia’s refusal of a 2012 Spanish 
evaluation visit request.  This refusal appeared to circumvent “the 
common international understanding that force majeure applies to major 
events that are clearly outside a party's control and which would have 
been in any case unavoidable by a party’s good faith application of due 
diligence to its obligations.”449 
 As requested by the FSC Support Section, national verification organisations 
made a number of implementation-focused presentations at the December 2012 Heads 
of Verification Meeting in Vienna.  During that meeting, open frustration was expressed 
over matters of non-compliance and non-conformity having remained inadequately 
addressed by the OSCE.  It was once again noted that most efforts to resolve reported 
deficiencies had been misdirected towards making adjustments to implementation 
mechanisms, rather than focusing on root causes and individual accountabilities.  It was 
made clear by some representatives that, while participating States may raise specific 
observations, more was required of the OSCE as the governing institution to address 
them in such a manner that fully respects and preserves established provisions and 
standards of conformity.450 
 
 
 Again, a range of transgressions were cited at this meeting, several of which 
were chronic infractions committed by select participating States in Eastern Europe, 
South Caucasus and Central Asia.   For example, the requirement of an inspected State 
to provide an aircraft for the aerial survey of a specified area unless otherwise agreed 
                                                
449 United States Department of State, General Statement to the 670th Meeting of the Forum for Security 
Co-operation, January18, 2012 (Vienna: United States Mission to the OSCE, 2012), n.p. 
450 Department of National Defence, Strategic Joint Staff Arms Control Verification. Conference Notes, 
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(Chapter IX, Paragraph 99) remained frequently unfulfilled, despite offers by inspecting 
States to cover attendant costs or even employ their own aircraft.  Similarly, failures or 
refusals to respond or otherwise acknowledge notifications transmitted via the OSCE 
Communications Network – particularly, Format 33 inspection requests (Chapter IX, 
Paragraphs 79, 86) – were becoming commonplace.  Furthermore, declarations of 
sensitive points and areas where access would not normally be denied to inspection 
(Chapter IX, Paragraph 80), along with unexplained refusal of “access, entry and 
unobstructed survey” within specified areas (Chapter IX, Paragraph 81), had increased 
considerably.  Indeed, along with what were becoming commonly regarded as “national 
procedures” ploys, an increasingly cavalier attitude had developed amongst some 
participating States.  This was frequently reflected in frivolous or dismissive responses 
to inspection and evaluation requests, as well as in the substandard support provided to 
verification personnel during inspections.451 
 
 
 Another important observation raised in consultations concerned the on-going 
disparity between actual inspection/evaluation findings and the “sanitised” 
interpretations reported by many inspecting states and the OSCE itself.  The March 
2012 OSCE/CPC Summary Report (once again stating that most inspections took place 
in full compliance with the regime), and the 2012 AIAM (noting mostly compliant 
behaviour), were specifically cited.  To be fair, it was also noted that the AIAM had at 
least acknowledged “some problems or inconsistencies.”  Omissions in some national 
inspection and evaluation reports were again acknowledged, having been previously 
discussed at past AIAM and Heads of Verification Centres meetings.  Finally, it was 
pointed out that some national delegations to the FSC had identified implementation 
                                                
451 Department of National Defence, Strategic Joint Staff Arms Control Verification and Swiss Verification 
Unit. Implementation Issues. Considerations for OSCE Heads of Verification Meeting (Ottawa: DND 
Canada, 2012), 9-10. 
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deficiencies for years, with effectively no response or corrective action taken.452  Such 
lack of action was consistent with what had become an established pattern of aversion 
by the OSCE in dealing with these faults. 
 In the course of general discussion, inspection/evaluation findings, national 
reporting and FSC analyses were criticised for containing not only interpretative 
variances, but also alterations designed to avoid diplomatic friction and discord.  
Indeed, one specified area inspection report, which had simply observed that the 
inspected State “was not fully compliant” for having refused an aerial survey and 
unnecessarily restricting the movement of inspectors, created a diplomatic uproar.  This 
included an open display of antagonism by the inspected State’s FSC delegation 
towards that of the inspecting State, together with a threat of persona non grata made 
against the inspecting State’s head of verification.  Moreover, informal requests were 
made within the FSC to “tone down” the report.  This incident served to support the 
view that paucities in detection and accountability were enabling some participating 
States to push the limits of transgression and that the fundamental measures of 
compliance and conformity were becoming increasingly irrelevant.  Given the attendant 
risk to regime stability, some practitioners called for the FSC to better exercise its 
authority as implementing body, while others recommended more direct OSCE 
involvement in verification operations, including the possible inclusion of CPC 
personnel in inspection and evaluation teams.453 
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 The long-term effect of unabated contraventions of the Vienna Document has 
been most recently illustrated by the current crisis in Ukraine.  While the implications of 
this unfolding calamity extend well beyond the scope of the Vienna Document, it 
nevertheless underscores the paradox of an autonomous military intervention 
undertaken in direct abrogation of not only that regime’s provisions, but also its 
underlying principles, as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act.   
 In early March 2014, at the request of the government of Ukraine, an OSCE 
observation team of 56 personnel from 30 participating States was deployed to that 
country’s southern region under hitherto unexercised Chapter III (Risk Reduction) 
provisions concerning “unusual military activities” in the Crimean Autonomous 
Republic – a federal subject of Ukraine.  Although some monitoring activity was 
undertaken along the boundary with Crimea, access was repeatedly blocked or 
otherwise refused by armed pro-Russian separatists supported by un-badged and 
otherwise unidentified Russian military personnel.454  Subsequently, a German-led 
multinational verification team was arrested by separatist officials in Slovyansk and 
detained for approximately five weeks.  Although Moscow had permitted earlier 
evaluation visits in the adjacent Russian regions of Belgorod and Kursk, the exhaustion 
of Russia’s annual passive quota (with no offer by Moscow to permit additional 
verification) precluded further scrutiny of its significant military build-up on the 
Ukrainian border.  Perhaps most disconcerting (but not surprising) was Moscow’s 
failure to provide proper notification under Chapter V (Prior Notification of Certain 
Military Activities) or voluntarily allow visits under Chapter III (Risk Reduction) of its 
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activities -- involving some 40,000 troops -- despite having well-exceeded established 
thresholds.455 
 While the Ukrainian crisis exemplifies the purpose, design and utility of the 
Vienna Document in preventing, limiting or otherwise mitigating conflict, it also 
highlights the fact that, despite its comprehensive provisions, the dissidence that has 
developed over the years has undermined its integrity and degraded its effectiveness.  
While the unprecedented use of Chapter III did enable some modest observation 
activity, there is little question that the regime’s evolved model is simply unfeasible 
without the necessary inducement to ensure its proper function.  This includes the 
required actions to suitably counteract any and all infractions -- even when committed 
by a major regime constituent -- in order to preserve integrity.  OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly President Ilkka Kanerva aptly characterized the implications of this most 
recent assault on the Vienna Document in a December 2014 address to the OSCE 
Ministerial Council:  
We’ve been faced with the greatest modern challenge to the OSCE – a crisis in 
which one participating State [Russia] has ignored the Helsinki Principles, 
violating the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbour.  The crisis in 
and around Ukraine has generated an institutional crisis: What can the OSCE do 
to monitor, to defuse, to mediate?  The institutional crisis has also meant a truly 
existential crisis: What’s the point of the Helsinki Final Act if countries that 
have pledged to play by these rules decide not to do so?456 
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Conclusions and Implications 
  The Vienna Document has endured significant changes in the European and 
Eurasian security landscape since it was first introduced in 1990, which is testament to 
its elemental value as a security concept.  Nevertheless, the actual manner in which the 
regime has been overseen and executed has highlighted serious deficiencies.  As noted 
repeatedly, the accumulation of myriad infractions and infringements -- ranging from 
the innocuous to the nefarious -- left largely unchecked, has progressively reduced its 
effectiveness.  Although Russia has figured prominently, many other participating 
States share some measure of culpability in having failed to maintain the standards of 
conduct required to preserve its viability.  This, in turn, has contributed to a general loss 
of confidence in the concept of cooperative security, with corresponding adverse impact 
on peace and security in the OSCE area.  Per Zdzislaw Lachowski, “while one view is 
that new arrangements, mechanisms and institutions are needed, others believe that the 
necessary instruments exist but that the political will is lacking.”457  Indeed, the Ukraine 
crisis exemplifies the ramifications of long-term inattention to a regime that, by its very 
design, should have proven itself far more effective in both precluding and 
counteracting such a crisis.  While debate will invariably continue, it is apparent that 
little should be expected of a security instrument if its governance, management and 
execution are to be openly subjected to deliberate subversion and other forms of 
impairment.   
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 While there exists collective blame for the diminishment of the Vienna 
Document, the OSCE, as overarching authority, must be specifically held to account.  
The Organisation’s significant institutional growth over the years, combined with its 
increasingly dispersed oversight of an ever-expanding range of operations and activities, 
have led to increasingly perfunctory approaches adopted in the regime’s governance and 
management.  Resultant inattentiveness, along with a growing propensity to undertake 
systematic modifications rather than addressing core issues, has permitted a multitude 
of breakdowns to go largely unanswered.  Metaphorically speaking, the carpenter has 
grown more inclined to focus upon blaming the design of his tool rather than the 
manner in which he uses it.   
 
 Considering that the OSCE had exercised greater authority in holding individual 
participating States to account in the past, the question must be asked as to why it has 
stepped back from doing so.  If the reason has been to maintain harmony and a sense of 
success, then such benefit is to be short-lived, as this could be characterised as merely 
lowering standards in order to meet them.  The situation has been further exacerbated by 
the apathy and diminished “stake” made by several participating States, as reflected in 
the decreased priority assigned and lack of investment made in implementation and 
training.  Finally, the increased gap between ground truth and expurgated interpretation 
has created false perceptions, discouraging suitable corrective action.  
  
 Given the nature in which the Vienna Document has been progressively 
degraded over several years, its prospects of rehabilitation are unclear.  Nonetheless, 
presupposing the necessary inducement to secure the reaffirmed commitment by all 
participating States to fulfil their politically-binding obligations, the OSCE would need 
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to similarly reassert its authority through active governance and management.  This 
would entail the unambiguous and consistent application of prescribed provisions and 
standards, more direct involvement in the oversight of implementation, together with a 
more purposeful, disciplined approach by all concerned. 
 




CASE STUDY 3: THE TREATY ON OPEN SKIES 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Introduction 
In keeping with the specified methodology of the thesis, this chapter will 
examine the Treaty on Open Skies as a detailed case study, with due attention accorded 
to its purpose and distinctive attributes, along with its correlation with the CFE Treaty 
and Vienna Document.  Key developments and notable events in the oversight and 
operation of the Treaty will be specifically estimated in terms of their effect upon its 
rudimentary function, progressive impediment and overall depreciation. 
 
Open Skies’ employment of aerial observation flights as a CSBM contrivance 
represents an essential consideration in its comparison with the other two regimes.  This 
includes its concept of unrestricted overflight, more expansive jurisdiction (which 
includes the entire territories of Canada, the United States and the Russian Federation) 
and other distinctive characteristics.  Underlying intelligence and technological aspects 
will be reviewed in detail, given their significance as both stimuli and impediments to 
the Treaty’s viability.  The roles of the United States and the Russian Federation, as the 
preeminent States Parties of the Treaty, will also be specifically scrutinised with a view 
to both sides’ manipulation of and influence over the regime as means of gaining 
respective advantage.  Consistent with the other case studies, non-compliance and non-
conformity will be examined as specific indicators of the breakdowns in the regime’s 
operating model that have increasingly degraded its viability. 
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 This examination will illustrate that, as a strategic reconnaissance-based CSBM, 
the Open Skies Treaty has been unencumbered by the armament and equipment 
categorisations, ceilings, zones and personnel levels inherent with the CFE Treaty and 
Vienna Document.  Nevertheless, in spite of its corresponding simplicity and proven 
effectiveness, the Treaty has been similarly impaired by various operative impairments 
that its oversight and management have largely failed to counteract.  Varied and 
growing capability disparities have further exacerbated this impairment.  While the two 
major States Parties -- the Russian Federation and the United States -- can be expected 
to sustain Open Skies in fulfilment of their respective agendas, the Treaty will 
nonetheless become increasingly imbalanced and corrupted without suitable restorative 
action.   This begins with the reestablishment of the accord required to ensure common 
adherence to the Treaty’s binding provisions, as established.  
Backdrop 
 
As previously noted, the Treaty on Open Skies was signed on 24 March 1992 by 
26 NATO and former WTO states.  Although ratified by most signatories it in the early 
1990s, the Treaty did not enter-into-force until January 1, 2002, following an extensive 
process of ratification in the Russian Federation, Belarus and Ukraine.  Since then, eight 
more European states have acceded to the Treaty (Kyrgyzstan was an original signatory 
but has yet to ratify).458  With the concept of an aerial observation regime first 
introduced in 1955, the Treaty represents the culmination of an extensive and prolonged 
effort to increase openness and transparency in military activities through the 
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employment of manned reconnaissance aircraft used to freely overfly, observe and 
image anything of interest or concern anywhere within a given State Party’s territory.  
This relatively simple model enables the gathering of information through the direct 
aerial observation of what are commonly referred to as “objects” of verification, 
concern or interest, such as military installations and formations, industrial complexes, 
and transportation centres.  The Open Skies “concept” therefore established an 
innovative mechanism through which States Parties could attain levels of predictability, 
stability and confidence that otherwise would have been largely unattainable. 
 
Formally stated, the Treaty seeks to “improve openness and transparency” 
through intrusive, direct airborne observation and imaging.  A legally-binding regime, it 
also serves to “facilitate the monitoring of compliance with existing or future arms 
control agreements and to strengthen the capacity for conflict prevention and crisis 
management.”459  Open Skies imagery can therefore be used to support other 
conventional and nuclear arms control and security mechanisms through validating 
coordinates, confirming the presence and configuration of infrastructure and equipment, 
or monitoring specific activities.  As an unclassified (albeit treaty-sensitive) resource, 
Open Skies imagery and associated data can be far more readily utilised in diplomatic 
and broader public settings than that derived from classified sources.460  While the 
Treaty is generally characterised as a CSBM regime, its framework of largely 
unrestricted aerial reconnaissance and survey flights has afforded a broad constituency 
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of states with unprecedented means of acquiring a wide range of information about 
military forces and activities of interest or concern at their individual discretion.461 
In addition to supporting other security mechanisms, Open Skies serves as a 
stand-alone mechanism of intrusive early warning, observation/verification and 
enhanced transparency in its own right.  With each State Party availing all of its 
territory to aerial observation and imaging, the Open Skies Treaty constitutes what is 
arguably one of the most potent and extensive security mechanisms ever established.  
Indeed, as noted in United States Congressional ratification testimony, “the Treaty 
represents the broadest international effort to date to promote openness and 
transparency of military forces and activities.”462  Given its conceptual simplicity, the 
Treaty also constitutes one of the “purest” forms of a CSBM -- one that is completely 
unfettered by quantitative or normative restrictions on military forces (i.e., personnel, 
weapon systems and equipment).  Rather, its only limitations are procedural 
(observation mission quotas, flight profiles, etc.) and technical (aircraft and associated 
observation/imaging systems).   
Notwithstanding this relative simplicity, the unbounded transparency of the 
Open Skies concept has brought with it considerable challenges over the course of its 
long-term negotiation and ratification.  The United States Congress’ Office of 
Technology Assessment characterised the Treaty’s negotiation process as “a much more 
nebulous and subjective task than devising schemes for monitoring compliance with 
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specific agreements.”463  It specifically noted the “deep divisions” that existed between 
the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the level of invasiveness necessary 
to establish a viable regime.  This was largely a function of comparative national 
capabilities (i.e., the United States’ possessing sensor superiority),464 with Washington 
seeking “maximal intrusiveness.”465  Moscow, on the other hand sought “restrictions on 
all aspects of the overflights,” given its natural resistance to such scrutiny, along with its 
wariness of the Treaty’s “vague” objectives.466  While most NATO and former WTO 
states favoured a “middle ground” approach, they leaned towards “more” rather than 
“less” transparency when pressed, as this was ultimately advantageous to their own 
national interests.467 
Notwithstanding various compromises in progressing negotiations towards a 
final consensus, the advantages of maximising Open Skies’ inherent concept of 
intrusiveness and transparency had, for the most part, prevailed.  The final accord had 
successfully secured all signatories’ entire territories for aerial observation, including 
restricted or sensitive areas, zones and sectors that would otherwise be precluded from 
any kind of overflight as a matter of national security.  This intrusiveness was further 
reinforced by according Open Skies missions due priority over all regular air traffic, 
with the only restrictions to observation flight mission profiles involving matters of 
flight safety.468   
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The Treaty is of unlimited duration and affords all States Parties with effectively 
the same opportunity through which to observe and acquire imagery.  This has proven 
to be tremendously empowering, as irrespective of comparative wealth, capabilities, and 
associated technologies, all States Parties are generally enabled in obtaining meaningful 
strategic reconnaissance data on their own terms.  The Treaty further “levels the playing 
field” by instituting specified standards for approved aircraft, sensors and imagery 
resolution, along with rigorous procedures for observation flight mission profiles.  As 
such, States Parties lacking integral “national technical means”469 are provided the 
technical and operational wherewithal through which to effectively monitor the military 
activities of other states – a capability that had previously been limited to few nations.470   
 
The Treaty also established a new benchmark in interstate relations by requiring 
the conduct of States Parties to stand up to the unrestricted scrutiny of a codified 
airborne observation regime.  That is, the employment of short-notice observation 
flights to scrutinise any given State Party’s military disposition, posture and intent 
imposes a normative standard that surpasses categorised technical measurements -- a 
particularly valuable tool during periods of increased tension.  Therefore, as an 
unconstrained early warning and threat assessment resource, Open Skies can alleviate 
unwarranted military escalation, thereby raising the threshold of potential conflict.  
Moreover, the Treaty’s unrestricted observation overflight mandate inherently enables it 
to transcend the purely military context of security.  That is, the Open Skies concept 
enables it “to contribute in a variety of institutional contexts without being limited to 
any particular set of activities or institutional frameworks,” rendering it especially 
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versatile and effectual.471  Indeed, the Treaty’s potential for broadened application, such 
as supporting environmental protection, is specifically noted in its preamble.472  This 
could conceivably result in the employment of new sensors, such as air sampling 
devices, to enable the monitoring of pollution or other forms of environmental 
degradation, or even as means of aiding the implementation of highly complex security 
mechanisms, such as the Chemical or Biological Weapons Conventions.473 
 
The establishment of specified active and passive observation flight quotas -- 
with no right of refusal -- along with the full accessibility to all acquired imagery by any 
State Party, further reinforces Open Skies’ highly effectual CSBM concept.474  
 All 34 states currently party to the Open Skies Treaty are member states of the 
OSCE, with Canada and Hungary serving as the Treaty’s Depositories.475  The Treaty is 
of unlimited duration and is open to accession by any state in the following order of 
priority:  
• successor states of the former Soviet Union have the right of automatic 
accession at anytime; 
• an application by any other OSCE member states may be made at any 
time; and 
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• following the initial six-month period following the Treaty’s entry-into-
force (i.e., since 1 July 2002), any other state may now apply for 
accession.476    
 In the second two cases, applications for accession require the approval of the 
OSCE’s Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC).   The OSCC is the OSCE’s 
dedicated oversight and consensus-based decision-making body, consisting of 
representatives from each State Party with a rotational chair, which serves to “promote 
the objectives and facilitate the implementation of the provisions of this Treaty.”477  
Through its regular monthly meetings and supported by the OSCE Conflict Prevention 
Centre (CPC), the OSCC manages the technical, procedural, and financial matters 
associated with Treaty implementation, including those related to compliance and 
conformity.  The OSCC is also discharged with resolving ambiguities and interpretative 
variances, while also addressing all technical and administrative requirements.478  
A Unique Regime 
 In comparison with other proliferation security-related regimes, the Open Skies 
Treaty is conceptually simpler, but nevertheless technically and procedurally complex, 
comprising 19 articles, 12 annexes and three appendices.  In addition, the decisions 
rendered by the OSCC are legally binding and are considered integral to the Treaty.  
Most of the Treaty’s more elaborate elements concern the inherent intricacies of 
observation flight operations.  A synopsis of the Treaty’s principal components is 
provided at Appendix C. 
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 Further to this summation, an overview of key characteristics is warranted, in 
order to provide sufficient background.  As previously stated, under the Treaty, all State 
Parties possesses the right to conduct observation flights, along with the obligation to 
accept them over their respective territories.  During the observation flight, flight 
monitors from the observed State Party accompany observation flight mission crews, 
which may also include flight representatives from other States Parties, as arranged with 
the observing State Party.  Per Article III and Annex A, both “active” and “passive” 
observation flight quotas are established for each State Party.  The “active quota,” is the 
specified number of observation flights that a given State Party shall have the right to 
conduct over the territory of another; whereas the “passive quota” is the specified 
number of observation flights each State Party must accept over its own territory.  
Quotas are established on an agreed basis, which, along with the maximum distance 
assigned to observation flight missions themselves, take into account the geographic size 
of each State Party.   A State Party’s “active quota” cannot exceed its “passive quota;” 
moreover, a single State Party cannot request more than 50% of another State Party’s 
“passive quota.”  Each year, requests for observation flights are submitted to the OSCC 
and all other States Parties for consensus-based approval.  
 While flight quotas are determined in advance of any given year of application, 
in keeping with the intrusive nature of the regime, Article VI specifies that the actual 
observation flight missions themselves may be conducted with as little as 72 hours’ 
notice (typically transmitted via the OSCE Communications Network).  Open Skies 
mission platforms are specifically configured, unarmed fixed-wing aircraft, certified 
under Article VI of the Treaty.  Generally, these are modified military transport aircraft 
that vary from medium-range turbo-prop aircraft (such as the Swedish Saab 340B or 
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Antonov AN-26) to long-range heavy transport jets (currently, the Tupolev TU-154M 
and the American OC-135B).  While a given State Party typically employs its own 
certified aircraft (or that of another State Party, as agreed), the observed State Party 
may, per Article VI, exercise the right to employ its own certified aircraft under the so-
called “taxi-option.”   
 To maximise intrusiveness, the observing State Party will notify the observed 
State Party of its estimated time of arrival no earlier than 72 hours in advance, to which 
a reply must be transmitted within 24 hours of receipt.  Following arrival at the 
designated Open Skies point of entry, the observing State Party must provide a mission 
plan to the observed State Party at least 24 hours prior to the observation flight. The 
observed State Party may propose modifications and, under certain circumstances, 
deviations from the submitted mission plan may also be allowed.  Unless otherwise 
agreed, the observation mission must be completed within 96 hours of the observing 
State Party’s arrival in the observed State Party, with the observing State Party 
departing the designated point of entry within 24 hours following the termination of the 
observation flight.479  
 As an added measure of transparency and consistent with the other two regimes, 
Article VI stipulates that for any given observation flight, the observing State Party is 
required to generate a corresponding mission report that will be distributed to all States 
Parties.  Furthermore, per Article IX, a copy of all data collected by the observing State 
Party shall be provided to the observed State Party, while other States Parties have the 
option of acquiring the data collected by the observing State Party at the cost of 
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duplication.  Under Annex K, representatives of the observed State Party may monitor 
processing and duplication of mission media at its discretion.  These are important 
transparency provisions, providing State Parties with a quantity of observation data that 
would be impossible to acquire individually.  Corroboration of processing, combined 
with the associated chain of custody of acquired imagery provides an added measure of 
validation and fidelity. 
 The Treaty specifies four types of sensors that may be employed for observation 
flights.  They are: 
• optical panoramic and framing cameras (with 30-centimetre ground 
 resolution); 
• video cameras with real-time display (with 30-centimetre ground 
resolution); 
• infrared line scanning devices (with 50-centimetre ground resolution); 
and 
• sideways-looking synthetic aperture radars (with three-metre ground 
resolution).480 
 While sensor types and performance may be modified through agreement under 
Article IV, the ground resolution currently established has been purposely limited in 
such a way as to enable sufficient visual discernment of military weapons, equipment, 
infrastructure and forces in order to fulfil, but not exceed, the Treaty’s fundamental 
transparency requirements.  As an added measure of parity, all sensors employed under 
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the Treaty must be commercially available to all States Parties.  As noted by Dan 
Lindley, because of its cooperative nature, the Treaty does not need to “push the state of 
the art” in surveillance technology.  Furthermore, in keeping with the Treaty’s 
“enabling” concept, this approach also limits higher costs in acquisition and operation 
through the use of “off-the-shelf” technologies.481  
The Intelligence Connection 
 As the Treaty affords States Parties with a highly structured and stipulated 
means of strategic reconnaissance, its sensor-resolution specifications raise a critically 
important point concerning the delineation between strategic transparency and strategic 
intelligence.  Such delineation is difficult, as transparency commonly involves the 
acquisition of sufficient information to support trust and confidence, whereas 
intelligence generally entails the exploitation of such information.  The question is the 
degree of exploitation that is achievable to support intelligence.  Therefore, in order to 
preclude the acquisition of information beyond Treaty objectives, image resolution is 
purposely limited: 
Description of an object requires much improved resolution in order to provide 
precise dimensions, configuration, construction of components (e.g., by 
specifying the calibre of the gun of a tank).  Description is usually seen as part 
of intelligence.  A resolution capability that would enable description of major 
land weapons systems (like tanks, artillery or combat aircraft) are clearly 
excluded by the Treaty for all sensor categories.482 
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 The limited resolution established under the Treaty is further characterised by 
Dan Lindley as follows: 
…although Open Skies cameras in Europe and North America permitted by the 
Treaty are much better than commercial satellites and are good enough to detect 
large-scale strategically significant actions, they still fall far short of easily 
achieved much higher resolutions.  Their capabilities are limited for political and 
military reasons.483 
 With regard to the parameters imposed by the Treaty upon image resolution, it is 
important to further consider that such limitations apply to the “raw” electro-optical, 
video, infrared and radar images acquired by Open Skies sensors and not to subsequent 
processing.  In fact, there exist a range of post-mission image enhancement processes 
and other means of exploitation that can be employed, subject to the capabilities of a 
given State Party.  Therefore, while the Treaty enables the observation and imaging of 
“strategically significant” objects and activities, while limiting the resolution required 
for outright intelligence exploitation, Open Skies platforms and sensors nevertheless 
enable varying degrees of subsequent intelligence-related analysis, including capability 
assessment.484   
 Within the proliferation security community, it is relatively common knowledge 
that the national intelligence entities of several States Parties provide “objects of 
verification, interest and concern” to Open Skies mission planners as “observation 
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targets” for programmed overflight.485  While post-mission intelligence exploitation 
remains subject to the technical means and wherewithal of those States Parties so 
inclined, the value of observation flight media in this regard simply cannot be 
discounted.  Indeed, the nature and inherent capabilities afforded by the Treaty have led 
it to be nicknamed “Open Spies” by some operators.486  To be sure, regardless of the 
Treaty’s specified purpose (i.e., aerial monitoring to achieve CSBM and supporting the 
compliance objectives of other arms control regimes), Open Skies capabilities 
commonly supplement national intelligence collection efforts.  That is, terms of 
collateral intelligence, Open Skies aerial observation missions provide a dedicated 
source of detection and cuing, threat characterisation and assessment, as well as further 
corroboration to customary national technical means, including satellites.487   
 In terms of strategic reconnaissance, Open Skies capabilities, despite its imposed 
and physically intrinsic limitations, also provides distinctly unique advantages.  While 
many space-based observation platforms are superior to airborne platforms in several 
respects, the opposite is also true.  For example, the image resolution of Treaty-
specified electro-optical sensors is better than most commercial space-based systems 
and its infrared sensors are, generally speaking, vastly superior to even dedicated 
reconnaissance satellites.488  Furthermore, whether they are commercial or government 
assets, the tasking of a reconnaissance satellite to prosecute a particular object or area of 
interest is usually a difficult and expensive proposition.  It is also frequently technically 
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impossible.  It is also noteworthy that a number of intelligence satellite constellations 
have degraded or become increasingly fragile over time, as acknowledged by 
Alden V. Munson Jr., United States Deputy Director of National Intelligence for 
Acquisition.489  Indeed, Moscow’s acquiescence to Open Skies was largely pragmatic in 
this respect.  Given the declining numbers and degraded performance of Russian 
reconnaissance satellites, Open Skies became increasingly favoured as cost-effective 
means of “closing the gap” in strategic reconnaissance, while at the same time 
conserving limited remaining on-orbit resources.490  A research report prepared for the 
State Duma stated: “[In] summary, we can conclude that the Treaty on Open Skies is 
advantageous to Russia, and allows for some compensation of Western superiority in 
obtaining information with minimal expenditures.” 491  This follows the general view 
that airborne observation systems are comparatively simpler, more flexible, more 
reliable and far more cost-effective than their space-based counterparts.492  
 Flexibility, reliability, sensor performance and costs are not the only 
comparative criteria. By virtue of their physical characteristics, most satellites cannot 
achieve the low, oblique “look angles” attained by airborne observation platforms.  
Indeed, aircraft sensors oriented sideways from low observation flight paths enable the 
imaging of objects that may be covered or located inside structures with large openings.   
On-board infrared and synthetic aperture radar sensors, capable of day/night operation, 
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can also penetrate certain light structures and materials (synthetic aperture radar also 
resists attenuation in poor weather), further enhancing airborne applications.  
 As acknowledged by the United States Defense Security Institute (USDDSI), the 
simultaneous use of Open Skies sensors enables a combination of vertical and oblique 
images to be effectively “layered,” thereby producing three-dimensional images capable 
of providing additional object detail, including the specific physical dimensions of 
structures and other objects.493  Such capability has led USDDSI to advise that, despite 
Treaty-imposed sensor limitations, “…imagery collected during Open Skies overflights 
will provide a significant amount of information that cannot be acquired by commercial 
satellites.”494   
 
Figure 5.1: Example of Open Skies Treaty mission imagery495 
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 Given these capabilities, it is not surprising that the United States developed an 
“Open Skies Notification System” to provide sensitive facilities with advance warning 
and updated information concerning when they could be overflown and imaged during a 
given observation flight mission by another State Party (in the United States, with the 
exception of an early trial flight conducted by Ukraine and collaborative training 
missions, this has consisted solely of missions conducted by the Russian Federation):  
Facilities are advised to carefully assess the risks posed by Open Skies 
observation flights.  Outdoor activities or indicators such as power sources, 
ventilation systems, cooling ponds, and pollution-affected vegetation could 
potentially reveal proprietary, national security-related, or other sensitive 
information.496 
 Notification and preparedness systems also exist in other States Parties to protect 
sensitive assets and to otherwise prepare installations and facilities for potential 
imaging.  This also ensures that a given overflight mission is received and supported in 
compliance and conformity with Treaty provisions.  In Canada, for example, an 
Operation PASSIVE SKIES “warning order” is typically generated upon receipt of the 
requisite overflight notification from the Russian Federation, which includes various 
advisory and coordinating instructions, including background, capabilities and 
associated precautionary measures for sensitive sites and installations.497   
 Irrespective of the Treaty’s formal objectives, is evident that, depending upon 
the manner of employment and subsequent processing of data, the capabilities afforded 
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by Open Skies observation aircraft and sensors can constitute de facto national technical 
means in their own right – a key point that will be touched upon further in this chapter. 
Early Implementation 
During the Treaty’s extended period of ratification (largely resulting from 
internal political turmoil, on-going suspicions of the West and cost-related concerns in 
Russia, Belarus and Ukraine498), training and testing activities were undertaken from 
1992 until entry-into-force on 1 January 2002.  This entailed the conduct of “joint trial 
flights” that enabled the training of observation flight mission crews, along with the 
necessary testing and calibration of specified sensors and related equipment.  The flights 
also afforded the opportunity to address other important technical and procedural issues, 
including the establishment of common certification standards.499  By the end of 2000, 
more than 400 joint trial flights had been conducted.  With the exception of Iceland, all 
signatories were involved, along with non-member states (including Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden), which were, at that time, considering 
accession.500  The Russian Federation’s initial involvement in these flights was 
extremely limited, however, with only two undertaken in 1995.  This increased to 
between 14 and 18 joint trial flights yearly from 1997 to 2001, signalling a change in 
Moscow’s outward approach to Open Skies.501   
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To be sure, in the years immediately following the signing of the Treaty, there 
remained deep suspicions within the Russian military and security establishments.  This 
had been further exacerbated by NATO expansion, which had now rendered the Russian 
Federation the top priority of a growing number of States Parties’ active quotas.  For 
Moscow, there were also some worrisome cost implications resulting from its early 
insistence on the “taxi option;” that is, an observed State Party’s option to use its own 
aircraft for observation overflights conducted by other States Parties.502   While 
presumably providing a measure of added security, this option was nevertheless a very 
expensive proposition, given Russia’s passive quota of 42 flights annually.503  
While political upheaval and resultant security-related anxieties in the 
immediate post-Soviet era had contributed to the prolongation of the ratification 
process, the suspicion of and resistance to the Treaty by Russian defence and 
intelligence establishments began to moderate with key political developments, 
including the succession of President Boris Yeltsin by Vladimir Putin and the political 
“steadying” that ensued.  Concurrent with these developments was a growing realisation 
of the security advantages the Treaty could provide, which had become increasingly 
evident as the Treaty’s concept continued to be demonstrated in its initial 
implementation phase.  As previously noted, this included its potential in reducing the 
disparity in strategic reconnaissance capability owing to the general decline of Russian 
space-based resources.  Also noteworthy was Moscow’s subsequent decision to drop its 
insistence upon exercising the “taxi option;” initially for its eastern Open Skies point of 
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entry, Ulan Ude and then altogether, relieving it of considerable added expense.  
Although this provision remains in effect, Moscow has yet to exercise it.504  
As specified under Article XVIII of the Treaty, implementation was “phased-in” 
over a three-year period, during which passive quotas were decreased by 25 percent, 
with sensor types and performance requirements reduced (only a single electro-optical 
panoramic or pair of framing cameras required at less than maximum capability).  
Accordingly, since 1 January 2005, full passive quotas have been observed, with all 
sensor types specified under the Treaty permitted.505 
Broadly speaking, the initial period of Open Skies Treaty implementation 
following its entry-into-force was somewhat understated, receiving relatively little 
fanfare or official reporting by the OSCE.  Indeed, much early effort had been focused 
upon the initial tranche of aircraft and sensor certifications which, given the associated 
technical complexity, were accomplished in relatively short order.  In April 2002, the 
Hungarian, Russia/Belarus and Ukraine certifications (involving Antonov AN-26, and 
AN-30B twin-engine turboprop aircraft) were completed at Nordholz Naval Air Station 
in Germany.  The American Boeing OC-135B certification was completed at Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base in May.  The ten-nation “Pod Group” C-130 Hercules “H” 
model certification was completed in June at Brecy Airbase in France (the C-130 Pod 
Group – a consortium comprising Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Spain, employed the “Special 
Avionics Mission Strap-on Now (SAMSON) Pod” as a common mission system aboard 
their respective C-130 aircraft).  This was followed by the British Andover MK1 and 
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Romanian AN-30B certifications at Royal Air Force Station Brize Norton in July.506  
Subsequent certification of the Russian long-range TU-154M, the Swedish Saab-340B 
and the Turkish Casa CN-235 would take place at Nordholz in April 2004.507  
In August 2002, the first operational Open Skies observation flight mission was 
conducted by the Russian Federation over the territory of the United Kingdom.  By 
31 December 2003, a total of 67 observation flight missions had been successfully 
completed.  This included a total of seven missions conducted by the United States over 
Russia/Belarus508 and one shared mission with Canada over Ukraine.509  It wasn’t until 
2004 that the Russian Federation conducted its first Open Skies missions in North 
America; namely, over the United States in June and over Canada in September.510 
The first OSCE Annual Report to make any real mention of the Treaty’s 
implementation was in 2003, but only in reference to the fact that the newly modernised 
OSCE Network was being employed to exchange military information, including that 
pertaining to Open Skies.511  
In its 2005 Annual Report, the OSCE positively noted the visit of its 
Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (comprising Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
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Morocco and Tunisia) at Melsbroek Airbase, Belgium, (the main operating base of the 
“C-130 Pod Group”) where they received briefings and demonstrations of the Open 
Skies concept.  The event was hosted by the Belgian Verification Agency, with officials 
from the OSCE Chairmanship and Secretariat, along with military representatives from 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands in attendance.  At that time, there was interest 
expressed in the possible adaptation of the Treaty (an aspiration noted in its 
Preamble512) to the Mediterranean region.  Accordingly, Belgian officials provided an 
orientation of the C-130 SAMSON Pod.  With the Treaty’s entry-into-force and 
certification of the C-130 SAMSON Pod having only occurred in 2002, the interest 
shown and efforts made to promote the Open Skies concept was, indeed, 
encouraging.513     
As might be expected with any initial period of implementation, a number of 
early “teething problems” necessitated various adjudicative efforts to be undertaken 
within the OSCC.  The majority of issues were technical, procedural and administrative 
in nature, such as the methodology for determining minimum permissible altitudes, 
frequency of data annotation, protection of data, designated airfields, the accession of 
signatories, cost redistribution, and quota allocations.  Other issues (several of which 
continue today) have included those pertaining to aircraft and equipment specifications 
and procedural standardization, along with corresponding air regulations.514  The United 
States Department of State explicated these early challenges as follows: 
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Because the Treaty is lengthy and contains portions that are technically detailed, 
there were several issues that arose during the first two years of Treaty 
operations.  Issues that have initially raised compliance concerns are 
implementation-oriented, and can largely be attributed to different 
interpretations and understandings of various Treaty provisions by the different 
States Parties as new (and often unanticipated) situations were encountered 
during the nascent stages of Treaty implementation. 515 
Indeed, early interpretive variances and misunderstandings of the Treaty’s 
provisions were largely addressed through OSCC consultation and adjudication.  Given 
the Treaty’s technical and procedural orientation (as opposed to the quantitative and 
normative orientation of other regimes) much of the OSCC’s efforts have remained 
focused on issues of this nature, with no fewer than 160 decisions formally rendered by 
the end of 2013.516  Observation quota redistribution issues arising from the accession 
of additional States Parties and NATO expansion added to these challenges.  Quotas 
have, in fact, remained an ongoing issue, particularly with respect to Russia: 
The distribution of flight quotas has been a source of concern since the treaty 
entered into force.  In accordance with a gentlemen’s agreement among its 
member states, NATO agreed not to carry out inspections on the territory of the 
alliance.  As the number of NATO members significantly increased, each 
member state was free to use its active quota to inspect non-members.  The most 
strategically important of the non-members - Belarus, Russia and Ukraine - have 
been the most ‘in demand’ for this purpose, and the result is a largely 
asymmetric pattern of flights.517 
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The 2015 passive quota distribution, as specified at Annex A of the Treaty and 
revised through OSCC Decision, is as follows: 
 
BENELUX: 6  Bulgaria: 4    Bosnia-Herzegovina: 4 
Canada: 12  Croatia: 4   Czech Republic: 2  
Denmark: 6  Estonia: 4    Finland: 5 
France: 12  Georgia: 4   Germany: 12  
Greece: 4  Hungary: 4    Iceland: 4    
Italy: 12  Latvia: 4    Lithuania: 4  
Norway: 7 Poland: 6   Portugal: 2  
Romania: 6  Russia/Belarus: 42518 Slovak Republic: 2  
Slovenia: 4 Sweden: 7   Spain: 4  
Turkey: 12 United Kingdom: 12 United States: 42 
Ukraine: 12519         
As demonstrated by the characteristically high subscription to the 
Russian/Belarusian passive quota, the noted “asymmetry” is, therefore, a function of 
both capacity and circumstance.  For example, in the OSCC distribution for 2015, 
NATO States Parties, along with Finland and Sweden, reserved 38 of the 42 
Russian/Belarusian observation overflights available.  In comparison, only six of the 
United States’ passive quota of 42 flights were reserved – all by Russia and Belarus.520  
As such, the Russian Federation and Belarus are presently far more exposed to aerial 
surveillance than any other States Parties.  Moreover, while calculated as a function of 
territorial size, the maximum distances established under Annex A for individual 
observation flights conducted over Russia and Belarus (i.e., 5,000 to 6,500 kilometres, 
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depending upon the mission point of origin) have been generally regarded by Moscow 
as disadvantageous.521  Russia’s dissatisfaction has been further compounded by the 
general lack of available imagery for purchase from missions by non-Russian 
observation flights over NATO States Parties.    
Given Moscow’s noted intent to address other deficiencies in information 
collection through its subscription to the Treaty, it is understandable that it would also 
wish to address this disparity.  Of course, the manner in how it would attempt to do so 
represents a recurrent facet of this thesis; that is, 1) the tendency to diverge from 
established provisions when national objectives cannot be otherwise attained; and 2) the 
integrity of the regime’s operating model in overcoming this tendency.  For example, 
during the provisional application phase, both Russia and Ukraine notified States Parties 
that, in addition to changing designated Open Skies airfields (permissible under the 
Treaty), they were unilaterally reducing the associated minimum flight distances already 
established (for which there existed no provision).  These reductions were intended to 
reduce the territory available for observation, thereby necessitating additional 
observation flights to acquire the same amount of observation imagery as means of 
offsetting the aforementioned disproportion.522  Following strong protests by other 
States Parties, the OSCC rendered a decision clearly stipulating that the observation 
overflight “coverage” of States Parties’ territories was to be maintained in such a 
manner as to not require additional flights.523  To ensure this, no State Party would be 
permitted to decrease maximum flight distances established for its original operating 
airfields, as listed under Annex A of the Treaty.  Further, while a State Party could 
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introduce new operating airfields, they were to ensure the same level of “effective 
observation” in the maximum flight distances assigned to those airfields and that the 
overall number of designated airfields could not be decreased from the number 
established at the time of the decision.524   
While the OSCC’s response and resultant decision appear entirely appropriate, 
the unilateral actions of Moscow and Kiev that necessitated this in the first place (i.e., 
rather than consulting on the matter) illustrate the proclivity of certain States Parties to 
“push” the limits of interpretation, including the imposition of so-called “national 
procedures.”  Such actions are generally consistent with mainstream international law 
theory; that is, states will violate or otherwise deviate from a given regime “when their 
interests are strong enough to outweigh their sense of obligation.”525  In this instance, a 
combination of perceived unfairness and general disaccord by Russia and Ukraine 
provided a sense of justification in “claiming” vice “seeking” the adjustments in 
maximum flight distances.  Such action highlights the importance of the “normative 
strength” of a regime’s model in sustaining a common “sense of obligation” to preserve 
its integrity through compliance and conformity.526 
Growing Disorder 
Because of its relative simplicity and absence of quantitative and categorised 
measurements, the Open Skies Treaty has been less encumbered than the CFE Treaty 
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and Vienna Document in several respects.  Nevertheless, even at the outset, various 
impairments to implementation were not merely the result of interpretative variances 
and misunderstandings, but also inherent bureaucratic inefficiencies and deliberate 
actions to limit the ability of States Parties to fulfil their objectives under the regime.  
The nature of these impairments is largely consistent with the other two regimes.  
Examples include the withholding of requisite designated airfield and national airspace 
information required to ensure the safe and effective execution of observation 
overflights, denial of specific flight mission routings or profiles, and refusal to accept 
notified observation flight missions altogether. 
 As reported by the United States Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and 
Compliance, subsequent to announced changes to Russian and Belarusian Open Skies 
points of entry and operating airfields in 2002 (i.e., four operating airfields to 10, along 
with 15 refuelling airfields), data required by a 1 April deadline, as specified under 
Annex I of the Treaty, was not provided.527  Moscow had stated that due to the 
reorganisation of national airspace, the information would be necessarily delayed.  Later 
that same year, the United States was compelled to push for this information through 
various diplomatic channels, including bilateral consultations held in Moscow.  While 
some information was eventually provided, it was, nevertheless, incomplete.528   
 This matter highlights a growing lack of OSCC oversight of the Treaty’s 
implementation, in that the United States had been compelled to engage the Russian 
Federation directly in order to impart the associated imperative and acquire more 
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information.  Certainly, given the very specific provisions of Annex I to the Treaty and 
in fulfilment of critical flight safety requirements, the matter of delayed information 
should have been more fully and urgently addressed within the OSCC itself.  Indeed, 
Annex I provisions underscore this urgency, requiring that no earlier than 90 days 
following entry-into-force, a State Party must provide specified airspace information in 
accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization provisions within 30 days of 
a request for such information by another State Party.  This includes information 
pertaining to airspace structure, as published in the Aeronautical Information 
Publication series; detailed information on all hazardous airspace; and airfield 
information, including arrival/departure procedures for each point of entry and point of 
exit; designated Open Skies airfields; and alternate/refuelling airfields for all points of 
entry/exit.  Additionally, no later than 90 days after entry-into-force, each State Party 
must notify all other States Parties of the source of this information.  Finally, States 
Parties are required to notify other State Parties that have requested this information of 
any changes to the information provided.529   
 While Washington’s bilateral efforts did lead to some information being 
released by Moscow later that year, it was generally incomplete, necessitating additional 
requests from Washington.  This, in turn resulted in the delay or cancellation of United 
States observation overflight missions:  
The U.S.-Russian dialogue on required airfield data has been a long, complex, 
and iterative one.  Each time we have asked for information, the Russians have 
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provided only some of that information, and sometimes not in the most useable 
format.530 
 Moscow’s outright refusal to accept a United States observation flight 
notification the same year was similarly problematic.  In subsequent discussion within 
the OSCC, it was determined that the principal reason for this refusal was driven by 
logistical constraints.  That is, Russia was insufficiently resourced to receive and 
support a United States observation aircraft and crew at the designated airfield (Klin 
Airbase, located about 100 kilometres northwest of Moscow), given the established 72-
hour notification and in particular, the fact that arrival would occur during a weekend.  
In their representations, American officials in Vienna pushed the Treaty’s “no right of 
refusal” provision, which ultimately prevailed.  Nevertheless, as a result of this 
difficulty, an informal understanding was reached, whereby weekends and holiday 
periods would be avoided, if possible, in the execution of observation flight missions in 
Russia.  This approach was similar in nature to the Vienna Document Plus Decision 
10/10 and subsequently incorporated in the Vienna Document 2011 to “take into 
account the information, which the participating States exchange on an annual basis, on 
official national and religious holidays of the receiving State.”531  While a planning 
consideration only, the potential for this convention to be misinterpreted, thereby 
undermining the intrusive nature of an observation mission flight mission, was apparent.   
As such, the United States maintained that, notwithstanding this consideration, it 
nevertheless reserved the right to conduct observation flight missions on weekends and 
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holidays, as required.532  Despite this assertion, varied interpretations of how weekend 
and holiday periods would ultimately be “factored in” to mission planning and 
execution have remained particularly problematic “sticking points” in the 
implementation of the Treaty. 
 In 2003, Ukraine refused a duly notified joint Canada-United States observation 
flight over a specific portion of the planned mission route.  The grounds of this refusal 
were that the portion of the route in question was within designated hazardous airspace 
and as such, would not be permitted.  The combined mission crew refused to accept this 
rationale on the grounds that it constituted a contravention of Article VI provisions, 
which state:  
The mission plan may provide for an observation flight that allows for the 
observation of any point on the entire territory of the observed Party, including 
areas designated by the observed Party as hazardous airspace in the source 
specified in Annex I.533   
 In this instance, as the established deadline for flight plan approval approached, 
Ukrainian officials agreed to permit a one-time exception for the mission as planned, 
with the stipulation that this concession would not set a precedent.  As the Ukrainian 
position clearly indicated a lack of understanding of Treaty provisions, but did not 
impact the mission, the matter was deferred to the OSCC for resolution.534  Shortly 
thereafter in Vienna, representatives of the two observing States Parties approached the 
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Ukrainian delegation on the matter.  The Ukrainian delegation reiterated its position 
prohibiting overflights in hazardous airspace; however, it advised that the matter would 
be reviewed.  It was not until 2004, following extensive bilateral engagement between 
the United States and Ukrainian delegations to the OSCC, that Ukraine finally accepted 
the right of overflight in hazardous airspace as specified in Article IV.  It should be 
further noted that, as reported by the United States Department of State, Ukrainian 
officials had demonstrated “a desire to fully understand the issue and resolve it,” 
indicating that this was actually more a matter of misinterpretation, rather than one of 
obstinacy or deliberate wrongdoing.535  Indeed, following its initial period of adjustment 
after independence, Ukraine has been progressively compliant and cooperative in the 
fulfilment of its Treaty obligations.  This conduct is generally consistent with Kiev’s 
efforts to improve cooperation with the United States, the European Union and NATO 
as means of counterbalancing its traditional strategic relationship with Moscow.536 
 These early events again denote a fundamental, yet important distinction 
between interpretative variances and deliberate actions as forms of “defection” from a 
given regime.537  In this instance, despite Ukraine’s initial disagreement to allow access 
to designated hazardous airspace, its prudent decision to permit a “one-time” overflight, 
along with its willingness to engage in further consultations leading to its eventual 
acceptance of Article IV particulars, enabled it to remain effectively compliant.  The 
manner in which the Russian Federation acted, however, constitutes an entirely different 
and arguably characteristic manner of conduct.  That is, Moscow’s subjective 
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interpretation of and selective adherence to legally-binding obligations, combined with 
general “foot-dragging” were indicative of not only a growing lack of regard for its 
conformity with the Treaty, but also where the desire to further advantage itself had 
outweighed the sense of obligation to conform.  In both cases, early detection and 
rectification were equally critical to preserving the Treaty’s fundamental integrity and 
viable implementation.  As noted earlier, Robert Axelrod specifically regarded early 
detection as a critical requirement in preventing an offender with further incentive to 
“defect.”538  Here, a lack of “provocability,” on the part of the OSCC was clearly 
demonstrated.  That is, despite its awareness, it largely left the matter to the States 
Parties to work out between themselves.  This is noteworthy, as the somewhat diffused 
manner in which matters such as these have been addressed has remained an on-going 
and increasingly problematic issue for the Treaty. 
2005 Open Skies Review Conference 
 As mandated under the Treaty, the first Open Skies Review Conference was 
held 14-16 February 2005, under the chairmanship of Germany.  The conference largely 
served as a means of taking stock of the Treaty’s implementation to that point, as well 
as considering various facets of continued implementation.  Consistent with the Treaty’s 
overall low profile, the Review Conference was a somewhat understated affair, with 
little media coverage or public awareness.539  Mindful of the objective to expand the 
regime, however, the organisers invited representatives from the OSCE Mediterranean 
and Asian Partners for Cooperation, of which Israel, Japan, Jordan, Morocco, South 
Korea and Tunisia attended (with Afghanistan, Algeria and Egypt declining), indicating 
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both the broad applicability and growing appeal of the Open Skies concept.  Indeed, 
support for the Treaty was on an upswing, with Estonia and Lithuania announcing their 
respective ratifications, and impending accessions.  Most importantly, the fundamental 
value and effectiveness of the Treaty as a CSBM regime were strongly endorsed.540  At 
a time of growing acrimony within the OSCE community concerning the CFE Treaty 
and, to some extent, the Vienna Document, this was a particularly positive indication 
that some degree of unity had been sustained in a major OSCE regime; i.e., “The 
treaty’s review conference in early 2005 demonstrated that many states parties value the 
achievements of this aspect of European arms control and wish to maintain its 
relevance.”541 
Despite this important endorsement, the aforementioned “imbalance” in 
observation flight mission quota distribution had developed into an underlying source of 
discontent for the Russian Federation, which continued to view itself as generally 
disadvantaged under the regime.  While the Russia-Belarus Group of States Parties 
alone conducted more than a third of the 71 observation missions flown in 2004, only 
three of these missions were flown in North America.  By 2005, the ratio of missions 
conducted by the United States over Russia/Belarus to those conducted by 
Russia/Belarus over the United States was approximately 5:1.  Other NATO and neutral 
States Parties had also continued to specifically focus their missions on Russia/Belarus 
and Ukraine (along with Georgia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina).542  Accordingly, 
Moscow remained largely “shut out” from acquiring copies of mission media of 
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interest; i.e., that of the United States in particular and other NATO countries generally.  
In comparison, the United States, Finland, Germany, Sweden and Ukraine were actively 
acquiring imagery from flights over Russia/Belarus conducted by other States Parties.543  
While the flight quota distribution did not develop into a “cause célèbre” at the 
conference, it was nevertheless noted as a matter warranting further consideration; i.e.:  
 
The States Parties discussed aspects of quota distribution, recognizing that 
effective January 1, 2006, 100 percent of active quotas will be available for 
distribution.  The States Parties agreed that the Open Skies mechanism of quota 
distribution should reflect the principles of equity, reciprocity and cooperation, 
and that the OSCC may further review this mechanism after January 2006.544 
While the lack of imagery of interest to Moscow was acknowledged, the 
established mathematical model employed for determining the passive quotas (territorial 
size and border-to-border distances) of States Parties continued to render this imbalance 
largely moot.  Moreover, NATO States Parties (increasingly augmented by former 
WTO States Parties joining the Alliance) continued to refrain from overflying another 
as a matter of internal policy.545  Neutral States Parties were either uninterested or 
incapable of conducting observation overflights of the United States and NATO States 
Parties of interest to Moscow.  Accordingly, lacking a revised flight quota formula or 
providing some form of an “exception” for the Russian Federation, the only realistic 
means of redress would be for Russia and Belarus to conduct more observation 
overflights themselves.   
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The conference also noted various issues concerning the certification of 
observation aircraft, rules of procedure, sensors, notification formats, and flight rules.  
While recognising the need to address these implementation issues, the conference 
deferred them to the applicable OSCC Informal Working Groups (Rules and 
Procedures; Certification) for resolution.  Similarly, on sensor-related issues, updates of 
associated documents and facilitation of the certification of all sensor categories 
(including infrared systems) were noted as matters to be addressed by the OSCC 
Informal Working Group on Sensors.546 
There were two particularly notable concerns raised regarding the status and 
future of the Treaty.  First, during the conference, France, Germany and Sweden 
proposed the expansion of the Treaty’s mandate to include:  
• protection of the environment, as noted in the Treaty’s preamble; and  
• conflict prevention/crisis management within the OSCE framework and 
in support of other international organisations, as conditionally provided 
for under Annex L (Extraordinary Observation Flights).547    
 The majority of delegations rejected such a broadened mandate.  One reason 
cited was the vulnerability and exposure of unarmed Open Skies observation aircraft, 
which typically fly at low altitudes and airspeeds.  Accordingly, a permissive operating 
environment was deemed the necessary general condition for conducting observation 
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flight missions.  Otherwise, the use of Open Skies platforms for the purposes outlined in 
the proposal was left to discretion of individual States Parties.548  
 
 Second, the matter of Cyprus’ accession to the Treaty had struck a negative 
chord within the conference.  Turkey had vetoed Cyprus’ application for accession in 
2002 and singularly objected to officially noting that the application remained pending.  
Consequently, the consensus required to issue a final document for the conference could 
not be reached.  Cyprus’ outstanding candidacy for accession was instead acknowledged 
in a separate Chairman’s Statement.549  Although Hartwig Spitzer observed that there 
was a sense that this matter would not alter States Parties’ intentions to adhere to the 
Treaty in the future, the Cyprus issue would subsequently serve to significantly 
undermine the oversight and management of the Treaty.550  
 Accordingly, while the 2005 Review Conference provided an important 
reaffirmation of Open Skies’ value as a CSBM regime, underlying elements of discord 
and various unresolved infringements would prove increasingly difficult to overcome in 
following years, adding to the overall degradation of conventional arms control. 
Evolving Implementation 
 During the five years following the first Review Conference, the Treaty realised 
a general upswing in the number of observation flights, whereby 100 or more missions 
were being conducted annually.  They are summarised as follows: 
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• 2005: 84 flight missions conducted;   
• 2006: 106 flight missions conducted; 
• 2007: 108 flight missions conducted; 
• 2008: 106 flight missions conducted; 
• 2009: 100 flight missions conducted; and 
• 2010: 103 flight missions conducted.551 
 Given the increased level of observation flight mission activity over this period, 
it is evident that the benefits of Treaty implementation were outweighing the liabilities.  
Nevertheless, on-going disparities and interpretive variances were joined by issues 
ranging from trivial technical and procedural disagreements to those potentially 
impairing the safe and effective execution of observation flight missions.  Regardless of 
their individual nature or significance, all served to place additional stress upon the 
regime, particularly when left unresolved.   
 Minor implementation issues included continued “squabbling” within the OSCC 
over an increasing number of requests made to suspend Open Skies mission requests 
during holidays and other specified periods.  That is, despite the Treaty’s fundamental 
precept of “no right of refusal,” an OSCC decision to take holiday periods and 
weekends into account as a planning consideration had led some States Parties to adopt 
the notion that holidays and other designated periods constituted a temporary 
suspension of receiving overflight requests as a “given.”  As an example of the effects 
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of the interpretative subjectivity of this planning consideration, during an OSCC 
meeting in May 2008, the Russian delegation reacted harshly to objections made over 
its request to defer observation flight missions in Russia during a specific national 
holiday period in April (due to the closure of airports and hotel facilities).552  The 
Russian delegation head, Alexander Kozlov, accused other States Parties of treating the 
Russian Federation unfairly: 
Recalling a Latvian request in June of 2006 for no Open Skies activity from 
November 15 to December 15 due to the NATO Ministerial, Kozlov wondered 
why no States Parties objected to Latvia's request at the time and accused the 
U.S. and others of "double-standard."553 
 While Kozlov’s point was valid to some extent, the fact of the matter is that 
Latvia’s request had little, if any effect in practical terms.  While both actions were 
arguably “self-serving,” the Russian request bore considerably more impact.  Another 
example concerns the requirement for an observing State Party to provide the observed 
State Party with a complete “first generation duplicate,” of the original mission media 
film prints, in accordance with Sections II and IV of Article IX of the Treaty.  This 
includes the specified right for the observed State Party to specify the “type and format 
of duplicate recording medium, either negative or positive film, or magnetic tape.”   
During this period, the Russian Federation was only able to “duplicate positive film,” 
because their media processing facility was incapable of producing a duplicate negative.   
While much less of an issue for some States Parties, this constituted a more significant 
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matter for the United States (likely driven by post-mission analytical requirements), 
which cited this deficiency as Russian non-compliance under Article IX.554 
 While some deviations from the Treaty’s specified provisions may have 
reflected various degrees of interpretive difficulty or limited capacity to effectively 
comply, deliberate actions -- such as placing “national procedural” limitations above 
fundamental Treaty requirements -- are another matter altogether, as they knowingly 
place individual state interests ahead of binding obligations.  Left unaddressed, such 
contraventions develop into a specific source of regime destabilisation.  In this regard, 
the Russian Federation’s actions concerning prohibited airspace and other restrictions 
imposed upon observation flights exemplify how the contravention of Article VI 
provisions concerning “the observation of any point on the entire territory of the 
observed Party,”555 would develop into a specific challenge to the Treaty’s viability and 
that of conventional arms control regimes in general. 
 UUP-53 is a 1,200 square kilometre area of prohibited airspace over the centre 
of Moscow, extending to 3,600 meters in altitude.  Until 2006, the area was previously 
designated UUP-33, which comprised approximately 2,000 square kilometres with no 
vertical limitation.  Refusing to permit observations flights through this airspace, 
Russian authorities originally asserted that imaging of its surface area from the 
periphery was possible, with the employment of panoramic cameras.  This, however, 
was proven to be technically impossible, even after the area was reduced in size and a 
ceiling “cap” established in 2006 to better enable imaging.  The inability to fly within 
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this airspace has continued to preclude Open Skies observation aircraft from overflying 
and imaging a significant portion of the city, even with the use of panoramic imaging 
cameras.  Moscow has consistently refused to permit observation flights within this 
area, despite the provisions of Article IV (which specify minimum sensor altitudes) and 
Article VI (allowing for the observation of any point on the entire territory of the 
observed State Party, as well as permitting flight through “hazardous” and “prohibited” 
airspace).  While technically capable of obtaining Treaty-specified 30-centimetre 
resolution electro-optical images by flying above UUP-33/53, the United States OC-
135B aircraft is only able to do so under clear weather conditions and employing its 
higher altitude cameras.  Otherwise, States Parties remain unable to gain the Treaty-
specified flight access needed to attain the imagery resolution specified for their 
respective camera systems.556   
 
 
Figure 5.2: UUP-53 Prohibited Airspace over the centre of Moscow 557 
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 As noted by a senior Open Skies specialist from the Canadian Strategic Joint 
Staff, refusal of flight through UUP-53 has been a particular source of consternation; 
that is, to be effectively “shut out” of overflying Moscow’s city centre, while the 
Russian TU-154M observation aircraft has been permitted to fly directly over Ottawa’s 
Parliament Hill at the specified altitude required for its sensors.  While Russian officials 
have long maintained that the primary reasons for not permitting flight through UUP-
33/53 are safety-related (i.e., low-altitude flight over the city’s high population density 
centre), they have been unable to justify their own exceptions for low-level flight 
displays put on by Russian military aircraft over Red Square during annual Victory Day 
celebrations and other occasions.558   
 Another impediment to Treaty implementation entails Moscow’s imposition of 
flight restrictions upon Open Skies observation flights conducted over Chechnya and 
various areas in south-western Russia beginning in 2002, and within 10 kilometres of its 
border with Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions since 2010.559  The 
10 kilometre restriction was craftily imposed in 2010 under the pretext of Article VI 
provisions that state that “the flight path of an observation aircraft shall not be closer 
than, but shall be allowed up to, ten kilometres from the border with an adjacent State 
that is not a State Party,”560 although these regions are within a State Party’s (i.e., 
Georgia’s) internationally recognised borders. 
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Figure 5.3: Restricted Airspace over Chechnya and adjacent regions.561 
 As notified in a July 2002 OSCE F35 notification message to all States Parties, 
the Russian Federation had established a “special regime of flight” over Chechnya 
(including portions of adjacent Russian oblasts), which was to remain in effect “until 
counter-terrorism operations in connection with the inability to ensure safety” were 
completed.562  Of interest, notwithstanding the abrogation of Article VI provisions, this 
restriction has remained in place, despite Moscow’s formal announcement of the 
cessation of its counter-terrorism operations on 15 April 2009.563  These restrictions 
have had particular ramifications for Georgian officials who, in the wake of the August 
2008 conflict with Russia over South Ossetia, observed that, despite the announced 
troop withdrawals, Moscow had continued to maintain considerable military forces 
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within the zone, located adjacent to Georgia’s northeast border.  As such, there clearly 
appeared to be an ulterior motive to Moscow’s sustainment of its flight restrictions.564 
 Moscow had established three other restricted areas (A4900/08, A4901/08, and 
A4887/08) in the North Caucasus in August 2008 (at the time of Russia’s conflict with 
Georgia in South Ossetia), again stating flight safety as the reason.  During the late 
summer and fall of that year, States Parties attempting to overfly and image various 
portions of Russia’s North Caucasus territory were either forced to modify their flight 
plans or cancel their missions entirely, under protest.565  In early September 2008, 
Russian officials refused a joint Canadian-Norwegian-Spanish C-130 overflight of the 
North Caucasus on trivial technical grounds concerning the manufacturing labels 
displayed on the SAMSON Pod’s camera lenses.  Despite this so-called infraction, the 
observing crew was advised that overflight of Russian territory outside of the North 
Caucasus would be permissible.  The mission was therefore cancelled under protest and 
subsequently addressed at the OSCC, where very strong remonstrations were made by 
Canada, Norway and Spain, in addition to those made directly with Russian officials.566  
When Moscow subsequently lifted the restriction, Canada leased a Swedish Saab-340B 
aircraft in December in order to conduct the previously planned mission route/profile 
and quota.  Despite reduced daylight, low cloud and aircraft icing issues, this second 
attempt technically fulfilled its specified objectives.567  Nevertheless, having been 
conducted three months later, this second mission was of diminished value, given that 
Moscow had effectively obviated the attainment of the original objective; that is, to 
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overfly and image designated observation targets during a specific period of heightened 
security sensitivity.568  Therefore, while Moscow had indeed relented to an observation 
overflight of the North Caucasus, the three-month delay had rendered this an acceptable 
concession, given that the principal objective to deny the original mission had been 
attained.569 
 Given both the essential nature and unambiguous language of Article IV and VI 
provisions, the imposition of flight restrictions upon Open Skies observation missions 
represents a critical problem by impeding the fundamental ability of States Parties to 
exercise their rights and fulfil their obligations under the Treaty.  Some interpretive 
variances notwithstanding, the manner in which these restrictions have been imposed 
and subsequently addressed illustrates again the risk of insufficient “provocability.” 
Despite the issue being repeatedly raised within the OSCC (including the Informal 
Working Group on Rules and Procedures), these problems have been largely left to be 
“worked out” amongst the involved States Parties themselves, with little consequence 
for the offending State Party.  This again highlights OSCC’s high tolerance for States 
Parties’ transgressions, along with the “passivity” of several OSCC plenary/working 
group chairs in addressing them.  As noted in national reporting, bilateral consultations 
at the working and senior levels have, at best, only partially resolved the matter of 
unilaterally-imposed flight restrictions.  As such, it remains on the agenda of the 
Informal Working Group on Rules and Procedures.570  
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 Moscow’s formal recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as sovereign states on 26 August 2008 has been similarly problematic.571  
Although largely rejected by the international community, Moscow’s recognition was 
immediately translated into its strict prohibition of Open Skies observation flight 
missions occurring over Russian territory within 10 kilometres of its borders with those 
two breakaway regions of Georgia, based upon Article VI provisions and the premise 
that they were not States Parties to the Treaty.  Russian authorities also objected to 
Open Skies flights conducted over Georgian territory within 10 kilometres of South 
Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s internal boundaries with other portions of Georgia, but 
obviously had less direct procedural control over such flights.  Indeed, while the 
employment of panoramic cameras within 10 kilometres of boundaries enabled some 
observation and imagery acquisition of these regions, this was limited at best.  
Regardless, such flights also served to exercise Treaty rights, as well as to reinforce the 
recognition of Georgia’s internationally recognised borders.  Nevertheless, Moscow’s 
2010 deployment of the S-300 (NATO designation: SA-20 Gargoyle) mobile air 
defence missile system in Abkhazia added a sobering new planning consideration.  
Given the S-300’s ability to provide surface-to-air missile coverage for both Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, the emplacement of this sophisticated air defence system clearly 
demonstrated a degree of resolve by Moscow that few States Parties would likely wish 
to challenge on the basis of principle.572   
 While Moscow’s position with respect to Abkhazia and South Ossetia has been 
repeatedly challenged by other States Parties within the OSCC, it remains unresolved.  
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Indeed, while in an aberrant sense technically consistent with Article VI, this position 
clearly demonstrates the upshot of selective adherence to provisions when advantageous 
to do so.  Additionally, the lack of any action taken to engage Moscow either the OSCC 
or OSCE as a whole denotes a troubling proclivity for tolerance and tractability, even 
for a consensus-based organisation.  Left largely unaddressed, this problem remains yet 
another serious impairment to the effective implementation of the Treaty. 
 It is somewhat ironic that, in the midst of the August 2008 Georgia-Russia 
conflict, the milestone 500th Open Skies observation flight mission was flown.  The 
flight was conducted by Benelux over Bosnia and Herzegovina, with flight 
representatives from Canada, the Czech Republic and Norway aboard.  This 
achievement was enthusiastically commemorated the preceding July at a meeting of the 
46th session of the OSCC, during which 500 multi-coloured balloons were released by 
delegates outside of OSCE headquarters at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna.573   
 Given the overall state of relations within the OSCE community in 2010, it is 
understandable that such milestone would be so celebrated.  With the United States 
serving as OSCC chair at the time, Paula DeSutter, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation stressed that “even when issues have 
come up in the course of implementation, the ensuing dialogues always have been 
carried out in a professional, serious and nonthreatening manner.”574  DeSutter also 
emphasised that Russian support for Open Skies was particularly valuable, given 
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Moscow’s suspension of its compliance with the CFE Treaty.  She noted the Open Skies 
Treaty’s “calming effect” in demonstrating that Russia had not rejected all of its arms 
control commitments.575  Nevertheless, the reality was that left largely unchallenged, 
Moscow was characteristically fulfilling its commitments only where and as long as it 
was advantageous to do so.  Accordingly, despite the outward appearances of the 500th 
flight mission achievement, serious implementation issues remained largely unresolved 
and as such, were compounding themselves. 
2010 Open Skies Review Conference 
 The Second Review Conference on the Open Skies Treaty was held at OSCE 
Headquarters from 7 to 9 June 2010, under the chairmanship of the United States.   
Nearly two years following the Georgia-Russia conflict, the conference was decidedly 
upbeat in overall tone, despite the general acknowledgement that serious issues existed 
and even greater challenges lay ahead in effectively implementing and sustaining the 
regime.  An early highlight of the conference was a video address made by United 
States Secretary of States Clinton, noting the success of Open Skies as one of the most 
successful CSBM regimes ever established, along with a strong reaffirmation of United 
States’ commitment to both its sustainment and advancement.576  Not to be outdone, the 
Russian Federation’s opening statement, while expressing specific concerns (including 
it being the most observed State Party, with 65 percent of all conducted missions) was 
also decidedly positive: 
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Looking back at the years that have elapsed since the signing of the Treaty, we 
have become even more convinced that the conclusion of the Treaty on Open 
Skies was one of the most important political acts in the OSCE area, ensuring 
the development of confidence, openness and transparency among the States that 
signed that document in 1992 or acceded to it in subsequent years. The Treaty in 
fact has become a unique and unparalleled multinational instrument for 
strengthening confidence and security in a huge region….  I should like to 
reiterate the Russian Federation’s commitment to the fundamental bases of the 
Treaty on Open Skies that have confirmed their viability during the period of its 
implementation.  We trust that the atmosphere of co-operation, mutual respect 
and understanding that has evolved among the States Parties to the Treaty on 
Open Skies will be preserved and strengthened.577 
In the midst of the generally propitious mood of the conference, the Georgian 
delegation provided a sobering reminder of the regime’s overall faultiness and fragility 
in failing to resolve outstanding implementation issues.  Specifically, the Georgian 
delegate raised objections to the restrictions imposed upon a joint Romania-United 
States mission conducted in the Russian Federation the previous month, which had 
sought to fly within 10 kilometres of Abkhazia.  Georgia’s statement, while 
diplomatically indelicate to some, nevertheless provided a valid appraisal of the impact 
and continued risk associated with unresolved implementation issues:  
… the Russian Federation has deliberately and illegally restricted the right of the 
states parties arising from the OS regime to full territorial access on the territory 
of the observed party.  We consider this as an attempt on the part of the Russian 
Federation to exploit the Treaty on Open Skies to achieve its own political goals.  
This is absolutely unacceptable and must not be tolerated.  Acts such as this by 
Russia contradict the spirit and goals of the Treaty and threaten to erode this 
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important component of European Security Architecture.  Unfortunately, by 
such actions as this one Russia “successfully” continues to contribute to the 
erosion of the arms control regime in Europe.  In behaving in this way, Russia 
has once again attempted to justify the forced redrawing of internationally 
recognized borders and the violation of international law.578 
 Notwithstanding the momentary “jolt” of the Georgian statement, proceedings 
gravitated back to the principal thematic of the conference.  In a more favourable 
reflection upon implementation, delegates noted the successful completion of more than 
670 flights since the Treaty entered-into-force, along with more than 100 flights being 
conducted annually.579  In reviewing and considering the overall status of the Treaty, 
particular emphasis was placed upon the technical modernisation and expanded 
orientation of the regime.  This included presentations by the Informal Working Group 
on Sensors and others on the critically important transition of mission imagery from 
analogue-based cameras and wet film to advanced digitised imaging sensors and 
associated media.   There were also presentations and representations by States Parties 
on successor aircraft; information on new approaches to data retrieval, access and 
archiving; and further discussions of broadening the Treaty mandate to include 
environmental monitoring and disaster response.580   
 Delegations acknowledged the enormity of effort and cost that the planned 
transition to advanced observation systems represented.  Nevertheless, given the 
associated imperatives, there appeared to be general recognition of the considerable 
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investment that would be involved with digitisation, along with mission aircraft 
maintenance, upgrades and replacement.  This was duly reflected in the Final Document 
of the Review Conference, calling for the modernisation of both sensors and aircraft.581    
 It was in this respect that the Russian Federation provided one of the 
conference’s highlights: a presentation on its new long-range observation mission 
platform, the Tupolev TU-214ON.  Based upon the TU-214 airliner, the TU-214ON is 
the first purpose-built Open Skies mission aircraft, as well as the first to carry all Treaty-
certified surveillance sensors.  This state-of-the-art aircraft (subsequently confirmed to 
be a fleet of at least two) will have much greater range and capability than the TU-154M 
presently employed by the Russian Federation for long-range missions.582  Based upon 
this fact alone, the Russian Federation will be able to fly direct to North America 
without en-route refuelling (a TU-154M requirement that has frequently provided “tip-
offs” to observed States Parties in advance of the 72-hour notification requirement), 
thereby enhancing the intrusiveness of Russian Open Skies missions.  A complete 
digital sensor-suite will also enable the aircraft to conduct observation flights at night.  
Although anticipated, the Russian presentation provided a clear indication of the 
significant investment it was willing to make in support of its Open Skies mission, 
placing it well ahead of other States Parties in this respect.  This, of course, also reflects 
the value of the Open Skies regime in supporting Moscow’s strategic security 
interests.583  
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Figure 5.4: Russian Tupolev TU-214ON mission aircraft584 
 During the conference’s working group meetings, there was a general 
reaffirmation of the need to progress work related to specific sensor categories, along 
with the formal establishment of minimum technical standards for Open Skies airfields.  
It was also apparent that, while some States Parties remained less than enthusiastic 
about expanding the Treaty’s mandate to include environmental monitoring and crisis 
response as extensions of the Open Skies concept, sufficient support existed for further 
consideration.585  From a national sovereignty perspective, some States Parties were 
openly uncomfortable with a recommendation put forth by the United States for a 
single, centralised OSCE-based repository of digital observation flight media, rather 
than being retained by individual observing States Parties.  Nevertheless, this was also 
noted in the Final Document as an item for further consideration.586    
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 The on-going matter of Cyprus’ candidacy for accession to the Treaty presented 
a particularly delicate political challenge to the conference in that, while most States 
Parties wished to keep this on the OSCC agenda, Turkey flatly objected.  This 
necessitated careful crafting of the language of the Final Statement to refer to Cyprus in 
vague terms, simply “noting one application for accession.”587  This resulted in all but 
two States Parties (Turkey and Bosnia-Herzegovina) making statements specifically 
supporting Cyprus’ accession.  This was met with a strong retort by Turkey, asserting 
that its veto had effectively settled the matter and that as such, the Cyprus question was 
outside the “scope, mandate and purview” of the OSCC, as well as the conference.588  
 Despite the obvious rancour over these issues, not only was the Review 
Conference able to produce a final document, but one that conveyed a decidedly 
positive regard and optimistic outlook for the Treaty.  It called for further cooperation in 
transparency, to seek expansion in membership, and to provide a model and assist other 
regions in adapting the Open Skies concept of aerial observation “to promote security 
and stability.”  It also signalled States Parties’ strong commitment to the Treaty and the 
2015 Open Skies Review Conference.589 
 The investment made by individual States Parties in their respective national 
Open Skies capabilities raises an interesting question pertaining to one of the 
fundamental precepts of the Treaty.  That is, given that the regime was established to 
provide all States Parties the ability to conduct observation overflight mission on their 
own terms, do the variances in the respective national capabilities of specific platforms 
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and sensors undermine this concept?  Some would agree, as evidenced by an earlier 
German proposal to acquire a “common operating platform” to better enable States 
Parties with a more standardised, efficient and cost-effective mission aircraft.590  
Touched upon briefly during the Second Review Conference, informal discussions on a 
common operating platform led to formal presentations made by Airbus Military and 
the former Alenia Aeronautica (now Alenia Aermacchi) to an OSCC Sharing Assets 
Meeting on 22 November 2010.591   
 The presentations (on the CASA C-295 and Spartan C-27J aircraft respectively) 
clearly demonstrated that there exist viable options in moving to a common platform as 
means of providing lower costs and increased value, particularly if undertaken in 
conjunction with the transition to digital based observation technologies.  Moreover, the 
aircraft briefed are already in production (a variant of the CASA C-295, the CASA      
C-235 currently serves as Turkey’s Open Skies platform) and are capable of replacing 
most legacy platforms in the Open Skies role, with the added advantage of having 
comparatively low life-cycle technical support costs.  The inherent multi-role capability 
of these aircraft would also facilitate expanded mission roles, such as environmental 
monitoring.  Perhaps most intriguing is the potential for a common platform to be 
acquired within a range of proprietary options; e.g., national ownership, a multinational 
pool, “power by the hour” leasing, or contract service through a private operator.592  
While the idea of a small fleet of aircraft commonly owned and operated by OSCE 
States Parties appeared to have merit for a number of OSCC representatives, others 
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opined that it was simply too much of a leap to combine the digital technology 
transition with the acquisition of a new aircraft.  Nevertheless, the idea will likely 
remain on the agenda of the OSCC Informal Working Group on Sharing Assets that was 
subsequently established in 2013.593 
 
Figure 5.5: Airbus Military - CASA C-295 Open Skies concept aircraft594 
New Challenges, Unresolved Issues 
 Since 2010, the Treaty has still managed to sustain a relatively high overall rate 
of implementation, which continues to indicate its value to individual national interests.  
Nevertheless, issues such as increasing operating costs and sustainment of specialised 
mission equipment and crews have taken their toll.  Moreover, unresolved 
implementation issues have also translated into a reduction of flight mission activity in 
some instances.  These missions are summarized as follows: 
• 2011: 96 flight missions conducted;595   
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• 2012: 101 flight missions conducted;596 
• 2013: 97 flight missions conducted;597 
• 2014: 93 flight missions conducted;598 and 
• 2015: 92 flight missions conducted.599 
Following the Second Review Conference, proceedings within the OSCC 
became increasingly taken up by the continued acrimony between Greece and Turkey 
over the Cyprus question.  Indeed, despite the OSCE’s early intention to facilitate all 
OSCE members in acceding to the Treaty as a group, Turkey had made it clear that it 
would veto such an approach in order to specifically preclude Cyprus.600  Given 
Turkey’s longstanding resistance, Greece consequently adopted the practice of routinely 
placing the Cyprus issue on the agenda of OSCC meetings as a “placeholder,” with 
Turkey routinely blocking any move for accession.  Following the Second Review 
Conference, however, things changed for the worse, with the Turkish Foreign minister 
instructing its OSCC delegation to block any and all business mentioning Cyprus, 
effective 1 January 2011.601  Greece’s practice of including Cyprus on the OSCC 
agenda resulted in Turkey blocking consensus on the agenda itself, effectively 
paralysing proceedings.  By 24 October 2011, some specific interpretations by the 
OSCC Chair and other workarounds (such as informal and bilateral consultations) 
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enabled flight quota allocations to be undertaken for 2012 and 2013, along with an 
extension to earlier agreed rules for certification methodology.602  Nevertheless, Turkey 
had escalated the matter as a major procedural challenge to OSCC rules and procedures, 
as well as the authority of the OSCE Chair itself.  Accordingly, another significant 
impediment to Treaty implementation had developed.   Hartwig Spitzer characterized 
the situation this way:   
Here the implementation of a treaty which has so far been working well is being 
held hostage by diverging interests in a status conflict, which has its roots far 
beyond the treaty….  Clearly, high-level ministerial intervention is needed to 
prevent a similar erosion process in the case of Open Skies.603 
 
The impasse was understandably downplayed at the OSCE’s commemoration of 
the 20th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty and the 10th anniversary of its entry-
into-force in Vienna on 27 March 2012.  Hosted by the Treaty’s Depositories, Canada 
and Hungary, the event was attended by all States Parties, observers and OSCE Partners 
for Cooperation.  The commemoration provided another opportunity to reflect upon the 
achievements of the Treaty, which was openly described as one of the most important 
CSBM and arms control regimes of the modern era.604 
 
In July 2013, following a series of concerted interventions by the United States 
in Ankara and Athens, further facilitated by the OSCC’s Hungarian Chair, the agenda 
crisis was finally assuaged.  While Turkey’s opposition remained unchanged on 
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Cyprus’ membership, the status and treatment of its application was sufficiently 
adjusted to allow Ankara to lift its “blockade” of OSCC proceedings.605  This 
development finally enabled the OSCC to “turn a corner,” just in time to commemorate 
yet another milestone: the 1000th Open Skies flight mission, which was conducted by 
Italy over the Russian Federation on 26 August 2013.606 
In noting the causes and effects of the Greek-Turkish dispute, Wolfgang Zellner 
observed, “the functioning of another arms control treaty is endangered by disputes on 
unresolved sub-regional conflicts, this time between two NATO member states.”607  It is 
evident that, given the very nature of the OSCE rules and procedures, a situation such as 
this one constitutes a significant impairment.  It also indicates how far States Parties and 
the OSCE itself are willing to go in order to address it.  For example, actions taken by 
the Chair to enable proceedings to continue to the extent possible, despite protest by 
Turkey, illustrate that there are some informal, discretionary approaches that can be 
undertaken as initial means of mitigation when consensus is blocked.  As previously 
discussed, the effectiveness of such approaches varies considerably as a function of the 
chair’s ability to shape and influence proceedings.  Otherwise, there have existed 
circumstances where the limits of the OSCE’s consensus-based governance structure 
warranted additional, formal measures to be established.  Accordingly, while the 
Organisation’s Rules of Procedure, which require decisions to be based upon “the 
absence of any objection expressed by a participating State to the adoption of the 
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decision in question,”608 the 1992 Prague Document on Further Development of CSCE 
Institutions and Structures instituted “consensus minus one,” whereby “appropriate 
action may be taken in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations of relevant 
CSCE commitments.”609  “Consensus minus one” thereby established the precedent of 
an exception to consensus, which was applied in Yugoslavia’s suspension from the 
OSCE that same year.  Shortly thereafter, the CSCE introduced the possibility of a 
decision being rendered under “consensus minus two,” pertaining to the peaceful 
settlement of disputes.   The 1992 Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration 
subsequently enabled the CSCE and OSCE to “direct any two participating States to 
seek conciliation to assist them in resolving a dispute that they have not been able to 
settle within a reasonable period of time.”610  In this instance, however, it again required 
the specific engagement of individual States Parties themselves to bring the situation 
under control. 
The references made to these mechanisms is not to suggest that a “consensus 
minus” approach would necessarily be required in this instance, but rather to point out 
that the CSCE and OSCE had previously sought means through which to address major 
transgressions and impasses.  Although consensus-based decisions are, by design, the 
preferred approach, in situations where such consensus has been blocked and the 
implementation of a binding mechanism has become significantly impaired, the 
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application of alternative measures (or lack thereof) becomes fundamentally a question 
of political will, as will be further discussed. 
  During the same period as the OSCC agenda impasse, other implementation 
issues continued to simmer.  In April 2012, given the unresolved dispute over its 
territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Georgia announced the cessation of Open 
Skies Treaty implementation with respect to the Russian Federation.  Appearing to take 
a page from the 2011 counter-suspension of CFE Treaty obligations vis-à-vis Russia by 
several States Parties to that regime, the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained 
its actions as follows: 
This move by the Georgian side responds to Russia's cessation of 
implementation of certain Treaty obligations, which began in 2010 and 
subsequent attempts of Russia to exploit Open Skies Treaty for the purpose of 
legitimizing the so-called independence of Abkhazia, Georgia and the 
Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia.  In such circumstances Georgia has 
made an appropriate decision to cease performing its obligations vis-à-vis the 
Russian Federation under the Open Skies Treaty.  This decision in specific terms 
means that Georgia will not allow any observation flights with the participation 
of the Russian Federation over the territory of Georgia and Georgia will not 
conduct observation flights over the territory of the Russian Federation.  Georgia 
will resume implementation of the Treaty obligations vis-à-vis the Russian 
Federation upon the latter's return to full compliance with the Treaty.  Georgia 
will, of course, continue to fulfill its Treaty obligations with respect to all other 
States parties.611 
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In this particular case, the degradation of not only the Open Skies Treaty, but 
also conventional arms control and CSBM regimes in general is further demonstrated.  
While no party should be able to unilaterally impose a restriction such as this upon the 
implementation of a binding regime unless specifically provided for, justification can be 
readily derived from various interpretations of conventional and customary international 
law.  Indeed, this was the case in Moscow’s CFE Treaty suspension and consequent 
counter-suspension by other States Parties.  This renders the Georgian suspension of its 
Open Skies obligations vis-à-vis Russia all the more difficult to resolve, given the CFE 
Treaty precedent.   
The Georgian suspension again highlights the risk of insufficient “provocability” 
to regime contraventions.  Moreover, as a further indication of institutional 
prevarication, an unofficial OSCE media-briefing document noted: “If a State refuses to 
comply with the [observation flight] request there is no system of sanctions although the 
State can expect to be criticized by other States.”612  While technically correct in the 
strictest terms of the Treaty’s text, this statement nevertheless conveys a sense of 
detachment, if not outright apathy, given the role of the OSCC as the regime’s 
implementing body and the OSCE as its governing institution. 
 Continued trivial or even arcane technical complications have also served to 
impede the implementation of the Treaty.  In March 2013, a new Canadian C-130 “J” 
model aircraft was to be used as an Open Skies platform for the first time in support of 
an overflight mission of the Russian Federation.  The “J” model Hercules aircraft had 
been previously certified for Open Skies by Italy on behalf of all Pod Group countries in 
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2003613 and the Canadian “J” model aircraft was identified as such in its notification to 
the Russian Federation.  Following the acceptance message from the Russian 
Federation, the aircraft proceeded to Melsbroek Airbase, Belgium for the installation of 
the SAMSON Pod mission system.  Following the aircraft’s arrival at Melsbroek, 
Moscow notified Canada that the mission was now refused, due to the Canadian “J” 
model Hercules having not been certified.  Although Canada argued that as a Pod Group 
C-130J, the aircraft indeed met all of the requirements of certification and would be 
available for ground inspection upon arrival at the Russian point of entry, Russian 
authorities rejected this response and the mission was necessarily cancelled.614  
Following extensive debate over the validity of the Canadian certification per OSCC 
Decision 15/04, which prescribes the requirements for new models of C-130 aircraft,615 
the matter was finally resolved through a compromise ground inspection (vice full 
certification) of a C-130J aircraft at Canadian Forces Base Trenton, Ontario in May of 
that year.  Attended by Russian and a handful of other representatives, the inspection 
was deemed unnecessary by most other States Parties for reasons that were largely self-
evident.  As such, Moscow’s pedantic interpretation, however erroneous, was rendered 
because it was deemed advantageous to be so, if only to “stick it” to a NATO State 
Party.616   
 Despite various efforts to resolve earlier instances of non-compliance and 
technical non-conformity, similar implementation infractions continued to occur.  In 
late September 2013, the Russia/Belarus Group of States Parties refused to accept a 
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Norwegian observation flight mission over specific areas of western Russia and 
Belarus, where the joint and combined Exercise ZAPAD (i.e., “WEST”) 2013 was 
taking place.617  The mission included flight through UMD187 -- a designated “danger 
area” typically reserved from the surface to 24,000 feet for the firing of missiles and 
other types of ordnance.618 Although Section II of Article VI of the Treaty specifically 
provides a States Party the right to overfly the entire territory of another State Party 
“including areas designated by the observed Party as hazardous airspace,”619 it is 
apparent that Moscow and Minsk simply did not want the exercise to be observed.  
Indeed, similar actions to obstruct access to the exercise by participating States to the 
Vienna Document were also taken.  While Norway cancelled the mission in protest and 
subsequently raised the issue within the OSCC, the explanation provided by Belarus 
was familiarly specious; i.e., that the restrictions were related to flight safety associated 
with live-firing activities.620  A subsequent statement issued by the Russian Foreign 
Ministry stated: 
It is also obvious that restricted areas over the area of military exercise involving 
battle firing are necessary.  Russia (and Belarus) ensured security of a U.S. or 
Norwegian open skies aircraft that was intended to be used for overflight of this 
area.  At the same time, Russia and Belarus issued notifications about restricted 
areas well in advance, informed the observing party and suggested alternative 
routes and flight height, thus implementing the OST [Open Skies Treaty] 
requirements.  It should be noted that some U.S. allies also set restricted areas, 
in particular over positions of their Patriot air defense missile systems.  Yet the 
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[United States Department of State compliance] report does not mention this.  It 
is regrettable that in this case we see a "hidden agenda" in the US schemes.621 
 Irrespective of disagreement, the immediate aim of denying overflight was once 
again achieved with little, if any, real consequence.  Norway’s rights were precluded in 
a perfunctory fashion that, similar to other “national procedures,” generally flouted the 
Treaty’s legally-binding obligations.  The OSCC’s lack of response was ostensibly 
borne out of the characteristic preference to await consensus and otherwise preserve 
goodwill.  Such a lack of response, however, only served to tacitly accept States Parties’ 
discretion in repudiating the very purpose and design of the Treaty; that is, the right of 
unimpeded overflight.  A 2014 State Department report, noting that the United States 
“…will press Belarus and work with other States Parties through diplomatic channels, 
including the OSCC, to urge the Russia/Belarus Group not to impose airspace 
restrictions during future military activities,” again serves to underscore serious 
deficiencies in the oversight and management of the Treaty, along with its significant 
degradation as a CSBM mechanism.622    
 Since 2011, on-going closures of Russian Open Skies airfields during holiday 
periods has continued to impair planned observation flight missions by some States 
Parties.  Despite the aforementioned OSCC convention to take holidays into account as 
a planning consideration only, Moscow has simply reinforced its own rule that it will 
not receive and support missions during these periods, in contravention of Article VI 
provisions.  Although various efforts have been made to accommodate Russian holidays 
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in planning missions, the more recent extensions of these holiday periods has had a 
particularly adverse impact on States Parties’ ability to exercise their Treaty rights.  
Likewise, continued disregard by Russian authorities in according air traffic control 
priority to time-sensitive Open Skies flight missions over regular air traffic has resulted 
in delays and cancellations of not only flight segments, but observation missions 
altogether.623  
 As repeatedly noted, despite objections being raised within OSCC meetings, a 
clear lack of any meaningful outcome has necessitated continued bilateral efforts to 
mitigate Treaty infringements.  As might be expected, the United States has taken the 
lead on such engagement.  Indeed, in late-December 2013, senior United States officials 
had engaged their Russian counterparts via formal correspondence to the Chief of the 
Foreign Military Cooperation Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence, while 
also holding separate meetings in Vienna with the Head of the Russian National Nuclear 
Risk Reduction Centre.624  While these bilateral efforts have continued, they have 
proven themselves exceedingly difficult, as evidenced in a Russian Foreign Ministry 
statement pertaining to a United States Department of State 2014 compliance report on 
Moscow’s various infractions of the Treaty: 
Many U.S. "quibbles" are of purely technical nature, and it would be quite 
difficult for the general public to understand what they are about if we started 
discussing them one by one….  One of their main claims is that Russia allegedly 
restricts the use of air space for OST [Open Skies Treaty] purposes…. The first 
thing to be noted is that the Treaty envisages that observation flights shall be 
conducted with due regard for national (in this case Russian, as well as, with 
respect to Zapad-2013 exercises, Belorussian) rules of use of air space.  
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Restrictions on flights of aircraft over Moscow and Chechnya restricted areas 
were introduced only for security reasons.  Unlike the Americans, we cannot 
disregard this….  When we introduced restrictions on OST flights near the 
border of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we strictly followed the provisions of the 
Treaty prohibiting observation flights closer than 10 kilometers off the border of 
a non-State Party.  Abkhazia and South Ossetia are such states.  Those who still 
consider them to be Georgian regions are six years behind the times.  …Another 
issue related to us is that we close Russian air fields during national holidays.  
What can we say, given that such practices are widely used by other OST parties 
without making the United States allergic?625 
  From an implementation oversight perspective, opposition by any State Party to 
any action that inhibits or constrains its rights under the Treaty is certainly appropriate; 
however, leaving the matter to individual States Parties to resolve separately as a matter 
of routine clearly denotes critical weaknesses in Treaty governance and management. 
Digitisation and Modernisation 
 In addition to attendant oversight and implementation challenges, the Treaty has 
also undergone various difficulties with its on-going transition to digital technology.  In 
2005, OSCC Decision 12/05 established an agreed digital data exchange format, thereby 
standardising the transfer of digital data recorded during observation flights, as well as 
the conversion of analogue data to digital following observation flights.626 This set the 
stage for the process of incorporating modern digital sensors into certified mission 
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systems, employing open standard, internationally approved and technically viable 
camera and other sensor configurations.  In order to achieve this, commercial-off-the-
shelf products were deemed suitable, as they comprised the most cost-effective, 
transparent and readily available/supportable equipment for Open Skies use, including 
the specified resolutions and output formats.627 
 
    By 2010, the OSCC had decided that commercial-off-the-shelf available digital 
camera systems, employing up to four colour channels (blue, green, red, and near-
infrared), would indeed be suitable for the purposes of the Treaty.628  This decision had 
been previously held up largely by Russian resistance over concerns about the 
multispectral capabilities of such systems, which employ specific frequencies across the 
electromagnetic spectrum, thereby enabling the acquisition of additional information 
such as camouflage, vegetation coverage, water depth and chemicals.629  Nevertheless, 
once the decision was made, Moscow readily adapted its already ambitious Open Skies 
modernisation programme, quickly incorporating this type of digital system into its 
planned mission aircraft sensor suites.  For the new TU-214ON, the integration of these 
new sensors (multi-channel vertical and oblique electro-optical cameras; infrared and 
synthetic aperture radar systems) has been facilitated by the aircraft’s open 
architecture.630   Nevertheless, a number of technical challenges remain in this 
ambitious project, with certification not expected before 2017.631  
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 In addition to the standardisation of formats for the exchange of digital data, the 
OSCC also had to develop specific procedures to safeguard the custody and processing 
of digital imagery, given the comparative ease with which such imagery can be altered.  
Accordingly, technical and procedural measures were established to ensure that 
unprocessed mission imagery and associated flight data are recorded onto approved 
removable storage systems, under the direct oversight of both observing and observed 
States Parties.  Similar custodial safeguards are then employed in the transfer and 
processing of annotated mission media into the approved Open Skies format, including 
duplicates.  Removable storage devices used in the transfer process are then erased 
under similar scrutiny to ensure that there is no possibility of further extraction of 
digital data.632  
 These transfer and exchange procedures would prove particularly problematic in 
the first Open Skies platform to undergo certification: the Russian Antonov AN-30 
medium-range turbo-prop aircraft.  The AN-30 had been quickly retrofitted with a new 
digital electro-optical camera system -- the OSDCAM4060, built by PO KSI, a private 
research company based in Moscow.633  Immediately following the requisite adoption 
of corresponding OSCC Decisions on 16 September 2013,634 a certification event, open 
to all States Parties, was conducted From 21 to 27 September 2013 at Kubinka Airbase 
near Moscow -- one of the Russian Open Skies points of entry.  For the most part, 
certification procedures (including ground inspection of the aircraft and mission 
systems, camera performance measurements, validation of digital processing, transfer, 
duplication and erasure) were carried out uneventfully.  The United States, however, 
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was concerned about the non-removable storage units integral to the OSDCAM 4060’s 
on-board computer and ground processing station; specifically, the possibility of 
concealed data acquisition.  When the United States representatives requested to use 
their own equipment to measure various camera and processing operations with respect 
to these fixed storage units, Russian officials refused on the grounds that no provisions 
existed to allow this.635  Accordingly, the United States refused to sign the certification 
document, resulting in the process being effectively suspended.   As might be imagined, 
this created considerable upheaval within the Open Skies community, particularly given 
that, from a technical perspective, the processing storage units were not a security 
concern to any other States Party.  Indeed, increasingly frustrated as the stalemate 
continued, Moscow began to seek bilateral arrangements with other States Parties to use 
the OSDCAM4060-equipped AN-30 for Open Skies missions in their respective 
countries.636   
  
Figure 5.6: Russian OSDCAM4060 Electro-Optical Camera (L); Installed on AN-30B               
mission aircraft (R).637 
 Several weeks later, the United States offered a technical compromise to enable 
certification; namely, that Russia permit other States Parties the option of purchasing 
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the OSDCAM4060 non-removable storage units following a given observation flight 
mission, or that it utilise removable storage units only.  These conditions were flatly 
rejected by Moscow on the grounds that removal of fixed components would entail 
system disassembly, which was clearly unfeasible and also had warranty implications.  
Furthermore, conversion to removable storage components would entail the complete 
re-design of the system.638  The proposal was also not particularly well received by most 
other States Parties as a matter of principle, given that it represented a departure from 
what had been originally agreed within the OSCC.  This resulted in the continuation of 
the stalemate.639 
 
 It is evident that within the United States defence and intelligence communities, 
there have been clear concerns over the possibility of digital data exploitation by Russia 
in its OSDCAM4060 design.  While such concern is understandable, the specific 
rationale for “holding out” on certification might have been averted with greater 
specificity accorded to the technical requirements established for digital mission 
systems in the first place.  In fairness, the transition has been evolutionary in nature and 
difficult to foresee in terms of any and all sub-system designs.  Nevertheless, under the 
strict interpretation of the Treaty and associated OSCC decisions, there was little the 
United States could offer to justify its position.   
 Internal disagreements that had pinned United States defence and intelligence 
communities against the State Department over the digital certification issue quickly 
degraded into open disaccord between Congressional Republicans and the Obama 
Administration that endured for several months.  This included debate concerning the 
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Defence Authorization Bill for 2015, which included added provisions to withhold 
funding required to enable United States’ certification of new Russian aircraft and 
sensors unless guarantees could be provided that they “will not enhance the capability 
or potential of the Russian Federation to gather intelligence that poses an unacceptable 
risk to the national security of the United States.”640  The language of the ensuing 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, while softened slightly, still 
called for specific requirements to be met in assessing the risk to the national security of 
the United States posed by new Russian observation aircraft and digital system 
capabilities.641  On-going criticism by senior lawmakers has also included the rationale 
that certification would only serve to further enable Russian airborne reconnaissance 
capabilities, despite its record of non-compliance with other treaty obligations.  This has 
translated into certification being accorded only on the condition of Russia’s withdrawal 
from Ukraine and the cessation of its violation of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear 
Forces Treaty.642  In response, the United States Office of Management and Budget has 
argued that impeding the means through which to certify would actually “prevent the 
United States from reviewing, examining, or raising concerns regarding a proposed 
Russian aircraft or sensor.”643 
 Notwithstanding these domestic diversions, as the only certification “holdout,” 
Washington needed to make a decision on either remaining opposed (bringing both the 
United States as a State Party and the future of the Treaty itself into question), or 
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“signing up” to the certification.  The decision was somewhat tempered by the fact that 
the AN-30B, while technically capable of operating in the United States, was intended 
first and foremost as a European mission platform and would almost certainly remain 
so.  On 21 May 2014, following National Security Council consultations, the United 
States formally approved the certification of the OSDCAM4060-equipped AN-30B – a 
full eight months after the certification event at Kubinka Airbase.644   The official 
announcement stated:  “After careful consideration the United States has decided to 
certify the electro-optical sensor for the Russian Federation’s AN-30 Open Skies Treaty 
aircraft, which is used in Open Skies flights over Europe.”645  The United States 
certification was also made with the caveat that certification did not establish a 
precedent for that of any future sensor/aircraft combination.  Nevertheless, the White 
House was careful to further explain the rationale for the decision, particularly in light 
of various Russian violations of the Treaty.  This rationale was, ultimately, to enable the 
transition to digital technology and preserve the Treaty:  “All states parties agree that 
the transition from film cameras to digital sensors is required for the long-term viability 
of the treaty.”646  From 7 to 12 July 2014, the first Open Skies observation flight 
mission employing a digital sensor was finally flown by a Russian AN-30B over 
Poland.647  The extended delay was not left without comment by Moscow: 
In late 2013 - early 2014, it took Washington eight months (instead of two 
weeks as required by the Treaty) to sign the certification report of Russia's An-
30B observation aircraft equipped with digital sensors, which challenged the 
"digital future" of the OST.  In this context, the unreliability of U.S. observation 
aircrafts, low skills of U.S. on-board interpreters and their poor coordination 
with the crews may seem insignificant, but all this still leads to flight delays, 
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changes in arrival time, and neglect of instructions by air traffic control bodies, 
etc.  It does not just inflict considerable costs on Russia, but can also adversely 
affect safety and security of the flights.648 
 The OSCDCAM4060, or a derivation thereof, is also being fitted on Russia’s 
legacy long-range observation aircraft, the TU-154M, with certification expected in 
2016.  Although new certification criteria will be utilised, similar issues can be expected 
to recur, this time concerning an aircraft used for long-range observation overflights of 
the United States and Canada.649  
 The first digital certification under the Treaty exemplifies not only the 
challenges of establishing highly intricate, common technical standards within a 
multilateral CSBM regime, but one fraught with various degrees of circumspection.  
Accordingly, despite the concerted efforts of the OSCC’s Informal Working Group on 
Sensors in establishing digital mission system specifications, complications were to be 
expected.  Still, the Russian OSDCAM4060 included other design aspects that arguably 
should have been better addressed during earlier stages of development.  While the 
certification impasse would appear to justify this comment, working relationships 
between Russia and other OSCC members may well have precluded the necessary 
collaboration. 
 The ensuing tumult in Washington highlights a number of issues.  This includes 
the perception held by some lawmakers of the justification of unilateral action taken in 
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response to the Russian Federation’s conduct not just with respect to the Treaty, but 
elsewhere.  It also raises questions concerning the awareness and understanding of Open 
Skies capabilities in general.  With the Russian Federation maintaining a clear lead in 
both mission system and aircraft modernisation, it is apparent that the regime affords it 
a highly important strategic reconnaissance capability.  This at least partially explains 
Washington’s resistance generally, along with own lack of progress in digital 
modernisation.  That is, bias favouring space-based reconnaissance superiority over 
airborne systems, notwithstanding the fundamental capability differences between the 
two.    
 In January 2014, the United States Defense Science Board report recommended 
that the Department of Defense abandon digital upgrades of its Open Skies OC-135B 
aircraft fleet.  This recommendation was based upon the “easy accessibility” of satellite 
imagery, further noting the extant Treaty requirement to employ analogue systems and 
wet film rather than digital optics.  This evidently misinformed and technically situated 
report therefore concluded that the expense involved in upgrading the OC-135B was 
unnecessary and wasteful.650  Nevertheless, the project to upgrade the OC-135B fleet 
remains “on the books,” as evidenced by a March 2014 United States Department of 
Defense Budget Item: PE 0305145F/Arms Control Implementation which, in 
accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 15, seeks to “upgrade the sensors on the 
current aircraft by replacing film-based cameras with available electro-optical sensors,” 
at an estimated cost of $US24.652 million and an initial operational capability in 
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2017.651  Despite this, some members of the United States Open Skies community 
remain somewhat sceptical that this replacement programme will remain on track.652  
 The C-130 Pod Group has also undergone a significant transformation.  
Following Norway’s departure in 2011 to pursue its own national mission platform and 
system, nine nations (Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain) had since comprised the Group.  In December 2013, 
the Pod Group’s “Ministerial Arrangement” was terminated, following a decision by the 
Government of Belgium to end its support of the SAMSON Pod mission system at 
Melsbroek Airbase, Brussels.653  The Belgian decision had been preceded by Group-
wide cost- and policy-related determinations that had translated into an overall reduced 
imperative to conduct observation overflights.  This included Belgium, which had 
publically stated that it no longer intended to conduct observation flights under the 
Treaty.  However, another major factor in terminating its host nation arrangements 
involved the planned phase-out of C-130-related infrastructure and support at 
Melsbroek in order to accommodate new A400 transport aircraft.654 
 Subsequent to Belgium’s announcement, the remaining Pod Group nations -- 
less Canada, France and Italy -- similarly indicated their intent to discontinue their use 
of the SAMSON Pod system, ostensibly to pursue other capability options.  These 
developments had the effect of expediting efforts already underway by Canada, France 
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and Italy in developing a digital successor to the SAMSON Pod.  This included the 
establishment of the Multinational Open Skies Digital Imaging System Focus Group 
(subsequently changed to the Open Skies Imaging System (OSIS) Focus Group), which 
is currently developing a successor C-130 mission system, incorporating digital sensors 
and processors compatible with OSCC specifications.655 
                                                                                   
Figure 5.7: C-130 SAMSON Pod Mission System656  
   The efforts of the OSIS Focus Group continue, with the successor mission 
system’s initial operational capability expected sometime in 2019.   To enable a smooth 
transition, Canada has assumed ownership of the legacy SAMSON Pod system and for 
coordinating its transfer to interim storage and basing facilities at Orléans Airbase, in 
France.  There, the now largely unsupported legacy system is hoped to remain mission 
capable “as is,” thereby enabling observation flight mission operations by Canada, 
France and other interested former Pod Group members throughout the transition to the 
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successor system.  Italy had initially agreed to eventually serve as Host Nation, with the 
main support base to be located at the 46ª Brigata Aerea, at Pisa.  This, however, 
remains to be confirmed, given questions regarding Italy’s continued involvement, 
along with other factors concerning the permanent European basing of the successor 
system.657  Securing funding for this project has also been a challenge, given the 
persistent perception that Open Skies capabilities are “non-essential.”  Accordingly, full 
funding is yet to be secured.  With the cost of the digital transition expected to be in the 
order of $US20 million, participation in OSIS remains open to all former Pod Group 
and other NATO States Parties to the Treaty.  While this may well occur once the 
“heavy lifting” is completed by Canada and France, it remains to be seen how the initial 
costs in digital conversion might suitably apportioned afterwards.658  
 It is evident that the demise of the C-130 Pod Group was predicated by high 
operations and maintenance costs, combined with the decreased priority subsequently 
accorded to conducting “active” observation overflight missions by most members, 
based upon a perceived lack of requirement.  The anticipated additional expense and 
effort of transitioning to digital technology provided further disincentive.  Although this 
reduced level of active engagement does not necessarily translate into an increased 
probability of future withdrawals from the Treaty itself, it does indicate a growing 
disparity in States Parties’ wherewithal and sense of imperative.  Given the original 
concept envisioned by the Treaty in providing a “level playing field” upon which to 
conduct discretionary observation flights, it would appear that efforts to sustain the 
regime through modernisation might, at least initially, prove contrary to this precept.  
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Certainly, the lack of other options to assist States Parties lacking the necessary 
resources to acquire a cost-effective capability -- such as those envisioned under a 
common operating platform -- may actually exacerbate this problem. 
The Ukraine Crisis 
 The utility of the Open Skies Treaty has been well demonstrated in Ukraine’s 
internal conflict with Russian-backed separatists in 2014 and 2015.  In response to this 
crisis, unique provisions have been employed in the conduct of observation overflights.  
That is, in addition to the general provisions for the conduct of observation flights under 
Article VI of the Treaty, Annex L further enables the OSCC to consider requests from 
the OSCE and other international organisations “to facilitate the organization and 
conduct of extraordinary observation flights over the territory of a State Party with its 
consent.”  It also permits observation flights conducted under a “bilateral and voluntary 
basis,” following the procedures regarding the conduct of observation flights.659  
Accordingly, at the invitation of Ukraine, two observation flight missions (one by 
Sweden and one by the United States and Canada) were conducted over Ukraine in 
March 2014.660  Under the same Annex L provisions, Ukraine itself was, surprisingly, 
permitted by the Russian Federation to conduct an observation mission over the 
Russia’s western border area that same month.  Another flight by the United States over 
Ukraine in May 2014 included the survey of Ukraine’s border with Russia, along with 
that of Moldova (including the breakaway region of Transdniestria).  In May 2014, 
Moscow’s denial of a second request by Ukraine to overfly Russia under Annex L 
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provisions was indicative of both the worsening situation, along with the elementary 
deduction that such an overflight would likely be disadvantageous to Russian 
objectives.661  
 Regular quota observation flights have also been employed to monitor the 
Ukrainian conflict.  As noted by Hartwig Spitzer, some 22 quota flight missions were 
conducted over Russia (out of the year’s total of 35) from the beginning of March to 
mid-August 2014.  These flights initially focused upon areas in the southwest, adjacent 
to Ukraine.662  Yet another refusal of a planned United States observation flight mission 
over Russia occurred in mid-April, with Russian officials basing their reason as “poor 
weather” which, under Treaty provisions, cannot be invoked by an observed State Party.  
That is, under Article VIII, the observed State Party can only “propose changes to the 
mission plan” on the grounds of weather as a flight safety criterion.663  According to 
American officials, the reason for this pretence was to limit observation of troop and 
equipment preparations shortly following the March annexation of Crimea.664  Indeed, 
until that time, Open Skies observation missions in Ukraine had frequently included 
Crimea; however, following Russia’s annexation, overflights of the peninsula had 
effectively ceased, even at the specific invitation extended by Moscow on 
12 May 2014.665  The reason for this is self-evident: even with the concurrence of Kiev, 
any observation overflight of Crimea coordinated with Moscow would signal States 
Parties’ acknowledgement of the legitimacy of its illegal appropriation of that territory.  
This once again demonstrates the damaging effect of repeated and unchecked 
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manipulation of, and defection from, a legally-binding security regime in fulfilment of 
an individual State Party’s self-interests. 
 
 For all of 2014, a total of eight observation flight missions were flown over 
Ukraine and 35 missions over the Russian Federation (not all of which were conducted 
in proximity of the area of conflict).666  On 6 June 2014, one of Ukraine’s two Open 
Skies AN-30B aircraft, conducting a non-Treaty national surveillance mission, was shot 
down by pro-Russian rebels near Slavyansk, located within the eastern conflict zone.667  
This was followed by the shoot-down of Malaysian Air Flight MH17, northeast of 
Donetsk, on 17 July 2014.668  These events, reinforced by Moscow’s notification that air 
space safety could not be assured within 45 kilometres of the Ukrainian border, led to a 
corresponding reduction of Open Skies observation flight missions in the respective 
Russian and Ukrainian border regions.669   
 The Ukrainian crisis demonstrates both the practical utility and limitations of the 
Open Skies regime in regional conflicts.  Indeed, its fundamental concept was more 
than proven to be effective in confirming the situation on the ground, thereby reducing 
the potential for further military escalation based upon “worse case assumptions.”  As 
noted by Dan Lindley and Hartwig Spitzer, as a CSBM mechanism, Open Skies 
functions most effectively when there exists “a limited zone of relations between former 
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and potential future adversaries.”670  This “limited zone” involves a combination of 
established mistrust with the recognised need for sufficient cooperation to enable 
observation.671  Observation overflights were unquestionably useful in confirming the 
presence or non-presence of specific deployments, troop dispositions and other 
specified requirements, but only when afforded a suitably permissive environment 
within to safely and effectively operate.  This illustrates that observation flights are 
indeed possible even within certain conflict areas, provided that sufficient coordination 
and other precautionary measures, such as “stand-off” mission profiles, are undertaken.  
As demonstrated by the shoot-down of the AN-30B, MH17 and other aircraft, however, 
the sophistication of armaments and unpredictability of Russian-backed separatist forces 
rendered airborne observation increasingly unfeasible.  Even where permissible, 
observation was further compromised by Russia’s characteristic manipulation of Treaty 
provisions.  This, in turn, impaired the Treaty’s effectiveness as a CSBM in contributing 
to the de-escalation of the conflict and stabilising the situation on the ground.    
Conclusions and Implications 
This chapter has sought to examine the Open Skies Treaty with particular 
attention accorded to its purpose, characteristics and key developments in its oversight 
and implementation.  While this examination has highlighted the benefits of the 
regime’s fundamental concept and practical application, it has also noted events and 
trends that have clearly contributed to its overall encumbrance. 
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 While the three principal arms control regimes feature various degrees of 
complementarity, the Open Skies Treaty is singularly unique in its ability to support a 
broad range of proliferation and regional security mechanisms, while functioning in its 
own right as both a standalone CSBM and regulated means of national reconnaissance.  
Notwithstanding its specified aims and objectives, the value of the regime as an 
intelligence tool must therefore be acknowledged as one of its most important features, 
particularly for those States Parties possessing the technical capability to exploit 
imagery for this purpose.  Although frequently misunderstood or even dismissed as 
having limited surveillance value, it is apparent that airborne observation capabilities 
afforded by the regime are unique and cannot be replicated by satellite systems.  It is 
equally evident that the investment made by the Russian Federation in its Open Skies 
resources reflects both the value of aerial reconnaissance capability of this nature, and 
as means of offsetting deficiencies in other national technical capabilities.  
 Despite an extended period of development and various teething pains in its first 
decade of implementation, the fundamental concept of the Treaty has been well 
demonstrated and its practical utility repeatedly proven.  Moreover, the relative 
simplicity of Open Skies renders it particularly well suited to adaptation, without 
extensive alteration of its core framework.  As such, the Treaty is inherently scalable, 
with the ability to quickly assume other missions, including environmental monitoring, 
disaster response, or biological and chemical agent detection. 
 
Even with the Treaty’s widely accepted conceptual validity and proven 
effectiveness, the lack of compliance and conformity in its implementation, along with 
fundamental shortcomings in addressing and correcting contraventions, have seriously 
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undermined its integrity.  Indeed, despite some limited success in resolving some 
transgressions, the deliberate impairment of the regime in its application vis-à-vis 
conflict situations has been especially paradoxical, given the basis of its conception.  
While the OSCC/OSCE may be faulted in several respects (including their overall 
lethargy in dealing with relatively straightforward matters of compliance), one must 
bear in mind that culpability must ultimately be assigned to the offender:  
As a principle, the ‘automatic’ consequence that international law attaches to 
instances of non-compliance by a State constituting an internationally wrongful 
act, is international responsibility of the perpetrator State….672  In arms control 
the consequences of an internationally wrongful act are in principle no different 
from those in other branches of international law.673 
 
 Despite the intention to both enable a modicum of balanced national airborne 
observation capability, inherent disparities have existed since the Treaty’s inception and 
will almost certainly continue with the transition to digital technologies.  Indeed, the 
most expensive of the three major conventional mechanisms to implement, Open Skies 
could ultimately prove too costly for many, if not most, to sustain.  This has already 
been indicated by some States Parties’ decisions to significantly reduce or effectively 
withdraw from conducting “active” missions, as was the case specifically cited by some 
members of the C-130 Pod Group.674  Indeed, the OSIS Focus Group exemplifies the 
considerable challenges faced by a reduced number of “second-tier” States Parties in 
undertaking such a project.  Another major investment will be required in the extension 
or replacement of most of the Open Skies mission platforms.  Although the combination 
                                                
672 International Law Commission, Article I on the Draft Articles on State Responsibility (1998), as cited 
by Guido Den Dekker, The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), 340-341. 
673 Guido Den Dekker, The Law of Arms Control: International Supervision and Enforcement, 341. 
674 Canadian Strategic Joint Staff official, interview with the author, 10 April 2015. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      303 
of digital transition with aircraft acquisition represents a potential opportunity for 
prudent collaborative investment, such as a common operating platform, there does not 
appear to be much interest by, or within, the OSCC in pursuing such an option.  As 
such, a common capability baseline appears somewhat remote.  Accordingly, while 
digital technologies and updated mission platforms can be expected to ultimately 
enhance capability, improve efficiencies and reduce costs in the long term, the manner 
in which this is accomplished may only serve to further delineate the “haves” from the 
“have nots.”    
 In addition to modernization, expansion and regional adaptation of Open Skies 
would be potentially beneficial in not only promulgating its concept, but also 
broadening the community’s base of support and subscription.  Despite some earlier 
momentum, this agenda appears to be generally stalled and would require suitable 
political reinvigoration to progress.   Turkey’s resistance to Cyprus’ accession to the 
Treaty provides ample evidence of just how difficult this can be. 
 When not interfered with, Open Skies missions have continued to function 
comparatively well and despite its overall impairment, the Treaty remains nominally 
functional in spite of the overall deterioration of East-West security relations.  Indeed, 
as noted by Commander Chris Nelson, a United States Navy aviator and Open Skies 
mission specialist: “the Open Skies treaty is one avenue for diplomacy that is still 
open.” 675  A more pragmatic explanation, however, is that the regime’s survival is 
ultimately attributable to the fact that it continues to serve Russian and American 
national interests.  Irrespectively, varied and repeated attempts to circumvent, 
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manipulate and suppress oversight and implementation -- particularly during periods of 
heightened tension and conflict -- have significantly enervated the Treaty. 
 Despite these various impairments, the two major States Parties -- the Russian 
Federation and the United States -- can be expected to support the regime so long as 
their respective security agendas are served.  Indeed, Moscow’s greater dependence 
upon airborne observation and reconnaissance requirements, along with its considerable 
current investment in modernisation provide some measure of assurance.  For 
Washington, above and beyond the technical benefits, support for the regime constitutes 
an important foreign policy and leadership commitment.  Nevertheless, as long as its 
relatively straightforward provisions continue to be flagrantly contravened without 
consequence, the Treaty on Open Skies will continue to deteriorate as a mainstream 
CSBM mechanism.  It therefore remains incumbent upon all States Parties and the 
OSCE to rededicate themselves to upholding the regime’s fundamental integrity.  A 
good start would be the fundamental acceptance of and adherence to its binding 
provisions and operative construct, as originally envisioned and agreed.  
 
 







 Having reviewed the concept and evolution of conventional arms control, along 
with the detailed case study examinations of the three major contemporary regimes, this 
chapter will further ruminate upon the central proposition of the thesis, supported by the 
broadened perspective gleaned from the study undertaken.  Additional viewpoints, 
including those obtained through interviews with subject matter experts, will also be 
noted as they relate to this broadened perspective.  This will provide added context to 
specific determinations rendered concerning the overall decline of conventional arms 
control.  From these determinations, the implications of this decline and the prospects 
for rehabilitation and revival can be more effectively derived.   
As previously noted, the achievements attained in conventional arms control 
represent remarkable innovations that have paralleled broader advancements in 
contemporary international relations.  While the principles, concepts and goals 
embodied in the CFE Treaty, Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty are singularly 
distinct accomplishments in their own right, their practical utility, effectiveness and 
relevance have been adversely affected by a wide range of factors, of which their state 
of elemental functionality constitutes a key underlying aspect.  That is, common 
willingness, commitment and cooperation have been weakened not only by 
unfavourable external conditions, but also by specific deficiencies and breakdowns 
within the regime constructs themselves.  In addition to adversative geostrategic, 
political, economic and human security factors, operative failures in oversight and 
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implementation have led to ever-increasing instances of non-conformity, non-
compliance and outright abrogation of legally- and politically-binding obligations.  
Indeed, a mutually inclusive dynamic of unfavourable external inducement and internal 
dysfunction has significantly impeded the practical application, sustainment and 
alteration of these regimes.  This outcome constitutes a significant element in the 
overall degradation of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian regions.   
While the inherent complexities of the international security dynamic frequently 
exceed states’ capacities to control, shape or otherwise influence events, conventional 
arms control regimes provide the means of regulated authority and ordered effect within 
their defined jurisdictions.  Accordingly, the impaired functionality of regimes can be 
further considered in terms of their authority and effect being undermined as a result of: 
• failures in uniformly fulfilling established provisions; and  
• failures in resolving issues inherent to the regime models themselves.  
This study has demonstrated that various fundamental faults have been neither 
assuaged nor even addressed within the practical oversight and execution of these 
regimes.  Indeed, efforts undertaken at various levels to rectify or otherwise mitigate 
these faults have all too frequently “missed the mark” by overlooking essential 
functionality in favour of symptomatic or aesthetic alterations.  Otherwise, attempts 
made to resolve specific paucities in authority, management and application have 
frequently proven deficient in correlating them with the rudimentary operation of 
regime models.  Consequently, corrective actions (i.e., amendments, revisions, 
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modifications and adjustments) have often left underlying core deficiencies unrequited 
and in several instances, the regimes themselves further impaired.  
Governance-Management-Implementation Failure 
Colonel Beat Spycher of the Swiss Verification Unit developed one of the more 
effectual schematic characterisations of the breakdown of the governance-management-
implementation model of conventional arms control introduced in Chapter 2.  In a joint 
Switzerland-Canada presentation to the OSCE Heads of Verification Meeting in 
December 2012, Spycher used a modification of the model to illustrate not only the 
elemental effects of unchecked non-compliance and non-conformity, but also the 
greater imbalance created from failing to maintain its essential functionality.676 Within 
the model’s “cycle,” this is depicted as both a disconnection between its three 
interdependent components, as well as deviation from established common standards of 
compliance and conformity.  Specifically: 
• implementation (most notably, verification and CSBM operations) 
becomes increasingly invalidated when detected occurrences of non-
compliance and non-conformity (i.e., feedback) are overlooked, 
unreported, mischaracterised or otherwise left unaddressed in either the 
implementation or consultation/coordination phases;   
• this results in the suppression, limitation or distortion of technical 
accuracy and accountability; 
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• in turn, policy and planning are rendered increasingly isolated as means 
of processing and responding to coordinated feedback, resulting in 
significant “gaps” in the formulation of overarching guidance and 
direction; and   
• as the cycle’s process of “continuous feedback and improvement” 
becomes increasingly obscured, this results in what Spycher refers to as a 
“self-reinforcing negative spiral” which, left unchecked, deviates further 
away from the model.677 
 Certainly, Spycher’s characterisation has been illustrated throughout this study, 
such as the imposition of “national procedures” over regime provisions, various 
constraints placed verification personnel, invalid Open Skies flight restrictions or the 
outright refusal to submit obligatory data, accept inspections or even participate in 
consultations.  For the most part, these infringements have occurred without suitable 
formal discernment, adjudication or counteraction by the corresponding OSCE 
implementing bodies.  Even when deviations have reached the point where their effects 
(or follow-on consequences) have been formally noted, they have often been 
subsequently disregarded, deferred or when deemed to warrant a response, moderated or 
misinterpreted in terms of their root causes.  Consequently, corrective actions, when 
attempted, have been frequently misdirected, including the various adjustments made to 
corresponding regime provisions.  As a result of the ineffectiveness of the actions 
undertaken, these essential failings have progressively eroded operating models, 
including their inherent means of rectification.  Left largely unresolved, the “self-
reinforcing negative spiral” created by these underlying deficiencies has continued to 
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undermine and weaken the regimes, with subsequent adverse impact upon the very 
security and stability they were designed to support and preserve. 
 
Figure 6.1: Governance-Management-Implementation Failure 678 
 
As previously discussed, the lack of priority accorded to maintaining effective 
oversight and sustainment of conventional arms control mechanisms is clearly 
indicative of various degrees of complacency, indolence and diminished commitment in 
keeping them viable at their most fundamental levels.  Diminished investment made in 
personnel and material resources within all components of regime oversight and 
implementation have also specifically contributed to corresponding degradations in 
conceptual awareness, subject matter knowledge and technical expertise -- all of which 
must be taken into account as having contributed to this overall breakdown.  While the 
need for suitable updating and recalibration of these mechanisms is certainly 
acknowledged, the diminished practical understanding of their critical components, 
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interrelationships and interdependencies has led to increasingly specious remedial 
approaches.  Indeed, the resultant propensity to focus upon indicative, rather than root 
causes, have frequently resulted in the injudicious determination that the principal 
regimes and their associated concepts have simply become out-dated and obsolete.   
Cooperation, Commitment, Compliance and Conformity 
  Arms control regimes are neither self-implementing, nor do they operate in a 
void.  They function within the broader construct of international security relations as 
formalised, consensus-based mechanisms through which specified security objectives 
are attained.  Whereas the behaviours of states only generally subscribe to customary 
norms derived from common legal principles, parties to any legitimate regime are 
explicitly bound to conform to the standards and rules embodied within its provisions.  
Therefore, in contrast with the complex variations of international relations generally, 
arms control regimes constitute a formal entrenchment of states’ collective willingness 
to submit to a converged set of codified, rules-based behaviours.  Therefore, while 
obviously affected by myriad external influences, regime success is also contingent 
upon parties uniformly conducting themselves in conformity and compliance with the 
terms prescribed.  Historically, the relative importance of regime functionality, heavily 
influenced by governance, has been greatly underestimated in this respect. 
 By way of added context, it should be emphasised that regime compliance and 
conformity should not be regarded as a static condition, but rather a systematised 
commitment to active, on-going adherence to established common standards.  As noted 
in this study, these common standards are derived from broader political processes, 
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interests and differences that ultimately constitute the “common will” embodied by the 
regime.  While differences exist between the legal foundations of the CFE and Open 
Skies Treaties and the political basis of the Vienna Document, they all have some 
measure of binding force.  As noted by Nick Flynn and Nicola Peart, while legally-
binding regimes provide a stronger basis for compliance as international mechanisms, 
both legally- and politically-binding mechanisms depend more upon “cooperation, 
consensus and reciprocity rather than any ultimate power of compulsion.”679  Flynn and 
Peart further acknowledge that “compliance mechanisms are strengthened by the 
existence of international fora which have the formal power to give rulings regarding 
interpretations of the agreed rules.”680 
 Any form of divergence, even that related to subjective or selective 
interpretation, generally translates into some form of non-compliance and/or non-
conformity.  Although valid mistakes may occur on occasion, adherence to established 
common standards reduces uncertainty in determining if a given case of non-
compliance is attributable to inadvertent error, misinterpretation or deliberate intent, 
thereby facilitating the selection of appropriate courses of action to resolve.  Regimes, 
therefore, should not be gauged simply by the attainment of their “end-states,” but 
rather by the manner in which their fundamental coherence is upheld.  In this respect, it 
is the regime’s overarching authority that must ultimately be called upon to assure the 
adherence to standards and fulfilment of obligations, as well as exercise the means 
through which to hold parties accountable. 
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  While arms control regimes parallel international relations in terms of their 
dependence upon cooperation, the difference is the binding commitment made to both 
conform to and comply with the codified rules of a given model.  Recognising the 
criticality of compliance and conformity, Dr. Harald Müller of the Peace Research 
Institute noted three necessary pre-conditions: treaty community coherence, leadership 
and great power cooperation.681  He further observed:   
Rule-bound behaviour was voluntarily undertaken, and compliance thus rests – 
similar to domestic law effectiveness - not on the eternal fear of forceful 
enforcement, but on the vast majority of parties abiding voluntarily by the rules 
in good faith.  …cohesion is the precondition for dealing successfully with the 
most problematic compliance issues: ambiguities in state behaviour that require 
clarification, and unambiguous breaches of treaty obligations that require a 
response.682  
While supportive of the concept of arms control, Müller’s outlook for the 
effective and compliant operation of these regimes was decidedly pessimistic.  Of note, 
he focused his concern on the actors (parties) -- particularly the leading ones -- for not 
fulfilling their “basic duty to play by the rules and integrate themselves into the 
multilateral frameworks that need to be saved, maintained, and improved….”683  
Although the failure to conform and integrate can be attributed to various causes, it 
remains evident that even with binding codification, regimes nevertheless constitute 
compromises that are inherently conflicted, as affirmed by Christopher Osakwe in his 
appraisal of Soviet legal precepts: 
                                                
681 Harald Müller, “Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multinational Arms Control Treaty 
Enforcement,” The Nonproliferation Review (Summer 2000): 79. 
682 Harald Müller, “Compliance Politics: A Critical Analysis of Multinational Arms Control Treaty 
Enforcement:” 79. 
683 Ibid: 89. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      313 
It is only a “coordinated will” (soglasovannaia volia) which means that it has an 
inbuilt unliquidated disaccord as a necessary remnant of the original 
disagreements between the parties.  The result therefore is not a perfect synthesis 
of the original wills and does not result in any common will, but rather in a 
coordinated will.684 
While characterisations vary, this study has upheld the fundamental view that in 
order to be viable in meeting their specified objectives, conventional arms control 
regimes must be sustained through assured compliance and conformity with their rules 
and provisions, in both letter and spirit.  As the “inbuilt unliquidated disaccord” of these 
regimes lends itself to varying degrees of inherent instability, this begins with the 
establishment and maintenance of the conditions necessary to stave off the intrinsic 
propensity to deviate (or “defect,” per Robert Axelrod).  These conditions (characterised 
by Müller as “community coherence, leadership and great power cooperation”) induce 
the “coordinated will” necessary to maintain compliance and conformity.  Therefore, 
regardless of its provisions, including verification, a regime is only as strong as its 
ability to sustain parties’ collective resolve in adhering to its specified standards of 
conduct and behaviour. 
Varied Perspectives, Common Elements 
As might be expected, the consultations and interviews undertaken in support of 
this study gleaned a wide range of perspectives and opinions in accounting for the 
decline in contemporary conventional arms control, the implications of this decline, and 
the prospects for recovery.  While attempts were made to cover a broad representative 
                                                
684 Christopher Osakwe, “Public International Law,” in Encyclopedia of Soviet Law Second Revised 
Edition, ed. Ferdinand Joseph Maria Feldbrugge, Gerard Pieter Van den Berg and William Bradford 
Simons (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), 641.   
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      314 
sampling of subject matter experts (e.g., policy-makers, diplomats, military officials, 
analysts, academics, etc.), a surprising number of those directly involved in regime 
oversight and implementation declined to be formally interviewed.  Others expressed a 
measure of reluctance in their participation.  Given the specific orientation and critical 
nature of this thesis, such common reticence appears to denote the sensitivity of the 
issue within the OSCE and the arms control community writ large.  This reluctance was 
especially evident amongst officials from the Russian Federation, Eastern European and 
Central Asian states, most of whom were highly taciturn in providing any appraisal of 
the conventional arms control and CSBM regimes.  Indeed, of the numerous interview 
requests made to OSCE delegations and representatives from corresponding capitals, 
only a very small number were approved.  In some instances, consent was granted on 
the condition of non-direct attribution.  Of those interviewed, comments were 
characteristically precautious, deflective or even supercilious in nature.  Nevertheless, a 
select few did provide some very insightful opinions, some of which are summarised 
here.  
 Lamberto Zannier, OSCE.  The OSCE’s Secretary General, Lamberto Zannier, 
acknowledges the pessimism that now pervades the conventional arms control 
community and how much of this has resulted from unresolved CFE Treaty issues.   He 
specifically notes the “difficulties in fully assessing these issues,” expressing particular 
concern about their “spill-over effect” on “soft security” writ large.   He also stresses the 
need for “fresh thinking," as well as more effectively factoring in “lessons learned” 
within the OSCE’s processes to improve its oversight.685 
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 Zannier also notes more recent difficulties encountered with the implementation 
of Vienna Document Chapter 3 (Risk Reduction) provisions in response to the 
Ukrainian crisis.  These most recent developments have provided greater imperative to 
“looking ahead” and working together to develop a “more uniform” OSCE framework 
of security mechanisms.  He acknowledges that, despite on-going efforts, more is 
required to address such fundamental areas as categorisations, capabilities, 
concentrations of forces, etc.; all of which require “further assessment.”  Some 
frustrations can be attributed to “inflated expectations” and in this regard, there needs to 
be a better understanding of the inherent limitations of the OSCE as both a forum for 
security dialogue and as an instrument of implementation.  Zannier’s overall outlook is 
one of optimism in the OSCE’s ability to continue making a positive difference in 
regional and sub-regional security.  Making no illusions that “significant challenges” 
lay ahead, he nevertheless stresses that “we should not be overly pessimistic,” 
expressing confidence in the inherent advantage of the OSCE’s flexible, adaptive 
approach.686   
 
 Diana Marvin, United States Department of State.  A senior advisor in the 
Office of Euro-Atlantic Security, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance 
of the United States Department of State, Diana Marvin regards the current state of 
conventional arms control as a more of an “identity crisis” than outright degradation.  
With conventional munitions greatly reduced, force structures dramatically reshaped, 
and the exchange of data significantly expanded, the overall improvement in security 
relationships achieved by these regimes has itself altered the security landscape.   
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Accordingly, while remaining valuable, these regimes no longer “fit” the current 
reality.687 
 
 Nevertheless, Marvin believes that sufficient basis exists to “move forward,” 
stressing that all three regimes remain in force and do not require outright 
recodification.  Noting the need to “reaffirm our commitment to our commitments,” she 
emphasises that the United States neither needs nor wants to “start over from scratch.”  
With regard to the outlook for the recovery of these regimes, she expresses optimism, 
while at the same time acknowledging that competition with other, more immediate 
security priorities will require “sustained effort over the long-term.”  She maintains that 
sufficient constituency still exists within the international community for verifiable 
control-based security mechanisms, of which the three major conventional arms control 
regimes continue to constitute an important foundation.688   
 
 Marvin underscores the importance of making adjustments that are realistically 
matched with the significant changes that have taken place in conventional military 
technologies, capabilities and corresponding structures, emphasising, “we don’t want to 
do arms control for the sake of arms control.  We do want the agreements to be relevant 
and satisfy the legitimate security needs of the parties, which is an iterative process.”  
For example, the current “one-size fits all” paradigm concerning large-scale military 
activities might be more appropriately matched or even tiered with the military forces of 
specific states.  This is a question of attaining “balance,” including the “sweet-spot” for 
verification.  Economics must also be weighed as a major consideration.  Finally, 
Marvin highlights the opportunities afforded by the current “maintenance phase,” 
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during which key assessments and adjustments can be made.  Notwithstanding the 
continued need for arms control, this includes a determination of “how much will be 
enough.”  Noting that the regimes “are easier to maintain than to let go,” she adds that 
suitable expertise is required in order to suitably “evolve” them, given their inherent 
complexities.  With many “original experts” retiring (policy officials, inspectors, etc.) 
this will present added challenges.689 
 Mathew Geertsen, OSCE.  Mathew Geertsen is the Head of the Forum for 
Security Cooperation Support Section in the Conflict Prevention Centre of the OSCE 
Secretariat.  He notes that under the “black and white” circumstances of the Cold War, 
the establishment of the three principal conventional arms control regimes was the 
result of enormous pressure that was translated into the “political willingness to take 
significant steps.”  Today, the OSCE continues to work with what is essentially the 
same security framework, as there simply is not significant enough “pressure” to go 
back and create a new security model.  Given the current overall state of “multi-polar 
security,” countries are largely unable or unwilling to engage in securing an entirely 
new security construct.  Moreover, while it is generally accepted that renewal is 
required to address contemporary security concerns, at present “we don’t really know 
how to do this.”690   
 Geertsen regards regional conflicts as a particular indication of a growing 
problem that must be addressed, but from an arms control and CSBM perspective, “we 
don’t really know how to do that either.  So we continue to employ the old fashioned 
approach.”  Although actions by the OSCE concerning Moldova and Georgia “made a 
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difference,” it would likely take a more imminent security threat to compel OSCE 
members to seriously seek new approaches:  
The key in moving forward is to resolve our regional conflicts and we’re not 
doing that.  While the CFE Treaty has provided our legal basis and the Vienna 
Document our political willingness -- which is a beautiful combination -- we 
need a real crisis, along with the “guts” to address the new security 
environment.691 
As Geertsen made this statement prior to the Russian annexation of Crimea in 
March 2014, it remains to be seen whether this most recent crisis has been enough to 
oblige the OSCE and its members to begin considering suitable new courses in the 
manner he describes. 
 Geersten’s view is that ideally, the recodification of new regimes should begin 
from a “clean slate,” but insufficient political will exists to do so because of the absence 
of any real “pressure.”  While the Helsinki Final Act provides a useful legal basis for 
this, the challenge is in aligning its principles with the current security landscape, which 
is predominantly regional conflict-oriented.  “While the Helsinki process was drastic 
and today we are no longer particularly concerned about a “World War III,” its 
principles can nevertheless be used to advantage in the current evolutionary phase.”  
Given the lack of collective imperative to move forward, the OSCE has been engaged in 
various areas of dialogue with technical experts, academics, think tanks, etc. as means 
of seizing upon all opportunities available in developing a “framework of possibilities.”  
This will enable the Organisation to be better prepared for when political conditions are 
more favourable, allowing parties “to return to the table and make determinations of 
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how we will employ specific approaches and mechanisms to address specific aspects of 
security.”692  
 Geertsen believes that the OSCE is effectively “hibernating” in terms of 
attaining its full potential.  He compared the Organisation’s conventional proliferation 
security role to “occupying a lower tier of a multi-level chessboard,” but important 
nevertheless.  He regards the conventional-nuclear proliferation security relationship as 
something of a “chicken and egg scenario,” emphasising that: “we have to do both and 
can’t use the excuse that we need solid conventional regimes in order to discuss nuclear 
issues.”  Regardless, the OSCE has substantial value, which has become underrated, 
partly because of an established “routine” that “works well,” referring to the associated 
verification regimes, information exchanges, and other processes.  Despite being 
consensus organisation, the OSCE remains highly flexible in its approach to security, 
but suffers from a lack of recognition of its achievements.  As such, it needs to better 
promote itself.  Given the modest expansion of the OSCE’s membership, Geertsen 
believes that the OSCE “concept” is better to be “exported” to other regions, as 
continued expansion, especially involving states from other regions, risks over-
extension and fragmentation.  The erosion of expertise in the field of proliferation 
security represents another problem.693 
 When asked about his views on the future of conventional arms control, 
Geertsen expresses optimism “because, ultimately, we need it and people will recognize 
it.”   He nevertheless predicts that States Parties will eventually “walk away” from the 
CFE Treaty, with regional agreements eventually replacing it.  Indeed, the inability to 
                                                
692 Mathew Geertsen, interview with the author, 10 December 2013. 
693 Mathew Geertsen, interview with the author, 10 December 2013. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      320 
deal with current regional crises is indicative of the difficulty in addressing this from an 
overarching perspective.  In this respect, he envisions a “matrix of regional 
mechanisms” that will have overall governance through the OSCE, rather than the broad 
jurisdictions of current regimes.694 
 William Alberque, NATO Headquarters.  William Alberque is the Head of the 
Arms Control and Coordination Section, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, 
NATO Headquarters.  He believes that, while there are several ways to look at the 
current situation, it is particularly useful to consider it from a broader regime context.  
He notes specifically that détente and disarmament were sought concurrently in the 
1980s and 1990s, resulting in a “huge wave” of treaties that “crested” from 1996 to 
1998, resulting in a “real reduction of global threats.”  The “orderly and massive 
reductions of weaponry” resulted in a corresponding reduction of a “security 
imperative.”  Consequently, the entire global proliferation regime had “succeeded itself 
to death.”  In fact, it had succeeded so well that its “primary advocates stopped thinking 
about it.”695 
 Alberque provides a useful historic perspective that links broader strategic 
security developments with the diminishment of conventional arms control.  Referring 
to the “remarkable dynamic” of East-West relations that had developed by the 1990s, he 
specifically acknowledges the very genuine positive sentiment in the contact, 
collaboration and closeness that had emerged at all levels.  While, of course, there 
remained those in Moscow with a completely “different vision,” the overall positive 
dynamic changed dramatically with the United States’ withdrawal from Anti-Ballistic 
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Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2001.  While the Russians sought to discuss the matter further, 
Washington’s decision had already been made and officials were “merely informing” 
Moscow of this.  Indeed, attitudes in Washington had become somewhat arrogant; that 
is, regarding Russia as a “near failed state.”  Although progress was being made on 
Russia’s 1999 “Istanbul Commitments” regarding the removal of its stationed military 
forces from Georgia and Moldova, this abruptly ended following the United States’ 
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.  Although American officials believed they were still 
able to compel Moscow to acquiesce to the preconditions set for ratification of the 
Adapted CFE Treaty, the Kremlin’s attitude changed to that of simply “taking away” 
this leverage.696  
 According to Alberque, the United States’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty 
taught the Russians that if something [i.e., a commitment] was ultimately determined 
not to be in their interests, they needn’t subscribe to it, particularly if there were costs in 
doing so.  This was reflected in President Vladimir Putin’s actions that led to Russia’s 
self-imposed suspension of CFE Treaty compliance in 2007.  This was quickly followed 
by the 2008 Georgian War, during which South Ossetia and Abkhazia were effectively 
secured by Moscow.  Since then, despite various consultations, negotiations and other 
approaches, no real progress has been made.  According to Alberque, “by 2010 it was 
apparent that Putin had done enough to threaten CFE by putting it precariously on the 
shelf -- but not enough for Moscow to be blamed for it failing -- and to see what NATO 
would do in response.”  Since then, there have been mixed messages from Russia, but 
increasingly those simply signalling that “Moscow just doesn’t care; transparency isn’t 
important.”  Given that President Putin personally directed the suspension, it is unclear 
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what Russia’s position on a way ahead really is, as “no one below can make a decision 
without really knowing what the boss wants.  Their position is that there is no 
position.”697 
 Despite the pessimism he felt from 2004 to 2011, Alberque’s opinion of the 
future of conventional arms control is decidedly optimistic.  He stresses that the regimes 
continue to demonstrate the possibilities: “even during their least active phases, they 
remain impressive, even amazing.”  He considers it a particular irony that during the 
current period of duress, so many countries outside of the regimes have openly 
expressed their strong interest in the conventional arms control concept.  He also 
acknowledges some of the internal failings caused by parties that have altered their 
approach to implementation under the false perception that because of the trust 
established, there was no longer a need to actively implement provisions: 
Any time you forgo your rights you risk the treaty.  Lowering one’s guard is not 
good.  As long as the treaty exists, the verifiability of it must be exercised.  The 
existence of the regime is dependent upon the faith you have that it is working.  
Regardless of what you think or what is actually happening, you are cheating the 
system; that is, diminishing the security it is creating.  To make a political 
decision not to implement is one thing, but to ‘half ass’ implementation is to 
undermine it.698   
 Alberque expressed surprise over how little arms control has been coordinated 
amongst NATO States Parties and participating States, noting that this could be done 
much better.  To that effect, he is undertaking to make the necessary changes to ensure a 
more coordinated approach.  In his view, it comes down to political engagement.  While 
                                                
697 William Alberque, interview with the author, 28 January 2014. 
698 William Alberque, interview with the author, 28 January 2014. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      323 
it is good to see more coordination at certain levels, it remains shocking to see virtually 
none at others.  Moreover, he stresses that in order for the regimes to survive, there must 
be better overall coordination and synchronisation between all three:   
If you make it all tied, make it relevant, easier to understand, easier for policy 
makers to engage, I think there is a real chance.  We’re trying to do this from the 
inside; we’re trying to do this with negotiations; trying to push people in that 
direction.  If we’re going to survive, it will be something like that and I think 
people are coming more and more to that conclusion.  We’ll see, but there is an 
appetite for something.  There is now more thought, more questions (other than 
just during periods of crisis) than there have been before.  These [regimes] are 
cornerstones of security, but they’ve received no mention at cabinet level. 
[National] leaders are actually now discussing this, which is critical.699 
 Jules Silberberg, United States Delegation, OSCE.  Jules Silberberg currently 
serves as the United States Chief Arms Control Delegate to the OSCE.  His views on 
the current state of arms control begin with its overall success and that “the absence of 
real threat in Europe” has contributed to the lack of commitment and even interest by 
European States and North American partners.  That is, conventional arms control is the 
“victim of own success.”  Nevertheless, Silberberg stresses that, “the reality is that we 
continue to implement commitments with one notable exception,” referring to the 
Russian Federation’s self-imposed suspension of its CFE Treaty commitments.  Noting 
that arms control “works where there are political means to see commitments through,” 
the Russian suspension “reflects a larger political dynamic that wasn’t apparent at the 
time of negotiation.”  Given this, the CFE Treaty’s successor will have to account for 
current political realities, and that this will have to be “worked out,” taking into account 
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Moscow’s renewed self-confidence, reinvigorated military and foreign policy, 
characterised by such things as its “insistence on consultation, if not a veto.”700 
 Silberberg remarked that “informed decision makers” recognise that success has 
undermined the vitality of the three regimes and that a “constant effort” is required to 
sustain them.  While budgets and policy decisions may be seeking ways of doing less, 
the counter-argument remains that the “alternative is far more expensive,” and that 
“arms control is still a great bargain.”  In developing a “mechanism of renewal,” he 
believes that “we will draw from past experiences with existing treaties along with our 
now altered political and military circumstances.”  Whether this will lead to a “blank 
paper or line-in line-out effort” is unknown.  The manner in starting negotiations and 
their actual “mechanics” of the process remains to be seen: “We will likely draw upon 
existing treaties.  All of it is up for discussion.  Most people have an idea of what it 
looks like.”  He nevertheless stressed the importance of verification as a key 
component.  In Silberberg’s estimation, Vienna Document issues appear easier to 
address than those of the CFE Treaty, given its political, rather than legal basis.701  
 Silberberg characterises the current state of conventional arms control as that of 
an “ungraceful maintenance phase.”  “Given that the greater international environment 
continues to change,” he stated, “we are the point now where we admit to ourselves that 
piecemeal change is not enough.  We need a systemic stem to stern review.”  Regarding 
the CFE Treaty, the United States’ position is that “there is life in it yet,” and will 
continue to implement, while expecting others to do the same.  “Regimes are like 
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engines,” he noted, “over time, they require new parts or even better, upgraded parts.”702  
When asked about the outlook for conventional arms control, Silberberg replied: 
 Optimistic?  Yes.  Over the long term we’ll update and modernise.  The problem 
is the day-to-day efforts in reaching consensus.  We need to convince the 
Russians to believe in their own better nature.  Remind them that they’ve 
expressed their commitment to collective security and convince themselves that 
they still want to do this.  While this a tough sell, their diplomats and other 
professionals believe that this is the right approach.703 
 Peter Jones, University of Ottawa.  Dr. Peter Jones is a professor with the 
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs of the University of Ottawa and the 
author of Open Skies.  Transparency, Confidence-Building and the End of the Cold 
War.  He notes a fundamental problem related to political will which is the inherent 
resistance of state apparatus and their bureaucracies to major change, such as that 
represented by conventional arms control regimes and particularly exemplified by the 
Open Skies Treaty.  Accordingly, direct, high-level political guidance and control must 
be employed and maintained in order to ensure the necessary level of on-going 
cooperation for a given regime to effectively function.  Jones also acknowledges the 
corresponding political and diplomatic investment that must be made and sustained over 
time in order to preserve a viable “network of agreements.”704  
 Jones also notes the wholly uncommon circumstances that enabled the 
successful final negotiations on Open Skies, which were preceded by not only a 
weakened and collapsing Soviet Union, but whose leader (and proponent) had managed 
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to survive an attempted coup by those opposed to Russian “acquiescence,” including 
that perceived to be represented by the Treaty.  While these rapidly developing external 
events added to the political complexity, they were nevertheless directly translated into 
the level and character of cooperation and common will that developed in consultations 
and negotiations.  In this respect, the tumultuous conditions that enabled the 
codification of the Treaty were clearly exceptional.  The resultant regime was therefore 
unique in the level of cooperation and equality that was established amongst its parties, 
regardless of their respective technical capacities.705  
 With respect to the outlook for conventional arms control, Jones specifically 
notes the comparative advantage of the Open Skies concept over the other conventional 
regimes, given its conceptual simplicity in comparison with verification undertaken 
through the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document.  He is nevertheless mindful of some of 
the similarities that exist with the other regimes, such as those concerning States 
Parties’ interdependence and the potential for roadblocks in a consensus-based regime, 
as aptly demonstrated by Turkey over the Cypress accession issue.  There also exist 
persistent issues in the relationship between the OSCE as the Treaty’s governing 
institution and certain States Parties.  Regardless, cooperative aerial monitoring clearly 
stands out from its counterparts, in that it functions effectively as an autonomous CSBM 
regime, but also effectively interacts with and supports other security mechanisms.  
Accordingly, despite a number of issues, the Treaty on Open Skies provides a promising 
conceptual model for future expansion and adaptation, thereby improving strategic 
security relations in other regions.706  
 
                                                
705 Peter Jones, interview with the author, 27 July 2014. 
706 Peter Jones, interview with the author, 27 July 2014. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      327 
 Senior Diplomat, Belarusian Permanent Delegation, OSCE.  An interview 
conducted with a member of the Belarusian Permanent Delegation to the OSCE 
provided some particularly useful insight from the Russian Federation’s closest security 
partner.  While acknowledging the accomplishments of conventional arms control, he 
noted its overall degradation despite his country’s efforts to act as an interlocutor 
between Western OSCE member states and Moscow.  Referring to the CFE Treaty as 
clearly “obsolete” and the lack of progress in addressing fundamental issues, he 
emphasised that nevertheless, “we are still here,” seven years after Russia’s self-
imposed suspension.  Given his direct involvement, the official expressed overall 
pessimism regarding the OSCE’s ability to deal with the CFE Treaty issue, describing 
the Joint Consultative Group as effectively “useless.”  While “CFE at 36” negotiations 
had come close to addressing major faults in the efforts to transition to a viable adapted 
treaty, various associated details had stalled the process.  Moreover, the most recent 
Ukrainian crisis had “demonstrated the lack of effectiveness of the OSCE’s political-
military toolbox,” suggesting that better approaches might be found outside of the 
Organisation.  The official specifically noted the lack of effective use of Chapter 3 (Risk 
Reduction) of the Vienna Document, which had raised the question of the regime’s 
“utility and practicality.”  He characterised Vienna Document 2011 modifications as 
largely technical and “not amounting to much,” adding that the consensus required had 
rendered the many attempts to effectively update it as “problematic.”707   
 The official’s overall assessment of conventional arms control was that while it 
was conceptually useful in conflict prevention and post-conflict rehabilitation, it was 
not viable for crisis management.  Indeed, the various bilateral confidence- and security-
                                                
707 Senior official of the Belarusian Permanent Delegation to the OSCE, interview with the author, OSCE 
Headquarters, 26 June 2014. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      328 
building arrangements that Belarus had entered into with countries such as Lithuania, 
Latvia and Ukraine had demonstrated that “there were possibilities” and that in his 
opinion, various sub-regional adaptations might prove to be a “viable alternative” to 
overarching regimes.  Emphasising that “we don’t need to reinvent the wheel,” he 
acknowledged the continued utility of information exchanges, ceilings and verification.   
This, however, could largely be accomplished through sub-regional mechanisms.  
Although he opined that the OSCE “still has a role to play,” it would need to be suitably 
adapted to a network of sub-regional, rather than overarching multinational regimes.708 
 Arne Knapskog, Norwegian Permanent Delegation, OSCE.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Arne Knapskog is the Military Advisor to the Norwegian Permanent Delegation to the 
OSCE.   His view of the current state of conventional arms control is straightforward.  
He believes that, having lost its “sexiness,” its vision and purpose have become 
progressively devalued.  The “system” finds itself increasingly fragmented, with the 
responsibility of its oversight and operation relegated to junior personnel possessing 
little expertise.  This degradation has occurred at various levels and within all 
components, which is evident within the OSCE, as well as within NATO’s conventional 
arms control bodies.709 
 Knapskog regards the current security situation in Europe as a clear indication of 
the state of conventional arms control and CSBMs and openly asks whether the current 
crisis in Ukraine highlights the fundamental “weaknesses or strengths” of the OSCE’s 
“pillars of security.”  When asked about his view on the future of conventional arms 
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control, he flatly stated that he is “neither optimistic nor pessimistic, but realistic,” 
adding, “we haven’t reached bottom… yet.”710  Knapskog believes that the critical path 
for the OSCE in rehabilitating conventional arms control begins with “getting the 
Russians back” as active, engaged partners.  He has found the various OSCE 
approaches taken to be “frustrating and repetitive.”  Knapskog sees the overall effort to 
address the current degraded state of conventional arms control as a broader and 
extended process that will likely take five to ten years to yield any real results.  He 
nevertheless fully believes in the concept and would like to see it re-established as a 
fundamental component of security.711 
 Senior Diplomat, Azeri Delegation, OSCE.  An official of the Permanent 
Mission of Azerbaijan to the OSCE conveyed a degree of frustration in characterising 
the current state of conventional arms control, given the specific circumstances of his 
country’s longstanding conflict with Armenia.  Emphasising that while “revitalisation” 
remains a worthy goal and that the “basic elements” of the CFE Treaty and Vienna 
Document remain sound, there are others that are no longer viable.  He specifically 
emphasised the critical importance of equality and, as might be expected, the territorial 
integrity of States Parties and participating States, in keeping with the Helsinki 
Principles.  “Without such assurances they cannot be effective,” referring to both CFE 
Treaty and Vienna Document provisions.  He also stressed Azerbaijan’s security 
situation and its impact upon implementation, stating that, given the security situation 
with Armenia, there were “circumstances that limited its ability to fully implement.”  
This comment denoted the various constraints his government has imposed upon 
inspections and evaluations conducted within Azerbaijan.  The official was nevertheless 
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adamant about Baku’s sincere desire to “fully implement,” and expressed open 
annoyance with the “accusations” of non-compliance that had been made against his 
country.712   
 When asked about his view on the future of conventional arms control, he 
stressed the imperative of “reviving” the regimes as a “common goal” that all OSCE 
member states needed to work toward.   He further emphasised that, notwithstanding 
Azerbaijan’s unique circumstances, it is “on-board” with its support of conventional 
arms control and corresponding OSCE mechanisms.713 
   Policy Official, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom.  An official of the Arms 
Control and Counter Proliferation Policy Department of the Ministry of Defence of the 
United Kingdom openly acknowledged the “weakened state” of conventional arms 
control and how both its fundamental tools and knowledge base had “eroded.”  The 
combined effect of this was an overall diminished system.  She also acknowledged that 
successive defence reviews in the United Kingdom had placed additional pressure on its 
own conventional arms control resources, given the determinations that had been made 
regarding “core” and “non-core” operations and activities.  This had been somewhat 
exacerbated by a perceived “lack of strategic vision” by the OSCE, along with 
associated EU and NATO “politics.”  Seeing conventional arms control “floundering,” 
the United Kingdom’s posture had become increasingly “reactive,” vice “proactive,” 
with successive defence reviews adopting a “risk management” approach.714  
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 The official acknowledged that the growing complexities of the OSCE-EU-
NATO dynamic had altered the United Kingdom’s view of European proliferation 
security landscape.  This, combined with adjusted defence priorities and cutbacks, had 
significantly impacted Britain’s traditionally strong support to conventional arms 
control and CSBMs.  Cutbacks had also significantly impacted the Joint Arms Control 
Implementation Group (the United Kingdom’s military verification unit) in the form of 
major reductions in personnel, equipment and operating budgets.715 
 Despite this rather bleak portrayal, the official expressed a measure of optimism 
over the “shift” that was occurring in the Ministry of Defence’s “strategic thinking.”  
That is, a general reappraisal of European and Eurasian security had recognised that 
significant “gaps” had developed in Britain’s arms control engagement as a means of 
contributing to regional stabilisation and reducing the risk of conflict.  Indeed, 
associated NATO summit discussions and internal reviews also suggested that the 
fundamental concept of conventional arms control was being re-embraced.  While this 
had been recognised in the United Kingdom Government’s 2010 Strategic and Defence 
and Security Review,716 recent events -- most notably those in Ukraine -- had provided 
what she described as the necessary “strategic shock.”  The official opined that this 
would likely be acknowledged in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review 
(which the author subsequently confirmed as a designated “tier two priority risk”717).  
This positive development notwithstanding, the official also emphasised the need to 
address waning regime oversight and implementation, as exemplified by the 
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“weaknesses” exposed in the execution of Vienna Document provisions vis-à-vis 
Ukraine.  She added that this was partly attributable to the OSCE Forum for Security 
Cooperation’s propensity to avoid “rocking the boat.”718  
 Jörn Wiederholz, NATO Headquarters.  Lieutenant-Colonel Jörn Wiederholz is 
a German arms control specialist serving with NATO’s Arms Control and Coordination 
Section (Political Affairs and Security Policy Division).  He notes with some irony that 
while the conventional arms control concept “is more relevant now than ever,” the 
principal regimes “have not suitably adapted to realities” following the end of the Cold 
War.  He believes that the various efforts made to update and modernise regimes have 
“lost sight of their fundamental purpose,” and that despite past reductions, military 
capabilities and activities remain the principal threat.  Accordingly, exchanged military 
data, notification, monitoring and, where called for, military observers remain highly 
relevant means of attaining and preserving security.  He adds that these fundamentals 
are “not just a sheet of paper, but a mind-set.”719 
 Wiederholz states that while the potential remains for the revitalisation of 
conventional arms control, the current manner and focus of effort has “lost track” of its 
essential concept, with politicisation having “developed a life of its own” within regime 
oversight and implementation.  He also expressed some frustration over reduced 
military expertise, lack of coordination, and absence of high-level representation within 
key bodies.  Such reduced involvement, combined with decreasing resources, have led 
“apathy and ambiguity” throughout the arms control community.  Nevertheless, he 
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maintains that on-going and emerging security challenges (regional conflicts, terrorism, 
organised crime, energy security, migration, etc.) will only serve to further demonstrate 
“regional interdependencies” within the OSCE area and ultimately lead to an 
improvement in the current state of conventional arms control and CSBMs.720  
 Dr. Walter Dorn, Canadian Forces College.  Dr. Walter Dorn is a Professor of 
Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and Royal Military College of Canada. 
He acknowledges the logic behind the view that, because the Russians are not abiding 
by established provisions, major conventional arms control regimes have consequently 
lost their value.  In this respect, he holds President Vladimir Putin largely responsible 
for what he considers to be a largely “psychological” development.  Holding 
“concentrated power,” Putin has been able to “create the tensions that democracies 
cannot.”  Nevertheless, even as they are, these regimes are still “much better than 
nothing” and that their abandonment would only result in an accelerated “death spiral.”  
Accordingly, despite their diminished state, efforts should remain focused on building 
upon them rather than discarding them.721   
 Dorn stresses the need for a clear and compelling argument to convince Russia 
that the status quo simply “isn’t good,” noting that Moscow appears willing to “take the 
hit” in order to secure its annexation of Crimea.  Accordingly, alternative means of 
pressuring Russia need to be explored, rather than just “reacting to punish.”  Challenges 
to Moscow’s actions at the International Court of Justice “might be a good place to 
start, given the Kremlin’s strong legalistic leanings.”   
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 In seeking courses to rehabilitate conventional arms control, Dorn believes there 
are some things that can be done to mitigate some of its inherent constraints.  For 
example, he advocates the use of Non-Governmental Organisations in undertaking the 
role of verification currently undertaken by states, as this renders it “easier to call a 
spade a spade.”  That is, non-national experts and teams are more objective and less 
impeded by diplomatic pressures and “can say what is needed to be said.”  This enables 
technical “naming and shaming” first, followed by diplomacy afterwards.  It also 
establishes a more valid baseline for assessments.  He cited the successful employment 
of “non-national” verification teams by the UN and the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons as examples.722 
 
 In Dorn’s view, a global Open Skies system would be a “tremendous” 
achievement.  Such a system would also be consistent with his view that the UN should 
serve not only as a body of discussion and negotiation of arms control mechanisms, but 
also as the overseer of their implementation.  He believes that greater UN governance 
and execution could “do for arms control what peacekeeping has done for conflict 
resolution.”  Dorn acknowledges that in terms of harmonising effort, “the UN is 
overburdened right now, so it is good that Europe has the OSCE.”  Nevertheless, he 
emphasises that the UN shouldn’t be excluded from involvement in crucial matters such 
as the Ukrainian crisis.  Moreover, as the OSCE’s role is partly to emphasise policy and 
create more policy, it would have to be more sanguine in this regard.723   
 
 Dorn believes that developments in recent years have actually rendered 
conventional arms proliferation issues more important than nuclear ones.  He cites the 
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Georgian conflict in 2008, the current Ukrainian crisis and the overall significant build-
up of conventional forces as events that have rendered nuclear arms control’s 
longstanding preeminence over conventional regimes “no longer valid.”  He further 
notes that, Iran notwithstanding, the United States “is not in the mood for something 
else” concerning major changes to its policies and approach to nuclear proliferation 
security.  Simply put, “conventional issues are more immediate and therefore more 
important.”724  
 
 With respect to the prospects of recovery, Dorn emphasises the difficulty in 
changing established mind-sets, for which there is a need “to step back a little” in 
assessing the increasing complex security situation and developing viable courses of 
action.  For example, with Crimea, “things have gotten worse; not as bad as the low 
point, but compared with two years ago, developments have not been good.”  NATO 
expansion, out of area operations and the “spectre” of its use of force, along with 
Russia’s extensive use of [UN] vetoes and other actions to counteract this, all factor into 
the “psychology” of the security dynamic, with corresponding effect upon arms control 
and CSBM.725  
 Despite the variances in the orientations and personal perspectives of those 
consulted and interviewed, there were, nevertheless, a number of consistencies in the 
views expressed.  They include: 
• conventional arms control mechanisms are necessary;  
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• the fundamental concept of conventional arms control and CSBMs 
remain essentially valid; 
• to varying degrees, the extant regimes are failing due to having become 
outmoded, undermined or otherwise impaired;    
• a general paucity of political will constitutes a predominant underlying 
factor in regime failure; and 
• conventional arms control and CSBM regimes should be suitably 
modified or replaced by suitable successor mechanisms in order to 
maintain their conceptual validity and relevance in their respective 
applications. 
Political Will: Enabler and Inhibitor 
In the consultations and interviews conducted, weakened political will was 
frequently cited as the single greatest contributor to the decline of conventional arms 
control and CSBM regimes.  The consistency of this view, in terms of both cause and 
effect, is noteworthy.  It also reflects mainstream thinking on political will as a critical 
factor in conventional arms control:  
Political will remains key to redressing the imbalances and imperfections of the 
current conventional arms control and CSBMs architecture. …the ongoing arms 
build-up and the crisis situation in Ukraine have demonstrated the continued 
relevance of CSBMs, particularly the Vienna Document 2011, and have also 
pointed to the need to reinvigorate conventional arms control tools to rebuild 
cooperative security in Europe. …While we should study lessons learnt from 
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such situations, we must remain cognizant of the fact that such measures cannot 
be effective without the political will of the parties.726  
 Although frequently regarded as a common underlying deficit, there has been 
little offered to more specifically expound upon and correlate these attributions within 
the specific oversight and operation of regime models.  That is, whether viewed as a 
common basis of failure or simply used as a convenient excuse, characterisations have 
been largely imprecise, equivocal and abstruse.  This is somewhat consistent with the 
portrayal of political will in general:   
An oft-cited culprit when government does not take action is a lack of political 
will.  Over a decade ago Hammergren (1998, 12) characterized political will as 
“the slipperiest concept in the policy lexicon,” calling it “the sina qua non of 
policy success which is never defined except by its absence.” Since 
Hammergren’s assertion, the term has enjoyed a surge in popularity, with the 
ambiguity of “political will” making it ideal for achieving political aims and for 
labeling political failures when the diagnosis is unclear.727  
Conceptually ambiguous and intangible, the broad attribution of diminished 
political will as a catch-all basis for the decline of conventional arms control renders 
detailed analysis somewhat obfuscated.  Moreover, the indirect and displaced manner in 
which blame is accorded to it renders it exceedingly abstract as a correctable fault.  
Nevertheless, its effects and outcomes (non-compliance, non-conformity, dissonance, 
complacency, apathy, neglect, etc.) can be more tangibly perceived and acted upon 
within a given regime than outside of it.  That is, while weakened political will may be 
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ascribed as a root cause of failure, there arguably exists greater means to resist or 
mitigate it through specific counteractions within the design and operation of 
governance-management-implementation models themselves.   
This underscores an important adjunct of this thesis’ central proposition; that is:  
• effects attributable to contracted political will have not been sufficiently 
demarcated and discerned within conventional arms control models; and   
• despite their indiscriminate origins, these effects can be functionally 
counteracted through courses that employ and reinforce the design and 
operation of regime models, thereby preserving, to the extent possible, 
conformity and compliance. 
 
Figure 6.2:  Counteractions to Stabilise Governance-Management-Implementation728 
A frequent complaint made by many practitioners has been that non-conformity 
and non-compliance are frequently overlooked or speciously rationalised to be beyond 
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the scope of a given regime’s operating model to rectify.  This runs fundamentally 
contrary to the processes established within the regime’s integral operating components, 
which include the means of monitoring, verification, analysis, evaluation, corrective 
action, coordination, revision and review.  While these processes are not without their 
limitations and flaws, they do nevertheless provide the fundamental tools with which to 
address deviations from their established codified norms.  They also constitute means of 
feedback, improvement and refinement.  It is therefore essential that, to the extent 
possible, existing conventional arms control and CSBM models operate as designed, in 
order that valid determinations of disorder can be made, from which the necessary 
corrections or modifications can be effected.   In a report by the International Group on 
Global Security, Masahiko Asada et al noted: 
Those treaties that require verification specify methodologies, technologies and 
procedures for collecting and evaluating information.  In other words, they 
require the use of objective information for verifying compliance with the treaty 
obligations and, conversely, detecting breaches of these obligations.  Decisions 
about non-compliance based on information collected under a verification 
regime can be optimized by improving the quality, reliability, analysis and 
evaluation of that information.729 
 As compliance- and conformity-weighted security mechanisms, the principal 
conventional arms control regimes have employed well-established verification 
provisions and reporting procedures.  As repeatedly noted, however, critical faults have 
developed in the manner in which occurrences of non-compliance and non-conformity 
have been detected, reported and subsequently addressed within corresponding OSCE 
oversight bodies.  While this can be partly attributed to inherent design limitations, the 
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fidelity of detection and reporting, subsequent analysis, evaluation and corrective 
actions have also proven to be particularly deficient.  This includes the determination of 
the specific nature of a given occurrence of non-compliance or non-conformity (e.g., 
deliberate, inadvertent, unintentional, etc.) in order to determine suitable corrective 
action: 
Actual breaches should lead to enforcement of compliance, while apparent ones 
should lead to improvements of the verification regime.  Each type of apparent 
breaches leads to different corrective action….  It is important for the 
verification regime to distinguish between detected breaches that are due to 
weaknesses of the regime and those attributable to non-compliance….  When 
discussing options for improving the non-compliance procedures it is thus 
important not only to look at the individual elements of the treaty but also at the 
possible feedback loops that connect these elements….  These take account of 
new developments and incorporate lessons learned in the course of 
implementation.730  
 The key components of regime oversight and implementation identified in this 
study are effectively consistent with the “elements” noted in Asada’s assessment.  These 
components have become increasingly debilitated in their ability to address, manage and 
resolve matters of non-compliance and non-conformity.  As previously noted, this can 
be attributed to:  
• technical non-adherence to existing provisions and procedures (thereby 
hindering feedback and improvement); and 
• inherent deficiencies in provisions and procedures themselves in 
enabling the  resolution of infractions or other deviations, frequently 
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resulting in the respective OSCE oversight bodies taking an ad-hoc 
approach or doing nothing at all.  
 Irrespective of political will, operative counteractions to regime model 
deficiencies, in both design and execution, would therefore appear to represent a more 
perceptible initial course through which to induce the behaviours needed to attain 
greater conformity and compliance. 
The OSCE and Russia - Common Denominators in Failure and Recovery 
 It is important to keep in mind that, while deficient, regimes’ extant provisions 
and procedures can be successfully employed and still provide means of correction and 
resolution.  Indeed, verification protocols in and of themselves have proven useful as 
means of rectification at the lowest levels, as exemplified by inspectors and escorts 
resolving technical or procedural faults during verification missions.  Moreover, the 
OSCE has acted to specifically dissuade or even correct non-compliant conduct, as 
demonstrated by the introduction of “consensus minus” as means of inhibiting major 
violations and other transgressions.731  Nonetheless, the OSCE’s Rules of Procedure 
remain decidedly unspecific concerning the specific manner in which instances of non-
compliance or non-conformity are to be addressed within the corresponding oversight 
bodies, other than for them to serve as discussion fora.  This lack of procedural 
specificity has required States Parties or participating States themselves to initiate the 
necessary consultation and corrective action.  In fact, the only OSCE body to which any 
specific reference is made to matters of non-compliance is the Permanent Council (PC), 
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which oversees regular political consultations and the overall operations of the 
Organization.  Again, the matter in which non-compliance is addressed is entirely 
general in nature: 
The PC may also convene special PC meetings in order to discuss matters of 
non-compliance with OSCE commitments and to decide on appropriate courses 
of action.  Special PC meetings may also be convened for other purposes in the 
periods when regular PC meetings are not normally held or for the consideration 
of a particular issue/topic.  Decisions adopted at reinforced or special meetings 
shall have the same force as other decisions of the PC.732 
 While the OSCE’s general consultative and consensus-based design does not 
preclude the successful resolution of a given infraction or lapse, the absence of more 
systematised procedures has rendered this increasingly difficult, particularly when 
cooperative temperament amongst parties is lacking, which is now generally the case.  
Advancing the arguments made by Masahiko Asada et al, the introduction of “default” 
adjudicative procedures could provide a “forcing function” to ensure that reported 
contraventions are addressed in a suitably graduated manner, beginning first with the 
OSCE Secretariat.733  Employing relatively straightforward criteria, the Secretariat 
could be suitably empowered to not only “track,” but also administer reported 
infractions or lapses.  Matters requiring further adjudication would then be deferred to 
the corresponding oversight body, as warranted.  If unresolved, the matter could then 
proceed further through a process of escalation to the PC or even the Ministerial 
Council (MC) -- the OSCE’s central decision-making and governing body, comprised 
of participating States’ foreign ministers.  This would also enable these matters to be 
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addressed more promptly and accorded some form of definition or status, rather than 
merely being left in some undefined form of abeyance, which is currently more often 
the norm than the exception. 
 Enhancements to revised consultative and adjudicative procedures would 
include well-defined parameters concerning rulings and judgements, along with the 
means of correction and enforcement where culpability is determined.  This would also 
require a decision on consensus being retained by the three implementing bodies or 
delegated as an executive authority, such as to the chair of each implementing body or 
vested in the PC.  When necessary, the adroit employment of technical and legal 
resources, including external judicial bodies (such as the International Court of Justice) 
as a source of legal opinion, would be advantageous to enabling fair and equitable 
determinations, along with suitable corrective action.734   
 As frequently noted in this study, the impact of a “non-response” to any 
deviation or ambiguity, whether inadvertent or deliberate, only serves to inhibit 
“provocability.”  This, in turn, encourages further and more serious contraventions of 
compliance and conformity, undermining regime functionality and integrity.  A more 
responsive and engaged adjudicative system would therefore encourage States Parties 
and participating States to more openly and actively report breaches.  This includes 
“self-reporting,” particularly when the opportunity is seen to explain a given action or 
development (such as a delay in reporting data), before it develops into a more serious 
issue.  In many instances, such infractions are the result of either limited administrative 
wherewithal or a lack of resources in fulfilling requirements.  The OSCE has already 
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more than proven itself capable of rendering financial or technical assistance to parties 
requesting such assistance.  Therefore, a more attentive and receptive system would 
inculcate a greater sense of individual and collective regime coherence, including 
parties taking on “the responsibility of requesting help, rather than simply assuming that 
their compliance is not important and non-compliance will go unnoticed.”735  While 
support for programmed adjudicative procedures would likely vary amongst OSCE 
participating States, proposals for alternations along these lines would likely receive 
sufficient backing for more serious consideration, given the generally substandard 
outcomes realised under the status quo. 
 The OSCE’s adaptable approach to security has often been touted as one of its 
major strengths.  As such, it is conceivable that the systematic restoration and 
progressive improvement of its own governance and management system offers a better 
chance of success than the many ad hoc and external approaches undertaken to resolve 
individual conventional arms control and CSBM issues.  Although the same basic 
argument of insufficient political will could be made against rehabilitating the OSCE’s 
own operating dynamic, it is still reasonable to suggest that efforts undertaken from 
within offer better prospects than outward, unsystematic ones.  Similarly, given the 
increased level of disaccord in international security relations generally, established 
regimes arguably provide a more assured basis for incremental, transformative change 
than starting over from scratch.  Nevertheless, the OSCE itself faces significant internal 
and external challenges, regardless of the approach taken. 
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 As evidenced throughout this study, the effectiveness and relevance of the 
OSCE have been tested in a manner that, in many respects, parallel that of conventional 
arms control and CSBM regimes themselves.  As noted in a study undertaken by the 
autonomous OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, while some 
participating States continue to perceive the Organisation positively, they believe that it 
“does not deliver sufficiently.”  Others refer to the OSCE’s “dysfunctional structure and 
bureaucratization,” “lack of political will among states to increase the OSCE’s role, 
especially in the field of security” and the “institutional fragmentation or 
compartmentalization of the OSCE region.”736 
 An analysis of the OSCE conducted by the Latvian Institute for International 
Affairs notes that the Organisation is currently “not very high in the security policy 
agenda” of its membership and that this could ultimately lead to questions about its 
“relevance and very existence.”737  Furthermore: 
 …the role of the OSCE as security institution could significantly diminish 
within the security environment of the 21st century, and one would argue that 
within increasing global interdependence, transparency, and further development 
of societies, OSCE should adapt itself to the new challenges or disappear.738 
 A policy paper prepared by Victor-Yves Ghébali for the Geneva Centre for the 
Democratic Control of Armed Forces determined: “In a nutshell, the OSCE has been 
fairly successful in conflict prevention, unsuccessful in conflict resolution and unevenly 
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successful in post-conflict rehabilitation.”739  Ghébali further concluded that three major 
factors were challenging the OSCE's raison d'être; namely, enlargement of the 
European Union and NATO; increasing functional deficiencies arising from the 
inability to successfully transition from a conference process to a “standard international 
organization;” and incompatibilities between the Russian Federation and the OSCE 
concerning its evolving political and institutional construct.740 
  Specifically, Ghébali opined that the OSCE’s perceived value had diminished in 
comparison with the European Union and NATO, whose respective guarantees of 
economic prosperity and hard security could not be matched.  Furthermore, a number of 
the OSCE's “core” functions (including conflict management) have been “increasingly 
assumed by the more politically relevant, richly-endowed and capable institutional 
actors.”741  He also cited the OSCE’s self-generated handicaps, resulting from “the 
modus operandi of an outstandingly pragmatic international institution – in particular 
the absence of an international legal capacity, a consolidated founding instrument and 
updated basic rules of procedure.”742 
 Finally, Ghébali regarded the third factor -- the Russian Federation’s 
participation in the OSCE -- as “an existential question” for the institution.  This is due 
to the critical investment made by the Organisation in the democratic evolution of that 
country, with the presumption of a “transformation of a Soviet-style State into a 
member of the modern European family of nations abiding domestically by the rule of 
                                                
739 Victor-Yves Ghébali, “The OSCE Between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease on Life,” Policy 
Paper No. 10, (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), 7. 
740 Victor-Yves Ghébali, “The OSCE Between Crisis and Reform: Towards a New Lease on Life,” 12. 
741 Ibid, 12. 
742 Ibid, 12. 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      347 
law and externally by international law.” 743  Contrarily, the OSCE has become 
seriously tested by Moscow, whose increasingly divergent conduct, general lack of 
cooperation and waning support are not only undermining the Organisation’s essential 
functionality, but threatening its very existence. 
 Indeed, the waning relationship between Russia and the OSCE generally 
parallels that country’s increasing disregard of its regimes, which is somewhat 
consistent with Colin S. Gray’s central paradox of arms control.  Gray, the Director of 
the Centre for Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, asserted: 
… if arms control is needed in a strategic relationship because the states 
involved might go to war, it will be impractical for that very reason of need, 
whereas, if arms control proves to be available, it will be irrelevant.”744   
In this respect, Russia’s resurgence and subsequent military actions to secure its Near 
Abroad have served to reduce its concern over the likelihood of traditional forms of 
major armed conflict.  This, in turn, has reduced its sense of imperative to further 
commit to “traditional” binding arms control regimes.  Therefore, notwithstanding its 
continued use of truculent rhetoric concerning the “threat” posed by NATO and the 
United States, Moscow’s more recent strategic security documents have suitably 
incorporated “non-traditional” threats within its own means and on its own terms.  
 With Russia’s renewed sense of confidence in its military capacities has come a 
general sense of disillusionment with OSCE’s ability to serve its strategic and regional 
security interests.  A key facet of this disillusionment concerns the Organisation’s 
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perceived “failure” to curtail NATO expansion and operations within Russia’s spheres 
of influence and interest.  Christopher J. Morrow and Matthew Mitchell note: 
Recent ineffectiveness of the OSCE’s security goals and Putin’s skepticism of 
Western influence in the organization has threatened the potential distinct 
advantages of the OSCE.…  Consequently, Russia no longer views the OSCE as 
a counter to NATO, but utilizes it in an instrumental, selective, and limited 
manner, primarily to legitimize viewpoints, exchange security information, draw 
attention to concerns, block unfavorable decisions, constrain member states’ 
actions, and cooperate on important ‘low politics’ challenges.745   
 Even with the “contentious and often obstructionist relationship” that has 
developed between Moscow and the OSCE, Morrow and Mitchel still stress the 
Organisation’s traditional advantage in bridging East-West disparities and fostering 
Russian trust.  This is something that has been largely unattainable through other means 
of dialogue, such as the EU and NATO.  Moreover, they emphasise the critical 
imperative of re-establishing this traditional role in the face of the on-going crisis in 
Ukraine, noting “Russia’s historical mistrust of NATO and the EU makes the OSCE a 
viable option to bridge the estranged relationship created by the crisis.”746 
 Accordingly, in spite of the downcast appraisal the OSCE has received, several 
critics concede that it retains value and that at least in the near-term, its rehabilitation 
remains within the realm of possibility.  For example, the Latvian Institute of 
International Affairs acknowledges that the OSCE retains “the capacity to address 
security issues and find common ground for mutually acceptable solutions which a 
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nation-state simply cannot do due to their limited capacity,” and that it could be a 
“relevant and quite valuable asset to arrange security issues in the future, in case when 
NATO, EU or other countries and/or organizations are not able to succeed.”747  
Regarding its particularly tenuous relationship with Moscow, Morrow and Mitchel 
emphasise the need for the OSCE to focus upon the fundamentals by promoting “its 
existing, but underutilized cooperative security approach… to advocate conflict 
prevention, stabilization, and reconstruction….”748  They also note some positive 
indications, such as Washington’s attempt to specifically employ the OSCE as a “forum 
for dialogue” with Moscow over the Crimea issue.  Finally, they emphasise that, despite 
its “bellicose demeanour,” Moscow still regards the OSCE as having value as an 
“information provider.”749   
 Even in its currently inhibited state, David J. Galbreath argues that the OSCE 
retains fundamental value:  
… the OSCE has been accused of being nothing more than a “talking box.”  If 
this were the only thing that the OSCE was, it would be problematic, but 
nevertheless that still would not make the organization irrelevant.  The OSCE is 
the only organization, other than the UN, that consists of North America, Europe 
and the entire post-Soviet region.  While NATO, the EU and the Council of 
Europe have expanded since the end of the Cold War, they are considerably 
unlikely to go this far.  Thus, with every other regional organization, there 
remain insiders and outsiders.  The OSCE’s inclusiveness makes it a vital 
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organization for peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic Area, even if were only 
a “talking box.”750 
 Beyond having residual value, Victor-Yves Ghébali also contends that the 
OSCE is “perfectly reformable,” with caveats:  
It has the capacity for adequate self-reform provided that reforms measures are 
envisaged from a good faith perspective.  This means that reform must aim to 
improve the efficiency and relevance of the Organisation for the common 
interest of all its participating states, and not just to advance a specific national 
or collective agenda: no participating State or group of participating States 
should be determined to obtain drastic reform measures or oppose fair reform 
measures at the price of breaking the instrumentality that the OSCE represents.  
It also entails that reform should not undermine the flexibility and creativity of 
the Organisation by straitjacketing formats and procedures with a shift from one 
extreme to other – substituting sheer rigidity for sheer pragmatism.  Finally, the 
objective of defusing divisions among participating States should not be 
achieved at the expense of downgrading monitoring standards or softening 
existing commitments.751 
 Ghébali’s assessment generally supports the premise that the rehabilitation of 
the OSCE includes the preservation of the core precepts of its existing construct and 
then undertaking the necessary steps to reinforce and improve upon them without 
compromising integrity.  While garnering the collective willingness to achieve this 
would again appear to constitute the greatest single obstacle, this approach appears 
more viable than alternative proposals (e.g., calls for replacement security concepts, 
such as the Russian Pan-European Security Pact) that fall short of attaining the same 
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degree of interconnected, overarching governance.  The rehabilitation of the CFE 
Treaty, Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty would, therefore, logically benefit 
from the institutional stabilisation and reinforcement of the OSCE itself. 
 Although the current encumbered state of conventional arms control regimes, 
along with that of their governing institution, may be regarded by some experts as 
having already surpassed a “point of no return,” others have contended that the situation 
presents opportunities for recuperation.  In 2001, Michael Moodie and Amy Sands 
questioned whether the slackened rate of progress had actually provided the opportunity 
to “slow down the arms control process and concentrate on strengthening the existing 
foundation:” 
 While many experts may bemoan the slow pace of today’s arms control agenda, 
perhaps it should be seen as a blessing in disguise.  The delay in developing new 
arms control initiatives and moving ahead on negotiating new agreements 
provides an opportunity to focus on an already over-crowded arms control 
agenda and to develop the political will and consensus needed to implement 
treaties effectively.  Given the limited resources available for arms control 
activities and the uncertain political will to implement effectively what already 
has been negotiated, increasing the burden on an already overloaded system may 
cause it to falter if not crash.752 
  This appraisal further supports the view that if conventional arms control is to be 
preserved as a fundamental component of Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security, then 
action must also be taken within regimes’ existing operating models to correct or 
otherwise alleviate the most patent faults and ambiguities.  This logically begins with 
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the re-establishment of critical planning, consultation and implementation functions, 
together with their ordered interaction.  Such a course would at least enable a basis for 
less encumbered implementation, improved validation and redress of contraventions, 
and more coherent policy and planning.  By re-establishing essential functionality, this 
“back to basics” approach would therefore constitute an elementary first step in 
stabilising these faltering regimes. 
  Although eliciting the cooperation of States Parties and participating States 
likely constitutes the single greatest obstacle in arresting the “negative spiral” of 
conventional arms control and CSBM regimes, it is evident that recent circumstances 
may have indeed rendered this an attainable initial step.  While the broader complexities 
of the OSCE’s organisational dynamic exceed the scope of this study, it can 
nevertheless be argued that such conditions are serving to increasingly compel the 
OSCE’s executive, corresponding implementing bodies and key members to induce 
greater conformism through fundamental leadership and reinforced personal example.  
While seemingly discordant within a consensus-based institution, there is little question 
that more is now required to shape priorities and influence behaviours in a manner that 
corresponds with regime imperatives.  It is evident that such leadership has been lacking 
for some time, with the institution itself having increasingly defaulted to serving more 
as a freewheeling platform for security-related dialogue than an actual instrument of 
security.   
 Maximilian Stern and David Svarin of the Swiss Forum on Foreign Policy 
assert: “One of the biggest flaws of the organization is certainly its lack of sustainable 
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leadership.”753  They argue the need for a permanent chairmanship to replace the current 
“troika” rotational system, noting that otherwise, “variances in capacities and expertise” 
necessitate the Chairmanship to be rebuilt again every year.”754  Robert Barry, a former 
OSCE Head of Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina states that “gaps in leadership” 
resulting from a weak rotating Chairmanship call for the “bolstering” of the OSCE 
Secretariat and the office of the “relatively weak” Secretary General.755  Other 
measures, such as the creation of a permanent undersecretary and the 
professionalization of staff (most of whom are seconded personnel from OSCE member 
states) have also been advocated.756  An OSCE-commissioned report concerning lessons 
learned from the Ukraine crisis notes: “the lack consensus is also reflected in the 
weakness of the OSCE as an organization – of which the lack of a legal personality is a 
particularly damaging example.  It is for this reason that the Report underlines the 
importance of political leadership.”757  It too, calls for the strengthening of the Secretary 
General’s powers.758    
  While there are clearly merits to these recommendations, they, like many other 
related appraisals, tend to focus more upon the institution’s organisational and operating 
limitations than the immediate imperative of effective headship within the current 
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system.  That is to say, there needs to be due priority accorded to what the OSCE can 
achieve now, within its existing means.  Given what the OSCE has been able to 
accomplish by way of decisive action in the past, leadership remains not only critical to 
stabilising the Organisation and its regimes, but is also arguably attainable. 
Prospects of Adaptation, Enhancement, Complementation and Succession 
If the stabilisation of existing conventional arms control and CSBM regime 
models can be secured, a restored process of continuous feedback and improvement 
opens up a variety of prospects.  These range from on-going calibration, refinement or 
amendment, to more pervasive measures, such as complementation or outright 
replacement.  A key underlying question would be whether or not the proven 
fundamental principles and established doctrine of these regimes can be sufficiently 
preserved as changes become more dramatic.  To illustrate, some experts maintain that 
in order to suitably alter extant treaties and accords, desired outcomes require a 
significant deviation or even a complete departure from the originating operating 
concepts.  John E. Peters states that this is to be expected, given that “necessary new 
measures… influence the resort to arms rather than controlling arsenal levels or access 
to weapons.”759  Accordingly, in order to effectively transform conventional arms 
control within a rapidly changing security environment, Peters advocates a complete 
reorientation that renders conventional arms control models more readily applicable to 
crisis management support and as a tool of conflict prevention: 
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… the U.S. and European arms control communities must reorganize themselves 
and create new tools… so that they can be responsive to the needs of crisis 
management.  Moreover, arms controllers should begin working with regional 
experts to craft appropriate measures to deal with potential conflict areas….760  
Peters introduced two key considerations in realigning arms control with crisis 
management: direct international oversight and recourse.  Specifically, he sees one way 
of re-establishing confidence amongst civil authorities in a “Balkans-type” sub-regional 
conflict scenario being the supplementation of the basic provisions of mainstream arms 
control regimes, with external monitors incorporated as an “evaluation provision” to 
ensure the compliance and conformity of the parties, thereby instilling greater 
confidence.  The added provision of available recourse to an external arbiter would 
ensure an appropriate means of remedy, should the civil authorities of one or more 
parties fail to fulfil established provisions.761  This effectively parallels the concept of 
the Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control - Article IV, Annex 1-B of the General 
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina -- an adaptation of the 
CFE Treaty applicable to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia, 
which is overseen by a representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for Article 
IV.762  Peters suggests that additional “safety and security measures” could be 
developed to complement ‘in-place’ arms control and CSBM.  These could include 
international police monitoring (such as those already established under the Dayton 
Accords763), international legal services, a purpose-specific appeal process and an 
independent media monitoring and reporting system.  Such measures could serve to 
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externally reinforce the governing arms control regime, while still enabling its integral 
implementation apparatus to function relatively unimpeded.764  
 
 While the example cited applies to an arms control mechanism oriented towards 
assuaging a major sub-regional conflict and humanitarian crisis, it is reasonable to 
hypothesise that, during the course of their implementation, other existing conventional 
arms control regimes might be similarly sustained or enhanced.  That is, complementary 
or peripheral safety and security measures could serve to mitigate existing and emerging 
deficiencies, even if temporal in nature.  
 Another consideration in the formulation of further developed, adapted or 
successor conventional arms control regimes concerns whether or not they would 
quantifiably improve underlying deficiencies in core capacities, such as the detection 
and validation of contraventions and infringements, along with the enforcement of 
compliance and conformity.  As noted by Moodie and Sands:  
…the intrinsic detection and reporting of non-compliance through verification 
arguably should have had greater impetus in terms of exposing and detailing 
specific contraventions.  Thus, developing a more widely accepted international 
approach to reviewing compliance questions is critical to developing the strong 
international base needed to address effectively significant compliance problems 
and to produce responses that yield results.765 
 
 As part of an overall process of regime development and change, a definitive 
standard of compliance and clear basis for enforcement action, formally defined, 
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specified and incorporated into regime codification would therefore constitute an 
important evolution.  In addition to establishing a suitable means of recourse within a 
given regime, effective detection and enforcement would also serve to raise the 
threshold of other, more extreme forms of reaction, most notably, military escalation.  
As noted by Harald Müller, regime enforcement would constitute “that set of activities 
aimed at bringing a reluctant or even resistant party back into compliance when more 
cooperative attempts at ensuring compliance have failed, and increasing evidence is 
available that the party is effectively in noncompliance with its obligations.”766  These 
might comprise a programmed sequence of prohibitions or sanctions, further enhanced 
through the judicious application of the intrinsic early warning and threat 
characterization already afforded by extant regimes.  Such an evolution should also 
logically take into account the increasingly asymmetric character of conventional 
weapons proliferation – such as small arms and light weapons -- which could be more 
effectively counteracted through the broadened harmonization of arms control, CSBMs, 
counter-proliferation, and conflict prevention efforts across the security spectrum.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to substantiate the central proposition of this thesis 
through the detailed appraisal of breakdowns in the governance-management-
implementation model of conventional arms control and CSBM.  The perspectives 
gleaned from subject matter experts, preceded by background research and case study 
examinations, have facilitated this appraisal.  Notwithstanding variations in 
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characterisation, it is apparent that in addition to inexorable external influences, the 
erosion of regime functional integrity -- itself very much the result of critical faults 
within respective operating models -- constitutes a highly important underlying 
contributor to the overall decline of conventional arms control and CSBM.  Indeed, as 
noted, increasingly enervated consensus and diminished cooperation have significantly 
impeded the ability to uniformly attain the codified standards of conduct that have been 
established. 
While varying degrees of disaccord are inherent to any regime, it is evident that, 
as the governing institution, the OSCE has demonstrated an overall aversion to 
adequately identifying, correcting or deterring two key manifestations of flagging 
common will: non-compliance and non-conformity.  While the Organisation and its 
implementing bodies must be held to account, individual parties themselves -- most 
notably, the Russian Federation -- are equally responsible for purposefully 
circumventing binding provisions and otherwise undermining regime integrity.  
Regardless of blame, unchecked contraventions and lapses will continue to degrade and 
diminish conventional arms control and CSBM regimes, with correspondingly escalated 
risk.  Accordingly, a critical initial step entails the stabilisation of existing models 
through focused counteraction to deviations from the established standards of conduct.  
Such counteraction, while notionally attainable, would nevertheless require significant 
changes in institutional and key constituent mind-sets, along with correspondingly 
influenced behaviours through example and leadership.  The stabilisation of regime 
models may indeed serve to better enable further alterations or replacements; however, 
the long-term recovery and sustainment of established principles and concepts remains 
an open question. 








This study of the concept, model and evolution of conventional arms control and 
CSBM, together with empirical case study analyses of the CFE Treaty, Vienna 
Document and Open Skies Treaty, has employed a “practitioner’s perspective” in 
accounting for the varied factors that have influenced both their progression and 
degradation.  Although elemental breakdowns within the operative constructs of these 
regimes have been established as a key underlying cause of their ensuing state of 
disorder, the overarching influences of the broader geostrategic environment remain 
inexorably linked and must be considered accordingly.  Still, the comparatively 
indistinct nature of these outward influences renders causative factors difficult to 
delineate and address.  For that reason, efforts to directly resolve indicative deficiencies 
from within regime models arguably constitute a more perceptible approach, in 
comparison with oblique external strategies.   
Over the past several years, the ability to control, restrict or otherwise constrain 
conventional military forces has become progressively moribund, with “quality” 
(greater mobility, increased precision, higher yields, etc.) now arguably surpassing 
“quantity” (munitions, equipment holdings and personnel strength) as the critical 
military capacity and regulatory benchmark.  Moreover, chronic unimpeded 
transgressions of binding regime provisions may have already rendered certain 
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conventional proliferation security precepts effectively outmoded, despite their 
fundamental judiciousness.  Nevertheless, the extent of regimes’ functional impairment 
represents, in and of itself, a distinct critical challenge to the prospect of their 
rehabilitation and the sustainment of conventional arms control in general.  
In light of the aforementioned, the principal actors (governing organisation and 
constituent parties) must be recognised for their individual and collective roles in the 
degradation of conventional arms control and CSBM.  Accordingly, this study has led to 
a somewhat exacting appraisal of the OSCE in the context of its record of performance, 
however constrained, in its oversight of the CFE Treaty, Vienna Document and Open 
Skies Treaty.  Individual States Parties and participating States, along with their 
associated security organisations, have been similarly scrutinised in terms of their 
corresponding relevance.  
It is apparent that impeded oversight and management have limited not only 
effective implementation, but also the means of enabling conventional arms control and 
CSBM regimes to keep pace as interconnected, scalable mechanisms within an 
increasingly multidimensional international security framework.  Indeed, some 
observations suggest that regional and national proliferation issues might have been 
more effectively addressed through expanded conflict prevention and resolution 
measures, rather than the customarily imposed limitations and verification of 
compliance.  While these rapidly evolving security challenges may ultimately prove 
well-suited to the OSCE’s “flexible, adaptive approach to security,”767 given the current 
state of disorder, it is unclear whether they can be any further assuaged through the 
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modification of existing regimes or if entirely new methodologies and mechanisms will 
be required.  Regardless, the preservation of the underlying principles of conventional 
arms control and CSBM, along with the operative functionality of their regimes, will 
remain key criteria in attaining succeeding standards of compliance and conformity. 
Key Takeaways 
This study has upheld the contention that while conventional arms control’s 
overall decline can be attributed to a wide-range of contributing factors, breakdowns 
within the interdependent components of the governance-management-implementation 
model have also seriously undermined the core integrities of the three principal regimes.  
Although the initial impact of these faults may have been minor, there is little question 
as to their subsequent, cumulative effect in impairing the predictability, transparency 
and stability required to sustain the mutually reinforcing and interlocking character of 
these regimes.  In particular, failures in oversight and implementation have 
progressively weakened both individual and collective accountabilities, along with the 
common resolve required for effective governance.  Given the unique circumstances 
leading to the establishment of these regimes, the prospects of their operative 
rehabilitation and revival do not appear likely unless some form of inducement is 
applied to “kick-start” current models to start functioning again as originally 
envisioned. 
 Significant security relapses within the past decade certainly provide a clear 
incentive.  The Russian Federation’s clash with Georgia, annexation of Crimea and on-
going proxy campaign in Eastern Ukraine have not only significantly undermined 
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security and stability generally, but have also clearly demonstrated what the outright 
abrogation of binding conventional arms control and CSBM commitments can reap.  
Although Russia can be easily cited as the leading offender, it is clear that various 
infringements and lapses of the CFE Treaty, Vienna Document and Open Skies Treaty 
by other States Parties and participating States have also eroded the integrity, efficacy 
and relevance of these “pillars of security.”   
Within a broad array of considerations, the near-collapse of the CFE Treaty 
perhaps best corroborates the exacerbating effects of the “negative spiral” created by 
deviations, defections and other events impeding a regime’s governance-management-
implementation model.  Without question, Russia’s suspension of compliance in 2007 
and its abandonment of the JCG in 2015 represent the most blatant outcomes of the 
Treaty’s failure as an enduring security regime.  Although the fundamental framework 
of the regime remains nominally intact amongst its 29 surviving States Parties, the 
departure of Russia -- the single largest holder of armaments and equipment subject to 
the Treaty -- has exhausted much of the regime’s impetus, potency and relevance as an 
instrument of transparency, predictability and accountability.  The resultant “void” has 
served to exacerbate, if not accelerate, the overall degradation of conventional arms 
control and CSBM in Europe.  Given these outcomes, Anthony H. Cordesman’s 
“unpleasant truths” and “iron laws” – including the contention that “nations that want to 
go to war will always be able to do so,” appear particularly valid.768   
While clearly battered, the CFE Treaty arguably retains some value and is not 
beyond some measure of stabilisation and rehabilitation.  Nevertheless, it remains to be 
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seen what aspects remain conceptually viable and operationally sustainable at this stage.  
Following several years of growing dysfunction, many consider the Treaty’s 
fundamental concept of verifiable conventional weapons, equipment and personnel 
ceilings effectively invalid at this juncture.  Others believe it still has utility and as such, 
should be sustained to the extent possible, rather than being jettisoned altogether.  
Regardless, the CFE Treaty “experience” will hopefully provide the basis upon which to 
make the right determinations in enabling a constructive process of alteration or 
succession. 
 Although similarly beset by recurrent contraventions, lapses and dysfunctional 
oversight, the Vienna Document continues to provide a mechanism for confidence-and 
security-building, verifiable information exchanges, and notification/observation 
provisions.  But even with successive updates, many of the regime’s politically binding 
provisions remain out-dated and unrealistic.  Nevertheless, the Vienna Document’s 
inherent character as a CSBM regime renders it an expedient verification and 
compliance instrument in certain respects.  Indeed, despite some disappointing results in 
Crimea, its voluntary hosting provisions (to dispel concerns about military activities) 
and over-quota inspections in Ukraine proved to be somewhat useful.  The Vienna 
Document, like the CFE Treaty, has been significantly degraded; however, as indicated 
in this study, it appears somewhat more amenable to undergoing the necessary 
adjustments to improve its practical utility and long-term viability. 
The Open Skies Treaty has remained the least degraded of the three regimes in 
terms of its ability to deliver its observation flight mission programme; however, 
significant issues have undermined its essential premise and reduced its overall high 
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potential.  Foremost of these are the many unresolved compliance and conformity issues 
that present an immediate and worrisome impediment to implementation.  Otherwise, 
the growing disparities between national observation aircraft and their respective 
mission systems -- including the difficult technological leap to digital-based 
technologies -- will continue to present a challenge to the Treaty’s underlying concept 
of affording all States Parties a common capability baseline.  Moreover, fundamental 
disputes between parties, such as that between Greece and Turkey over the accession of 
Cyprus, run the risk of effectively paralysing the Treaty.  These important issues 
notwithstanding, Open Skies has more than proven its utility, as evidenced by the 
valuable observation flight missions recently conducted over Ukraine and western 
Russia in the proximity of conflict areas, including the first use of “extraordinary” 
observation flight provisions.  Regrettably, the shoot-down of a Ukrainian AN-30 Open 
Skies aircraft (conducting a national reconnaissance mission), followed shortly 
thereafter by Malaysian Airways Flight MH17, have tragically demonstrated the risk of 
operations conducted within or near “non-permissive,” environments, both real and 
contrived.    
Despite their impairment, conventional arms control and CSBM regimes have 
nevertheless managed to “limp along” with varying degrees of residual utility.  
Certainly, their subsistence thus far indicates at least a modicum of continued 
recognition and support.  Accordingly, restored essential functionality could serve to 
“stem the bleeding” and possibly provide the conditions for more attuned assessment 
and rehabilitation.  Still, there remains a surfeit of unresolved issues that would have to 
be addressed in order to realise any meaningful progress.  From the outset, revitalised 
dialogue would be required to move beyond various obstructions and impasses.  This 
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includes the moderation of well-entrenched obduracy.  As previously indicated, the 
leadership and initiative of the OSCE and its leading members would be crucial in 
securing the active participation and support of all concerned.  This includes, of course, 
the pivotal involvement of the Russian Federation, whose divergent security perceptions 
have been all too frequently translated into a troublesome combination of intransigence 
and unpredictability.  Moscow, which has largely focused its efforts towards 
maintaining a posture of general contrariness, will have to avail itself to the opportunity 
of renewed engagement if it is to realistically attain any of the security assurances it has 
sought from NATO and the West. 
From the case study examinations and subsequent analysis, the following 
overarching determinations and adjunct findings have been rendered:  
• Conventional arms control and CSBM regimes are in an overall state of 
serious decline.  This is attributable to a wide variety of contributing 
factors, of which breakdowns within the operative constructs of the 
regimes themselves constitute a key underlying aspect; 
• While the fundamental concepts of arms control and CSBM have 
remained essentially valid, they have been progressively weakened by 
misapplication, dissonance and lack of resolve in suitably adapting to 
changes in international security.  This has been further compounded by 
fallacious interpretations, complacency and unchecked misconduct, 
leading to cumulative failures in governance, management and 
implementation;   
• Over time, non-compliance and non-conformity with the binding 
provisions of established regimes have become increasingly 
commonplace.  This can be attributed, at least in part, to individual and 
collective self-interests superseding binding obligations and the 
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perception that, given weak central oversight, contraventions and lapses 
can occur with little or no consequence; 
• From an oversight perspective, the core integrities of established regimes 
have been compromised as a result of individual and collective failings 
in upholding established provisions, standards and attendant obligations.  
While certainly not without fault, the regimes themselves have been too 
the focus of criticism, rather than the governing institution, implementing 
bodies and parties themselves;  
 
• The manner in which arms control verification observation, inspection 
and evaluation provisions have been applied has proven increasingly 
insufficient as a primary means of inducement, correction and 
deterrence.  This may in part be attributable to complacency derived 
from early successes, combined with individual and collective reticence 
in formally reporting offenders and their transgressions, so as to avoid 
confrontation and preserve goodwill; 
 
• The OSCE and its constituents have largely failed to mitigate the 
impeded function of the three regimes, as well as hold aberrant States 
Parties and participating States sufficiently accountable.  While this can 
be attributed, in part, to the Organisation’s construct and character as a 
consensus-based institution, there nevertheless exists fundamental fault 
in overlooking non-compliance and non-conformity in favour of 
promoting a sense of harmony and perception of success; 
 
• Excessive tolerance of national laws, regulations and procedures 
conflicting with and superseding binding provisions has progressively 
undermined the legally- and politically-binding force of conventional 
arms control and CSBM regimes.  This is, again, indicative of 
fundamental shortcomings in regime governance, management and 
implementation, including the constrained ability to effectively assess 
compliance and enforce uniform standards of conduct; 
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• Conventional arms control and CSBM regimes were not designed to self-
regulate or readily adapt to changes in their corresponding security 
paradigms.  Amending provisions and protocols have proven to be 
convoluted and inadequate.  In addition to inherent technical 
complexities, this could be further ascribed to undue procedural 
exigencies and the fundamental difficulty of multinational oversight.  
Regardless, established mechanisms could have been rendered more 
scalable to better accommodate changes in major conventional 
armaments, equipment systems, and corresponding force structures; 
 
• Arms control verification concepts and procedures have been 
insufficiently accommodated within operational planning processes at 
various national and international military staff levels, as exemplified by 
continued incompatibilities and successive revisions, such as those 
associated with NATO military guidance.  This is indicative of a 
persistent lack of awareness, understanding and support, in favour of 
established military doctrine;769 
 
• With few exceptions, inspection, evaluation and overflight quotas have 
remained generally disproportionate and uncoordinated between Eastern 
and Western parties.  Although the lack of coordination remains 
somewhat a function of intended unpredictability and intrusiveness, 
developments such as NATO expansion have led to even greater 
disparity.  While acknowledged, more suitable quota distribution 
protocols have remained elusive, given the difficulty in achieving 
consensus amongst increasingly divergent parties; 
 
• A lack of arms control-related operations and activities jointly conducted 
by States Parties and participating States from NATO and CSTO -- 
owing largely to respective security policies and conventions -- has 
decreased the opportunity for expanded dialogue, coordination and 
collaboration between principal security groupings.  Similarly, despite 
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established provisions encouraging professional military contacts as a 
specific CSBM, such interaction has been limited, likely as a result of 
reduced resources and perceived limited benefit by respective higher 
authorities;  
 
• Institutional, vice national implementation -- such as composite OSCE 
inspection and evaluation teams (CFE Treaty, Vienna Document), 
observation flight crews and common operating platforms (Open Skies 
Treaty) -- may have served to allay distrust and enable a more balanced, 
equitable verification and CSBM programme;  
• A lack of impetus and resources has delayed the expansion or regional-
adaptation of regimes within new geographic regions (e.g. North Africa; 
North-South Korea, India-Pakistan, China-Taiwan, Ecuador-Peru).  This 
has further inhibited the promulgation of conventional arms control and 
CSBM concepts, along with the establishment of a broader network of 
complementary regimes; and  
• While the extent of overall degradation varies (with the CFE Treaty 
clearly being the most impaired), all three regimes are not beyond some 
measure of remediation.  This would likely be best initially undertaken 
through specific measures to counteract deviations and stabilise existing 
regime model functionality, from which more valid determinations could 
then be made regarding subsequent alteration or replacement. 
Closing Remarks 
It is particularly ironic that conventional arms control, a concept conceived to 
reduce the threat of conflict, safeguard security and foster confidence, has itself 
succumbed to significant upheaval and uncertainty.  The CFE Treaty, Vienna Document 
and Open Skies Treaty, once regarded as archetypal, have been undermined to the point 
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where their current state ranges from general impairment to near-collapse.  Although 
their early implementation significantly reduced the potential for large-scale offensive 
military operations, subsequent evolutions and events -- most notably, those associated 
with Russian military resurgence and aggression -- have clearly demonstrated just how 
quickly the risks to Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security have increased as these regimes 
declined. 
Although the current geostrategic environment is presently unamenable to major 
initiatives to salvage conventional arms control and CSBM, pragmatic internal 
rectifications could serve to re-establish, at least to some extent, the integral 
functionality of existing regimes.  This could, in turn, provide a sufficiently stable 
footing upon which to undertake measured, incremental courses to sustain, adapt and 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
 
APPENDIX A  
SYNOPSIS OF THE CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE 
TREATY 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 The technical complexity of establishing restrictions on conventional military 
armaments and equipment for 30 States Parties (including the Russian Federation) 
within its designated Area of Application is reflected in the 23 Articles and eight 
Protocols of the CFE Treaty.  They are summarised as follows: 
Preamble and Articles 
• The Preamble, lists the original 22 signatory States, refers to the CFE 
Mandate of 10 January 1989, outlines the Treaty’s objectives, notes the 
freedom of each State Party in rendering its own decision concerning 
membership and exhorts all parties to commonly uphold the provisions 
established.770   
• Article I summarises the general obligations that each State Party will 
undertake under the Treaty and lists both its Protocols and Annexes;771 
• Article II provides the definition of terms used throughout the Treaty, its 
Protocols and Annexes.  It also provides for “existing types of 
Conventional Armaments and Equipment Subject to the Treaty” 
(CAEST) to be listed in the Protocol on Existing Types and that this list 
will be periodically updated in accordance with Article XVI and the 
Protocol on Existing Types;772 
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• Article III establishes the “counting rules” for armaments and equipment 
limited by the Treaty, thereby establishing a common standard for 
implementation and verification;773 
• Article IV specifies the rather complicated rules concerning the 
numerical limits established under the five categories of armaments and 
equipment limited by the Treaty, including group limitations in each 
category within established zones;774 
• Article V outlines special provisions pertaining to the Treaty’s 
designated “flank zones;” that is, those portions of the AOA located out 
of the zones specified in Article IV and including the territory of 
Bulgaria, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Romania, Turkish territory within 
the area of application, and that part of the former Soviet Union 
comprising the Military Districts of Leningrad, Odessa, Trans-Caucasus, 
and North Caucasus.  As an added security measure, Article V places 
specific limits within the flank zones to preclude the concentration on 
CAEST within them;775 
• Article VI states the "sufficiency rule," which limits any one State Party 
to no more than approximately one-third in each of the five categories of 
all the CAEST located within the AOA.  This is intended to limit any one 
State Party from holding a disproportional percentage of armaments and 
equipment as a means of reducing the potential for large-scale surprise 
attack;776 
• Article VII concerns the maximum levels for holdings of CAEST and, 
with Articles IV, V, and VI, comprise the critical operational 
components of the Treaty.   These three Articles set forth the principal 
numerical limitations of the Treaty on the basis of the two respective 
"groups of States Parties;”777 
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• Article VIII specifies States Parties’ legal obligations concerning the 
Treaty's 40-month reduction period following entry-into-force including 
the means by which CAEST are to be reduced in order to achieve 
compliance per Articles IV, V, VI, VII, and XII; 778 
• Article IX provides for the decommissioning of CAEST (as opposed to 
“reduction,” which entails their destruction) as means of facilitating the 
phased replacement of a given States Party's conventional armed forces 
within the AOA at or near established ceilings without first having to 
first destroy existing weapon and equipment systems and degrading 
capability;779 
• Article X outlines the provisions concerning designated permanent 
storage sites. These provisions permit the maintenance of prepositioned 
stocks of CAEST, which limits those held by active units, thereby 
lowering the capability to conduct a surprise attack;780 
• Article XI provides specific provisions concerning armoured vehicle-
launched bridges;781 
• Article XII imposes specific provisions, including exemptions and 
limitations, on armored infantry fighting vehicles held by internal 
security organizations within the AOA;782 
• Article VIII outlines States Parties’ obligations for notification and 
information exchanges required by the Treaty, as specified under the 
Protocol on Information Exchange and its Annex on Format.  
Comprehensive in both scope and detail, the notifications and 
information exchanges are vital to Treaty verification;783 
• Article XIV outlines the provisions of verification, including the rights 
and obligations of State Parties in conducting various types of 
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inspections and evaluations in accordance with the Protocol on 
Inspection, along with the corresponding (i.e., baseline validation, 
reduction, residual validation and residual) phases of Treaty 
implementation.  This includes specific provisions concerning “active” 
(conducted) and “passive” (received) inspections to ensure equitable 
apportionment of available quotas between the respective “groups of 
States Parties.”  “Passive” inspection quotas are based upon a percentage 
of a given State Party’s “objects of verification,” whereas “active” 
inspection quotas are determined by each “group of States Parties” to 
determine the allocation of inspections for each of its States Parties.  To 
avoid circumventing the inspection regime, “active” inspections 
conducted by any State Party within its own group is limited to five 
within each annual Treaty cycle;784 
• Article XV specifies the means of national or multinational technical 
means (NTM) of verification that the States Parties can use in support of 
Treaty verification inspections and evaluations;785 
• Article XVI establishes the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) as the 
Treaty’s designated oversight body, responsible for its general 
implementation, resolution of disputes, and consideration of proposals to 
improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.  The associated 
Protocol on the JCG provides specific rules and procedures;786 
• Article XVII concerns communications formats for the transmission of 
notifications and other information prescribed by the Treaty. It further 
stipulates the use of both diplomatic channels, with reference made to 
what would become the OSCE Communications Network;787 
• Article XVIII provides for follow-on negotiations on military personnel 
ceilings (CFE IA);788 
                                                
784 Ibid, 18-19. 
785 Ibid, 19-20. 
786 Ibid, 20-21. 
787 Ibid, 21. 
788 Ibid, 21. 
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• Article XIX concerns the duration and withdrawal provisions of the 
Treaty. It stipulates that the Treaty is of unlimited duration and may be 
supplemented by a "further treaty."  In addition to the general rights of a 
State Party under customary international law, this Article includes 
specific withdrawal provisions pertaining to a State Party’s "supreme 
interests," entailing a 150-day advance notification to the Depositary and 
all other States Parties and a statement of the “extraordinary events” 
resulting in that State Party’s supreme interests being jeopardised;789 
• Article XX outlines the provisions concerning the Treaty amendment 
process, which may be initiated by any State Party;790 
• Article XXI establishes and specifies the four types of Treaty 
conferences; i.e., five-year regular review conferences; ad hoc 
extraordinary conferences; amendment conferences; and withdrawal 
conferences;791 
• Article XXII specifies the details of Treaty ratification; entry-into-force; 
the functions of the Depositary; and the Treaty’s registration with the 
United Nations;792 and 
• Article XXIII provides that all English, French, German, Italian, 
Russian, and Spanish texts of the original Treaty document are equally 
authentic and are to be deposited in the archives of the Depositary (i.e., 
the Netherlands), with certified copies transmitted by the Depositary to 
all State Parties.793 
 
 
                                                
789 Ibid, 21-22. 
790 Ibid, 22. 
791 Ibid, 22. 
792 Ibid, 22-23. 
793 Ibid, 23. 
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Protocols 
 Extensive and highly detailed, the eight Protocols noted in Article III amplify 
the provisions outlined in the Articles and are fully incorporated and integral to the 
Treaty.  They are: 
• The Protocol on Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and 
Equipment lists all types of CAEST, and those that are specifically 
limited under it.  The Protocol also details the specifications for 
photographs and technical data that are to be provided for each type 
CAEST, as well as the procedures for updating the lists and providing 
notification of such updates;794 
• The Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reclassification of Specific 
Models or Versions of Combat-Capable Aircraft into Unarmed Training 
Aircraft provides for reductions through the reclassification of certain 
models or versions of combat-capable trainer aircraft into unarmed 
trainer aircraft, along with associated procedures for accounting for 
reclassified aircraft in national holdings and attendant notification 
requirements;795 
• The Protocol on Procedures Governing the Reduction of Conventional 
Arms and Equipment Limited by the Treaty, amplifies Article VIII in 
providing detailed procedures for the reduction of CAEST.  It is central 
to the major objective of attaining compliance with the numerical 
limitations specified in Articles, IV, V, and VI and includes provisions 
for approved means of reduction, including various of destruction and 
conversion;796 
• The Protocol on Procedures Governing the Categorisation of Combat 
Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Combat 
                                                
794 Ibid, 24-37. 
795 Ibid, 38-41. 
796 Ibid, 42-57. 
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Helicopters amplifies Article VIII of the Treaty.  It specifies the manner 
in which States Parties are to categorize their combat helicopters (i.e., 
specialized attack, multi-purpose attack, or combat support helicopters) 
and provides for reduction through the recategorisation of multi-purpose 
attack helicopters;797 
• The Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information Exchange 
amplifies Article XIII with detailed provisions and procedures 
concerning both notification exchange of military information 
requirements;798 
• The Protocol on Inspection, a critical reference used by all inspectors and 
escorts, provides highly detailed procedures for the execution of 
intrusive declared site, challenge, reduction and certification inspections.  
Further to Articles XIII and XV, this protocol is critical to ensuring the 
accurate verification of compliance with Treaty provisions; 799 
• The Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group outlines the provisions 
relating to the establishment, procedures and other provisions concerning 
the JCG pursuant to Article XVI;800 and 
• The Protocol on the Provisional Application of Certain Provisions of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, upon being signed, 
established the legal rights and obligations of States Parties and put into 
effect specific provisions largely concerning the operation of the JCG 
and the exchange of information, pending the Treaty’s entry-into-
force.801 
 
                                                
797 Ibid, 58-60. 
798 Ibid, 61-83. 
799 Ibid, 84-114. 
800 Ibid, 115-116. 
801 Ibid, 117-118. 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
 
APPENDIX B  
SYNOPSIS OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Designed to build confidence and security through the provision of military data 
exchanges, visits, weapon and equipment system demonstrations, area inspections and 
on-site evaluations, the Vienna Document is designed to increase transparency, promote 
cooperation, reduce misunderstand and suspicion, and restore/reinforce stability during 
times of international conflict or tension.  Its 12 Chapters and five Annexes are 
summarized as follows: 
Chapters 
• Chapter I provides for the Annual Exchange of Military Information, 
which is submitted each December and obliges a detailed account of land 
and air forces, including: command organisations (down to 
brigade/regiment level); location; personnel strength (and planned 
increases); and categorized major conventional weapon and equipment 
systems (e.g., battle tanks, helicopters, armoured combat vehicles 
(including armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting 
vehicles, heavy armament combat vehicles, certain artillery pieces, and 
armoured vehicle launched bridges), along with data on new and existing 
major weapon and equipment systems planned for deployment within the 
zone of application;802  
 
• Chapter II, Defence Planning, specifies information exchange 
requirements, including defence policy and doctrine, force planning, 
                                                
802 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (Vienna: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 1999), 3-6. 
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expenditures, budgets and projected spending, procurements, and 
calendars;803 
 
• Chapter III, Risk Reduction, entails the mechanisms for consultation, 
verification and cooperation regarding unusual military activities and 
hazardous incidents of a military nature;804 
 
• Chapter IV, Contacts, provides the guidance for visits to air bases and 
other military facilities in order to directly observe routine air 
base/facility operations, training and other activities, along with 
demonstrations of new major weapon and equipment systems.  This 
chapter also outlines optional military contacts activities;805 
 
• Chapter V Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities, and Chapter 
VI, Observation of Certain Military Activities, outline the advance 
notification thresholds for military activities exceeding 9,000 troops, 250 
tanks, 500 ACVs, or 250 pieces of artillery.  Observation provisions 
specify the criteria for participating States to invite observers to military 
activities involving more than 13,000 troops, 300 tanks, 500 armoured 
combat vehicles or 250 pieces of artillery.806 
 
• Chapter VII, Annual Calendars, specifies the requirement for each 
participating State to submit its planned military activities that are subject 
to prior notification for the upcoming calendar year;  
 
• Chapter VIII, Constraining Provisions, establishes additional limits on the 
number, frequency and troop levels of military activities;807 
 
                                                
803 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Vienna Document 1999 of the Negotiations on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 7-11. 
804 Ibid, 12-14. 
805 Ibid, 15-19. 
806 Ibid, 20-23, 24-27. 
807 Ibid, 28-29, 30-31. 
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• Chapter IX, Compliance and Verification, provides detailed provisions 
designed to ensure the sustained integrity of the Vienna Document 1999’s 
overarching specifications by permitting specified area inspections to 
ascertain the non-presence of notifiable military activity; along with 
formation/unit evaluations to confirm the accuracy of exchanged military 
information; i.e., the visual confirmation of the data exchanged between 
Participating States in order to increase transparency: 
 
o specified area inspections entail the access to and examination of a 
previously-designated area (excluding sensitive areas/installations 
as declared by the inspected State), including aerial inspection, by 
a team of four inspectors, over a 48-hour period, with as little as 
36 hours’ prior notification.  Participating States within the zone 
of application are obliged to receive three inspections per calendar 
year;808 and 
 
o formation/unit evaluation visits involve the access by a three-
member team over a maximum 12-hour period, in order to allow 
the other participating States to evaluate the information on 
military forces provided by the evaluated State.  Evaluation visit 
requests, notified five to seven days in advance, can be refused if 
the formation/unit is unavailable.  Further, access can be refused 
to “sensitive points, facilities and equipment.”  Participating 
States’ forces within the zone of application are obliged to accept 
a quota of one evaluation visit per calendar year for every sixty 
units, or portion thereof, of forces reported under Chapter I;809 
 
• Chapter X, Regional Measures, “encourages” participating States to 
undertake a broad range of complimentary bilateral and regional 
arrangements -- on an optional basis -- as a means of complementing and 
building upon Vienna Document 1999 aims and objectives;810 
                                                
808 Ibid, 32-36. 
809 Ibid, 36-41. 
810 Ibid, 42-43. 
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• Chapter XI, the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting outlines the 
modalities of the “AIAM” as a recurring consultative requirement;811 and 
 
• Chapter XII, Final Provisions, entails the use of the OSCE 
Communications Network, along with attendant publication and 




• Annex I provides the detailed definition of and specifications for the 
Vienna Document 1999’s zone of application; 
• Annex II establishes the detailed, standardised format for reports 
concerning the Annual Exchange of Military Information, Defence 
Planning, Annual Calendars and Constraining Provisions; 
• Annex III established the detailed information required for the reporting 
of: 
o Battle tanks; 
o Armoured combat vehicles; 
o Armoured personnel carrier “look-alikes” and armoured infantry 
fighting vehicle “look-alikes;” 
o Anti-tank guided missile launchers permanently/integrally 
mounted on armoured vehicles; 
o Self-propelled and towed artillery pieces, mortars and multiple 
rocket launchers (100 millimetre calibre and above); 
o Armoured vehicle launched bridges; 
                                                
811 Ibid, 44. 
812 Ibid, 45-46. 
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o Combat aircraft; and 
o Helicopters; 
• Annex IV provides detailed provisions concerning the events as set out 
in Chapter IV (Contacts) and Chapter VI (Observation of Certain 
Military Activities); and 
• Annex V contains the Chairman's Statement of 28 November 1994, that 
stipulates that implementation aspects of CSBMs in the “contiguous 
areas” of the zone of application sharing frontiers with non-
European/non-participating States may be discussed at future Annual 
Implementation Assessment Meetings. 
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______________________________________________________________________ 
 
APPENDIX C  
SYNOPSIS OF THE TREATY ON OPEN SKIES 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 Providing for the unimpeded observation overflight of the entire territories of its 
States Parties, Open Skies Treaty missions have priority over all other flights within a 
State Party’s airspace, with the exception of emergency and flights by heads of state or 
government.    Restrictions can only be imposed concerning the safety of flight, and not 
for reasons of security.  The Treaty comprises 19 Articles and 12 Annexes, which are 
summarized here. 
Preamble 
• The Preamble specifies:  
o the aims and objectives of the Treaty,  
o underlying principles, constituents, accession criteria, 
background, potential contributions to other regions and 
institutions, and possible extension to other aspects of security, 
such as the environment;  
o the intent of observing a single State Party or groups of States 
Parties on the basis of equity and effectiveness, while 
maintaining flight safety; and  
o the assertion that the Treaty will be undertaken without prejudice 
to non-States Parties;813 
                                                
813 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Treaty on Open Skies (Vienna: Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1992), 1.1. 
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Articles 
• Article I (General Provisions) states that the Treaty establishes the Open 
Skies regime and “sets forth” States Parties’ rights and obligations, 
further noting that all annexes and related appendices constitute integral 
components;814 
• Article II (Definitions) provides a detailed list of definitions for the 
purposes of the Treaty;815 
• Article III (Quotas) outlines the provisions for the allocation of both 
“active” and “passive” overflight quotas, including those for individual 
States Parties and “Groups of States Parties;”816 
• Article IV (Sensors) outlines the basic requirements for sensors to be 
employed on observation aircraft.  It refers to Annex B, concerning the 
technical information associated with the categories of stipulated sensors 
stipulated and Annex D, concerning specific certification provisions;817 
• Article V (Aircraft Designation) specifies the manner through which 
aircraft are formally designated for observation;818 
• Article VI (Choice of Observation Aircraft, General Provisions for the 
Conduct of Observation Flights, and Requirements for Mission 
Planning).  In conjunction with Annexes D through H, Article VI 
provides the principal specifications and outlines the fundamental rights 
and obligations of States Parties in implementing the Treaty as follows: 
                                                
814 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Treaty on Open Skies, 1.1. 
815 Ibid, 2-4. 
816 Ibid, 5-7. 
817 Ibid, 8-10. 
818 Ibid, 10. 
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o Section I provides for the selection of observation aircraft and 
specifies the general provisions for the conduct of observation 
flights;  
o Section II specifies the mission planning and submission 
requirements for a proposed observation flight, notes the right of 
the observing State Party to overfly any part of the observed State 
Party’s territory and limits the flight to be no closer than 10 
kilometres from the border of any adjacent non-State Party; and 
o Section III, outlines “special provisions” concerning personnel 
permitted on board observation aircraft; i.e., flight monitors, 
representatives and interpreters.819 
• Article VII (Transit Flights) outlines the general provisions concerning 
conduct of transit flights; i.e., the non-observing passage of one State 
Party’s aircraft of over the territory of a third State Party en-route to or 
from an observed State Party;820 
• Article VIII (Prohibitions, Deviations from Flight Plans and Emergency 
Situations) specifies the specific circumstances under which observation 
flights can be prohibited, when a mission flight plan can be modified or 
otherwise deviated from, and specific actions permitted in emergency 
situations;821 
• Article IX (Sensor Output from Observation Flights) outlines the rights 
and obligations of States Parties concerning sensor data:   
o Section I establishes the type of recording media to be used, 
restricts the transmission of data during flight, specifies the 
handling of recorded media, sets parameters concerning the use 
                                                
819 Ibid, 11-17. 
820 Ibid, 17. 
821 Ibid, 17-20. 
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of data, and encourages States Parties to resolve any technical 
“incompatibilities” associated with recorded media;   
o Section II and III respectively outline the requirements for data 
processing of optical and non-optical data; and 
o Section IV specifies the right of State Parties to acquire copies of 
observation flight data from a given observing State Party;822 
• Article X (Open Skies Consultative Commission) establishes the OSCC, 
its responsibilities in overseeing the aims and objectives of the Treaty 
and provides the general modalities of implementation. Article X is 
supplemented by Annex L of the Treaty, which provides specific rules 
and procedures of the OSCC;823 
• Article XI (Notifications and Reports) specifies the requirements and 
procedures concerning all related notifications and reports;824 
• Article XII (Liability) notes the liability of States Parties for the payment 
of compensation of any damages resulting from the Treaty’s 
implementation in “accordance with international law and practice;”825   
• Article XIII (Designation of Personnel and Privileges and Immunities) 
provides for the designation of those personnel who will implement the 
Treaty on the territories of other States Parties and specifies the 
privileges and immunities they are to be accorded, based primarily upon 
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;826 
• Article XIV (BENELUX) specifies that under the Treaty, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands shall be considered a single State 
                                                
822 Ibid, 20-24. 
823 Ibid, 24-25. 
824 Ibid, 25. 
825 Ibid, 25. 
826 Ibid, 25-26. 
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Party (Benelux) for the purposes of Articles II to IX and Article XI, 
along with Annexes A to I and K;827 
• Article XV (Duration and Withdrawal) states that the Treaty is of 
“unlimited duration” and specifies the specific provisions for a State 
Party’s withdrawal;828 
• Article XVI (Amendments and Periodic Review) outlines the 
amendment procedures for the Treaty, as well as the requirement to 
review the implementation three years after the Treaty’s entry-into-force 
and at five-year intervals afterwards.  It also provides for a review 
conference to be convened at any time if requested by no fewer than 
three States Parties;829 
• Article XVII (Depositories, Entry Into Force and Accession) notes the 
ratification requirements of signatories, the responsibilities of the 
Depositaries (Hungary and Canada), particulars concerning the Treaty’s 
entry-into-force and the accession of other states; 830 
• Article XVIII (Provisional Application and Phasing of Implementation 
of the Treaty) stipulates the provisional application of specific provisions 
of the Treaty, pending its entry-into-force, along with the phased 
application of other provisions, as a means of facilitating its overall 
implementation;831 and 
• Article XIX (Authentic Texts) affirms the authenticity of the original 
English, French, German, Italian, Russian and Spanish texts of the 
Treaty, further noting that they shall be deposited in the archives of the 
Depositaries, with certified copies provided by the Depositories to all 
States Parties.832 
                                                
827 Ibid, 27. 
828 Ibid, 27. 
829 Ibid, 27-28. 
830 Ibid, 28-29. 
831 Ibid, 29-30. 
832 Ibid, 30. 
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Annexes 
Given that the Treaty’s detailed annexes and associated appendices are integral 
and equally legally-binding, they are also noted here:  
• Annex A:  Quotas and Maximum Flight Distances, which details both 
active and passive quotas, along with the maximum observation flight 
distances from designated airfields, calculated from geographic size and 
border-to-border distances of States Parties; 
• Annex B:  Information on Sensors, with Appendix: Annotation of Data 
Collected During an Observation Flight.  This annex specifies the 
technical information for each sensor employed on designated 
observation aircraft, by type.  It also specifies the aircraft and sensor 
information that must be annotated on mission media; 
• Annex C:  Information on Observation Aircraft, which specifies the 
information that must be disclosed by States Parties for each observation 
aircraft type, including model type, operating parameters, navigation and 
communications systems, and flight/mission crew configuration; 
• Annex D:  Certification of Observation Aircraft and Sensors, with 
Appendix: Methodologies for Verification of the Performance of Sensors 
Installed on an Observation Aircraft.  This annex outlines the highly 
detailed procedures for the certification of a given State Party’s 
observation aircraft and their sensors; 
• Annex E:  Procedures for Arrivals and Departures, with Appendix: on 
Designation of Sites and Points of Entry, Points of Exit, Open Skies 
Airfields, Entry Fixes, Exit Fixes, Refuelling Airfields, and Calibration 
Targets.  As stated, this annex provides the detailed technical provisions 
and data for designated entry, exit and operating airfields and sensor 
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calibration targets, along with procedures concerning the arrival and 
departure of observation aircraft within a given State Party’s territory;  
• Annex F:  Pre-Flight Inspections and Demonstration Flights outlines the 
procedures pre-flight inspection of both the observation aircraft and 
sensors provided by the observing State Party and for the sensors of an 
observation flight provided by the observed State Party.  The annex also 
outlines the procedures to be followed for demonstration flights, if 
requested by the observed State Party to observe sensor function; 
• Annex G:  Flight Monitors, Flight Representatives, and Representatives.  
This annex specifies the functions and rights of Flight Monitors, who 
perform specific on-board monitoring functions on behalf of the 
observed State Party, Flight Representatives, who carry out observation 
flight duties on behalf of the observing State Party and Representatives, 
who perform observation flight duties on behalf of the observing State 
Party, but come from another State Party; 
• Annex H: Coordination of Planned Observation Flights. This annex was 
devised to provide non-obligatory means of de-conflicting observation 
flights during a given quarter of the Treaty year, particularly those 
involving States Parties with high passive quotas (e.g., the Russian 
Federation and Belarus); 
• Annex I:  Information on Airspace and Flights in Hazardous Airspace 
requires that each State Party provide regularly updated information on 
their respective national airspace, to include hazardous airspace, for the 
awareness of other States Parties in the planning of observation flights.  
Such information does not preclude observing States Parties from 
overflying the entire territories of other States Parties, per Article VI;  
• Annex J:  Montreux Convention.  This annex acknowledges Turkey’s 
control over the Bosporus Straits and the Dardanelles and the Treaty’s 
Perilous Onset: The Decline of Conventional Arms Control      389 
conformity with the Convention concerning the routing and notification 
of transit flights; 
• Annex K - Information on Film Processing, Duplicators and 
Photographic Films, and Procedures for Monitoring the Processing of 
Photographic Film.  This annex outlines the specifications and 
procedures for film processing and duplication of film media.  It also 
provides for the provision of film, chemical samples, and processing 
procedures to observed States Parties, along with their specified right to 
directly observe processing and duplication; and 
• Annex L - Open Skies Consultative Commission.  This annex provides 
the general provisions of the OSCC, its annual review of active quotas, 
provisions for “extraordinary observation flights” (i.e., observation flight 
requirements arising from unforeseen circumstances) and additional 
applications of the Treaty, such as environmental monitoring.833 
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